HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 


HOW  DIPLOMATS 
MAKE  WAR 


BY 
FRANCIS  NEILSON 

Member    of    Parliament,    January,    1910-December,    1915. 


The  whole  theory  of  the  universe  is  directed  to  one 
single  individual — namely,  to  You. 

— Walt  Whitman. 


NEW  YORK 

B.  W.  HUEBSCH 

MCMXVI 


Copyright,  1915,  by 
B.  W.    HUEBSCH 


First  edition,  November,  1915 
Second    edition,    May,    1916 


PRINTED  IN    U.    S.    A. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  SECOND  EDITION 

Now  that  it  is  necessary  to  publish  a  second  edition 
of  this  book,  and  as  I  have  resigned  my  seat  in  Parha- 
ment,  I  wish  to  take  this  opportunity  of  making  the 
name  of  the  author  public. 

I  am  grateful  to  my  friend,  Mr.  Albert  Jay  Nock, 
for  his  kindness  in  editing  the  work  and  fathering  the 
book  upon  its  first  appearance. 

Francis  Neilson. 

New  York,  April  17th,  1916. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  I 

PAGE 
1815 I 

Waterloo  —  After  181 5  —  Long  period  of  unrest  —  Na- 
tional rights  and  individual  rights  —  Unpatriotic  critics 
— "After  the  Kaiser  is  crushed" — New  values  —  Litera- 
ture and  Jingoes  —  Britain  and  her  warmongers  —  Might 
and  Right  —  The  interests  of  the  people  —  What  the  na- 
tions are  fighting  for  —  The  power  that  makes  wars  — 
The  god  of  battles  —  The  diplomatic  machine  —  The 
work  of  diplomacy. 

CHAPTER  H 
"Scraps  of  Paper" 15 

The  Treaties  of  1831  and  1839  —  Holland  and  Belgium 
—  Palmerston  and  Talleyrand  —  Treaty-making  and  the 
balance  of  power  —  Lord  Granville  and  the  Crimea  — 
Sevastopol  —  After  the  Treaty  of  Paris  —  Wars  from  1837 
to  1850  —  Sir  Robert  Peel  and  armaments  —  The  Duke  of 
Wellington  and  France  —  After  1854  —  Disraeli  and 
Gladstone  —  The  panic  of  i860  —  Cobden  and  the  utterly 
futile  theory  of  secrecy  —  The  rise  of  Bismarck  —  The  in- 
fluence of  Lassalle —  George  Brandes  on  Lassalle  and  Bis- 
marck—  Might  and  Right  —  Poland  1862  —  Prussia  and 
Russia  —  Letter  from  King  of  the  Belgians  to  Queen  Vic- 
toria—  Fitzmaurice  on  the  diplomacy  concerning  the  par- 
tition of  Poland  —  Schleswig-Holstein  and  Denmark  — 
Britain's  relation  then  to  France  —  The  diplomatic  squab- 
bles of  the  Continent — "Scraps  of  Paper" — Queen  Vic- 
toria works  for  peace  —  Letters  to  Lord  Granville  —  Dis- 
raeli's motion  in  the  House  —  John  Bright  and  the  balance 
of  power  —  The  people  and  treaties  —  The  condition  of 
Britain,  1864. 

XI 


xii  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  III 

PAGE 

1870 39 

Succession  to  the  Spanish  throne  —  Bismarck  and  Moltke 

—  The  Ems  telegram  —  Editor  Bismarck  —  British  neu- 
trality—  The  Queen's  advice  —  Belgium  in  1870  —  The 
schemes  of  Bismarck  and  Napoleon  III  —  Morley  on  the 
British  attitude  —  The  Treaties  of  1870  —  Gladstone  to 
John  Bright  —  Diplomatic  unrest  —  The  neutral  league  — 
The  Foreign  Office  then  and  now  —  Thiers  and  Prussia  — 
The  military  party  and  the  political  party  in  Prussia  — 
Peace  negotiations  —  Alsace  and  Lorraine  —  Gladstone's 
fears  —  Britain  free  from  Continental  entanglements  in 
1870  —  Lord  Granville  and  neutrality  —  Britain's  posi- 
tion in  1914 — Secret  understandings  —  Foreign  friend- 
ships—  Neutrality  of  Belgium  —  Foreign  policy  and  viola- 
tion of  the  Treaty  of  1839  —  The  provisions  in  Treaties 
of  1870  —  Britain's  action  now  not  comparable  with  that 
of   1870  —  War  first,   law  after  —  Russia  and  Black  Sea 

—  Essential  principle  of  the  law  of  nations — •Interna- 
tional law  —  The  casus  belli  —  Belgium's  preparations  — 
The  moral  value  of  treaties  —  Diplomacy  and  territory  — 
Palmerston's  letter  to  Clarendon,  1857  —  Lord  Gran- 
ville's difficulties  —  The  condition  of  Britain  in  1884. 

CHAPTER  IV 
Friendships 66 

Germany  and  colonies  —  Bismarck's  policy  —  Fltz- 
maurice  and  the  Luxembourg  quarrel  —  Odo  Russell  on 
Bismarck  and  British  foreign  policy  —  Bismarck's  letter  — 
Lord  Acton  to  Mary  Gladstone  —  Resolution  in  the  House 
of  Commons  on  embarking  in  war  without  the  knowledge 
and  consent  of  Parliament  —  Naval  expenditure,  1887  — 
Russia  and  France  —  Toulon  and  Kronstadt  —  The  rise  in 
armaments  —  Germany  before  and  after  the  Boer  War  — 
Forcing  the  pace  —  Germany  versus  France  and  Russia  — 
Morocco  —  Secret  articles  —  Von  Bulow  on  relations  of 
Britain  and  Germany  —  M.  Delcasse  —  The  Kaiser's  visit 
to  Tangiers  —  The  press  campaign  —  Baron  d'Estour- 
nelles   de    Constant   on    the   Anglo-French   Agreement  — 


CONTENTS  xiii 

PAGE 

Germany  ignored  —  Lord  Lansdowne  on  war  —  Sir  Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman  —  Mr.  Balfour's  statements  in  1905 
—  Lord  Rosebery  on  violent  polemics  —  Sir  Edward  Grey 
and  alliances  —  Undesirable  entanglements  —  Mr.  Cham- 
berlain and  Germany  —  Continuity  of  foreign  policy  — 
Mr.  Asquith  on  caretakers  —  Lord  Rosebery  on  the  An- 
glo-French Agreement  —  The  new  Government  —  Mr. 
Asquith  and  the  Kaiser  at  the  Guildhall  —  Lord  Cro- 
mer's startling  information. 

CHAPTER  V 
Enemies .     91 

Nietzsche  and  Germany  —  Britain  after  the  Boer  war  — 
The  Tariff  Reform  campaign  —  The  press  campaign 
against  Germany  —  The  Schleswig-Holstein  invasion 
rumours  and  M.  Delcasse  —  The  armament  ring  —  M.  de 
Pressense  on  M.  Delcasse  —  The  interview  in  Le  Gau- 
lois  —  Mr.  Bryce  and  Mr.  Morley  on  the  dangers  of  the 
press  campaign  —  The  yellow  press  —  Lord  Roberts  and 
the  Expeditionary  Force  —  Lord  Halsbury  —  Sir  Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman  and  the  Hague  Conference  —  The 
march  of  events  —  Scaremongers  —  Mr.  Churchill's 
speech  at  Swansea  —  Germany  before  and  after  the  out- 
break of  hostilities. 

CHAPTER  VI 

Panicmongers Ill 

The  Franco-German  Declaration  —  The  people  and 
diplomatic  traffickings  —  Forces  against  democracy  — 
The  panic  of  1909  —  The  Government's  case  —  The  Ger- 
man Government's  naval  declaration  to  Britain  —  The 
Jingo  storm  —  Mr.  Mulliner  —  Mr.  Asquith  on  German 
expansion  —  Mr.  Balfour's  estimates  of  German  naval 
strength — 'Sir  Edward  Grey  on  armaments  —  The  Gov- 
ernment bow  before  the  storm  —  The  budget  of  1909  — 
Lord  Rosebery  and  Armageddon  —  The  General  Election 
of  1910  —  Mr.  Churchill  on  the  methods  of  his  political 
opponents  —  The  British  strength  in  ships  1904  and  1910 


xlv  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

—  Mr.  Balfour's  speech  at  Hanley  —  The  Jingo  press 
campaign  increases  in  violence  —  Mr.  Asquith's  remon- 
strance—  Dreadnaughts   and  pre-dreadnaughts. 

CHAPTER  VII 
Insurance 132 

The  policy  of  European  naval  expansion  —  Secret  for- 
eign policy  —  Pacifists  and  militarists  —  The  Govern- 
ment's blunders  of  1909  —  The  German  Fleet  Law  —  The 
disquieting  rumours  of  1908  —  British  naval  expansion  — 
The  first  dreadnaught  —  The  Anglo-French  Agreement 
and  its  effect  on  German  estimates  —  Arming  against 
Germany  —  The  work  of  the  British  and  French  naval 
and  military  experts  —  The  Anglo- Russian  Agreement  — 
"Under  which  King?" — The  Kaiser-Tweedmouth  corre- 
spondence—  The  Kaiser  complains  —  Fury  of  the  Jingo 
press  —  Old  Liberal  watchwords  abandoned  —  German 
feeling  against  Britain  —  The  policy  of  isolating  Germany 

—  Comparison  of  navies,  1908  —  The  figures  for  new  con- 
struction, 1909  to  19 14  —  Big  business  —  What  intelligent 
Germans  must  have  thought  of  British  foreign  and  naval 
policy  —  Figures  of  Triple  Entente  and  Triple  Alliance 
for  new  construction,  1914,  compared  —  Ministers  misled 
in  1909  —  Sir  Edward  Grey  and  German  naval  pro- 
gramme—  Lord  Roberts  and  Lord  Haldane  —  The  Pan- 
ther's visit  to  Agadir  after  the  French  expedition  to  Fez. 

CHAPTER  VIII 
Apostles  of  Peace 154 

Office  —  Mr.  Churchill  at  the  Admiralty —  The  new 
public  policy  —  The  supremacy  of  Entente  Powers  —  Mr. 
Dillon  on  Morocco  —  The  publication  of  the  secret  articles 

—  Sir  Edward  Grey  on  foreign  friendships  —  Mr.  Bonar 
Law  on  Germany  —  Lord  Morley  on  Germany's  ambi- 
tion—  Lord  Rosebery  on  foreign  policy  —  Lord  Haldane's 
visit  to  Berlin  —  Mr.  Asquith  on  the  crisis  of  191 1 — The 
German  Chancellor  and  the  British  Government's  mission 
to  Berlin — "Strategy"  and  foreign  policy  —  Mr.  Church- 
ill's    declaration  —  The     "naval     holiday" — Bernhardi 


CONTENTS  XV 

PAGE 

quoted  in  the  Commons  —  Germany  isolated  —  The  naval 
position  in  the  Mediterranean  —  The  attitude  of  the 
masses  —  Mr.  Bonar  Law's  warning  —  The  conscription- 
ists  —  Lord  Roberts'  speech  at  Manchester  —  Thucydides 

—  Lord  Percy's  startling  statement  —  The  disposition  of  the 
British  and  French  fleets  in  1912  —  Belgian  preparations 

—  The  position  of  Belgium. 

CHAPTER  IX 
"Not  in  the  Public  Interest" 182 

Secrecy  and  heredity  —  Awkward  questions  —  Foreign 
AfiFairg  —  Debate  on  the  Army  —  Secret  alliance  with 
France  —  The  Foreign  Secretary  questioned  again  — 
Naval  policy  not  for  the  public  —  Mr.  Swift  MacNeill  on 
secrecy  in  foreign  affairs  —  Questions  about  Fez  —  The 
Coraite  du  Maroc  —  British  "  interests"  in  Morocco  —  The 
Agadir  crisis  —  Secret  agreements  —  Ministers  at  vari- 
ance—  The  basis  of  Government  —  Spinoza. 

CHAPTER  X 
The  Power  to  War 201 

The  debate  on  the  Expeditionary  Force  —  Mr.  Amery's 
remarkable  speech  —  Sir  Reginald  Pole-Carew  on  the 
War  Office  secret  —  The  Nowvelle  Revue — The  entente 
and  naval  policy  —  Lord  Hugh  Cecil  questions  Mr.  As- 
quith  on  the  secret  understanding  —  Major-General  Sir 
Ivor  Herbert  on  a  Continental  Alliance  —  More  awk- 
ward questions  to  Ministers  —  The  naval  estimates  of  1913 

—  Mr.  Lee  and  Lord  Charles  Beresford  on  the  naval 
policy  in  the  Mediterranean  —  Contradictions  —  Lord  Hal- 
dane  on  the  Entente  Powers'  naval  policy  —  The  "naval 
holiday"  again  —  Expenditure  on  navies  for  1913  — 
The  burden  on  Britain  —  The  Foreign  Secretary's  power 

—  Questions  in  1914  on  secret  understandings. 

CHAPTER  XI 
The  Work  of  Diplomatists 222 

Britain  in  1914  —  Condition  of  Germany  —  The  inter- 
nal affairs  of  France  —  Italy's  position  before  the  war  — 


xvi  CONTENTS 

PAGE 
The  crisis  in  Austria  —  Russia  —  The  White  Paper  — 
When  the  House  of  Commons  heard  of  the  crisis  —  Des- 
patch-making—  What  the  House  was  not  told  —  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  in  the  toils  —  Despatch  No.  17  —  Russian 
mobilization  —  German  diplomacy  —  Orders  to  the  fleet  — 
The  attitude  of  Russia  after  the  fleet  sailed  —  Diplomatic 
chess  —  M.  Sazonof  —  Depression  in  Berlin  —  Telegrams 
of  the  Czar  and  Kaiser — "All  would  depend  on  Russia" 

—  Events  in  Petersburg  —  The  freest  assembly  in  the 
world  —  The  Commons  a  week  before  the  declaration  of 
war. 

CHAPTER  XII 
A  Game  of  Chess 261 

Tlie  Foreign  Secretary's  statement  on  July  30th  —  Des- 
patch No.  85  —  The  "infamous  bargain" — Belgian  fore- 
sight—  What  the  German  Foreign  Office  knew  —  Mr. 
Asquith  makes  a  statement  —  No  questions  until  Monday 

—  What  the  Commons  did  not  know  —  German  pressure 
on  Austria  —  The  Foreign  Secretary  warns  Prince  Lich- 
nowsky  —  Strange  methods  of  diplomatists  —  Britain  and 
peace  —  M.  Cambon  reminds  Sir  Edward  Grey  of  the 
understanding  —  Black  Friday  —  Kriegsgefahr  proclaimed 

—  Sir  Edward  Grey's  struggle  —  Dilatory  methods  of 
the  Cabinet  —  Neutrality  of  Belgium  —  Rejoicing  in 
Petersburg  —  The  Belgian  diplomatic  correspondence  — 
The  plans  of  General  Staffs — "Technically  impossible" 

—  Austria  concedes  Russian  demands  —  Despatch  No.  123 

—  The  position  of  the  Foreign  Secretary  —  Grave  news 
from  Berlin  —  Saturday,  August  ist  —  Cabinet  consent 
to  give  France  naval  support  —  Sunday  Cabinet  meetings 

—  Feverish  military  activity. 

CHAPTER  XIII 
The  Foreign  Secretary's  Statement    ....  296 

The  House  of  Commons  —  The  speech  —  The  con- 
fession—  Cryptic  speeches  of  1905  made  plain  —  Sir 
Edward  Grey^s  letter  to  M.  Cambon  —  The  French  fleet 
and  the  Mediterranean  —  Strange  discrepancies  in  Franco- 


CONTENTS  xvli 

PAGE 

British  documents  —  What  the  Foreign  Secretary  did  not 
tell  the  House — Secrecy  to  the  bitter  end  —  Striving  for 
Peace  —  Bound  to  France  —  What  France  and  Belgium 
were  doing  meanwhile  —  More  strange  discrepancies  — 
Germans  invade  Luxembourg  and  Belgium  —  Co-opera- 
tion—  More  explanations  —  Despatch  No.  123  again  — 
What   Jingoes   toiled    for  —  Who   began    it?  —  Signposts 

—  Secret  diplomacy. 

CHAPTER  XIV 
Recrimination 317 

Anatole  France  —  Friendly  Societies  —  Basil  Williams 
on  Anglo-German  relations  —  Mr.  Lloyd  George  on  Ger- 
man alarm  —  The  year  1912  again  —  Mr.  Asquith's  rev- 
elations at  Cardiff  —  Hoodwinking  the  people  —  Friendly 
speeches  and  unfriendly  affairs  —  Mr.  Churchill  at  Dun- 
dee—  Lord  Welby  —  More  light  on  the  Treaty  of  1839  — 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  Belgian  neutrality  —  Military  un- 
derstanding with  Belgium  —  Lord  Palmerston  on  the 
Treaty  —  The  Times  editorial  —  Official  Tory  position 
in  the  '80s  — "  Diplomaticus  " —  The  Standard  gives  ad- 
vice. 

CHAPTER  XV 
On  Brotherly  Terms 341 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  at  the  City  Temple  —  The  faith  of 
the  Puritan  Fathers  —  Jesus  — "  Resist  not  evil  " —  Wars  — 
Justice  and  right  —  The  long  ago — Greece  and  China  — 
The  god  of  battles  —  Luther  on  war  —  After  the  Treaty 
of  Peace  is  signed  —  Lessons  that  might  be  learned  — 
Christianity  and  Humanists  —  The  new  hope  —  Browning 

—  The  fight  against  poverty  —  Atrocities  —  Religions  — 
The  masses  and  Jesus  —  Mr.  Blatchford  and  the  future  — 
What  is  justice?  —  Mr.  Asquith  and  Socialism  —  Indi- 
vidual  justice  —  Cromwell  —  Milton. 

CHAPTER  XVI 
Aftermath 366 

Back  to  the  causes  of  the  war  —  Danger  of  forgetting 
what  brought  it  about  —  Nothing  so  cheap  as  human  life 


xvili  CONTENTS 

—  War  and  poverty  —  Disarmament  not  probable  —  Rus- 
sia as  dominant  power  —  Suggested  changes  in  Foreign 
Office   system  —  Parliament  must   have  complete  control 

—  Fixed  period  for  Parliament  —  The  problems  of  arma- 
ments and  war  —  Recruiting  —  Equal  opportunity  the 
remedy  —  What  the  war  means  —  Christianity  has  not 
done   its   work  —  Hope   of  the  soldiers. 

Appendix       t.;     .     .     .     > •  377 


HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE 

WAR 

.CHAPTER  I 

1815 

"  What,  speaking  in  quite  unofficial  language,  is  the  net 
purport  and  upshot  of  war?  To  my  own  knowledge,  for 
example,  there  dwell  and  toil,  in  the  British  village  of  Dum- 
drudge,  usually  some  five  hundred  souls.  From  these,  by 
certain  '  Natural  Enemies '  of  the  French,  there  are  suc- 
cessively selected,  during  the  French  war,  say  thirty  able- 
bodied  men:  Dumdrudge,  at  her  own  expense,  has  suckled 
and  nursed  them ;  she  has,  not  without  difficulty  and  sorrow, 
fed  them  up  to  manhood,  and  even  trained  them  to  crafts, 
so  that  one  can  weave,  another  build,  another  hammer,  and 
the  weakest  can  stand  under  thirty  stone  avoirdupois. 
Nevertheless,  amid  much  weeping  and  swearing,  they  are 
selected ;  all  dressed  in  red ;  and  shipped  away,  at  the  public 
charges,  some  two  thousand  miles,  or  say  only  to  the  south 
of  Spain ;  and  fed  there  till  wanted.  And  now  to  that  same 
spot  in  the  south  of  Spain,  are  thirty  similar  French  artisans, 
from  a  French  Dumdrudge,  in  like  manner  wending:  till  at 
length,  after  infinite  effort,  the  two  parties  come  into  actual 
juxtaposition;  and  Thirty  stands  fronting  Thirty,  each  with 
a  gun  in  his  hand.  Straightway  the  word  *  Fire ! '  is 
given:  and  they  blow  the  souls  out  of  one  another;  and  in 
the  place  of  sixty  brisk  useful  craftsmen,  the  world  has  sixty 
dead  carcasses,  which  it  must  bury,  and  anew  shed  tears  for. 
Had  these  men  any  quarrel?     Busy  as  the  Devil  is,  not  the 

I 


2         HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

smallest!  They  lived  far  enough  apart;  were  the  entlrest 
strangers;  nay,  in  so  wide  a  Universe,  there  was  even,  un- 
consciously, by  Commerce,  some  mutual  helpfulness  between 
them.  How  then?  Simpleton!  their  Governors  had  fallen 
out:  and,  instead  of  shooting  one  another,  had  the  cunning 
to  make  these  poor  blockheads  shoot. —  Alas,  so  it  is  in 
Deutschland,  and  hitherto  in  all  other  lands;  still  as  of  old, 
*  what  devilry  soever  Kings  do,  the  Greeks  must  pay  the 
piper!'" 

—  Carlyle,  Sartor  Resartus. 

Within  a  year  of  the  centenary  of  Waterloo, 
Europe  is  again  engaged  in  a  conflict,  in  which  three 
Powers  are  united  in  awful  bonds,  to  overthrow  an- 
other military  tyrant.  Another  hundred  years  of 
treaties,  alliances,  understandings,  secret  engage- 
ments, and  ententes,  leave  Europe  now  in  the  throes 
of  Gargantuan  battles,  the  like  of  which  Napoleon 
never  in  his  wildest  dreams  imagined  possible.  A 
century  ago,  the  vast  majority  of  the  millions  of 
Europe  believed  it  was  absolutely  necessary  for  na- 
tions to  spend  every  energy  In  subduing  the  French 
Emperor,  because  he  was  a  danger  to  the  peace  of 
the  world  and  a  menace  to  democracy.  Twenty 
years  of  carnage,  over  fields  extending  from  Mos- 
cow to  Corunna,  were  spent  in  crushing  the  might 
of  the  "  hero-monster  "  who  rose  at  Toulon  to  be 
master  of  Europe.  When  at  last  the  aim  of  the 
allies  was  accomplished,  and  the  "  man  of  blood  " 
was  safely  isolated  on  St.  Helena,  Europe  knew 
little  peace,  nor  did  Britain  rest  from  the  labours  of 
the  arsenal.  The  nations  of  Europe  did  not  disband 
their  armies.  They  did  not  beat  their  swords  Into 
ploughshares,  nor  did  they  decide  that  battleships 
would  be  required  no  more. 


WHAT  THE  PEOPLE  GET  3 

All  wars  we  are  told  are  fought  In  the  interest 
of  the  people.  It  is  their  land,  their  nation,  their 
homes,  that  are  at  stake.  It  is  their  pride,  their 
honour,  their  patriotism,  that  are  called  upon  by  re- 
cruiting statesmen  when  a  diplomatic  squabble  is  to 
be  settled  by  force  of  arms.  The  same  appeals  were 
broadly  made  one  hundred  years  ago  that  are  made 
to-day.  But  what  do  the  people,  the  workers,  get 
in  return  for  all  the  vast  sacrifices  they  make?  The 
economic,  industrial,  and  financial  condition  of  Eng- 
land, for  over  a  generation  after  the  Second  Treaty 
of  Paris,  was  not  a  whit  less  miserable  than  when 
her  people  suffered  from  the  ravages  of  Napoleonic 
wars.  National  distress  and  widespread  disaffection 
brought  agitation  and  revolt.  Riots  In  the  large 
towns,  and  rick-burnings  In  the  agricultural  districts, 
were  every-day  occurrences.  For  seventeen  years 
artisans  and  labourers  suffered  terrible  privations. 
Parliament  gave  little  or  no  heed  to  the  lamentations 
of  the  people  who  had  supplied  the  armies  for 
Wellington  and  had  made  a  thousand  sacrifices  to 
crush  the  militarism  of  Napoleon.  After  the  down- 
fall of  military  France,  diplomacy  secured  for  a  time 
the  privileges  of  some  small  nations,  but  Parliament 
did  not  secure  the  rights  of  those  men  who  had  di- 
rectly and  indirectly  helped  to  conquer  the  man  who, 
no  matter  what  he  thought  of  national  rights,  had 
a  better  conception  of  individual  rights  than  British 
statesmen  of  the  time.  Parliament  was  indeed  more 
concerned  in  those  days  in  transporting  to  Van  Die- 
men's  Land  men  who  had  the  courage  to  ask  the 
nation's  representatives  to  observe  the  first  duty  of 
a  Parliament:  to  grant  economic,  political,  and  re- 
ligious rights  to  all  men.     National  honour,  pride, 


4        HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

and  patriotism  did  not  run  to  that.  The  rights  of  in- 
dividuals could  wait,  but  the  privileges  of  nations 
were  urgent  affairs. 

The  aftermath  was  enough  to  satisfy  the  most 
war-loving  patriot.  Over  £530,000,000  were  added 
to  the  National  debt.  The  honour  and  glory  of  an 
all-conquering  nation  filled  the  empty  stomachs  of 
the  people,  who  knew  they  were  at  last  safe  from 
the  atrocities  of  the  Corsican  terror.  Carping  crit- 
ics, ignorant,  no  doubt,  of  Britain's  superb  achieve- 
ments on  land  and  sea,  said  that  corn  at  eighty 
shillings  a  quarter  was  a  poor  return  for  all  the  peo- 
ple had  done  to  save  Europe  from  the  mailed  fist 
of  Napoleon.  But,  it  was  ever  thus.  There  have 
been  unpatriotic  critics  in  all  ages.  It  may  be  pre- 
sumed that  after  Agincourt  some  stay-at-home 
grumbled  about  the  net  result  of  Henry's  campaigns. 
In  extenuation  it  might  be  said  that  a  short-sighted 
people  may  not  expect  to  see  the  political  significance 
of  the  work  of  kings  and  diplomatists.  Patience, 
a  virtue  carried  to  excess  by  the  people  of  warring 
nations,  is  required  to  an  almost  unwarrantable  de- 
gree if  one  generation  is  to  appreciate  the  full  diplo- 
matic glory  the  next  one  will  enjoy.  Still,  peace  is 
not  consummated  when  war  on  foreign  fields  is  trans- 
ferred to  the  villages  and  towns  of  one's  own  coun- 
try. And  even  when  all  the  military  nations  of  the 
earth  stand  at  ease, —  not  only  indulge  In  an  armed 
peace  but  disarm  altogether, —  the  people  will  suffer 
without  cessation  all  the  horrors  of  economic  and  in- 
dustrial war. 

But  this  war  is  different  from  any  other  that  has 
been  waged.  We  are  told  It  is  a  "  holy  "  war;  some 
say  it  Is  a  "  spiritual  "  war;  there  seems  to  be  no 


PROMISES  AND  FULFILMENT  5 

doubt  in  the  minds  of  most  journalists  that  it  is  a 
"  just "  war.  The  end  of  it  is  to  be  a  democratic 
millennium.  No  one  is  to  be  left  out  of  the  apotheosis 
of  the  nations.  Russia  will  be  the  freest  land  on 
earth;  Pole  and  Jew,  Finn  and  Slav,  will  all  unite 
in  a  liberty  which,  in  the  press,  already  touches  the 
confines  of  licence.  No  more  Balkan  troubles,  no 
more  aggrandizement,  no  more  envy,  greed,  or  bully- 
ing. Disarmament  is  only  one  of  the  blessings  which 
will  come  to  the  race  of  man,  after  the  Kaiser  is  shut 
up  on  the  Island  of  Juan  Fernandez,  or  some  other 
pacific  spot. 

It  is  a  pity  Nietzsche  died  before  he  completed 
his  Transvaliiation  of  All  Values.  When  the  bu- 
reaucrats of  Prussia  and  Russia  regard  the  inter- 
ests of  all  Germans  and  Russians  as  a  first  charge 
on  the  departments,  then  we  shall  not  know  what  to 
do  with  many  volumes  that  now  occupy  so  much 
space  on  our  book-shelves.  New  values  will  be  nec- 
essary when  the  churches  cry,  "  We  have  no  work 
to  do."  And  when  war  is  known  no  more  the  woes 
of  the  armament  ring  will  call  for  a  system  of  new 
values  beyond  the  inventive  powers  of  the  sanest 
superman  that  ever  lived.  But  what  will  the  heathen 
think  of  it  all?  A  real  Christendom  in  the  place 
of  a  sham  Christendom  will  revolutionize  everything 
that  mortal  man  can  think  of. 

Unfortunately  history,  that  rude  awakener  from 
such  dreams,  jeers  at  all  the  fine  prognostications  of 
the  journalists  and  statesmen  of  to-day,  and  makes  us 
pause  while  we  ponder  the  question:  "Will  men, 
much  less  Governments,  change  so  quickly?  "  The 
noble  aspirations  of  men  writing  under  the  strain 
of  a  great  war  are  not  always  warranted  unshrink- 


6         HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

able.  Written  in  the  heat  of  wartime  they  suffer 
when  the  chill  of  peace  sets  in.  Still,  a  touch  of 
Pharisaism  is  a  virtue  at  a  time  like  this,  for  it  makes 
us  forget  our  vices. 

Now  that  the  public  Is  reading  the  works  of  au- 
thors whose  names  it  never  heard  of  before,  it  is  diffi- 
cult for  a  politician  who  does  not  see  eye  to  eye 
with  the  present  Government  to  say  anything  pro- 
found. The  simple  middle-class  household  that  was 
content  last  spring  with  the  Daily  Mail,  or  the  Daily 
News,  at  breakfast,  will  now  take  nothing  less  than 
copious  extracts  from  Treitschke  or  Sybel.  Since 
Mr.  Archer  discovered  Thus  Spake  Zarathustra,  no 
afternoon  tea  is  complete  without  a  discussion  on 
A  Genealogy  of  Morals.  Sociology,  Carson,  and 
suffragettes  are  no  longer  subjects  of  interest  now 
that  Bernhardi  and  Beyerlein  are  household  authors. 
No  war  was  ever  the  means  of  discovering  so  much 
literature  as  this.  Everybody  is  so  learned  that  a 
person  of  limited  knowledge  must  perforce  sit  mute 
in  a  club,  in  a  restaurant,  in  a  railway  train,  or  in  a 
bus,  while  some  stranger  who  has  read  the  Times 
expounds  the  philosophy  of  some  German  whose 
name  he  cannot  pronounce. 

But  Germany  has  had  no  monopoly  of  Treitschkes 
and  Bernhardis,  not  any  more  than  Britain  has  had  a 
monopoly  of  Cremers  and  Carnegies.  The  senti- 
ments of  Bernhardi  were  expressed  in  many  a  home 
in  Britain  long  before  Germany  and  the  Next  War 
was  published.  The  notion  that  wars  are  necessary 
for  the  development  of  the  race  Is  not  new;  and  years 
before  Kipling  tickled  the  souls  of  British  Jingoes, 
a  large  section  of  the  people  of  Britain  worshipped 
the  god  of  battles.     The  wife  of  an  archbishop  bap- 


MEMORIES  7 

tized  a  dreadnaught  not  so  long  ago.  During  the 
Boer  War,  when  Britain  was  busy  attending  to  the 
"  rights  "  of  small  nations  in  South  Africa,  ministers 
of  the  gospel  gave  the  Prince  of  Peace  the  cold 
shoulder.  The  most  popular  pictures  on  the  walls 
of  church  schools  were  copies  of  Maclise's  Battle  of 
Waterloo,  and  Battle  of  Trafalgar.  Church  armies 
and  juvenile  regiments  of  various  kinds  have  been 
fostered  by  the  clergy;  and  "leaders  of  thought," 
and  soldiers,  and  war  office  organizers,  have  joined 
societies  founded  for  the  propaganda  of  peace, —  so 
that  the  useful  doctrine,  "  the  best  way  to  keep  the 
peace  is  to  be  prepared  for  war,"  should  not  be  lost 
sight  of  altogether.  Scarcely  one  society  for  the 
propaganda  of  useful  knowledge  has  escaped  its 
Jingo.  The  Psychical  Society  had  a  prominent 
member  in  the  man  who  led  the  Jingoes  in  1909, 
when  the  cry  was,  "  We  want  eight,  and  we  won't 
wait."  This  Jingo  made  an  attempt  to  show  his 
sympathy  with  Bergson  when  in  the  debate  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  on  August  3rd,  19 14,  he  said 
the  speeches  of  the  pacifists,  who  had  the  courage  to 
express  their  opinions,  were  "  the  very  dregs  and  lees 
of  the  debate."  Perhaps  he  was  conscious  that 
"  We  trail  behind  us,  unawares,  the  whole  of  our 
past;  but  our  memory  pours  into  the  present  only 
the  odd  recollection  or  two  that  in  some  way  com- 
plete our  present  situation."  It  is  most  strange  what 
a  revolution  British  thought  has  passed  through  since 
the  beginning  of  August,  19 14.  No  one  seems  to 
remember  what  the  nation  suffered  from  1908  to  the 
end  of  July,  19 14.  No  one  remembers  that  the 
contempt  of  the  militarists  of  Britain  for  the  advo- 
cates of  peace  at  home,  was  just  as  deep  as  that  of 


8         HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

BernhardI  for  the  pacifists  of  Germany.  It  seems 
to  be  forgotten  that  the  section  of  the  British  press 
given  over  to  the  crusade  of  hatred  and  greed, 
pushed  their  campaigns  as  unscrupulously  as  did  any 
Krupp-owned  journal  in  Germany.  Forgotten  are 
the  armament  firms  that  welcomed  half-pay  officers  to 
their  boards  of  directors.  Forgotten,  too,  are  those 
leaders  of  religious  bodies  who  did  not  hesitate  to 
associate  themselves  with  the  business  of  warfare, 
and  its  dividends. 

But  all  these  methods  of  stimulating  interest  in 
the  destruction  of  life  and  property  were,  we  are 
told,  not  to  be  held  parallel  with  similar  designs  in 
Germany.  Not  by  any  means.  Even  comparison  is 
not  to  be  tolerated  for  a  moment.  For  the  Germans 
have  a  war-lord  who  is  absolute;  a  melodramatic  vil- 
lain, jealous  of  Britain's  might.  Besides,  our  war- 
like preparations  were  not  made  for  the  purpose 
of  aggrandizement;  our  objects  were  pacific,  our  in- 
tentions laudable.  Defence,  not  defiance,  was  our 
motto.  Nothing  could  be  clearer.  We  had  as 
much  territory  as  any  one  but  a  Kaiser  could  wish 
for,  and  all  we  asked  of  other  nations  was  to  let 
us  alone  in  the  enjoyment  of  our  vast  empire. 
Britain  had  only  one  desire,  and  that  was  to  keep 
what  she  had  got.  Germany,  on  the  other  hand, 
had  a  strictly  limited  area  for  expansion,  because  she 
came  rather  late  into  the  game  of  pushing  afield. 
Her  ambitions  were  behind  the  times.  Still,  though 
it  was  unfortunate  for  her  colonial  policy,  it  was 
but  natural,  all  the  same,  that  she  should  want  to 
get  from  us  what  we  took  from  others.  Neither 
Machiavelli  nor  Plato  understood  the  British  posi- 
tion.    "Might  is  Right," — up  to  a  point.     When 


MAXIMS  FOR  MONARCHS  9" 

an  empire  is  established  nowadays  nothing  can  be 
right  that  questions  its  fundamental  notion,  that  God 
sanctioned  its  making,  "  Might  is  Right,"  ceased  to 
have  any  virtue  as  a  doctrine,  once  the  British  Em- 
pire was  formed.  Plato's  notion  that  Justice  is  the 
end  for  which  a  state  exists,  is  classical;  in  modern 
days,  no  such  Utopian  idea  can  exist. 

When  the  Kaiser  was  studying  the  law  of  nations, 
Bismarck  should  have  taught  him  those  two  useful 
maxims  (which  every  monarch  should  in  future 
memorize)  :  "  First  come,  first  served,"  and  "  Pos- 
session is  nine  points  of  the  law."  It  is  true  Na- 
poleon did  not  always  let  those  useful  precepts  guide 
him;  but  it  must  be  remembered  that  a  century  has 
passed  since  his  methods  of  laying  the  basis  of  an 
empire  upset  so  many  Europeans.  Besides,  Na- 
poleon was  a  mere  amateur  at  making  war,  and  wag- 
ing war.  His  Government  never  voted  £52,000,- 
000  In  a  single  year  for  naval  purposes.  In  these 
days  a  boy  scout  could  tell  him  things  about  ex- 
plosives and  submarines  that  would  make  his  hair 
stand  on  end;  so  far  has  science  carried  us  onward 
and  progress  left  the  victor  of  Jena  behind.  Per- 
haps the  writers  of  books  on  Napoleon  do  not  know 
how  harmful  their  works  are  in  giving  false  notions 
of  what  can  be  accomplished  by  studying  strategy 
and  empire-making;  the  monarchs  and  generals  that 
have  been  led  astray  In  this  respect  are  legion. 
Even  so,  it  is  not  to  be  inferred  that  this  war  would 
not  have  taken  place  if  the  Kaiser  had  not  taken 
to  reading  books  on  Napoleon.  The  Emperor  of 
Germany  may,  however,  sometimes  console  himself 
with  the  thought,  that  Britain  one  hundred  years  ago 
said  of  Napoleon  what  she  now  says  of  the  Kaiser, 


lo       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

and  that  Napoleon,  long  dead,  has  somehow  lived 
it  all  down. 

Nevertheless,  our  political  leaders  and  newspaper 
editors  tell  us  we  are  fighting  in  the  interest  of  the 
people.  That  is  what  the  Kaiser  is  telling  the  Ger- 
man. The  Czar  is  telling  the  same  story  to  the  Rus- 
sian. And  the  French  Government  no  doubt  as- 
sures the  disciples  of  Sorel  that  the  carnage  is  for 
the  benefit  of  the  people.  It  is  a  great  time  for 
democracy, —  surely  never  so  many  statesmen  and 
diplomatists  talked  so  affectionately  of  It  before. 
One  editor  told  us  that  the  Triple  Entente  is  no  alli- 
ance formed  for  the  purpose  of  keeping  their  peo- 
ples in  subjection.  Rather  a  nasty  slap  at  the  Mon- 
archial  League !  —  still,  it  is  just  as  well  we  should 
know  the  truth  about  the  Triple  Entente.  Another 
editor,  eager  to  set  his  readers  right  as  to  why  we 
are  fighting,  said,  "  Austria  and  Germany  must  be 
thrashed  because  the  principles  of  democracy  must 
be  maintained  by  Britain,  whose  duty  it  has  always 
been  to  keep  open  the  road  of  progress."  All  seem 
to  be  agreed  the  principles  of  democracy  are  at 
stake.  No  country  thinks  of  putting  these  princi- 
ples into  practice,  but  somehow  they  seem  to  be 
worth  fighting  for.  And  the  fight  might  cost  twice 
as  much  as  was  spent  on  beating  Napoleon,  ten  times 
as  many  lives  might  be  sacrificed  as  the  nations  lost 
during  the  whole  of  Napoleon's  campaigns,  and  one 
hundred  times  as  many  wounded  and  crippled,  and 
then  in  the  end,  the  people  find  themselves  econom- 
ically, industrially,  and  financially,  worse  off  than 
they  were  in  1830;  no  matter,  the  Kaiser  must  be 
crushed,  for  he  is  a  menace  to  peace  and  a  danger 


A  CENTURY  AGO  n 

to  the  democracies  of  Europe.     One  hundred  years 
ago,  the  London  News  told  its  readers  that: 

"  The  situation  of  this  country  at  the  successful  close  of 
a  long  war  is  singular,  and  worthy  of  observation.  It  is  a 
fact  that  peace,  instead  of  having  brought  us  security,  re- 
trenchment, relief  from  burthens,  or  extended  commerce,  to 
enable  us  to  bear  them,  has  left  us  all  the  expenses  of  war, 
without  gaining  to  us  the  friendship  of  the  very  Powers  for 
whom  we  undertook  it.  Of  all  the  countries,  that  one 
against  which  we  fought  has  come  out  of  the  contest  with 
the  least  harm ;  and  that  which  set  all  the  rest  in  motion  has 
suffered  in  the  highest  degree." 

That  was  the  way  wars  were  conducted  in  the  days 
of  Palmerston  and  Canning;  and  no  one  can  say  the 
men  of  1814  were  'prentice  hands  at  diplomacy  or 
war. 

There  is,  however,  one  thing  certain  about  this 
war;  and  that  is,  it  cannot  go  on  for  ever.  All  par- 
ticular wars  have  an  end;  but  there  has  so  far  been 
no  end  to  the  power  that  makes  wars.  When  the 
might  of  Britain  in  18 15  put  an  end  to  the  mihtary 
achievements  of  the  "  monster,"  who  poor  English 
villagers  believed  made  a  daily  meal  of  boiled  babies 
with  brain  sauce,  it  did  not  alter  one  tittle  of  the 
real  dangers  to  peace.  Kings,  and  courts,  and 
diplomatists  flourished  just  as  strongly  in  the  nine- 
teenth century  as  they  did  in  the  eighteenth.  The 
god  of  battles  was  still  worshipped  by  huge  con- 
gregations; and  the  god  was  busy  enough  finding 
new  fields  for  military  operations  years  before  Vic- 
toria was'  crowned.  His  activities  roamed  over 
enormous  areas:  there  were  wars  in  Burma,  Man- 


12       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

Chester,  Algiers;  the  Triple  Entente  destroyed  the 
Turkish  and  Egyptian  fleets  at  Navarino;  there  were 
revolutions  In  Spain,  Portugal,  a  second  revolution 
in  France,  and  Belgium  revolted  from  the  Nether- 
lands; the  kingdom  of  Poland  was  abolished,  and  all 
that  remained  of  its  territory  was  swallowed  up  by 
Russia.  In  Britain  there  were  riots,  plots  to  mur- 
der the  King's  Ministers;  and  Parliament  was  busy 
for  a  number  of  years  passing  legislation  which  re- 
stricted the  freedom  of  the  people.  In  1 832,  the  vic- 
tor of  Waterloo  was  obliged  to  barricade  his  house 
against  the  fury  of  a  London  mob.  Seventeen  years 
after  his  triumph  over  Napoleon,  when  he  saved 
Europe,  and  showered  blessings  upon  the  democra- 
cies extending  from  the  Urals  to  Bantry  Bay,  it  was 
ungenerous,  to  say  the  least,  that  Londoners,  of  all 
citizens,  should  be  guilty  of  inflicting  such  indigni- 
ties on  the  Iron  Duke,  merely  because  he  was  op- 
posed to  a  Reform  Bill. 

The  diplomatic  machine,  stronger  by  far  than  any 
military  organization,  did  its  work  night  and  day 
in  the  Chancelleries  of  Europe,  no  matter  who  w^as 
Foreign  Minister.  Castlereagh,  Canning,  or  Gode- 
rlch,  the  figure-head  could  do  little  to  change  the 
fixed  methods  of  the  permanent  officials.  Canning 
might  be  more  liberal-minded  than  Castlereagh,  but 
Canning  could  not  affect  the  policies  of  all  the  em- 
bassies, nor  inculcate  radical  Ideas  In  all  the  officials 
at  the  Foreign  Office.  The  machine  was  against 
change,  for  the  whole  system  of  parasitism  had  its 
roots  firmly  embedded  In  diplomacy.  It  was  a  so- 
cial growth  which  extended  its  privileges  to  one  class. 
It  was  beyond  the  efforts  of  any  Foreign  Minister 
to  uproot  the  Upas  tree  of  traditional  diplomacy; 


A  LICENSED  CAMORRA  13 

the  Minister  was  here  to-day  and  gone  to-morrow; 
diplomacy  remained. 

There  is  only  one  way  to  bring  about  a  change. 
Only  the  people,  the  people  of  the  leading  nations, 
acting  in  concert,  can  perform  that  formidable  task. 
The  people  of  England  have  made  great  efforts  to 
bring  about  a  change  In  education,  In  the  franchise, 
in  taxation,  and  in  many  other  things,  but  they  have 
never  attacked  the  diplomatic  machine.  The  reason 
Is  because  the  people  of  England  and  of  Europe  have 
not  yet  connected  diplomacy  with  the  horrors  of  war. 
Diplomacy  carries  on  its  work  In  secret;  it  is  re- 
moved from  the  notice  of  the  general  public.  More- 
over, an  utterly  false  idea  has  crept  Into  the  minds 
of  people  that  the  term  diplomacy  Is  synonymous 
with  peace.  When  a  too  curious  person  at  a  polit- 
ical meeting  has  put  a  question  on  foreign  affairs, 
consternation  has  struck  the  audience.  How  should 
any  one  be  so  mad  as  to  question  the  virtue  of 
our  diplomacy?  Besides,  foreign  policy  Is  some- 
thing too  complicated  for  the  understanding  of  any 
one  living  In  a  house  assessed  at  less  than  £100. 
Thus  the  machinations  of  diplomats  seldom  reach 
the  mind  of  the  vast  majority  of  the  electors.  Se- 
crecy being  essential  to  the  existence  of  the  Foreign 
Office,  It  is  not  surprising  that  the  public  takes  so  lit- 
tle Interest  in  its  work.  Even  in  an  assembly  reputed 
so  free  as  the  British  House  of  Commons,  Its  mem- 
bers, when  they  question  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  are  often  silenced  by  the  reply,  that  "  It 
would  not  be  to  the  public  Interest  to  give  the  in- 
formation." Secrecy  encircles  a  Foreign  Secretary 
with  mysterious  walls.  His  work,  like  the  mole's. 
Is  subterranean.     This  is  not  always  his  fault;  the 


14       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

best  Foreign  Secretary  must  be  a  victim  of  the  sys- 
tem, and  what  he  does  must  be  accepted  by  an  elec- 
torate,—  ignorant  in  these  affairs, —  as  labours  per- 
formed in  the  public  interest. 

It  is  a  pity  so  many  do  not  know  all  the  won- 
derful schemes  carried  out  by  a  vigilant  Foreign  Of- 
fice for  their  individual  well-being.     How  few  know 
that  there  is  a  net-work  of  agents  all  over  the  world, 
watching  and  waiting  for  opportunities  to  add  an- 
other sandy  acre  to  the  area  of  the  empire;  frus- 
trating the  attempts  of  alien  agents  to  take  that  acre 
from  us;  making  friendships  to  preserve  the  balance 
of  power  in  Uganda  or  Tibet;  allotting  territory  in 
Africa  and  Asia,  so  that  the  natives  will  not  quar- 
rel among  themselves  for  more  land  than  is  good 
for  them.     Think  of  the  value  of  the  work  of  these 
agents,  helping  concessionaires  to  stir  the  lazy  na- 
tives into  labours  only  known  in  Christian  countries ! 
It  is  a  shame  the  electors  cannot  picture  these  agents, 
carrying  the  torch  of  Liberty  in  one  hand,  and  the 
bandage  from  the  eyes  of  Justice  in  the  other;  un- 
dertaking all  the  irksome  business  of  painting  red 
dots  on  the  map  of  the  world,  for  the  glory  and  the 
preservation  of  the  British  Empire, —  when  they  are 
not  engaged  in  countries  where  dreams  of  coloniza- 
tion are  governed  by  the  size  of  the  nation's  navy. 
It  is  so  good  for  the  British  people  to  have  a  de- 
partment occupied  from  one  year's  end  to  another 
in  seeing  that  the  slum-dwellers  of  our  great  cities, 
towns,  and  villages,  have  a  place  in  the  sun;  and 
that  the  missionaries  we  do  not  need  at  home  shall 
not  lose  their  lives  abroad.    The  public  learns  slowly ; 
and  nothing  is  heeded  so  little  as  the  lesson  of  the 
marvellous  "  utilities  "  of  diplomacy. 


CHAPTER  II 


" SCRAPS   OF    PAPER  " 


Alas,  the  country!  how  shall  tongue  or  pen 

Bewail  her  now  wncountry  gentlemen? 

The  last  to  bid  the  cry  of  warfare  cease, 

The  first  to  make  a  malady  of  peace. 

For  what  were  all  these  country  patriots  born? 

To  hunt,  and  vote,  and  raise  the  price  of  corn? 

But  corn,  like  every  mortal  thing,  must  fall, 

Kings,  conquerors,  and  markets  most  of  all. 

And  must  ye  fall  with  every  ear  of  grain? 

Why  would  you  trouble  Buonaparte's  reign  ? 

He  was  your  great  Triptolemus ;  his  vices 

Destroy'd  but  realms,  and  still  maintain'd  your  prices; 

He  amplified  to  every  lord's  content 

The  grand  agrarian  alchymy  hight  rent. 

Why  did  you  chain  him  on  yon  isle  so  lone? 

The  man  was  worth  much  more  upon  his  throne. 

True,  blood  and  treasure  boundlessly  were  spilt, 

But  what  of  that?  the  Gaul  may  bear  the  guilt. 

—  Byron,  The  Age  of  Bronze. 

How  many  of  the  journalists  writing  articles  on  the 
present  trouble  know  the  history  of  the  "  scrap  of 
paper "  that  was  the  casus  belli?  The  Encyclo- 
paedia Britannica  Is  not  so  popular  now  as  the  works 
of  Professor  Treitschke,  "  who  had  brought  his- 
torical teaching  into  contact  with  real  life,  and  had 
created  a  public  opinion  more  powerful  than  the 
laws"   (to  quote  Lord  Acton),  but.  If  the  bible  of 

15 


1 6       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

sciolists  is  not  the  fashion,  then  a  ghmpse  at  Eve- 
lyn Ashley's  Life  of  Lord  Palmerston  will  yield 
some  information  as  to  motives  of  the  Powers  in 
drawing  up  the  Treaties  of  1831  and  1839. 

Ashley  describes  the  squabbles  of  the  Dutch  and 
the  Belgians,  and  defends  Palmerston  for  tearing 
one  of  the  main  provisions  from  the  Treaty  of 
Vienna,  which  united  Holland  and  Belgium.  When 
Napoleon  fell,  we  desired  to  bring  these  countries 
together,  to  fortify  parts  of  them,  and  relieve  our- 
selves from  the  anxiety  of  having  to  watch  a  coast 
which  had  been  hostile  and  extremely  dangerous  dur- 
ing the  years  of  Napoleon's  might.  There  was  no 
question  of  the  rights  of  Belgians  in  those  days; 
our  interest  in  the  affair  was  one  of  convenience  — 
how  to  keep  Belgium  from  falling  into  the  hands 
of  the  French.  We  were,  however,  between  the 
devil  and  the  deep  sea.  Ashley  says:  "To  side 
with  Holland  would  have  been  contrary  to  all  the 
traditions  which  Palmerston  had  inherited  from 
Canning.  To  acquiesce  in  French  aggrandizement 
would  have  been  little  short  of  a  national  disgrace." 
Opinion  in  Britain  was  divided;  there  was  no  whole- 
hearted outburst  of  national  indignation  at  the  action 
of  Holland.  Palmerston's  methods  were  the  subject 
of  some  fierce  attacks.  The  Foreign  Minister  had 
no  easy  road  to  travel  at  any  time  during  the  negotia- 
tions. Talleyrand  was  as  keen  to  look  after  the  in- 
terests of  France  as  Palmerston  was  to  safeguard  the 
coasts  of  Britain.  The  tangle  and  the  wrangle  of 
the  settlement  was  of  the  order  of  low  comedy,  and 
any  one  under  the  impression  that  the  separation  of 
Belgium  from  Holland  was  accomplished  by  the  five 
Powers  with  one  mind  and  solemn  behaviour,  should 


SCRAPS  OF  PAPER  17 

spend  an  hour  reading  the  utterly  discreditable  pro- 
ceedings. They  all  snarled  and  quarrelled  like  a 
pack  of  fishwives.  Neither  Dutch  nor  Belgians  were 
pleased  when  the  settlement  was  made;  indeed  the 
King  of  Holland  very  soon  defied  the  Allies,  and 
showed  his  contempt  for  the  "  scrap  of  paper," 
which  the  Powers  were  in  no  haste  to  sign.  After 
the  Treaty  of  1831  was  consummated  by  the  signa- 
ture of  Russia,  the  last  power  to  sign,  on  May  4th, 
1832,  it  was  not  long  before  the  neutral  states,  Hol- 
land and  Belgium,  had  another  row,  this  time  about 
Luxembourg  and  Limbourg.  Finally,  the  matter 
was  adjusted,  and  a  new  "scrap  of  paper"  was 
signed  April  19th,  1839,  at  London.  Treaty-mak- 
ing was  not  the  solemn  affair  the  journalists  of 
to-day  imagine;  and  the  makers  of  treaties  were  not 
always  actuated  by  the  purest  motives.  Their  ac- 
tions and  methods  were  often  enough  comparable 
only  to  those  of  a  certain  class  of  horse-dealer,  whose 
bargains  satisfy  neither  the  seller  nor  the  buyer. 

Anyway,  the  balance  of  power  was  secured,  and 
there  seemed  no  reason  why  any  European  should 
ever  think  of  going  to  war  again.  For  decades  the 
term  "  balance  of  power  "  meant  nothing  at  all  to 
millions  of  men  who  sweated  their  hves  away  — 
when  they  did  not  give  themselves  as  food  for  can- 
non—  to  help  pay  the  bill  for  maintaining  the  bal- 
ance. It  has  always  been  a  shifting  question;  for 
after  sacrificing  thousands  of  lives  and  spending  mil- 
lions of  pounds  in  attempts  to  preserve  the  balance, 
the  result  of  battles  has  seldom  left  the  balance  of 
power  where  it  was.  Never  was  such  a  wobbly  thing 
invented  to  Inflict  so  much  misery  on  mankind. 
And  diplomatists,  as  a  rule,  have  had  a  poor  opinion 


1 8       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

of  it.  They  have  many  times  discovered,  after  a 
war,  that  little  or  nothing  had  been  gained  by  all 
the  fighting.  Lord  Granville,  in  1887,  wrote  to  the 
Duke  of  Argyll  that  his  own  belief  was  that  the 
Crimean  War  was  a  great  misfortune,  and  that  either 
Palmerston  or  Aberdeen  alone  would  have  prevented 
it.  Yet,  no  war  was  ever  so  popular.  It  is  interesting 
to  read  Lord  Edmund  Fitzmaurice  on  that  blunder. 
He  said: 

"  In  order  to  find  a  sufficient  explanation  of  the  great 
decision  for  which  Lord  Granville  had  his  share  of  respon- 
sibility we  must  look  further.  In  the  arrogant  attitude  of 
Russia  since  1815  towards  Europe,  to  which  she  seemed 
hardly  to  belong,  in  the  ever  increasing  insolence  of  that 
attitude  since  the  accession  of  the  Emperor  Nicholas,  in  the 
existence  of  a  threatening  military  autocracy  rendered  dou- 
bly odious  by  half-mystical  claims,  and  in  the  translation  of 
those  claims  into  action  against  liberty  not  merely  in  Poland 
or  Hungary  but  all  over  Europe,  is  to  be  found  the  explana- 
tion of  the  Crimean  War.  These  things  had  produced  an 
atmosphere  of  alarm  and  hatred  out  of  which  the  lightning 
was  certain  sooner  or  later  to  leap.  No  quarrel  about  the 
Holy  Places,  no  dispute  about  the  Christian  subjects  of  the 
Porte,  could  possibly  have  dragged  an  unwilling  Prime  Min- 
ister to  associate  the  history  of  his  Government  with  a  war 
against  a  country  to  which  he  was,  to  say  the  least,  not  per- 
sonally hostile.  It  was  the  belief  which  animated  the  people 
that  western  civilization  was  threatened  in  its  essential  con- 
ceptions of  individual  and  political  liberty  which  forced  him 
on,  and  sent  the  armies  and  fleets  of  Great  Britain,  France, 
and  Sardinia,  with  no  adequate  cause  of  immediate  quarrel 
to  the  shores  of  the  Black  Sea  and  the  Baltic.  It  is  no  exag- 
geration to  say  that  if  the  Crimean  War  had  never  been 
fought  the  two  subsequent  decades  of  the  century  would  not 
have  seen  the  formation  of  a  United  Italy  and  a  United 
Germany  and  all  the  consequences." 


NET  RESULTS  19 

Here  is  a  lesson  worth  a  moment's  consideration. 
It  points  a  moral;  two,  indeed.  The  Crimean  War 
was  popular;  but  years  after  Lord  Granville  believed 
it  to  have  been  a  great  misfortune.  Russia  threat- 
ened western  civilization;  Russia  was  a  military  au- 
tocracy with  half-mystical  claims;  she  was  also  a 
danger  to  individual  and  political  liberty.  If  the 
war  had  not  been  fought  there  would  have  been  no 
United  Germany,  with  all  its  power;  that  military 
autocracy  with  more  than  half-mystical  claims  might 
never  have  been  strong  enough  to  fight  the  French 
in  1870.  So,  we  smash  one  Power  which  threatens 
individual  and  political  liberty  so  that  one  far  worse 
may  some  day  arm  with  the  intention  of  smashing  us. 
But  Holy  Places  must  be  preserved,  and  there  is  no 
better  way  than  using  gunpowder  and  bayonets;  just 
to  show  a  Christian  nation's  religious  feelings  are 
not  to  be  outraged  with  impunity.  The  Crimean 
War  cost  Great  Britain  some  25,000  lives,  and  fifty 
millions  in  money;  and  the  balance  of  power  and  the 
position  of  neutrals  received  many  rude  shocks  dur- 
ing the  progress  of  that  disastrous  campaign.  The 
treaty  made  in  Paris  in  1856  was  only  fifteen  years 
old  when  it  was  cancelled.  Anyway,  Russia  was 
properly  thrashed,  and,  for  a  few  years,  the  citizens 
of  the  western  democracies  slept  soundly,  their 
dreams  never  haunted  by  the  nightmare  of  a  Slav 
autocracy  threatening  their  individual  and  political 
liberties. 

Not  all  diplomatists  have  been  as  frank  as  Lord 
Granville.  In  his  letters  he  gives  us  a  glimpse  be- 
hind the  scenes : 

"  The  siege  of   Sevastopol  has  hitherto  been   a  failure. 


20       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

We  have  generals  whom  we  do  not  trust,  and  whom  we  do 
not  know  how  to  replace.  We  have  an  Ambassador  at 
Constantinople,  an  able  man,  a  cat  whom  no  one  cares  to 
bell,  whom  some  think  a  principal  cause  of  the  war,  others 
the  cause  of  some  of  the  calamities  which  have  attended  the 
conduct  of  the  war;  and  whom  we  know  to  have  thwarted 
or  neglected  many  of  the  objects  of  his  Government.  The 
French  generals  seem  worse  than  ours;  the  troops  before 
Sevastopol  inferior  to  ours,  if  not  to  the  Russians." 

That  was  written  to  the  Duke  of  Argyll  during  the 
progress  of  the  war.  It  would  be  interesting  to 
know  what  the  Government  at  the  time  told  the  coun- 
try about  the  business.  Another  passage  from  the 
same  letter  contains  a  sentiment  worth  noting: 

"  In  the  meanwhile  the  deaths  of  brave  men  and  distin- 
guished officers,  falling  in  affairs  which  have  absolutely  no 
results,  press  upon  us  the  duty  of  considering  whether  it  is 
absolutely  necessary  to  continue  the  war." 

Lord  Granville  might  have  gone  further  and  said, 
"  No  matter  what  the  result,  nothing  of  any  practical 
value  to  mankind  will  be  gained."  He  might  also 
have  said,  "  In  a  few  years  the  Russian  and  the  Turk 
will  be  at  each  other's  throats,  and  even  Britain,  to 
say  nothing  of  France,  will  stand  aside  and  let  them 
tear  each  other  to  pieces." 

The  Treaty  of  Paris  gave  the  god  of  battles  little 
rest.  The  period  from  Victoria's  accession  to  the 
date  of  the  Repeal  of  the  Corn  Laws  was  replete 
with  wars;  and  scores  of  peoples,  scattered  nearly  all 
over  the  earth,  engaged  the  attention  of  the  martial 
deity.  A  complete  list  of  the  wars  and  revolutions 
of  that  period  would  occupy  too  much  space;  but  to 
mention  some  of  the  localities, —  to  indicate  how 


PEEL  ON  ARMAMENTS  21 

widespread  the  area  was  over  which  the  god  had 
to  watch  the  strife, —  may  serve  a  useful  purpose. 
There  was  a  revolution  in  Canada;  Chartist  dis- 
turbances at  home;  war  in  Afghanistan;  tumults  in 
Vienna,  Berlin,  and  Rome :  there  were  wars  in  India, 
Burma,  Egypt,  Turkey,  and  China;  to  say  nothing 
of  the  risings  in  Ireland  and  South  Wales.  France, 
of  course,  had  a  revolution.  1848  was  a  very  busy 
year  for  the  god  of  battles.  Nietzsche  was  not  to 
blame  for  any  of  those  wars.  Indeed,  the  funda- 
mental idea  of  Thus  Spake  Zarathustra  did  not  come 
to  him  until  188 1.  So  that  work  was  not  account- 
able even  for  the  Franco-German  War  of  1870. 
And  no  British  editor  will  assert  that  Treitschke 
was  a  popular  author  before  he  went  to  Leipzig. 
What  then  could  have  been  the  cause  of  all  the  dis- 
turbances? It  must  have  been  either  Goethe  or  Jean 
Paul,  or,  mayhap,  Tieck.  There  were  men  in 
Britain  who  might  have  said  it  was  our  fault  for 
spreading  bibles  about  the  globe,  and  letting  the  un- 
sophisticated read  the  144th  Psalm.  Anyway, 
treaties  and  diplomatists  were  not  successful  in  so 
much  as  keeping  the  peace  of  Burma,  let  alone  the 
peace  of  Europe. 

It  must  not  be  inferred,  however,  that  every  man 
in  Britain  during  the  first  two  decades  of  Victoria's 
reign  was  war-mad.  There  were  some  men  who 
spoke  strongly  against  armaments.  For  instance. 
Sir  Robert  Peel,  in  the  House  of  Commons,  in  1841, 
said: 

"  Is  not  the  time  come  when  the  powerful  countries  of 
Europe  should  reduce  their  armaments  which  they  have  so 
sedulously  raised?     Is  not  the  time  come  when  they  should 


22       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

be  prepared  to  declare  that  there  is  no  use  in  such  overgrown 
establishments?  The  true  interest  of  Europe  is  to  come  to 
some  common  accord,  so  as  to  enable  every  country  to  reduce 
those  military  armaments,  which  belong  to  a  state  of  war 
rather  than  of  peace.  I  do  wish  that  the  councils  of  every 
country  (or  the  public  voice  and  mind,  if  the  council  did 
not)  would  willingly  propagate  such  a  doctrine." 

A  brave  statement  that,  in  the  days  when  Pal- 
merston  and  Thiers  influenced  the  military  establish- 
ments of  Britain  and  France;  before  the  Entente 
Cordiale  was  taken  as  a  step  towards  the  goal  of 
European  peace.  Our  western  ally  of  to-day  was 
then  in  a  position  to  fill  the  mind  of  the  Duke  of 
Wellington  with  awe.  He  wrote,  "  excepting  Im- 
mediately under  the  fire  of  Dover  Castle,  there  is  not 
a  spot  on  the  coast,  from  the  North  Foreland  to 
Selsey  Bill,  on  which  infantry  might  not  be  thrown 
on  shore  at  any  time  of  tide  with  any  wind  and  in 
any  weather."  Seven  years  after  the  Duke's  awful 
warning,  Britain  found  France  fighting  side  by  side 
with  her  in  the  Crimea.  Diplomacy  brings  together 
strange  bedfellows. 

After  Russia  was  soundly  thrashed  by  the  Allies, 
peace  did  not  even  bring  a  reduction  of  military 
expenditure.  In  1857  we  sent  military  expedi- 
tions to  China  and  Persia,  at  a  time  when  Brit- 
ish methods  of  teaching  Hindoo  princes  how  to  gov- 
ern were  causing  grave  unrest  In  India.  Then  Dis- 
raeli was  moved  to  say,  "  When  a  time  of  peace  con- 
sists of  preparations  for  war,  of  fitting  out  expedi- 
tions, of  sending  fleets  to  different  quarters  of  the 
globe,  then  I  am  obliged  to  consider  whether  the  war 
taxation  Is  not  required  for  circumstances  and  objects 
far  different  from  those  which  a  time  of  peace  justi- 


THE  BOGEY  OF  i860  23 

fies  and  requires."  Many  of  the  leading  men  then 
in  the  House  of  Commons  believed  that  the  best 
way  to  keep  the  peace  was  to  curtail  expenditure  on 
armaments.  Whatever  may  be  said  of  the  futility 
of  that  notion,  it  cannot  now  be  claimed,  by  those  who 
support  the  contrary  view  (namely,  that  the  best  way 
to  keep  the  peace  Is  to  prepare  for  war),  that  large 
armies  and  powerful  navies  are  factors  which  make 
for  international  harmony.  There  were  "  Little 
Navy  "  men  in  those  days.  Gladstone,  for  instance, 
resolutely  opposed  Palmerston's  scheme  to  expend 
£11,000,000  on  the  defence  of  arsenals  and  dock- 
yards. That  was  In  the  summer  of  i860,  when 
Herbert  was  at  the  War  Office,  and  scared  so  many 
patriots  by  saying  he  was  convinced  that  a  great 
calamity  was  Impending  in  the  shape  of  war  with 
France.  Three  years  earlier  the  French  Emperor 
had  offered  to  facilitate  the  passage  of  troops 
through  France  to  reinforce  our  regiments  in  India. 
The  Cabinet,  the  House,  and  the  country,  were, 
nevertheless,  in  a  state  of  panic,  and  Palmerston  car- 
ried the  day.  Millions  were  spent  fortifying 
our  coasts  against  a  French  Invasion,  and  the  tax- 
payers, no  doubt,  felt  secure  behind  the  fortifications 
that  saved  them  from  Herbert's  Impending  calamity. 
But  to  their  sorrow,  the  taxpayers  learned,  in  a  very 
few  years,  that  their  millions  had  been  thrown  away. 
At  that  time  of  panic  Gladstone  said: 

"  We  have  no  adequate  idea  of  the  predisposing  power 
which  an  immense  series  of  measures  of  preparations  for  war 
on  our  part  has  in  actually  begetting  war.  They  familiarize 
ideas  which  lose  their  horrors,  they  light  an  inward  flame 
of  excitement  of  which,  when  it  is  habitually  fed,  we  lose 
the  consciousness." 


24       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

The  change  from  wooden  to  iron  vessels  two  years 
after  the  panic  revealed  the  madness  of  the  wasters 
who  had  squandered  the  millions  in  i860.  From 
panic  to  negotiation  within  one  year  was  quick  shift- 
ing for  any  nation;  still,  Disraeli,  in  1861,  suggested 
a  compact  should  be  made  with  the  French  Govern- 
ment to  limit  naval  expenditure.     He  said: 

"  What  is  the  use  of  diplomacy,  what  is  the  use  of  Gov- 
ernments, what  is  the  use  of  cordial  understandings,  if  such 
things  can  take  place?  " 

Cobden  at  that  time  used  all  his  intelligence  and 
strength  to  make  the  Government  and  the  people  see 
the  danger  of  the  nations  piling  up  enormous  arma- 
ments. His  view  of  the  question  is  worth  remem- 
bering: 

"  A  remedy  for  the  evil  can  only  be  found  in  a  more 
frank  understanding  between  the  two  Governments,  If 
they  will  discard  the  old  and  utterly  futile  theory  of  secrecy 
—  a  theory  on  which  an  individual  manufacturer  or  merchant 
no  longer  founds  his  hopes  of  successful  competition  with  a 
foreign  rival  —  they  may  be  enabled,  by  the  timely  exchange 
of  explanations  and  assurances,  to  prevent  what  ought  to  be 
restricted  to  mere  experimental  trials  from  growing  into 
formidable  preparations  for  war.  But  the  greatest  evil  con- 
nected with  these  rival  armaments  is  that  they  destroy  the 
strongest  motives  for  peace.  When  two  great  neighbour- 
ing nations  find  themselves  subjected  to  a  war  expenditure, 
without  the  compensation  of  its  usual  excitements  and 
honours,  the  danger  to  be  apprehended  is  that  if  an  accident 
should  occur  to  inflame  their  hostile  passions  —  and  we  know 
how  certain  these  accidents  are  at  intervals  to  arise  —  their 
latent  sense  of  suffering  and  injury  may  reconcile  them  to  a 
rupture,  as  the  only  eventual  escape  from  an  otherwise  per- 
petual war  taxation  in  a  time  of  peace." 


FERDINAND  LASSALLE  25 

Well  might  Disraeli  ask  what  Is  the  use  of  diplo- 
macy. But  "  discard  the  old  and  utterly  futile  theory 
of  secrecy,"  and  what  becomes  of  nine-tenths  of  the 
work  of  the  Foreign  Office?  Besides,  parasites  take 
good  care  of  their  departments,  and  as  they  have 
benefited  from  the  system,  they  consider  it  their  duty 
to  pass  it  on  with  all  its  privileges  unimpaired  to 
future  parasites,  as  if  it  were  a  vested  interest.  Pal- 
merston  would  have  none  of  Cobden's  Utopian  pro- 
posals,—  not  he, —  and  straightway  he  set  out  to 
keep  the  country  in  a  state  of  panic. 

Diplomatists  kept  the  god  of  battles  busy  through 
the  years  extending  from  the  Crimean  War  along  to 
1864,  the  year  before  Palmerston  passed  away  to 
that  realm  where  the  "  jingo  does  not  panic  and 
bingo  has  no  sale."  Just  about  that  period  Prussia 
set  to  work  to  put  her  house  in  order.  British  states- 
men failed  to  detect  new  movements  which  would 
mean  great  things  in  European  history,  but  Pal- 
merston was  not  the  man  to  estimate  the  value  of 
those  plans  and  tendencies.  And  to-day,  now  that 
so  many  writers  are  looking  to  find  the  beginnings 
of  this  Germany  we  are  warring  against,  few  under- 
stand the  influences  that  were  at  work  about  the  year 
i860,  to  which  the  extraordinary  changes  which  took 
place  might  very  well  be  attributed.  The  rise  of 
Bismarck  cannot  be  accredited  to  the  teachings  of 
Sybel  and  Treitschke,  as  some  people  imagine.  Nor 
were  the  German  people  stimulated  by  their  works. 
It  may,  however,  be  safely  suggested  that  the  vast 
majority  of  the  Germans  of  that  time  read  more 
books  and  pamphlets  of  Ferdinand  Lassalle  than 
those  of  any  other  four  or  five  authors.  Treitschke 
was  read  then  no  more  than  Bergson  is  read  in  Eng- 


26       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

land  now.  The  Germany  we  are  trying  to  under- 
stand in  this  year  19 15,  is  the  product  of  two  men 
of  extraordinary  powers  who  met  in  the  plastic  time, 
and  impressed  their  strong  personalities  on  a  people 
of  great  capacity.  Ferdinand  Lassalle  and  Bismarclc 
were  the  men,  and  the  Germany  that  is  puzzling 
many  newspaper  historians  owes  no  more  to  the  lat- 
ter than  it  does  to  the  former.  George  Brandes 
touches  this  idea  in  his  work  on  Lassalle: 

"  One  event  during  the  nineteenth  century  has  provoked 
the  greatest  surprise  and  astonishment  in  Europe.  Unsuc- 
cessful attempts  at  its  explanation  have  been,  and  are  still, 
offered  by  the  different  European  nationalities.  This  event 
is  the  process  by  which  the  Germany  of  Hegel  was  trans- 
formed to  the  Germany  of  Bismarck.  Some  theorists  speak 
as  if  the  old  German  stock  had  suddenly  died  out,  and  a  new 
race  had  sprung  up  without  roots;  others,  as  if  the  old  stock 
had  been  destroyed  or  ennobled  by  an  infusion  of  Wendish- 
Slavonic  blood.  To  some,  modern  Germany  is  enigmatic 
as  the  Iron  Mask.  The  face  of  the  philosopher  and  poet 
was  the  real  countenance,  and  this  has  now  been  hidden  by 
Prussian  domination,  as  the  mask  concealed  the  identity  of 
the  unhappy  prisoner.  Others,  again,  regard  the  old  and 
pleasant  countenance  of  romance  as  the  mask,  hypocritically 
hiding  the  real  features,  which  have  now  become  visible. 
These  views  are  alike  injudicious,  and  are  based  in  either 
case  upon  ignorance  of  the  course  of  development  which 
modern  Germany  has  pursued.  If  this  development  is 
studied  in  literature,  it  will  be  seen  how,  step  by  step,  the 
ideas,  the  methods  of  action,  and  the  views  of  life  pursued 
and  entertained  by  the  newer  generation  have  developed  or- 
ganically from  those  of  the  past  age.  The  gulf  which  di- 
vides the  Germany  of  Hegel  from  the  Germany  of  Bismarck 
will  gradually  be  filled  before  our  eyes.  The  faces  upon 
either  side  of  this  gulf  will  appear  as  related  by  similarity 
of   feature;  while  certain   interesting  and  strongly  marked 


A  FORGOTTEN  FACTOR  27 

countenances  which  stand  out  boldly  against  the  background 
of  history  will  of  themselves  typify  the  process  of  transition 
and  amalgamation  which  has  fused  the  intellectual  individ- 
ualities of  two  generations.  Of  these  special  features  hardly 
any  is  more  interesting  or  more  clearly  cut  than  the  figure 
of  Ferdinand  Lassalle.  He  was  born  on  April  nth,  1825, 
and  died  of  a  wound  received  in  a  duel  on  August  21st,  1864. 
He  was  a  distinguished  pupil  of  Hegel,  and  was  spoken  of 
in  his  time  as  Bismarck's  tutor,  and  not  unreasonably;  for 
even  though  he  cannot  be  shown  to  have  influenced  Bismarck 
directly,  yet,  if  we  examine  the  points  which  decided  both 
the  foreign  and  domestic  policy  of  the  great  statesman,  we 
shall  find  that  this  policy  precisely  realized  the  programme 
propounded  by  the  philosophical  agitator." 

How  any  responsible  student  of  the  history  of 
Germany  can  pretend  to  describe  her  growth  during 
the  middle  third  of  the  last  century,  without  taking 
account  of  the  Influence  and  genius  of  Lassalle,  is  in- 
comprehensible. The  same  confusion  exists  to-day 
In  the  minds  of  the  critics  of  German  policy  that  ex- 
isted over  fifty  years  ago  in  the  Fatherland,  as  to 
Lassalle's  interpretation  of  Might  and  Right.  Then 
the  common  notion  was  that  Lassalle  put  might  in 
the  place  of  right.  When  he  said  in  his  lecture  in 
Berlin  in  1862,  "  Constitutional  questions  are,  there- 
fore, In  the  first  instance,  not  questions  of  right,  but 
questions  of  might,"  he  stated  the  case  of  every  so- 
called  civilized  nation,  not  Germany  only,  but  Britain, 
France,  and  Belgium.  He  said,  "  The  actual  consti- 
tution of  a  country  has  its  existence  only  in  the  actual 
conditions  of  force  which  exist  in  the  country."  No 
Britisher  should  now  deny  that  ugly  truth.  But  Las- 
salle was  not  stating  what  should  be;  he  was  present- 
ing the  case  as  It  then  stood  in  Germany  and  in 
other  nations.     True,  the  press  at  the  time  Inter- 


2  8       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

preted  the  lecture  as  a  declaration  that  might  was 
right.  Lassalle  in  a  pamphlet  replied  to  the  obvious 
misunderstanding,  and  said,  "  If  I  had  created  the 
world  I  should  very  probably  have  made  an  excep- 
tion at  this  point  in  favour  of  the  wishes  of  the 
Volkszeitiing  and  of  Count  Schwerin,  and  have  ar- 
ranged that  right  should  precede  might.  Such  an 
arrangement  would  be  quite  in  harmony  with  my  own 
ethical  standpoint  and  desires.  Unfortunately,  how- 
ever, I  have  not  been  entrusted  with  the  creation  of 
the  world,  and  must  therefore  decline  any  responsi- 
bility, any  praise  or  blame,  for  the  nature  of  existing 
arrangements." 

Certainly,  the  first  law  of  every  "  civilized  "  na- 
tion is  force. 

But  we  return  to  the  immediate  subject,  however 
fascinating  the  digression  may  be  to  one  whose  only 
amusement  in  these  terrible  days  is  the  nonsense  bab- 
bled and  scribbled  by  statesmen  and  journalists  on 
German  philosophers.  The  next  exhibition  of 
might  preceding  right  was  another  utterly  discredit- 
able affair  for  British  diplomacy.  It  took  place  in 
Eastern  Europe,  concerning  Poland.  What  half  a 
century  can  do  for  European  nations,  in  changing 
and  shifting  thrones  and  boundaries,  cannot  be  bet- 
ter illustrated  than  by  presenting  a  simple  record  of 
events  since  1862.  Lord  Edmund  Fitzmaurice  in 
his  Life  of  Lord  Granville,  adorns  the  tale  from 
which  the  public  of  to-day  might  draw  many  morals. 
Writing  about  the  beginning  of  this  century,  Fitz- 
maurice said: 

"  Poland  was  then,  as  it  still  is,  the  hinge  on  which  Prus- 
sian foreign  policy  turns.  Ever  since  the  first  partition  to 
avoid  a  conflict  with  Russia  has  been  the  policy  of  the  Prus- 


"  RIGHTS  OF  SMALL  NATIONS  "       29 

sian  Foreign  Office  and  the  inherited  tradition  of  her  Royal 
Family.  The  Minister  whom  William  I  had  just  called  to 
his  councils,  already  contemplating  that  he  might  shortly 
have  to  open  a  new  and  perilous  chapter  of  German  and 
European  history,  which  might  bring  him  into  collision  with 
Austria  and  France,  was  determined  under  no  circumstances 
whatever  to  risk  a  struggle  with  Russia.  He,  on  the  con- 
trary, intended  to  obtain  a  solid  guarantee  of  her  future 
good-will,  with  an  eye  to  coming  events.  To  stand  rigidly 
aloof  from  European  intervention  in  the  affairs  of  Poland 
was  the  obvious  method  to  gain  his  end,  especially  as  this 
policy  would  have  the  additional  advantage  of  separating 
Russia  from  France  should  France  join  in  the  proposed  in- 
tervention." 

Britain  and  France  sympathized  with  the  Polish 
insurrectionists,  but  diplomatic  intervention  without 
the  support  of  Austria  or  Prussia  seemed  to  Lord 
Granville  an  act  of  madness.  The  Queen  was 
alarmed  and  feared  a  rupture  with  Russia.  The 
King  of  the  Belgians  wrote  to  the  Queen  a  letter 
which  is  of  great  significance  at  present  when  Britain 
is  spending  millions  and  sacrificing  thousands  of  lives 
in  "  upholding  "  the  integrity  and  independence  of 
Belgium.  It  seems  incredible  that  the  King  of  a 
small,  weak  power  could  write  in  such  terms  of  an 
ancient  kingdom  that  had  suffered  more  terribly  from 
the  aggression  of  great  powers  than  any  country  in 
the  world.  And  it  should  be  remembered  that  Bel- 
gium then  owed  its  political  existence  to  the  Treaty 
of  1839.     The  King  said: 

*'  About  Poland  the  English  Cabinet  must  be  prudent. 
...  It  would  be  impossible  for  the  Emperor  Alexander  to 
give  up  these  provinces,  which,  one  must  say,  are  prosperous, 
and  have  been  now  Russian  for  a  long  period.     Their  ex- 


30      HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

istence  will  be  improved,  as  truly  much  has  been  already 
done  in  that  way.  But  the  Russians  as  a  nation  will  never 
and  can  never  submit  to  give  them  up.  To  carry  on  a  war 
for  that  purpose,  would  for  England  be  a  fool's  play.  If  a 
Poland,  as  the  Garibaldians  wish  it  could  be  restored,  it 
would  be  in  close  alliance  with  France;  and  Prussia,  par- 
ticularly betAveen  the  French  on  the  Rhine  and  a  French 
province  on  the  Vistula,  could  not  exist.  It  would  be  com- 
pletely nullified.  Austria  would  also  get  such  a  dangerous 
set  of  people  near  Hungary,  that  it  would  find  itself  in  the 
same  position.  England  has  a  vital  interest,  for  its  own 
security,  that  those  two  Powers  should  continue  to  maintain 
their  existence.  ,  .  ." 

Poor  Poland  !  Not  much  sympathy  then  for  your 
notions  of  independence.  But  what  a  strange  thing 
is  diplomacy!  After  all,  continuity  of  foreign  policy 
is  merely  a  party  shibboleth,  and  ambassadorial  la- 
bours are  vain.  Prussia  and  Austria  were  the  bul- 
warks of  British  and  Belgian  foreign  policy  of  that 
day,  and  France  was  the  menace  to  the  peace  of 
Europe.  The  British  Cabinet  did  not  then  go  out 
of  its  way  to  do  much  for  a  small  nationality,  and 
it  was  content  to  give  merely  platonic  advice  to  Rus- 
sia. Fitzmaurice  said,  "  With  the  result  that  at  the 
end  of  the  diplomatic  campaign  Russia  had  become 
bound  by  ties  of  gratitude  to  Prussia  for  having  re- 
fused to  take  part  in  it,  while  the  previous  good  un- 
derstanding between  France  and  Russia  was  shat- 
tered. The  remnants  of  good  feeling  between 
France  and  England  were  also  still  further  re- 
duced. .  .  .  The  net  result  was  that  both  Great 
Britain  and  France  were  felt  to  have  lost  heavily  in 
public  estimation," 

Then  followed  all  the  squalid  business  of  Schles- 


LAND-GRAB  AND  JINGO  HOPES       31 

wIg-Holstein  and  Denmark.  Any  one  deeply  im- 
bued with  the  alleged  gallantry  of  diplomatic  Britain 
guarding  the  interests  of  small  states  and  preserving 
"  scraps  of  paper,"  might  read  with  profit  the  history 
of  our  share  in  those  transactions.  In  looking  back 
it  is  amazing  to  see  just  where  we  stood  in  relation 
to  France.  Writing  of  the  Frankfurt  Congress, 
Lord  Granville  said  to  Lord  Palmerston: 

"  No  doubt  anything  tending  to  German  Unity  would  be 
disagreeable  to  France,  but  would  not  give  France  any  just 
pretence  for  attacking  Belgium  or  Prussia,  and  if  unity  was 
in  any  military  sense  accomplished,  it  would  make  French 
aggression  towards  the  Rhine  more  difficult." 

There,  in  that  Danish  brawl,  again  the  question  of 
the  integrity  of  a  kingdom  (which  had  been  guar- 
anteed by  the  Powers  in  a  treaty  in  1852)  nearly 
set  Europe  in  a  blaze.  The  Germans  resented  the 
action  of  the  Powers  and  now  sought  an  opportunity 
of  adding  to  their  area  the  two  Elbe  Duchies.  The 
squabble  gave  all  the  diplomatists  a  grand  chance  of 
pushing  ulterior  affairs  affecting  their  states.  It  was, 
indeed,  an  orgy  in  which  the  mildest  game  was  "  beg- 
gar my  neighbour,"  and  the  most  modest  one  "  strip 
Jack  naked."  The  Jingoes  in  England  were  elated 
at  the  prospect  of  a  war  with  Germany,  Palmerston 
had  high  hopes;  the  situation  was  one  he  gloried  in. 
There  is  nothing  like  a  "  scrap  of  paper  "  for  bring- 
ing nations  at  each  other's  throats,  whether  it  be  to 
keep  the  scrap  whole  or  to  tear  it  to  shreds.  The 
temperature  of  Britain  was  raised  to  fever  heat  at 
the  force  thrown  by  two  great  Powers  on  little  Den- 
mark. Ashley  says:  "It  was  suggested  that 
France  and  Great  Britain  should  offer  their  media- 


32       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

tlon  on  the  basis  of  the  Integrity  of  the  Danish  mon- 
archy and  the  engagements  of  185  1-2;  and  that,  if 
such  mediation  were  refused  by  Austria  and  Prussia, 
England  should  despatch  a  squadron  to  Copenhagen, 
and  France  an  army  corps  to  the  Rhenish  frontier  of 
Prussia."  Palmerston  talked  big  and  did  little. 
He  said:  "If  any  violent  attempt  was  made  to 
overthrow  the  rights  and  to  interfere  with  the  in- 
dependence of  Denmark,  those  who  made  the  at- 
tempt would  find  in  the  result  that  it  would  not  be 
Denmark  alone  with  which  they  would  have  to  con- 
tend." Ignorance  of  German  feeling  and  ambition 
was  just  as  dense  then  as  it  is  now,  and  the  ignorance 
was  the  cause  of  many  silly  misunderstandings. 
Apart  from  the  national  question  of  Denmark,  some 
people  said  the  Schleswig-Holstein  affair  arose  be- 
cause commercial  bills  in  the  Duchies  were  drawn 
upon  Hamburg  and  not  upon  Copenhagen !  A  letter 
from  the  Queen  to  Lord  Granville  is  instructive  as 
to  the  way  monarchs  in  those  days  regarded  "  scraps 
of  paper  " : 

"The  Emperor  (French)  and  M.  Drouyn  de  I'Huys  say 
*  We  wish  to  maintain  the  treaty,  but  if  the  alternative  is 
maintaining  it  or  a  conflagration  in  Europe,  we  prefer  to 
modify  or  cancel  it,  rather  than  a  conflagration.'  .  .  .  We 
have  done  too  much,  been  too  active,  and  done  ourselves  no 
good.     We  are,  alas!  detested  in  Germany." 

The  Queen  fought  hard  for  peace  against  the 
leaders  of  the  Opposition  and  some  of  her  chief  Min- 
isters. It  was,  however,  Lord  Granville  whose  wis- 
dom and  tact  ultimately  saved  the  country  from  a 
disastrous  war.     In  another  letter  the  Queen  said: 

*'  The  only  chance  of  preserving  peace  for  Europe  is  by 


QUEEN  VICTORIA'S  IDEAS  33 

not  assisting  Denmark,  who  has  brought  this  entirely  upon 
herself,  and  who,  the  Queen  believes,  would  now  even  resist 
fulfilling  her  promises!  Denmark  is  after  all  of  less  vital 
importance  than  the  peace  of  Europe,  and  it  would  be  mad- 
ness to  set  the  whole  Continent  on  fire  for  the  imaginary 
advantages  of  maintaining  the  integrity  of  Denmark.  Lord 
Palmerston  and  the  Emperor  Nicholas  are  the  cause  of  all 
the  present  trouble  by  framing  that  wretched  Treaty  of 
1852." 

What  strange  ideas  Victoria  had  of  treaties  and 
people's  rights.  What  would  have  happened  had 
she  been  on  the  throne  last  year?  She  might  have 
asked  what  on  earth  the  people  of  this  generation 
have  to  do  with  a  treaty  signed  in  1839,  and  why 
the  British  nation  should  be  committed  to  a  European 
conflagration  because  their  grandfather's  Foreign 
Secretaries  agreed  to  a  diplomatic  deal  of  which  the 
people  knew  little  and  cared  less.  She  might  have 
said,  "  that  Lord  Palmerston  was  the  cause  of  all  the 
present  trouble  by  framing  the  wretched  Treaties  of 
1 83 1-9  which  abrogated  the  Treaty  of  Vienna." 
"  Scraps  of  paper  "  were  not  hallowed  in  those  days, 
and  even  Queens  preferred  peace  to  the  strict  ob- 
servance of  treaties  made  by  men  who  scarcely  ever 
consulted  the  people.  Victoria's  stand  against  Pal- 
merston and  Russell  In  1864  was  a  notable  perform- 
ance for  a  constitutional  monarch.  The  following 
on  sacred  duties  and  convictions  Is  refreshing: 

"  The  Queen  thanks  Lord  Granville  for  his  reassuring 
letter.  She  can  only  repeat  that  she  is  so  thoroughly  con- 
vinced of  the  awful  danger  and  recklessness  of  our  stirring 
up  France  and  Russia  to  go  to  war,  that  she  would  be  pre- 
pared to  make  a  stand  upon  it,  should  it  even  cause  the 
resignation  of  Lord  Russell.  .  .  .  There  are  duties  and  con- 


34       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

victions  so  sacred  and  so  strong  that  they  outweigh  all  other 
considerations.  .  .  .  We  must  not  commit  a  second  time  the 
grievous  fault  of  signing  away  other  people's  rights  and  of 
handing  over  people  themselves  to  a  Sovereign  to  whom  they 
owe  no  allegiance." 

Palmerston's  unauthorized  threat  that  he  would 
regard  it  "  as  an  affront  and  insult  to  England," 
and  that  he  "  would  not  stand  such  a  thing  "  if  an 
Austrian  squadron  were  to  pass  along  the  English 
coasts,  was  provocative  if  it  were  nothing  else.  The 
Cabinet  did  not  endorse  the  language  of  the  fire- 
eating  statesman,  and  though  the  fate  of  Britain  for 
a  long  time  trembled  on  the  brink  of  war,  the  saner 
folk,  rallied  to  the  side  of  the  Queen.  She  wrote 
at  midnight,  June  23rd,  1864,  to  Lord  Granville: 

"  What  the  Queen  is  so  anxious  for  is  that  the  true,  real, 
and  great  interests  of  the  country  should  be  considered,  and 
the  enormous  danger  of  allying  ourselves  with  France,  who 
would  drag  us  into  a  war  with  Italy  and  on  the  Rhine  and 
set  all  Europe  in  a  blaze;  which  is  so  far  more  important 
than  the  very  foolish  excitement  which  the  Queen  is  sure 
will  cool  down  the  moment  war  seems  likely  to  result  from 
it.  .  .  .  The  Treaty  of  1852  must  be  given  up." 

And  given  up  it  was;  utterly  destroyed  by  the 
wolves  that  feasted  on  the  menu  at  Prague.  Den- 
mark was  stripped  stark  of  Lauenburg,  Holstein  and 
the  southern  part  of  Schleswig,  and  the  Danish  por- 
tion of  that  Duchy.  Prussia  won  an  all-round  vic- 
tory, leaving  no  unscrupulous  military,  diplomatic,  or 
imperial  method  out  of  the  deal.  Our  prestige  and 
honour  came  out  of  all  the  miserable  business  some- 
what tousled;  but  the  people  were  spared  the  cost  of 
an  unnecessary  war.     Whether  they  regretted  the 


"  FOUL  IDOL  THROWN  DOWN  "       35 

loss  of  prestige  and  honour  suffered  by  her  diploma- 
tists will  never  be  known;  for  there  is  no  way  of  esti- 
mating the  value  of  diplomatic  honour  in  a  game 
that  is  carried  on  without  the  participation  of  the 
people.  In  the  House  of  Commons,  Disraeli  moved 
the  following  motion : 

"  To  express  to  Her  Majesty  our  great  regret  that  while 
the  course  pursued  by  the  Government  had  failed  to  main- 
tain their  avowed  policy  of  upholding  the  independence  and 
integrity  of  Denmark,  it  has  lowered  the  just  influence  of 
this  country  in  the  councils  of  Europe  and  thereby  dimin- 
ished the  securities  for  peace." 

It  was  in  1864  that  John  Bright  had  something  to 
say  about  the  balance  of  power,  which  had  been  so 
many  times  upset  since  Napoleon  was  sent  to  St. 
Helena.     Speaking  in  Birmingham,  Bright  said: 

"  The  theory  of  the  balance  of  power  is  pretty  nearly 
dead  and  buried.  You  cannot  comprehend  at  a  thought 
what  is  meant  by  the  balance  of  power.  If  the  record  could 
be  brought  before  you  —  but  it  is  not  possible  for  the  eye 
of  humanity  to  scan  the  scroll  upon  which  are  recorded  the 
sufferings  which  the  balance  of  power  has  entailed  upon  this 
countiy.  It  rises  up  before  me  when  I  think  of  it  as  a 
ghastly  phantom  which  during  one  hundred  and  seventy 
years,  whilst  it  has  been  worshipped  in  this  country,  has 
loaded  the  nation  with  debt  and  taxes,  has  sacrificed  the 
lives  of  hundreds  of  thousands  of  Englishmen,  has  deso- 
lated the  homes  of  millions  of  families,  and  has  left  us,  as 
the  great  result  of  the  profligate  expenditure  it  has  caused, 
a  doubled  peerage  at  one  end  of  the  social  scale,  and  far 
more  than  a  doubled  pauperism  at  the  other.  I  am  very 
glad  to  be  here  to-night,  amongst  other  things,  to  be  able 
to  say  that  we  may  rejoice  that  this  foul  idol  —  fouler  than 
any  heathen  tribe  ever  worshipped  —  has  at  last  been  thrown 


36       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

down,  and  that  there  is  one  superstition  less  which  has  its 
hold  on  the  minds  of  English  statesmen  and  of  the  English 
people." 

Bright  perhaps  regretted  that  so  much  labour  was 
wasted  on  the  schemes  of  diplomatists  while  the 
rights  of  individuals  were  neglected  at  home.  Edu- 
cation, the  franchise,  and  religious  equality  had  not 
much  chance  in  Parliament  while  foreign  affairs  oc- 
cupied the  attention  of  statesmen.  Any  trouble 
abroad  about  some  succession,  or  treaty,  or  duchy, 
was  of  far  greater  importance  than  the  economic, 
political,  or  rehgious  rights  of  the  people.  Whether 
it  is  moral  for  one  generation  to  impose  the  obliga- 
tions of  war  on  the  next  has  not  yet  been  decided  by 
politicians  —  much  less  diplomatists  —  nor  has  it  yet 
occurred  to  any  statesman  to  draw  a  sharp  line  of 
differentiation  between  those  affairs  that  directly  af- 
fect the  true  interests  of  the  people,  and  the  terrible 
traffickings  which  are  done  in  the  name  of  the  people 
without  their  consent.  In  1864  the  agricultural  la- 
bourer in  Britain  was  a  chattel-slave,  and  millions 
of  the  workers  in  the  towns  were  politically  little 
better  off.  Instead  of  a  vote,  a  rifle;  instead  of  an 
acre  of  "  their  native  land,"  a  place  in  a  foreign 
trench;  instead  of  the  full  value  of  his  product,  a 
ticket  for  soup;  these  were  the  net  returns  for  wor- 
shipping the  "  foul  idol."  And  there  were  not  less 
cant  and  hypocrisy  talked  In  the  days  of  Palmerston 
than  are  talked  now  In  the  days  of  Sir  Edward  Grey. 

The  foul  idol  was  not,  however,  so  easily  got  rid 
of  as  Bright  Imagined.  If  the  balance  of  power 
was  thrown  down  in  1 864,  it  did  not  take  diplomatists 
long  to  set  up  something  just  as  foul  in  its  place. 
What  do  terms  matter?     The  cost  is  just  the  same, 


RESULTS  — AS  BEFORE  37 

whether  It  be  balance  of  power,  Triple  Alliance,  En- 
tente Cordlale,  known  agreements,  secret  agreements, 
or  "  conversations  between  military  and  naval  ex- 
perts." The  result  is  the  same;  the  nation  loaded 
with  debt  and  taxation;  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
lives  are  sacrificed;  homes  desolated;  and  there  stalks 
a  pauperism  which  brings  honour  and  glory  to  the 
flag  that  floats  over  the  free.  The  prestige  of  a 
landless  people  Is  something  the  war-poets  might 
immortalize  in  song,  and  the  patriotism  of  a  double 
peerage  be  exalted  in  new  epics  that  might  rival 
Byron's  "  Age  of  Bronze."  The  gospel  of  learn- 
ing to  die  for  one's  country  was  satirical  enough  In 
1864;  —  certainly  millions  had  little  chance  of  living 
decently  in  it, — 

**  The  *  good  old  times  ' —  all  times  when  old  are  good  — 

Are  gone ;  the  present  might  be  if  they  would ; 

Great  things  have  been,  and  are,  and  greater  still 

Want  little  of  mere  mortals  than  their  will: 

A  wider  space,  a  greener  field  is  given 

To  those  who  play  their  '  tricks  before  high  heaven.' 

I  know  not  if  the  angels  weep,  but  men 

Have  wept  enough  —  for  what?  —  to  weep  again!" 

Did  Bright  think  the  power  to  make  war  passed 
with  the  burial  of  the  balance  of  power?  Sanguine 
man,  he  little  knew  what  a  decade  of  diplomacy 
would  bring  forth.  Abyssinia,  the  Austro-Prussian 
War,  and  the  Franco-German  Wars  had  to  come. 
The  inevitable  in  each  case  had  to  happen!  Soon 
after  Bright's  speech,  the  god  of  battles  was  as  busy 
as  ever.  Meanwhile  legislators  quarrelled  like  Kil- 
kenny cats  as  to  whether  the  time  was  ripe  for  the 
people  to  have  free  education,  more  votes,  and  fewer 


38       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR  1 

religious    animosities.     Britain    entered    upon    the 

three  last  decades  of  the   nineteenth  century  with  | 

high  hopes  of  that  enlightenment  which  would  bring 

wisdom  to  electors,  and  enable  them  to  judge  which 

party  was  politically  best  to  carry  on  the  stupendous  1 

work  of  foreign  affairs.     But  with  all  these  hopes 

of  raising  an  educated  electorate,  not  yet  have  the 

people  learned  that  "  fVisdom  is  better  than  weapons 

of  war:  but  one  sinner  destroyeth  much  good." 


CHAPTER  III 

1870 

"  Heavy  banks  of  cloud  with  occasional  breaks  of  brighter 
sky  over  Europe;  and  all  the  plot,  intrigue,  conspiracy,  and 
subterranean  scheming,  that  had  been  incessant  ever  since 
the  Crimean  War  disturbed  the  old  European  system,  and 
Cavour  first  began  the  recasting  of  the  map,  was  but  the 
repulsive  and  dangerous  symptom  of  a  dire  conflict  in  the 
depths  of  international  politics.  The  Mexican  adventure, 
and  the  tragedy  of  Maximilian's  death  at  Queretaro,  had 
thrown  a  black  shadow  over  the  iridescent  and  rotten  fabric 
of  Napoleon's  power.  Prussian  victory  over  Austria  at 
Sadowa  had  startled  Europe  like  a  thunderclap.  The  reac- 
tionary movement  within  the  Catholic  fold,  as  disclosed  in 
the  Vatican  council,  kindled  many  hopes  among  the  French 
clericals,  and  these  hopes  inspired  a  lively  antagonism  to 
protestant  Prussia  in  the  breast  of  the  Spanish-born  Empress 
of  the  French.  Prussia  in  1866  had  humiliated  one  great 
Catholic  power  when  she  defeated  the  Austrian  monarchy 
on  the  battlefields  of  Bohemia.  Was  she  to  overthrow  also 
the  power  that  kept  the  Pope  upon  his  temporal  throne  in 
Rome?  All  this,  however,  was  no  more  than  the  fringe, 
though  one  of  the  hardest  things  in  history  is  to  be  sure 
where  substance  begins  and  fringe  ends.  The  cardinal  fact 
for  France  and  for  Europe  was  German  unity.  Ever  since 
the  Danish  conflict,  as  Bismarck  afterwards  told  the  British 
Government,  the  French  Emperor  strove  to  bring  Prussia 
to  join  him  in  plans  for  their  common  aggrandizement. 
The  unity  of  Germany  meant,  besides  all  else,  a  vast  exten- 
sion of  the  area  from  which  the  material  of  military  strength 
was  to  be  drawn;  and  this  meant  the  relative  depression  of 

39 


40       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

the  power  of  French  arms.  Here  was  the  substantial  fact, 
feeding  the  flame  of  national  pride  with  solid  fuel.  The 
German  confederation  of  the  Congress  of  Vienna  was  a 
skilful  invention  of  Metternich's,  so  devised  as  to  be  inert 
for  offence,  but  extremely  efficient  against  French  aggres- 
sion. A  German  confederation  under  the  powerful  and 
energetic  leadership  of  Prussia  gave  France  a  very  different 
neighbour." 

—  Morley,  Life  of  Gladstone. 

When  the  Due  de  Gramont,  the  French  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  said  in  1870  that  France  would 
not  tolerate  a  Hohenzollern  prince  on  the  Spanish 
throne,  the  balance  of  power  theory  was  suddenly  re- 
vived and  diplomatists  saw  the  prospect  of  a  boom 
in  their  business.  There  had  been  a  lull  at  the  For- 
eign Office,  and  armaments  were  somewhat  de- 
pressed. Save  for  the  murder  of  some  British  sub- 
jects by  brigands  In  Greece  the  horizon  was  fairly 
clear  of  war-clouds.  But  there  was  nothing  quite 
like  the  succession  to  the  Spanish  throne  for  raising 
animosities  In  the  best  regulated  royal  families.  Ac- 
tual military  proceedings  seemed  to  hang  fire  for 
some  time,  and  Bismarck  and  Moltke  became  de- 
pressed. The  latter  saw  no  advantage  to  the  Ger- 
mans in  deferring  the  outbreak  of  hostilities.  A 
telegram  from  the  King  of  Prussia,  recording  a  con- 
versation he  had  had  with  BenedettI,  the  French  am- 
bassador, at  Ems,  reached  Berlin  In  time  to  enliven 
an  otherwise  dull  dinner  for  the  Fafner  and  Fasolt 
of  the  modern  Valhalla.  The  story  is  an  old  one. 
Bismarck  set  to  work  to  make  the  telegram  read  as 
it  suited  his  aim.  It  was  altered  and  published  so 
that  the  new  version  should  stir  the  laggard  factions 
Into  strife.     After  Bismarck's  editing,  Moltke  cried, 


EDITOR  BISMARCK  41 

"  Now  It  has  a  different  ring;  It  sounded  before  like 
a  parley;  now  It  Is  like  the  flourish  In  answer  to  a 
challenge."  Soon  after  the  garbled  telegram  was 
known  to  the  world,  the  German  artisan  was  packing 
up  for  Paris,  and  his  outraged  brother  In  France  was 
labelling  his  luggage  for  Berlin.  Royal  brawls 
touch  the  shrine  on  the  hearth  of  every  labourer's 
cottage  In  Christendom,  and  It  must  not  be  expected 
that  any  loyal  labourer  will  sit  down  under  the  insult 
of  any  nation,  not  his  own,  attempting  to  Interfere 
with  the  succession  of  any  prince  to  a  throne.  The 
people  of  Britain,  too,  were  deeply  agitated.  Soon 
the  question  of  our  neutrality  disturbed  the  minds 
of  statesmen  and  men  in  the  street.     Bismarck  said: 

"  Great  Britain  should  have  forbidden  France  to  enter 
on  war.  She  was  in  a  position  to  do  so,  and  her  interests 
and  those  of  Europe  demand  it  of  her.  He  observed  that 
if  Germany  should  be  victorious,  of  which  he  had  every 
confidence,  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe  would  be  pre- 
served; but  if  France  should  unfortunately  obtain  the  upper 
hand,  she  would  be  mistress  of  Europe  and  impose  her  law 
on  other  states.  England  could  prevent  this  by  her  action 
now.  ..." 

The  French  had  hoped  Britain  would  support  their 
claim  to  Interfere  with  the  Hohenzollern  Intentions. 
Germany  criticised  our  lapse  from  strict  neutrality, 
because  arms,  and  coals,  and  horses  had  been  ex- 
ported to  France.  Each  belligerent  looked  for  be- 
nevolent neutrality  from  Great  Britain,  but  political 
opinion  on  the  question  was  divided.  The  Queen, 
however,  entered  the  lists  and  showed  a  better  un- 
derstanding of  what  strict  neutrality  meant  than  many 
statesmen  did.     She  wrote  to  Lord  Granville : 


42       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

"  The  Queen  would  much  regret  that  any  misunderstand- 
ing should  embitter  the  feelings  between  us  and  Germany, 
and  would  be  glad  to  know  if  you  think  it  would  be  pos- 
sible to  make  any  public  declaration  that  would  convince 
the  German  people  that  our  object  is  to  preserve  a  strict 
neutrality,  and  not  in  any  way  to  favour  France,  but  to 
treat  both  nations  equally." 

It  is  pretty  reading  at  this  time,  how  Belgium 
stood  as  a  neutral  zone  in  1870.  To  one  whose 
heart  is  filled  with  loathing  of  the  hellish  business 
that  has  laid  that  busy  country  waste  and  crippled 
its  brave  population,  nothing  but  bitter  regret  for 
the  misdeeds  of  diplomatists  is  left,  and  a  profound 
horror  of  the  popular  ignorance  of  the  history  of 
treaties. 

The  Treaty  of  1839  was  in  existence  in  1870; 
how  then  did  Britain  act  in  relation  to  it?  What  in- 
fluence did  she  exert  to  keep  Belgium  free  of  blood- 
shed and  all  the  woe  she  suffers  to-day?  What 
great  mind  was  then  at  work?  Is  it  too  much  to  say 
that  all  the  difference  lies  in  the  fact  that  Britain 
had  a  Granville  then,  and  now  she  has  a  Grey?  Our 
hands  were  free  in  1870 1  and  in  face  of  the  danger 
that  either  Germany  or  France  might  be  tempted 
to  gain  military  or  territorial  advantage  in  Belgium 
or  Luxembourg,  we  were  able  to  avoid  dragging 
Britain  into  a  European  war. 

When  the  Times  published  the  text  of  the  draft 
treaty  which  Benedetti  submitted  to  Bismarck  in 
1866,  the  country  was  roused  to  a  high  pitch  of 
Jingo  fever.  According  to  that  document,  in  case 
the  Emperor  of  the  French  should  be  led  by  circum- 
stances to  send  his  troops  to  enter  Belgium  or  to  con- 
quer it,  it  was  laid  down  that  the  King  of  Prussia 


"WHY  NOT  ANNEX  BELGIUM?"     43 

should  "  grant  armed  aid  to  France,"  and  support 
her  "  with  all  his  forces,  military  and  naval,  in  the 
face  of  and  against  every  other  power  which  should 
in  this  eventuality  declare  war."  And  that  was  the 
conspiracy  of  the  agents  of  two  of  the  Powers  which 
signed  the  Treaty  of  1839!  France  evidently  in 
1866  did  not  place  as  much  reliance  on  its  sacred 
provisions  as  her  Ministers  do  to-day.  Some  treat- 
ies are  like  great  lies,  in  this  respect:  the  older  they 
grow  the  more  revered  they  become.  When  that 
notorious  political  adventurer,  Napoleon  III,  wrote 
to  the  Due  de  Gramont  explaining  what  to  his  recol- 
lection occurred  when  the  conspirators  met  in  1866, 
he  said: 

"  Bismarck  said  to  Prince  Napoleon  in  Berlin,  '  You  seek 
an  impossible  thing.  You  would  take  the  provinces  of  the 
Rhine  which  are  German,  and  wish  to  remain  as  they  are. 
Why  do  you  not  annex  Belgium,  where  a  people  exists  of 
the  same  origin  and  the  same  language?  I  have  already 
said  this  to  the  Emperor;  if  he  agrees  with  these  views  we 
will  help  him  to  take  Belgium.  As  for  me,  if  I  were  master, 
and  if  I  were  not  troubled  with  the  King's  obstinacy,  this 
would  be  soon  done.'  " 

Now  Britain  is  fighting  shoulder  to  shoulder  with 
France  because  Germany  has  violated  the  Treaty  of 
1839!  Morley  in  his  Life  of  Gladstone  describes 
the  situation  as  it  affected  Britain: 

"  There  were  members  of  the  Cabinet  who  doubted  the 
expediency  of  England  taking  any  action.  The  real  posi- 
tion of  allFairs,  they  argued,  was  not  altered :  the  draft  treaty 
only  disclosed  what  everybody  believed  before,  namely,  that 
France  sought  compensation  for  Prussian  aggrandizement, 
as  she  had  secured  it  for  Italian  aggrandizement  by  taking 


44       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

Savoy  and  Nice.  That  Prussia  would  not  object,  provided 
the  compensation  were  not  at  the  expense  of  people  who 
spoke  German,  had  all  come  out  at  the  time  of  the  Luxem- 
bourg affair.  If  France  and  Prussia  agreed,  how  could  we 
help  Belgium,  unless  indeed  Europe  joined  ?  But  then  what 
chance  was  there  of  Russia  and  Austria  joining  against 
France  and  Prussia  for  the  sake  of  Belgium,  in  which  neither 
of  them  had  any  direct  interest?  At  the  same  time  ministers 
knew  that  the  public  in  England  expected  them  to  do  some- 
thing, though  a  vote  for  men  and  money  would  probably  suf- 
fice. The  Cabinet,  however,  advanced  a  step  beyond  a  par- 
liamentary vote.  On  July  30th  they  met  and  took  a  decision 
to  which  Mr.  Gladstone  then  and  always  after  attached 
high  importance.  England  proposed  a  treaty  with  Prussia 
and  France,  providing  that  if  the  armies  of  either  violated 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  Great  Britain  would  co-operate 
with  the  other  for  its  defence,  but  without  engaging  to  take 
part  in  the  general  operations  of  the  war.  The  treaty  was 
to  hold  good  for  twelve  months  after  the  conclusion  of  the 
war.  Bismarck  at  once  came  into  the  engagement.  France 
loitered  a  little,  but  after  the  battle  of  Worth  made  no  more 
difficulty,  and  the  instrument  was  signed  on  August  9th." 

It  Is  a  nice  point  in  international  law  how  far  Aus- 
tria and  Russia  lent  their  sanction  to  the  making  of 
the  Treaties  of  1870.  Anyway,  the  treaties  signed 
by  Britain,  France  and  Germany  were  to  continue 
for  the  period  of  the  war  and  for  a  year  after  the 
termination  of  hostilities.  It  was  the  publication  of 
the  draft  treaty  of  1866  that  threw  upon  the  Govern- 
ment the  necessity  of  "  either  doing  something  fresh 
to  secure  Belgium,  or  else  of  saying  that  under  no 
circumstances  would  we  take  any  step  to  secure  her 
from  absorption,"  so  Mr.  Gladstone  said  in  laying 
the  case  before  John  Bright.  In  a  later  letter  to 
Bright  he  said: 


GLADSTONE  ON  BELGIUM  45 

"  You  will,  I  am  sure,  give  me  credit  for  good  faith  when 
I  say,  especially  on  Lord  Granville's  part  as  on  my  own, 
who  are  most  of  all  responsible,  that  we  take  this  step  in 
the  interest  of  peace.  .  .  .  The  recommendation  set  up  in 
opposition  to  it  generally  is,  that  we  should  simply  declare 
that  we  will  defend  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  by  arms  in 
case  it  should  be  attacked.  Now  the  sole  or  single-handed 
defence  of  Belgium  would  be  an  enterprise  which  we  incline 
to  think  Quixotic.  ...  If  the  Belgian  people  desire,  on 
their  own  account,  to  join  France  or  any  other  country, 
I  for  one  will  be  no  party  to  taking  up  arms  to  prevent  it." 

He  added  that  it  would  be  a  crime  to  stand  aloof 
and  see  Belgium  taken  by  another  country  to  satisfy 
dynastic  greed.  Then  Britain's  position  would  have 
been  intolerable  had  she  not  been  perfectly  free  from 
European  entanglements. 

However,  a  new  danger  arose  after  the  signing  of 
the  treaties.  Austria  was  looking  for  an  opportunity 
of  getting  even  with  Bismarck  for  the  troubles  of 
1866.  The  Austrian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
hoped  to  drag  Italy  Into  the  row.  Russia  was  likely 
to  side  with  Germany.  Napoleon  thought  Denmark 
might  be  persuaded  to  join  the  fray  and  get  Schleswig 
back  from  Germany.  The  squabble  which  began  with 
the  HohenzoUern  claim  to  the  Spanish  succession 
seemed  likely  to  Involve  the  whole  of  Europe. 
Then  as  now,  the  Initial  trouble  was  lost  sight  of  in 
the  myriad  complications  set  up  by  former  affrays. 
Of  course,  in  all  these  Intrigues  diplomatists  were 
looking  after  "  the  Interests  of  the  people."  Na- 
tional "  prestige  "  and  "  honour  "  were  acclaimed  by 
the  proletariats  In  every  capital  of  Europe.  The  Im- 
perial aspirations  of  France,  so  dear  to  the  hearts  of 
her  revolutionists,   ranked  in  ardour  with  the  Im- 


46       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

perial  desires  of  the  small  kingdoms  and  duchies  of 
the  German  states,  which  were  to  lose  their  identity 
in  the  maw  of  Bismarck's  scheme  of  confederation. 
The  mixed  populations  of  a  "  united  "  Austria  spent 
sleepless  nights  thinking  of  their  national  "  heritage," 
and  Italy,  with  her  people  all  of  one  mind,  yearned 
for  an  opportunity  of  showing  how  highly  she  valued 
her  "  honour  "  by  siding  with  Austria  in  the  struggle. 
The  success  of  Germany  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war  enabled  Lord  Granville  to  form  a  neutral  league 
which  kept  the  ring  for  the  French  and  Germans. 
There  Is  a  fine  passage  in  Fitzmaurice's  Life  of 
Granville,  which  bears  directly  on  the  wisdom  of 
his  action  In  forming  the  league  of  neutrals.  It  is 
strikingly  appropriate  here;  besides,  it  bears  repeti- 
tion because  it  so  graphically  describes  the  position 
of  Russia  in  European  affairs  forty  years  ago: 

"  It  was  argued  in  France  that  had  Lord  Granville  pur- 
sued an  opposite  policy  to  that  adopted,  and  had  the  Queen 
at  his  advice  placed  herself  at  the  head  of  a  militant  league 
—  so  easy  are  such  combinations  on  paper  —  Denmark, 
Italy,  Austria,  and  Turkey  would,  with  Great  Britain,  have 
forced  conditions  upon  Count  Bismarck,  and  been  ready  to 
bring  Russia  to  a  standstill  in  the  event  of  the  Czar  coming 
to  the  rescue  of  the  King  of  Prussia.  According  to  these 
calculations  not  only  would  France  then  have  been  saved, 
but  Great  Britain  herself  would  have  escaped  the  humilia- 
tion of  having  subsequently  to  consent  to  the  abrogation  of 
the  clauses  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris  relating  to  the  neutraliza- 
tion of  the  Black  Sea.  If  Lord  Granville,  such  was  the 
contention,  had  imposed  an  armed  mediation  on  the  com- 
batants, and  had  practically  dictated  term^  of  peace  to  Ger- 
many, Great  Britain  and  France  could  afterwards  have 
joined  hands  against  Russia,  and  the  clauses  of  the  Treaty 
of  1856  regarding  the  Black  Sea  would  have  been  main- 


GRANVILLE,  FOREIGN  MINISTER       47 

tained  in  their  intcgrit}'.  In  refusing  so  to  act,  Lord  Gran- 
ville, according  to  these  critics,  showed  an  absolute  lack  of 
foresight,  and  missed  an  obvious  opportunity  in  the  month 
of  September,  1870.  The  argument,  however,  overlooks 
the  main  factor  of  the  situation,  the  determination  of  Ger- 
many to  refuse  mediation,  a  determination  plainly  and 
openly  declared.  It  also  overlooks  the  fact,  frequently  for- 
gotten by  foreign  writers  when  engaged  in  making  a  policy 
for  Great  Britain,  that,  in  the  famous  words  of  Lord  John 
Russell  used  in  the  debate  on  the  case  of  Don  Pacifico,  the 
Foreign  Secretary  of  this  country  is  the  Minister  not  of 
France,  nor  of  Russia,  nor  of  any  other  foreign  country, 
but  of  Great  Britain  alone,  and  has  to  think  first  and  fore- 
most of  her  interests.  The  decision  which  Lord  Granville 
had  to  take  depended  on  the  relative  importance  which  as 
Foreign  Minister  he  attached  to  the  preservation  of  peace 
and  to  the  maintenance  of  the  Black  Sea  clauses.  The  for- 
mer and  not  the  latter  was  in  Lord  Granville's  opinion  the 
main  object.  It  is  certain  that  no  intervention  except  an 
armed  mediation  could  have  produced  any  marked  result, 
and  an  armed  mediation  would  only  have  extended  the  area 
of  disturbance.  Nor  can  it  even  be  assumed  as  a  matter 
beyond  doubt  that  a  mediation  in  favour  of  France,  even  if 
successful,  would  necessarily  have  ended  in  the  preservation 
of  the  Black  Sea  clauses,  for  an  armed  mediation  would 
inevitably  have  thrown  Germany  into  the  arms  of  Russia 
even  more  completely  than  before  the  commencement  of  the 
war.  It  is  idle  now  to  speculate  whether,  under  any  cir- 
cumstances, the  clauses  of  the  Black  Sea  Treaty  could  long 
have  remained  part  of  the  public  law  of  Europe;  but  what 
degree  of  sacrifice  it  would  be  wise  for  Great  Britain  to 
make  in  order  to  maintain  them,  if  the  other  Powers  would 
make  no  effort  to  do  so,  was  a  question  which  the  British 
Government  alone  was  competent  to  decide.  On  the  as- 
sumption that  the  clauses  were  worth  an  effort  to  save,  it 
is  hardly  possible  to  imagine  any  method  more  certain  to 
have  immediately  led  not  only  to  their  final  loss,  but  to  that 


48       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

also  of  other  and  far  more  valuable  provisions  of  the  Trea- 
ties of  1856,  than  to  have  initiated  at  this  date  a  gigantic 
struggle  in  which  Germany,  backed  by  Russia  alone,  would 
have  been  engaged  in  a  hand-to-hand  contest  with  the  rest 
of  Europe." 

How  national  dispositions  change  under  the  guid- 
ance of  diplomatists  is  one  of  the  strangest  things, 
outside  the  ultramontane  forest  where  the  lion  will 
lie  down  with  the  lamb,  that  can  be  imagined.  The 
fear  then  was  the  union  of  the  arms  of  Germany 
and  Russia.  Then  our  Foreign  Secretary  was  not 
the  Minister  of  any  country  but  our  own.  And  a 
precept  of  the  Foreign  Office  was  that  phrase  which 
in  our  school-days  we  had  to  write  in  our  copy-books 
one  hundred  times  by  way  of  penalty  for  some  prank, 
"  Mind  your  own  affairs."  Forty  years  back,  our 
policy  was  a  selfish  one:  our  interests  first.  And  it 
was  good  for  Europe  as  a  whole.  Then,  diplomatic 
humiliation  was  preferred  to  war;  now  we  prefer  a 
European  cataclysm  rather  than  diplomatic  humilia- 
tion. In  those  days  treaties  were  "  scraps  of  paper," 
even  when  their  dates  were  of  that  generation;  now 
"  scraps  of  paper  "  are  holy  writ,  though  their  dates 
carry  us  back  more  than  three  score  years  and  ten. 
Holy  writ!  Not  all  the  religious  bodies  in  this 
Christian  land  ever  paid  to  holy  writ  half  the  atten- 
tion we  have  lately  paid  to  the  Treaty  of  1839. 

In  the  negotiations  which  followed,  Thiers  gave 
utterance  to  a  prophetic  statement  when  he  spoke  to 
Lord  Granville  of  the  apathy  shown  by  Great  Britain. 
He  referred  to  Britain's  loss  of  dignity  and  "  the 
danger  to  her  and  all  Europe  of  the  immense  pre- 
ponderance of  Germany:  more  immediately  to  Aus- 
tria,  which  must  lose  her  German  provinces;   for 


JOURNALISTS  AND  STATESMEN        49 

there  was  nothing  that  North  Germany,  with  a  popu- 
lation of  60,000,000,  could  not  do,  acting  as  a  ma- 
chine, and  led  by  such  a  man  as  Bismarck."  Europe 
had  a  foretaste  of  Prussian  militarism;  of  its  arro- 
gance, its  vindictiveness,  its  cruelty.  And  now  it 
would  be  well  for  Britain  to  learn  that  the  same 
sharp  line  which  divided  the  political  party  from  the 
military  party  in  those  days,  still  marks  the  line  of 
cleavage  between  the  parties  to-day.  While  jour- 
nalists and  statesmen  are  lumping  together  indis- 
criminately everything  which  is  of  German  origin, 
and  blasting  the  whole  life  and  thought  of  that  peo- 
ple with  one  charge,  it  should  be  remembered  that, 
after  the  war,  we  shall  have  a  German  Minister  at 
the  Court  of  St.  James,  and  at  Berlin  there  will  be  a 
British  ambassador.  Diplomatic  relations  are  not 
broken  off  forever,  no,  no  matter  what  the  news- 
papers say. 

Even  Thiers,  after  a  visit  in  1870  to  the  Prussian 
headquarters,  found,  so  Lord  Lyons  wrote,  "  that 
there  was  a  political  party  and  a  military  party,  each 
clearly  defined.  The  political  party,  with  which 
Count  Bismarck  himself  in  a  great  measure  agreed 
was  desirous  of  bringing  the  war  to  an  end  by  con- 
cluding peace  on  comparatively  moderate  terms. 
The  military  party  held  that  the  glory  of  the  Prus- 
sian arms  and  the  future  security  of  Germany  de- 
manded that  the  rights  of  war  should  be  pushed  to 
the  uttermost,  and  that  France  should  be  laid  waste, 
ruined,  and  humiliated  to  such  a  degree,  as  to  render 
it  impossible  for  her  to  wage  war  again  with  Germany 
for  very  many  years."  Instead  of  doing  everything 
now  to  embitter  the  best  minds  in  Germany,  how 
much  better  it  would  be  to  seek  out  the  remnant  of 


50       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

the  political  party,  and  sow  the  seeds  of  the  peace 
that  some  day  must  be  consummated,  and  spread  the 
spirit  of  amity  that  must  rise  again  in  the  two  peo- 
ples!  It  is  difficult  to  do  this  so  long  as  the  god  of 
battles  is  presiding  over  British  interests,  but  the  day 
may  come  when  the  people  will  forsake  that  brass 
deity  and  turn  to  the  All-Father.  France  was  sore 
in  1870,  but  France  traded  with  Germany  after  the 
fighting  was  done. 

Peace  negotiations  in  1870  had  a  tortuous  and 
rather  degraded  road  to  travel.  Bismarck  said  that 
Thiers,  through  a  third  party,  proposed  to  make 
peace  and  cede  Alsace  and  Lorraine  in  exchange  for 
Belgium,  by  giving  France  to  King  Leopold,  and  that 
the  Belgian  King  was  most  favourably  disposed  to 
the  scheme.  What  schemes  are  now  being  hatched 
for  grabbing  territory,  only  diplomatists  can  say;  but 
it  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  Allies  will  not  depart  from 
the  conditions  laid  down  in  the  British  House  of 
Commons  by  the  Prime  Minister  at  the  beginning  of 
the  war.  We  might  look  back  to  1870  with  some 
profit  and  remember  what  Gladstone  had  to  say 
about  the  settlement: 

"  If  the  contingency  happen,  not  very  probable,  of  a  sud- 
den accommodation  which  shall  include  the  throttling  of 
Alsace  and  part  of  Lorraine,  without  any  voice  previously 
raised  against  it,  it  will  in  my  opinion  be  a  standing  reproach 
to  England.  There  is  indeed  the  Russian  plan  of  not 
recognizing  that  in  which  we  have  no  part ;  but  it  is  difficult 
to  say  what  this  comes  to." 

Then  later  he  prophesied  a  bad  time  for  Europe 
as  a  result  of  the  settlement: 

"  I  have  an  apprehension  that  this  violent  laceration  and 


WHAT  IS  NEUTRALITY?  51 

transfer  is  to  lead  us  from  bad  to  worse,   and  to   be  the 
beginning  of  a  new  series  of  complications." 

Our  freedom  from  Continental  engagements  saved 
us  from  innumerable  troubles  in  those  days.  The 
position  Lord  Granville  took  up  with  regard  to  strict 
neutrality  could  only  have  been  maintained  so  long 
as  Britain  kept  her  hands  quite  free  of  entanglements 
and  secret  engagements.  Neutrality  is  a  word  that 
has  been  bandied  about  since  the  beginning  of  this 
war,  but  it  had  another  quite  different  meaning  when 
Lord  Granville  was  at  the  Foreign  Office.  The 
policy  of  to-day  has  been  one  of  benevolent  neutral- 
ity, and  it  has  perhaps  been  one  of  the  chief  reasons 
why  we  were  drawn  into  the  tragedy.  Lord  Gran- 
ville defined  the  difference  between  strict  neutrality 
and  benevolent  neutrality  most  clearly: 

"  It  seems  hardly  to  admit  of  doubt  that  neutrality,  when 
it  once  departs  from  strict  neutrality,  runs  the  risk  of  alter- 
ing its  essence,  and  that  the  moment  a  neutral  allows  his 
proceedings  to  be  biassed  by  predilection  for  one  of  the  two 
belligerents  he  ceases  to  be  neutral.  The  idea,  therefore,  of 
a  benevolent  neutrality  can  mean  little  less  than  the  extinc- 
tion of  neutrality." 

According  to  this  definition  the  policy  of  the  For- 
eign Office  of  to-day  is  preposterous,  and  the  des- 
patches of  the  Foreign  Secretary  to  our  ambassadors 
at  Paris  and  Berlin,  asking  the  French  and  German 
Governments  to  declare  their  intentions  towards  Bel- 
gium, were  mere  diplomatic  subterfuge  and  pretext, 
done  to  hoodwink  the  people  and  Parliament.  Our 
position  was  vitiated  by  the  entente  and  the  secret 
agreement  entered  into  in  1906,  when  conversations 
between  French  and  British  military  and  naval  ex- 


52       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

perts  were  permitted  by  the  very  Foreign  Secretary 
that  put  on  the  mantle  of  strict  neutrality  at  the  end 
of  July.  Can  any  one  now  doubt  that  our  proceed- 
ings were  "  biassed  by  predilection  "  when  our  For- 
eign Minister  exchanged  letters  with  M.  Cambon  in 
November,  19 12,  which  committed  Britain  to  the 
obligations  of  war?  Were  we  or  were  we  not 
biassed  when  our  ambassador  at  Petersburg  was 
informed  about  the  orders  given  to  the  fleet  on  July 
27th? 

A  neutral's  hands  must  be  free !  —  at  no  time  since 
January,  1906,  have  our  hands  been  free.  Only  a 
position  of  "  splendid  isolation  "  can  leave  a  nation 
free  to  act  in  a  strictly  honourable  way  in  affairs  of 
this  kind.  There  can  be  no  impartiality  where  the 
policy  of  a  country  is  fettered  by  secret  understand- 
ings. The  phrase  "  foreign  friendships,"  used  so 
often  of  late,  is  in  itself  an  indictment;  and,  in  con- 
nection with  France,  proves  how  absurd  our  position 
as  a  so-called  neutral  power  was  all  through  the  ne- 
gotiations since  the  murder  of  the  Austrian  arch- 
duke. What  would  Lord  Granville  have  thought  of 
our  position  as  a  "  neutral  "  had  he  known  of  arma- 
ment rings  and  touting  diplomats?  What  would  he 
have  said  of  London  newspapers  encouraging  their 
correspondents  in  foreign  capitals  to  inflame  Jingoes 
abroad,  while  the  journals  benefited  from  Russian 
money  paid  for  supplements?  No  one  can  look 
through  the  report  of  Parliamentary  Proceedings 
since  1906,  and  read  the  questions  and  replies  re- 
garding the  Expeditionary  Force  without  being  im- 
pressed with  the  notion  that  we  were  committed  up 
to  the  hilt  to  support  France  if  she  were  attacked  by 
a  third  Power.     Neutrality !     Neutrality  was  a  term 


A  USEFUL  TREATY  — NOW!         53 

to  conjure  with  in  Lord  Granville's  day;  but  since 
the  policy  of  "  foreign  friendships  "  was  inaugurated 
at  the  Foreign  Office  the  term  might  just  as  well  have 
been  obliterated  from  the  vocabulary  of  diplomatists. 
As  for  the  Treaty  of  1839  which  guaranteed  the 
independence  and  neutrality  of  Belgium,  its  existence 
was  never  thought  of  by  any  one  outside  the  Foreign 
Office  since  the  close  of  the  Franco-German  War, 
until  an  excuse  had  to  be  found  for  our  implication 
in  this  imbroglio.  Anyway,  no  attempt  was  made 
to  revive  the  treaties  of  August  9th,  1870.  And  for 
a  very  good  reason;  our  understanding  with  France 
precluded  the  possibility  of  such  a  thing.  The  farce 
of  asking  France  if  she  would  observe  the  independ- 
ence and  neutrality  of  Belgium  could  only  have  been 
appreciated  by  Germany.  On  July  31st  our  fleet 
had  nearly  bottled  up  the  German  navy,  and  an  in- 
vasion of  the  northern  and  western  coasts  of  France 
was  not  probable.  There  was  only  one  way  the 
Germans  could  invade  France,  with  whom  she  had 
no  particular  quarrel,  and  that  was  by  violating  the 
Treaty  of  1839,  and  advancing  her  troops  through 
Luxembourg  and  Belgium.  No  one  knew  that  bet- 
ter than  our  Foreign  Secretary  when  he  sent  his 
despatches  to  Paris  and  Berlin  on  July  31st.  What 
is  to  be  said  of  a  foreign  policy  which  aggravates  a 
nation  by  hemming  it  in  with  secret  understandings 
and  plans  of  General  Staffs,  so  that  when  it  is  at- 
tacked on  its  eastern  frontier  by  a  formidable  foe 
(with  whom  we  act  in  benevolent  ways,  and  who 
with  the  other  Powers  is  privy  to  the  Belgian  Treaty 
of  1839),  and  says  to  the  aggravated  country,  *'  You 
must  not  use  the  only  road  left  open  for  rapid  move- 
ments against  the  ally  of  the  nation  on  your  eastern 


54       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

frontier  ";  while  all  the  time  in  secret  agreement  with 
the  Power  on  the  western  frontier  to  lend  armed 
support  in  the  event  of  an  attack?  A  foreign  policy 
that  binds  together  for  obligations  of  war  three 
Powers  signatory  of  a  treaty  of  neutrality  against 
two  Powers  also  signatory  of  the  same  treaty,  and 
which  places  one  of  these  latter  in  an  invidious  posi- 
tion as  a  belligerent,  is  not  based  upon  the  policy  of 
neutrality  laid  down  by  Lord  Granville. 

But  in  the  event  of  one  of  the  Powers  signatory 
of  the  Treaty  of  1839  violating  the  neutrality  and 
independence  of  Belgium,  were  we  bound  to  help 
lay  waste  its  territory  in  process  of  chastising  the 
initial  violator?  Under  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  our 
obligations  were  not  defined.  There  is  no  provision 
in  it  which  necessitates  Britain  sending  troops  into 
Belgium  to  make  war  on  any  Power  that  should  vio- 
late its  territory.  The  diplomatists  who  drew  up 
the  treaty  knew  what  they  were  doing  when  they  left 
the  question  of  obligation  open.  They  had  no  in- 
tention of  committing  their  respective  Governments 
to  the  obligations  of  war.  The  only  possible  way 
Britain  could  have  Insisted  on  all  the  Powers  signa- 
tory of  the  treaty  observing  its  provisions  was  by 
maintaining  a  position  of  strict  neutrality.  This 
would  have  enabled  her  to  say  that  she  would  act 
against  any  one  or  more  of  the  Powers  who  should 
violate  Belgian  territory,  and  that  British  action 
would  be  limited  to  Belgium  only.  In  the  Treaty  of 
1870  the  obligations  of  Britain  were  clearly  defined: 

"  The  Queen  on  her  part  declares  that  if  during  the  said 
hostilities  the  armies  of  France  should  violate  that  neutral- 
ity (Belgian)  she  will  be  prepared  to  co-operate  with  his 
Prussian  Majesty  for  the  defence  of  the  same  in  such  man- 


CONTORTIONIST  DIPLOMACY        55 

ner  as  may  be  mutually  agreed  upon,  employing  for  that 
purpose  her  naval  and  military  forces  to  insure  its  observ- 
ance, and  to  maintain  in  conjunction  with  his  Prussian 
Majesty,  then  and  thereafter,  the  independence  and  neu- 
trality of  Belgium." 

In  the  same  treaty  our  liability  was  strictly  limited, 
and  the  area  of  our  operations  in  the  case  of  action 
laid  down: 

"  It  is  clearly  understood  that  Her  Majesty  the  Queen 
of  the  United  Kingdom  does  not  engage  herself  by  this 
Treaty  to  take  part  in  any  of  the  general  operations  of  the 
war  now  carried  on  between  the  North  German  Confed- 
eration and  France,  beyond  the  limits  of  Belgium." 

These  provisions  revealed  the  necessity  of  dis- 
pensing with  the  Treaty  of  1839,  which  was  useless 
for  all  practical  purposes  when  the  danger  of  in- 
vasion presented  itself  to  Belgium  in  the  days  when 
Lord  Granville  was  in  control  of  the  Foreign  Office. 
Military  operations  have  so  far  shown  that  Britain 
has  had  something  else  to  do  than  protect  the  neu- 
trality of  Belgium  within  the  area  of  Belgium.  She 
is  at  present  engaged  in  doing  the  very  thing  she 
engaged  with  his  Prussian  Majesty  not  to  do  in  1870: 
that  is,  take  part  in  any  of  the  general  operations 
of  the  war.  Under  the  Treaty  of  1870,  Britain 
could  not  have  landed  a  drummer-boy  on  French 
soil.  Our  actions  on  the  Continent  since  the  out- 
break of  hostilities  have  no  connection  of  any  kind 
with  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  signed  in  1870. 

It  is  not  easy  to  say  how  the  Treaty  of  1870  af- 
fected the  position  of  Russia  and  Austria  as  signa- 
tories of  the  old  treaty.  Their  interest  was  only  con- 
cerned with  that  of  1839,  and  the  fact  that  they  were 


S6       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

not  parties  to  the  new  treaties  raised  a  debatable 
point  as  to  the  validity  of  the  old  one.  All  the  sig- 
natories of  a  treaty  must  agree  to  any  alteration  of 
its  provisions.  Did  Russia  and  Austria  agree  in 
1870  to  the  making  of  the  treaties  of  that  year? 
Morley  says,  referring  to  the  situation  in  1870, 
"  What  chance  was  there  of  Russia  and  Austria  join- 
ing against  France  and  Prussia  for  the  sake  of  Bel- 
gium, in  which  neither  of  them  had  any  direct  in- 
terest? "  In  1830  Britain's  plan  of  preventing  Bel- 
gium from  becoming  a  French  province  was  no  easy 
business,  for  it  destroyed  the  triumph  of  18 14-5 
in  making  Belgium  part  of  the  kingdom  of  Holland. 
Russia  and  Austria  were  lukewarm  parties  to  the 
affair;  and  Prussia  knew  then  she  was  only  a  party 
to  a  deal  of  Palmerston's  to  dish  Talleyrand.  Let 
us  be  ordinarily  honest.  Let  us  for  Heaven's  sake 
get  away  from  the  neurasthenic  slosh  and  tosh  of 
"  violating  treaties,"  and  think  of  our  history  in  con- 
nection with  numberless  "  scraps  of  paper."  No- 
body in  the  long-run  is  going  to  be  taken  in  by  our 
sanctimoniousness,  our  smug  lifting  up  of  hands  to 
heaven  as  though  heaven  were  a  colony  of  the  Brit- 
ish Empire.  "  Things  and  actions  are  what  they 
are,"  said  Bishop  Butler,  in  a  noble  passage,  "  and  the 
consequences  of  them  will  be  what  they  will  be.  Why 
then  should  we  desire  to  be  deceived?" 

The  hoary  method  of  war  first  and  law  after  Is 
being  repeated  in  this  present  complication.  When 
the  question  of  the  legal  position  of  the  five  Powers 
with  regard  to  the  old  treaty  is  thrashed  out  after 
the  war,  there  will  be  a  rush  for  precedents.  A  dip- 
lomatic war  broke  out  in  Europe  when  Russia  an- 
nounced to  the  Powers  In  1870  that  she  considered 


*'  AN  ESSENTIAL  PRINCIPLE  "        57 

herself  no  longer  bound  by  the  provisions  of  the 
Treaty  of  1856.  Mr.  Odo  Russell,  who  was  sent 
by  Lord  Granville  on  a  mission  to  Bismarck,  at  the 
headquarters  of  the  German  army  in  France,  sounded 
Lord  Derby  and  Lord  Russell  before  he  left  Eng- 
land, and  gathered  from  Lord  Russell  that  he  did  not 
believe  that  the  Black  Sea  clauses  could  be  permanent 
and  that  he  favoured  modification.  Lord  Derby 
said,  "  He  would  fight  for  the  neutrality  of  Egypt, 
but  not  for  the  neutrality  of  the  Black  Sea."  The 
actions  of  Lord  Palmerston  and  his  ministry  were 
the  cause  of  deep  dissatisfaction  in  1856,  and  Lord 
Granville  was  severely  criticised  for  the  part  Britain 
took  in  1 870-1.  It  was  said  that  he  had  tamely 
permitted  Russia  to  flaunt  her  decision  to  disregard 
the  Black  Sea  clauses  in  the  face  of  all  the  Powers. 
Our  diplomatic  prestige  suffered  some  humiliation 
on  both  occasions.  In  the  Treaty  of  Paris,  1856,  it 
was  laid  down  that  the  annexed  convention  could  not 
be  annulled  or  modified  without  the  assent  of  the 
Powers  signatory  of  the  Treaty.  Russia's  decision 
was  therefore  a  violation  of  that  provision.  The 
point  of  consequence  here,  however,  is  the  fact  that 
a  Conference  met  in  London  early  in  1871  where  the 
Powers,  including  Russia,  signed  an  agreement  to 
recognize, 

"  that  it  is  an  essential  principle  of  the  law  of  nations, 
that  no  Power  can  liberate  itself  from  the  engagements  of 
a  treaty,  nor  modify  the  stipulations  thereof,  unless  with 
the  consent  of  the  contracting  Powers,  by  means  of  an 
amicable  arrangement." 

If   this    declaration    of   the    London    Conference 
which  defined  an  essential  principle  of  the  law  of  na- 


58       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

tlons  still  holds  good,  what  becomes  of  the  Treaty  of 
1839?  That  Treaty  did  not  define  the  obligations 
of  the  Powers  which  signed  it.  The  Treaties  of 
1870  modified  its  provisions  by  defining  strict  obliga- 
tions without  the  consent  of  Russia  and  Austria. 
Did  the  actions  of  Britain,  France,  and  Prussia,  in 
1870,  according  to  an  essential  principle  of  the  law 
of  nations,  make  the  Treaty  of  1839  null  and  void? 
Mr.  Gladstone  described  the  new  treaties  as  more 
stringent  measures  for  the  protection  of  Belgian  neu- 
trality than  the  general  guarantee  of  1839.  The 
only  way  the  apologists  of  our  foreign  policy  of  to- 
day can  defend  our  action  in  making  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium,  as  laid  down  in  the  Treaty  of  1839,  the 
casus  belli,  is  by  isolating  that  treaty  and  exempting 
it  from  the  law  that  affected  the  Treaty  of  Paris, 
and  the  Agreement  arrived  at  by  the  Powers  at  the 
London  Conference  of  1871,  when  the  Powers  recog- 
nized that  "  no  Power  can  liberate  itself  from  the  en- 
gagements of  a  treaty,  nor  modify  the  stipulations 
thereof,  unless  with  the  consent  of  the  contracting 
Powers." 

International  lawyers  have  gone  so  far  In  defining 
our  position  under  the  old  treaty  as  to  say  that  we 
should  have  accepted  the  German  guarantee  of  Bel- 
gian Integrity  and  independence  at  the  close  of  the 
war,  though  technically  the  spirit  of  the  treaty  were 
violated  by  Germany  In  despatching  troops  across  the 
territory.  Britain  was  not  in  any  way  empowered 
by  the  treaty  to  declare  war  against  Germany  be- 
cause she  asked  Belgium  for  a  free  passage  for  her 
troops.  Why  were  only  Germany  and  France  asked 
the  question?  Why  were  Austria  and  Russia  ig- 
nored?    Russia  was  every  bit  as  much  an  ally  of 


INCONSISTENCIES  59 

Britain  and  France  on  July  31st  as  she  Is  today.  Is 
there  a  European  law?  Surely  all  history  teaches 
us  that  with  nations  it  Is  only  a  question  of  time 
when  each  in  turn  will  say  with  Alexander  I,  "  What 
do  you  suppose  that  all  your  parchments  and  your 
treaties  signify  to  me?  "  Ashley  says,  "  During  the 
Crimean  War  w«e  sent  a  remonstrance  to  Holland  on 
her  violation  of  neutrality  in  supplying  arms  to  Rus- 
sia, and  then  discovered  that  our  own  Ordnance  De- 
partment had  been  ordering  from  the  Dutch  large 
quantities  of  gunpowder." 

The  sublime  faith  that  nations  have  from  time 
Immemorial  placed  in  the  efficacy  of  treaties  is  one  of 
the  features  of  nineteenth  century  diplomacy.  Con- 
sider the  faith  of  the  Belgian  Government  In  the 
Treaty  of  1839 !  On  August  3rd,  the  Belgian  Gov- 
ernment decided  not  to  appeal  to  the  guarantee  of  the 
Powers;  but  within  twenty-four  hours  the  King  of 
the  Belgians  telegraphed  to  King  George  to  exert 
diplomatic  Intervention,  and  no  reference  was  made 
in  the  telegram  to  the  Treaty  of  1839,  Belgium 
knew  from  the  beginning  that  in  the  event  of  a  Euro- 
pean war  Germany  must  advance  against  France 
through  Belgium.  Yet  on  August  2nd  our  Foreign 
Secretary  said  the  Cabinet  had  not  decided  whether 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium  should  be  made  the  casus 
belli/  On  August  ist  our  ambassador  at  Brussels 
was  told  by  the  Belgian  Government  that  they  were 
In  a  position  to  defend  themselves  against  intrusion, 
though  the  relations  between  Belgium  and  her  neigh- 
bours were  excellent,  and  there  was  no  reason  to  sus- 
pect their  Intentions!  Nevertheless,  Belgium  was 
something  of  an  armed  camp  at  Easter,  19 14. 
There  is  a  discrepancy  somewhere;  for  huge  prepara- 


6o       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

tions  for  war  seem  unnecessary  when  a  country  has 
no  reason  to  suspect  the  intentions  of  her  neighbours, 
and  her  relations  with  them  are  excellent. 

Belgium,  however,  thought  it  well  to  be  prepared 
for  all  emergencies.  No  doubt  her  faith  in  Euro- 
pean law  needed  armed  support.  We  know  now 
that  for  eighteen  months  at  least  the  Belgian  Gov- 
ernment had  been  preparing  for  the  day  when  Britain 
and  France  would  be  engaged  together  in  a  European 
war.  Alone,  Belgium  was  no  match  for  Germany. 
Which  Power  then  did  she  fear?  Why  should  a 
neutral  nation,  with  an  abounding  faith  in  the  law 
of  nations,  pass,  within  five  years,  two  laws  to  in- 
crease her  military  establishments?  In  January, 
1910,  she  raised  her  war  forces  from  140,000  to 
180,000,  and  in  November,  1912,  she  raised  her  war 
army  from  180,000  to  340,000.  What  is  the  good 
of  diplomacy?  What  is  the  good  of  treaties,  old  or 
new,  if  distrust  is  to  be  the  result  of  all  efforts  at  neu- 
tralization and  the  making  of  friendships?  There 
is  nothing  quite  so  preposterous  in  the  annals  of  for- 
eign affairs  as  the  arming  of  Belgium,  this  neutral 
state,  against  a  nation  which  had  guaranteed  her 
neutrality.  Does  it  not  prove  that  the  moral  value 
of  a  treaty  depends  on  the  weight  of  armament  be- 
hind it?  Treaties  are  to  blame  for  the  desolation  of 
Belgium;  and  the  treaties,  or  alliances,  or  ententes, 
or  engagements,  or  whatever  diplomatists  call  them, 
that  have  been  the  cause  of  all  the  dreadful  havoc, 
are  those  which  united  France  and  Russia,  and  united 
Britain  and  France.  These  engagements  have  been 
feared  from  the  first  by  all  men  who  look  beyond  the 
point  of  their  noses.  The  policy  of  the  British  For- 
eign Oflice,  ever  since  secret  arrangements  were  en- 


BEHIND  THE  LOOKING-GLASS       6i 

tered  into  with  the  French  and  Spanish  Governments 
in  1904,  has  been  the  most  sinister  menace  to  the 
peace  of  Europe. 

When  the  war  is  over  international  lawyers  may 
be  asked  to  define  the  position  of  a  neutral  state 
that  acts  in  conjunction  with  signatories  of  its  Treaty 
of  neutrality  against  other  signatories  before  its  pro- 
visions are  in  any  way  violated.  Fitzmaurice,  in 
dealing  with  the  negotiations  of  the  Powers  in  con- 
nection with  the  Suez  Canal,  said: 

"  The  world  knew  of  the  '  neutralization  '  of  Belgium  and 
of  the  Black  Sea;  and  it  had  heard  of  the  neutralization  of 
the  Republic  of  Cracow.  But  the  essence  of  those  and 
other  analogous  arrangements  was  the  exclusion  of  the  mili- 
tary and  naval  forces  of  the  Powers  from  entry  upon  the 
neutralized  territories  and  seas." 

If  the  essence  of  the  Belgian  treaty  was  the  ex- 
clusion of  the  military  and  the  naval  forces  of  the 
Powers  how  could  the  casus  belli  of  this  war  be  the 
Treaty  of  1839,  when  Britain  was  engaged  to  France 
and  Russia  against  Germany  and  Austria  before 
Germany  invaded  Belgium?  Well  may  some  curi- 
ous people  ask  the  very  pertinent  question,  Would 
Britain  have  taken  action  against  the  French  if  they 
had  been  the  first  to  invade  Belgium?  Diplomatic 
circumstances  alter  international  cases.  How  they 
have  altered  over  a  period  of  half  a  century  beats  all 
the  ideas  of  topsy-turvydom  that  Gilbert  or  Lewis 
Carroll  ever  dreamed  of.  Take  Egypt:  Lord 
Derby  in  1871  would  fight  for  the  neutrality  of 
Egypt.  In  1857  Palmerston  wrote  the  following  to 
Lord  Clarendon: 


62       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

"  Piccadilly,  March  ist,  1857. 
"  My  dear  Clarendon, 

"  As  to  the  Emperor's  schemes  about  Africa,  the  sooner 
Cowley  sends  in  his  grounds  of  objection  the  better.  It  is 
very  possible  that  many  parts  of  the  world  would  be  better 
governed  by  France,  England,  and  Sardinia  than  they  are 
now;  and  we  need  not  go  beyond  Italy,  Sicily,  and  Spain  for 
example.  But  the  alliance  of  England  and  France  has  de- 
rived its  strength  not  merely  from  the  military  and  naval 
power  of  the  two  states,  but  from  the  force  of  the  moral 
principle  upon  which  that  union  has  been  founded.  Our 
union  has  for  its  foundation  resistance  to  unjust  aggression, 
the  defence  of  the  weak  against  the  strong,  and  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  existing  balance  of  power.  How,  then,  could 
we  combine  to  become  unprovoked  aggressors,  to  imitate  in 
Africa  the  partition  of  Poland  by  the  conquest  of  Morocco 
for  France,  of  Tunis  and  some  other  state  for  Sardinia,  and 
of  Egypt  for  England?  And,  more  especially,  how  could 
England  and  France,  who  have  guaranteed  the  integrity  of 
the  Turkish  Empire,  turn  round  and  wrest  Egypt  from  the 
Sultan?  A  coalition  for  such  a  purpose  would  revolt  the 
moral  feelings  of  mankind,  and  would  certainly  be  fatal  to 
any  English  Government  that  was  a  party  to  it.  Then, 
as  to  the  balance  of  power  to  be  maintained  by  giving  us 
Egypt,  but  wc  do  not  want  the  burden  of  governing  Egypt, 
and  its  possession  would  not,  as  a  political,  military,  and 
naval  question  be  considered,  in  this  country,  as  a  set-off 
against  the  possession  of  Morocco  by  France.  Let  us  try 
to  improve  all  these  countries  by  the  general  influence  of 
our  commerce,  but  let  us  all  abstain  from  a  crusade  of  con- 
quest which  would  call  upon  us  the  condemnation  of  all 
other  civilized  nations." 

It  would  be  difficult  for  the  fiercest  opponent  of 
present  foreign  policy  to  crowd  into  the  same  space 
a  blacker  indictment  than  time  itself  has  made  of 
the  fine  sentiments  of  Palmerston  set  dovv^n  in  that 


UNRECORDED  AGREEMENTS        63 

letter.  Egypt!  What  memories  the  name  brings 
in  a  flash  to  the  student  of  foreign  poHcy.  Den- 
shawi !  The  partition  of  Morocco !  Shades  of 
Algeciras  and  Agadir !  And  all  that  has  been  done 
or  sanctioned  by  Britain  up  to  this  year  would  in 
1857  "revolt  the  moral  feelings  of  mankind  and 
would  certainly  be  fatal  to  any  English  Govern- 
ment that  was  a  party  to  it!"  What  a  commen- 
tary on  the  electors  of  to-day ! 

After  all,  known  treaties  are  the  least  significant 
work  of  diplomatists.  What  is  written  down  in 
them  may  some  day  be  revealed;  but  secret  agree- 
ments and  tacit  understandings  made  by  the  agents 
of  Governments  may  be  without  end,  and  their  true 
import  never  reach  the  people  until  they  are  at 
each  other's  throats.  To  what  base  commitments 
nations  have  been  pledged  by  their  diplomatists,  the 
records  of  the  nineteenth  century  give  us  but  an  Ink- 
ling. The  cross  purposes  of  the  chancelleries  seem 
to  be  without  limit.  Driblets  of  information  left 
behind  by  ambassadors  and  secretaries  of  legations 
frequently  show  that  what  is  one  nation's  meat  Is 
another's  poison.  Lord  Granville  seems  to  have 
been  an  exceptional  man;  one  who  kept  this  country 
fairly  free  from  entanglements.  The  difficulties  of 
his  position  in  the  eighties  may  be  gleaned  from  this 
passage  from  Fitzmaurlce: 

"  Good  relations  were  now  restored  with  Germany  and 
France;  but  if  a  struggle  was  to  take  place  with  Russia, 
Italy  was  also  a  factor  to  be  taken  into  account.  By  the 
Triple  Alliance  of  1882  the  German  Government  was  as- 
sured of  the  support  of  Austria-Hungary  and  Italy  against 
any  attack  by  Russia  or  by  France.  By  the  subsequent 
Treaty  of   1884  with   Russia  a  further  security  had   been 


64       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

obtained  by  Germany  against  a  French  attack.  The  sub- 
stance of  this  Treaty,  though  not  actually  known,  was 
probably  suspected  by  the  Italian  Government,  and  her 
statesmen  apprehended  that  Germany,  once  assured  of  the 
neutrality  of  Russia,  might  in  the  end  attach  a  diminished 
importance  to  the  friendship  of  Italy.  They  consequently 
desired,  by  means  of  an  understanding  with  Great  Britain, 
to  obtain  a  further  security  for  their  northwestern  and 
maritime  frontier  against  France,  and  hoped  to  secure  it 
by  offering  effective  military  support  in  Egypt,  in  return 
for  an  assurance  of  naval  aid  in  the  Mediterranean  in  case 
of  a  French  attack  on  Italy.  Advantageous  as  such  an 
offer  in  many  respects  might  appear.  Lord  Granville  ad- 
hered to  the  view  that  British  policy  consisted  in  avoiding 
entangling  bargains  with  particular  Powers  in  Egj'pt.  The 
choice,  in  his  opinion,  still  lay  between  the  European  con- 
cert and  individual  action  by  Great  Britain.  In  the  finan- 
cial negotiations,  it  has  been  seen,  he  had  supported  the 
proposals  of  Lord  Northbrook  for  the  latter.  He  had  ended 
by  having  to  consent  to  the  former.  But  he  had  at  least 
escaped  joining  in  an  Anglo-French  guarantee." 

The  changes  which  have  taken  place  since  that 
time,  so  vast  and  opposite  they  are,  fill  one  with 
amazement  that  the  foul  idols  of  diplomacy,  no  mat- 
ter by  what  name  they  are  called,  should  be  super- 
stitions still  in  the  minds  of  the  British  people. 
What  diplomacy  cost  Britain  in  the  twenty  years, 
since  Bright  congratulated  the  audience  at  Birming- 
ham in  1864  to  the  year  when  Gordon  set  out  on 
his  mission  in  Egypt,  must  be  incalculable.  And 
what  did  the  British  masses  get  in  return?  In  1884 
the  burning  domestic  questions  were  the  franchise, 
education,  land,  the  Church,  and  Ireland.  Since 
1864  some  little  progress,  very  little,  had  been  made. 
Russia  still  threatened  the  peace  of  Europe  and  was 


MISSIONARY  LABOURS  65 

a  danger  to  western  civilization  and  individual  lib- 
erty. The  work  of  foreign  affairs  entailed  enor- 
mous sacrifices  of  blood  and  money.  The  peerage 
increased  by  scores;  the  cost  of  poor-relief,  infant 
mortality,  insanity,  all  increased.  Social  evils 
spread;  the  slum  in  the  towns  and  the  unsanitary 
cottage  in  the  country  became  the  forcing-houses  of 
consumptives.  The  army  of  the  unemployed  had  its 
battalions  in  every  town  in  the  land.  But  more  and 
more  money  was  found  by  the  churches  for  foreign 
missions;  and  slowly  the  work  of  converting  the 
heathen  to  a  Christian  method  of  life  made  progress, 
and  the  bayonet  and  high  explosives  were  the  sym- 
bols that  impressed  the  peoples  of  Asia  and  Africa 
that  England  was  the  land  of  the  free. 


CHAPTER  IV 

FRIENDSHIPS 

"  For  all  purposes  of  a  resident  ambassador,  I  hear  persons 
extensively  and  well  acquainted  among  our  foreign  em- 
bassies at  this  date  declare,  That  a  well-selected  Times  re- 
porter or  *  own  correspondent '  ordered  to  reside  in  for- 
eign capitals,  and  keep  his  eyes  open,  and  (though  spar- 
ingly) his  pen  going,  would  in  reality  be  much  more  effec- 
tive;—  and  surely  we  see  well  he  would  come  to  a  good 
deal  cheaper!  Considerably  cheaper  in  expense  of  money; 
and  expense  of  falsity  and  grimacing  hypocrisy  (of  which 
no  human  arithmetic  can  count  the  ultimate  cost)  incal- 
culably cheaper!  If  this  is  the  fact,  why  not  treat  it  as 
such?  If  this  is  so  in  any  measure,  we  had  better  in  that 
measure  admit  it  to  be  so!  The  time,  I  believe,  has  come 
for  asking  with  considerable  severity,  How  far  is  it  so? 
Nay,  there  are  men  now  current  in  political  society,  men  of 
weight  though  also  of  wit,  who  have  been  heard  to  say, 
'  That  there  was  but  one  reform  for  the  Foreign  Office, — 
to  set  a  live  coal  under  it,'  and  with,  of  course,  a  fire- 
brigade  which  could  prevent  the  undue  spread  of  the  de- 
vouring element  into  neighbouring  houses,  let  that  reform 
it!  In  such  odour  is  the  Foreign  Office  too,  if  it  were  not 
that  the  Public,  oppressed  and  nearly  stifled  with  a  mere 
infinitude  of  bad  odours,  neglects  this  one, —  in  fact,  being 
able  nearly  always  to  avoid  the  street  where  it  is,  escape 
this  one,  and  (except  a  passing  curse,  once  in  the  quarter 
or  so)  as  good  as  forgets  the  existence  of  it." 

—  Carlyle,  Latter-Day  Pamphlets. 

It  is  hard  to  believe  there  was  a  time  when  Ger- 
many desired  neither  colonies  nor  fleets.     We  have 

66 


"  A  PLACE  IN  THE  SUN  "  67 

heard  so  much  in  recent  years  of  Germany  wanting 
our  place  in  the  sun,  of  her  determined  policy  to 
wrest  from  us  all  our  colonies,  that  the  Bismarck  of 
the  early  seventies  seems  a  personage  connected  with 
the  Swiss  admiralty  rather  than  a  Chancellor  in 
Berlin.  A  day  or  two  ago  a  reputable  journal  told 
its  readers  that  the  whole  of  the  present  trouble  came 
from  the  ambition  of  Bismarck  to  found  an  empire 
as  vast  as  that  of  Britain,  with  naval  and  merchant 
fleets  dominating  all  the  seas.  The  statement  was 
not  true;  but  in  war-time  that  is  a  small  matter. 
It  was,  however,  a  relief  to  find  neither  Nietzsche 
nor  Treitschke  responsible  for  the  existence  of  the 
Kiel  Canal  and  the  Hamburg-American  Line.  The 
cry  "  Colonies  for  Germany "  had  no  force  until 
1883,  and  then  Bismarck  had  only  an  electioneer- 
ing affection  for  it.  Ten  years  earlier  he  told  Odo 
Russell  that  "  Colonies  would  only  be  a  cause  of 
weakness,  because  colonies  could  only  be  defended  by 
powerful  fleets.  Many  colonies  had  been  offered 
him  —  he  had  rejected  them,  and  wished  only  for 
coaling  stations  acquired  by  treaty  from  other  na- 
tions." The  letters  of  Lord  Ampthill  indicate 
clearly  how  the  change  in  Bismarck's  policy  came 
about : 

"  I  am  in  perfect  despair  at  Prince  Bismarck's  present 
inclination  to  increase  his  popularity  before  the  general 
election  by  taking  up  an  anti-English  attitude.  Compelled 
by  the  colonial  mania,  which  has  gradually  come  to  the 
surface  in  Germany,  to  act  contrary  to  his  better  convictions 
in  the  Angra  Pequena  question,  he  has  discovered  an  un- 
explored mine  of  popularity  in  starting  a  colonial  policy. 
.  .  ,  The  laxity  of  our  quarantine  regulations  has  always 
been  a  German  grievance,  and  the  news  that  the  German 


68       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

Government  has  brought  it  before  the  Conference,  has 
been  hailed  with  enthusiastic  approval  in  the  German  press. 
Men  like  Professor  Virchow  and  Dr.  Koch  accuse  us  openly 
of  having  brought  the  cholera  into  France." 

In  1884  Lord  Granville  wrote  to  Lord  Ampthlll: 

"I  have  never  had  a  more  arduous  fight;  the  difficulty 
being  that  the  Colonial  Office  had  a  very  strong  case  which 
they  had  already  put  in  writing,  and  their  opposition  was 
strongly  backed  by  the  Chancellor  .  .  .  Bismarck's  atti- 
tude is  disagreeable.  He  has  always  been  violently  op- 
posed to  colonization.     He  is  now  obliged  to  yield  .  .  ." 

Rulers  may  have  short  reigns,  but  they  have  some- 
times long  memories.  In  all  the  weary  wranglings 
between  London  and  Berlin  in  the  early  eighties 
there  Is  nothing  more  noticeable  than  the  suspicion 
in  Bismarck's  mind  of  all  our  manoeuvring  with  re- 
gard to  his  colonial  grievances.  There  was  much  to 
remember  which  would  cause  suspicion.  Fltzmau- 
rlce  gives  some  reason  for  this.  In  thinking  over 
the  following  extract,  it  may  be  well  for  us  to  let  our 
minds  go  back  to  early  August,  and  recollect  how 
chary  our  Foreign  Minister  was  of  touching  the 
Luxembourg  question  when  the  neutrality  of  that 
state  was  an  affair  of  the  hour.  FItzmaurice  lifts 
the  curtain  and  reveals  these  signposts  of  foreign 
policy  which  were  not  to  our  credit : 

"  In  the  Liberal  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Colonies, 
Prince  Bismarck  had  not  failed  to  recognize  the  old  Con- 
servative Foreign  Secretary,  the  Lord  Stanley  of  1867,  who 
in  his  opinion  had  betrayed  Europe  over  the  Luxembourg 
question  by  allowing  his  own  signature  to  the  Treaty  of 
that  year  to  be  explained  away:  a  proceeding  which  he  had 
never    forgiven.     In   order   to   avoid   war   between    France 


DISTRUST  AND  SUSPICION  69 

and  Prussia,  it  had  been  agreed  that  Luxembourg  should 
be  neutralized,  that  the  Powers  should  guarantee  the  neu- 
trality of  the  Duchy,  and  that  it  should  be  placed  under 
their  collective  guarantee.  But  the  ink  was  hardly  dry 
on  the  paper  which  embodied  these  conditions  before  ex- 
planations were  added  as  to  the  character  of  this  collective 
guarantee  by  Lord  Derby,  then  Prime  Minister,  which 
seemed  to  reduce  the  international  sanction  thereby  given 
to  the  level  of  a  moral  sanction  only.  The  Treaty,  it  was 
explained,  gave  a  right  to  make  war,  but  it  imposed  no 
obligation ;  none  in  any  case  on  any  of  the  high  contracting 
Powers,  unless  the  others  all  fulfilled  their  own  obligations 
simultaneously.  If  this  interpretation  were  correct,  Lord 
Granville  had  said  at  the  time,  speaking  from  the  benches 
opposite,  it  was  difficult  indeed  to  understand  the  impor- 
tance which  Russia  had  attached  to  the  guarantee,  or  why 
Lord  Stanley  had  shown  such  hesitation  in  becoming  a 
party  to  it.  The  old  wound  still  rankled,  and  if  in  1884 
considerations  of  domestic  policy  were  pushing  Prince  Bis- 
marck into  a  course  of  conduct  hostile  to  Great  Britain  in 
order  to  secure  the  colonial  vote  in  the  German  Parliament, 
he  was  not  discouraged  by  the  reflection  that  he  was  si- 
multaneously annoying  the  Colonial  Secretary.  There  were 
those  also  who  deemed  that  Prince  Bismarck  enjoyed  the 
thought  that  he  was  once  more  opening  up  the  ancient 
chapter  of  accounts  with  England,  which,  notwithstanding 
all  the  recollections  of  18 14-5,  no  German  statesman  has 
ever  entirely  forgotten  in  regard  to  the  betrayal  of  Fred- 
erick the  Great  by  Lord  Bute  in  1762,  when  the  British 
Minister  not  only  deserted  his  ally,  but  while  the  alliance 
still  subsisted  was  believed  to  have  revealed  the  plans  of 
Frederick  for  the  next  campaign  against  France  to  Choiseul 
himself." 

In  foreign  affairs  the  devil  is  really  just  as  black 
as  he  is  painted;  and  the  British  devil  Is  as  black 
as  the  Continental  deviL     "  Love  your  neighbour  as 


70       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

yourself,"  was  not  a  text  to  be  found  over  the  bed 
in  the  guest  chambers  at  Downing  Street,  nor  yet  in 
the  Continental  chancelleries.  Distrust,  suspicion, 
intrigue,  and  bitter  memories  animated  the  vast  ma- 
jority of  men  who  were  entrusted  with  the  construc- 
tion of  treaties,  friendships,  and  alliances.  Odo 
Russell  wrote  from  Berlin  in  1881  to  Lord  Gran- 
ville : 

"  For  ten  years  have  I  preached  confidence  in  Bismarck 
as  a  means  of  success  in  foreign  policy,  but  in  vain !  I 
never  could  overcome  the  deep-rooted  distrust  his  wish  for 
a  cordial  understanding  with  England  inspired  at  home." 

Bismarck  himself  found  the  want  of  consistency 
in  the  policy  of  successive  British  Cabinets  a  source 
of  great  vexation.  In  a  letter  he  wrote  in  1883  he 
complained  of  the  "  astounding  policy  of  succeeding 
Enghsh  Cabinets."     In  the  same  letter  he  said: 

"  Assuming  that  the  ambition  of  an  English  administra- 
tion in  regard  to  Egypt  were  to  overstep  the  limits  which, 
in  my  opinion,  a  reasonable  British  policy  ought  to  respect, 
we  should  not  feel  called  upon  to  quarrel  with  England, 
even  out  of  friendship  for  other  Powers.  .  .  .  The  greatest 
difficulty,  however,  we  encounter,  in  trying  to  give  a  prac- 
tical expression  to  our  sympathies  for  and  our  relations  with 
England,  is  in  the  absolute  impossibility  of  confidential  in- 
tercourse in  consequence  of  the  indiscretion  of  English 
statesmen  in  their  communications  to  Parliament,  and  in 
the  absence  of  security  in  alliances  for  which  the  Crown 
is  not  answerable  in  England,  but  only  the  fleeting  Cabi- 
nets of  the  day.  It  is  therefore  difficult  to  initiate  a  re- 
liable understanding  with  England  othenvise  than  publicly 
and  in  the  face  of  all  Europe.  Such  public  negotiations 
from  their  initiation,  and  even  without  arriving  at  any 
definitive   result,   would  be  highly  detrimental  to   most  of 


FOREIGN  OFFICE  IN  THE  '8o'S       71 

our  European  relations;  but  all  these  difficulties  should  not 
be  allowed  to  stand  in  the  way  of  our  cordially  entertaining 
any  advances  made  to  us,  or  to  prevent  us  from  cultivating 
the  consolidation  of  our  and  Austria's  friendship  with  Eng- 
land." 

A  sidelight  Is  thrown  on  our  Foreign  Office  by 
Lord  Acton,  who  in  his  letters  to  Mary  Gladstone 
said: 

"Yes!  at  last,  foreign  affairs  are  in  a  very  wretched 
way,  and  are  unjustly  and  unreasonably  injuring  Mr.  Glad- 
stone's own  position.  If  Morier  is  still  in  England,  I  wish 
he  could  see  him  before  Petersburg.  He  is  our  only  strong 
diplomatist;  but  he  is  only  strong. 

"  You  know  that  for  all  people  not  private  friends  of 

his  own is  disappointing.     He  is  a  bad  listener,  easily 

bored  and  distrustful  of  energetic  men  who  make  work  for 
themselves  and  for  the  Foreign  Office.  Morier,  in  par- 
ticular, has  force  without  tact,  and  stands  ill  with  a  chief 
who  has  tact  without  force." 

The  work  of  the  Foreign  Office,  In  conjunction  with 
similar  departments  abroad  laid,  in  the  eighties, 
the  foundations  of  the  vast  scheme  of  armaments 
we  have  to  carry  to-day.  It  seemed  then  that  the 
more  we  tried  to  preserve  the  peace  the  more  strained 
foreign  relations  became.  When  we  were  not  quar- 
relling with  Germany,  we  were  not  on  speaking  terms 
with  Russia;  when  we  were  not  colonizing  African 
deserts,  to  use  Mr.  Chamberlain's  phrase,  we  were 
fighting  the  battles  of  the  Ameer.  There  were  bit- 
ter attacks  and  votes  of  censure  In  the  House  of 
Commons,  but  for  the  most  part  on  strictly  party 
lines;  the  Opposition  dearly  desiring  for  themselves 
an  opportunity  of  keeping  up  the  grand  tradition  of 


72       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

the  Foreign  Office.     In  1886  the  following  resolu- 
tion was  moved: 

"  That  in  the  opinion  of  this  House  it  is  not  just  or  ex- 
pedient to  embark  in  war,  contract  engagements  involving 
grave  responsibilities  for  the  nation,  and  add  territories  to 
the  Empire,  without  the  knowledge  and  consent  of  Parlia- 
ment." 

It  was  lost  by  only  four  votes.  It  was  opposed 
by  Mr.  Gladstone,  though  he  did  not  attempt  to  de- 
fend the  Foreign  Office  system  as  an  ideal  one. 

We  now  enter  upon  the  period  when  the  rise  in 
expenditure  on  armaments  must  be  traced  very 
closely.  Beginning  just  after  the  policy  of  "  Col- 
onies for  Germany"  became  popular,  in  1887,  the 
figures  for  naval  expenditure  of  Britain,  France, 
Russia,  and  Germany  were  as  follows:  Britain 
£12,375,000,  France  £8,452,000,  Russia,  £4,352,- 
000,  and  Germany  £4,179,000.  In  1892  the 
French  fleet  visited  Kronstadt,  and  in  1893  ^^^  B.us- 
slan  fleet  visited  Toulon.  Wild  demonstrations  took 
place  on  both  occasions.  Germany  was  not  de- 
lighted with  the  sentiments  expressed  by  the  orators 
at  the  dinners  given  to  the  officers  of  the  dual  navies. 
The  French  shouted,  "  Long  live  Russia,"  and  the 
Russians  shouted,  "  Long  live  France."  The  peace 
of  Europe  was  the  only  aim  of  the  demonstrators  at 
these  feasts.  At  a  dinner  given  at  the  Elysees  Pal- 
ace, the  Russian  ambassador  said: 

"  Before  drinking  a  toast  to  which  will  respond  from 
the  depths  of  their  hearts,  not  only  those  who  are  within 
these  walls,  but  even  those  —  and,  that,  too,  with  equal 
force  —  whose  hearts  near  by  and  far  away,  at  all  the  points 
of  great,  fair  France,  as  also  in  all  Russia,  at  the  present 


COMPARATIVE  FIGURES  73- 

moment  are  beating  in  unison  with  ours, —  permit  me  to 
offer — "  and  so  on  and  so  on,  "  the  true  significance  of  the 
magnificent  peaceful  festivities,  etc.,  etc." 

Czar,  and  President,  and  ambassadors,  and 
bishops,  etc.,  etc.,  all  united  in  glorifying  the  "  peace- 
ful festivities."  Naval  demonstrations  have  no 
other  object!  Anyway,  Germany  did  not  rejoice. 
The  figures  for  naval  expenditure  for  the  Entente 
Powers  and  Germany  in  1897  were  as  follows: 
Britain  £21,972,000,  France  £10,444,000,  Russia 
£6,239,000,  and  Germany  £6,467,000.  These  are 
an  enormous  increase  for  peace  establishments! 
Russia  and  France  combined  spent  that  year  over 
£10,000,000  more  than  Germany.  When  it  is  as- 
sumed by  politicians  and  journalists  that  Germany  is 
to  blame  for  all  the  vast  millions  spent  on  navies  in 
recent  years,  it  would  be  just  as  well  if  it  were 
shown  when  and  how  Germany  led  the  way.  One 
writer  on  naval  affairs,  whose  articles  occupy  much 
space  in  the  monthly  reviews,  stated  recently  that 
Germany  began  the  armament  race  at  the  time  of  the 
Boer  War.  There  is  no  evidence  of  this  in  the  fig- 
ures of  expenditure;  and  to  these  we  must  look,  no 
matter  what  the  Kaiser  said  in  his  speeches  at  that 
time. 

Let  us  begin  with  the  year  before  the  war  in 
South  Africa  broke  out.  In  1898  Britain  spent  £25,- 
674,000,  and  Germany  spent  £5,972,000;  a  differ- 
ence of  less  than  £20,000,000.  After  all  the  agita- 
tion in  Germany  for  a  colonial  policy,  there  was  no 
great  expansion  in  fleet  building.  Indeed  the 
Franco-Russian  celebrations  at  Kronstadt  and  Tou- 
lon fell  within  a  period  when  Germany  pushed  ahead 
in    naval    affairs.     From    1892-3    the    actions    of 


74       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

France  and  Russia  must  not  be  left  out  of  account 
in  tracing  the  growth  of  Germany's  navy.  It  has 
been  the  policy  of  British  Governments  and  the 
press  to  concentrate  attention  on  Germany  and 
Britain  alone,  as  if  Germany  had  no  other  consid- 
eration than  naval  expansion  solely  against  England, 
Now  at  the  close  of  the  Boer  War,  in  1904,  Britain 
spent  £42,431,000  and  Germany  spent  £1 1,659,000; 
a  difference  of  over  £30,000,000.  In  1904  our  ex- 
penditure on  the  navy  was  equal  to  a  four  or  five 
Power  standard.  Germany  then  spent  less  than 
France  or  Russia.  The  figures  for  1904  are  in- 
structive: France  £12,517,143,  Russia  £12,072,- 
381,  and,  as  Germany  had  to  reckon  with  both  coun- 
tries since  the  "  peace  festivities,"  no  one  can  say 
her  naval  expenditure  was  more  of  a  menace  to  the 
peace  of  Europe  than  that  of  France  and  Russia.  If 
we  take  the  years  1890  and  1901  and  compare  the 
figures  of  France  and  Russia  with  those  of  Germany 
we  shall  see  how  "  peace  festivities  "  conduce  to  fleet 
building. 

France  Russia  Germany 

1890     £  8,060,000        £  4,360,000         £  4,938,000 

1901      £13,107,701         £11,659,766         £9,624,956 

France  and  Russia  were  spending  against  Ger- 
many at  the  rate  of  a  two  and  a  half  Power  stand- 
ard. The  British  Government  and  a  certain  well- 
informed  section  of  the  press  knew  that,  but  it  was 
not  the  game  to  give  the  show  away.  Admiral  von 
Tirpitz,  speaking  in  the  Reichstag,  in  1900,  said: 

"  We  should  be  in  a  position  to  blockade  the  Russian 
fleet  in  the  Baltic  ports,  and  to  prevent  at  the  same  time 


\ 


DIPLOMATIC  HUCKSTERING         75 

the  entrance  to  that  sea  of  a  French  fleet.     We  must  also 
protect  our  ports  in  the  North  Sea  from  blockade." 

Well  might  the  Admiral  of  the  German  navy  set 
industriously  about  the  business  of  preparing  to  meet 
his  "  peaceful  "  neighbours.  He  perhaps  had  his  eye 
on  M.  Delcasse,  who  had  great  ambitions  for  France 
in  Morocco.  It  is  nauseating  to  think  of  all  the  in- 
trigue, the  chicanery,  and  the  lying,  that  were  ex- 
pended over  the  Moroccan  affair,  and  to  read  it 
again  at  this  time  is  enough  to  fill  one  with  the  de- 
sire of  Carlyle's  friend  to  place  a  live  coal  under 
the  Foreign  Office,  and  all  such  departments  wher- 
ever found.  To  think  of  our  claim  to  uphold  the 
integrity  and  independence  of  Belgium,  after  the 
Lansdowne-Grey  trafiickings  with  France  and  Spain 
in  connection  with  Morocco,  is  extremely  humiliat- 
ing. A  Government  pledged  to  uphold  the  integ- 
rity and  neutrality  of  a  territory,  which,  behind  the 
back  of  men  representing  nations  determined  to  carry 
out  that  policy,  makes  secret  arrangements  to  allow 
that  territory  to  be  partitioned,  is  not  morally  in  a 
position  to  uphold  the  independence  and  integrity 
of  a  South  Sea  Island.  It  is  a  revolting  page  in  the 
history  of  diplomacy  that  records  the  secret  negotia- 
tions affecting  Morocco.  In  Morocco  in  Diplomacy, 
Mr.  Morel  says: 

"  France  had  in  1901  and  1902  publicly  assured  Mo- 
rocco upon  repeated  occasions  that  she  had  not  the  least 
intention  of  threatening  the  independence  or  the  integrity 
of  that  state.  France  had  formally  and  publicly  declared 
in  an  agreement  with  Great  Britain  that  she  had  no  inten- 
tion of  altering  the  political  status  of  Morocco.  France 
and  Spain  had  formally  and  publicly  declared  their  firm  at- 
tachment  to   the   independence   and   integrity   of   Morocco. 


76       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

France  and  Spain,  and,  by  implication,  Great  Britain,  were, 
therefore,  publicly  pledged  towards  Morocco  and  towards 
the  world  at  large  to  maintain  the  integrity  and  independ- 
ence of  Morocco.  In  point  of  fact,  P'rance,  Spain,  and 
Britain  had  privately  entered  into  contracts  with  one  an- 
other whereby  the  destruction  of  the  independence  and  in- 
tegrity of  Morocco  was  decreed,  the  date  of  the  event  to 
depend  upon  circumstances." 

To  bargain  away  Moroccan  Independence  and  In- 
tegrity for  one  or  two  paltry  advantages  gained 
from  France  In  the  Mediterranean  was  an  act  of 
treachery. 

The  Agreement  between  France  and  Britain  re- 
specting Egypt  and  Morocco  was  signed  April  8th, 
1904.  Our  relations  with  Germany  at  that  time 
may  be  Inferred  from  the  following  excerpt  from 
an  Interview,  published  In  the  Nineteenth  Century 
Review,  with  Count  von  Billow,  the  German  Chan- 
cellor : 

"  I  cannot  conceive  that  the  idea  of  an  Anglo-German 
war  should  be  seriously  entertained  by  sensible  people  in 
either  country.  If  they  will  coolly  consider  the  enormous 
damage  which  even  the  most  successful  war  of  this  char- 
acter would  work  upon  their  own  country,  and  when  they 
reckon  it  out  it  will  be  found  that  the  stake  is  much  too 
high  in  view  of  the  certain  loss.  For  this  reason,  I,  for  my 
part,  do  not  take  the  hostility  of  a  section  of  the  English 
press  too  tragically.  I  hope  that  the  destinies  of  the  two 
countries  will  always  be  determined  by  those  cool  heads 
who  know  that  the  best  advantage  of  Germany  and  Eng- 
land will  be  served  not  only  for  the  present,  but  for  all 
future  time  so  far  as  it  is  discernible  to  the  human  eye  — 
by  the  maintenance  of  the  present  pacific  relations." 

The   North   German   Gaz€(t^   in   March,    1904, 


A  SCARE  MADE  TO  ORDER  77 

said,  "  so  far  as  can  be  gathered  at  the  moment," 
German  interests  in  Morocco  were  not  In  danger, 
as  France  had  repeatedly  stated  that  "  neither  the 
conquest  nor  occupation  "  of  Morocco  was  contem- 
plated. M.  Delcasse  assured  the  German  ambassa- 
dor at  Paris  that  it  was  the  wish  of  France  "  to  up- 
hold in  Morocco  the  existing  political  and  terri- 
torial status."  Four  days  after  Britain  and  France 
signed  the  secret  articles  attached  to  the  public  dec- 
laration, the  German  Chancellor  said  in  the  Reichs- 
tag that  he  had  not  been  notified  of  the  declaration, 
but  he  saw  no  reason  to  believe  that  it  was  directed 
against  Germany : 

"We  are  interested  in  that  country  (Morocco),  as, 
moreover,  in  the  rest  of  the  Mediterranean,  principally 
from  the  economic  standpoint.  Our  interests  therein  are, 
before  all,  commercial  interests;  also  are  we  specially  inter- 
ested that  calm  and  order  should  prevail  in  Morocco.  We 
must  protect  our  commercial  interests  in  Morocco  and  we 
shall  protect  them.  We  have  no  reason  to  fear  that  they 
will  be  set  aside  or  infringed  by  any  Power." 

So  honest  men  generally  believed;  and  indeed  all 
through  the  rest  of  that  year,  millions  of  British- 
ers, Frenchmen,  Spaniards  and  Germans,  were  ut- 
terly ignorant  of  the  secret  articles.  These  were 
not  made  known  to  the  world  until  the  Paris  papers 
got  hold  of  them  and  published  them  in  November, 
191 1.  In  the  early  spring  of  1905,  the  Emperor  of 
Germany  paid  a  visit  to  Tangier.  If  he  had 
strangled  Charon  and  invaded  the  dim  plains  of 
Helusion  there  could  not  have  been  a  greater  out- 
cry in  Christian  Britain.  Many  journalists,  ignorant 
of  the  secret  articles,  imagined  the  Emperor's  visit 


78       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

was  "  a  blow  on  the  heart  "  of  Britain  because  of 
the  Anglo-French  Entente.  The  British  press 
screamed  at  Germany,  and  the  German  press 
screamed  at  Britain.  It  was  a  dirty  campaign  con- 
doned by  the  Foreign  Office;  some  said,  inspired  by 
the  Foreign  Office.  Anyway,  it  is  only  necessary  to 
raise  the  landmarks  here  so  that  we  may  the  better 
understand  why  naval  expenditure  rose  to  gigantic 
proportions  in  the  ensuing  years.  Still,  the  words 
of  a  French  Senator  might  be  quoted,  to  indicate 
the  opinion  of  an  honest  man  as  to  the  public  and 
secret  policies  of  the  Anglo-French  Agreement. 
Baron  d'Estournelles  de  Constant,  in  February, 
1912,  said: 

"  The  French  Parliament,  by  an  abuse  morally,  if  not 
constitutionally,  unpardonably  was  kept  in  ignorance  of 
this  policy.  .  .  .  Far  from  ensuring  general  peace,  the  ar- 
rangements of  1904  tended  to  compromise  it.  .  .  .  Why 
was  the  French  Parliament  told  only  half  the  truth  when 
it  was  asked  to  pass  its  opinion  upon  our  arrangement  with 
England?  Why  was  it  allowed  to  suspect  that  this  ar- 
rangement had  as  its  complement  and  corrective  some  secret 
clauses  and  other  secret  treaties?  It  is  this,  it  is  this  double 
game  towards  Parliament  and  towards  the  world  which 
becomes  morally  an  abuse  of  trust.  .  .  .  Now  the  whole 
effort  of  the  arrangement  of  1904  appears  to-day  in  its 
truth  and  in  its  vanity.  It  was  a  Treaty  of  friendship  with 
England  recognizing  the  freedom  of  our  political  action  in 
Morocco  and  also  proclaiming  our  will  to  respect  the  integ- 
rity of  that  country;  that  was  what  the  public  knew  and 
approved.  But  the  public  was  ignorant  that  at  the  same 
time,  by  other  Treaties  and  by  contradictory  clauses  hidden 
from  it,  the  partition  of  Morocco  between  Spain  and 
France  was  prepared,  of  that  Morocco  of  which  we  guar- 
anteed   the    integrity.     There    existed    two    irreconcilable 


GERMANY  LEFT  OUT  79 

French  policies  in  Morocco:  that  of  the  public  arrange- 
ments, that  is  to  say,  a  policy  of  integrity  which  was  not  the 
true  one ;  and  that  of  secret  arrangements  postulating  a  Pro- 
tectorate and  the  partition  of  Morocco." 

The  reason  the  Emperor  visited  Tangier  must 
be  clear  to  any  honest  business  man.  The  German 
Foreign  Office  had  been  deceived.  The  Under-Sec- 
retary for  Foreign  Affairs,  Lord  Percy,  said  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  in  April,  1905,  that  the  Ger- 
man Government  was  not  officially  notified  as  to  the 
Anglo-French  Agreement  having  any  reference  to 
Morocco.  France  should  have  communicated  it  to 
Germany  but  she  failed  to  do  so.  Germany  was  ig- 
nored. 

Only  a  year  before  Lord  Lansdowne  left  the  For- 
eign Office  he  spoke  at  the  Guildhall,  and  no  doubt 
thought  the  Agreement  he  had  made  v/ith  France 
would  help  to  keep  the  peace  of  Europe.  After 
quoting  from  the  American  Secretary  of  State,  Mr. 
Hay,  that  "  war  Is  the  most  ferocious  and  the  most 
futile  of  human  follies,"  he  said: 

"  We  can  conceive  no  more  terrible,  no  more  life-long 
punishment,  than  that  remorse  that  would  be  felt  by  any 
Minister  who  either  from  a  fault  of  temper  or  from  love 
of  a  passing  popularity,  or  because  they  were  unable  to  put 
themselves  in  the  place  of  their  opponents,  brought  upon 
the  country  the  scourge  of  a  needless  war." 

Yes,  but  the  trouble  Is,  that  the  work  of  the  For- 
eign Office  Is  usually  done  by  men  of  long  lineage 
and  short  vision.  He  hoped  that  something  might 
be  done  "  to  give  a  stimulus  to  the  existing  desire 
for  the  discovery  of  some  less  clumsy  and  brutal 


8o       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

method  of  adjusting  international  disputes."     Cer- 
tainly not  by  making  secret  treaties! 

Peace  advocates  all  over  the  world  believed  when 
Sir  Henry  Campbell-Bannerman  took  office  that  a 
new  era  had  opened.  Arbitration-men,  disarma- 
ment-men, non-resistance  men,  thought  this  leader  of 
the  Liberal  party  would  bring  Britain  into  the  prom- 
ised land  where  brotherhood  was  something  more 
than  an  abstraction.  From  Liberal  platforms  all 
over  the  country  during  the  general  election  of  1906 
audiences  heard  the  gospel  of  peace  and  good-will 
among  nations  preached  by  thousands  of  orators. 
The  new  Prime  Minister  led  the  way  at  the  Albert 
Hall,  in  December,  1905,  when  he  said: 

"  It  is  vain,  it  is  vain,  to  seek  peace  if  you  do  not  also 
ensue  it.  I  hold  that  the  growth  of  armaments  is  a  great 
danger  to  the  peace  of  the  world.  A  policy  of  huge  arma- 
ments keeps  alive  and  stimulates  and  feeds  the  belief  that 
force  is  the  best,  if  not  the  only,  solution  of  international 
differences.  It  is  a  policy  that  tends  to  inflame  old  sores 
and  to  create  new  sores.  And  I  submit  to  you  that  as  the 
principle  of  peaceful  arbitration  gains  ground  it  becomes  one 
of  the  highest  tasks  of  a  statesman  to  adjust  those  arma- 
ments to  the  newer  and  happier  condition  of  things.  What 
nobler  role  could  this  great  country  assume  than  at  the 
fitting  moment  to  place  itself  at  the  head  of  the  league  of 
peace,  through  whose  instrumentality  this  great  work  could 
be  effected." 

Fine  sentiments  those,  for  a  new  government. 
After  fourteen  wars  in  a  period  of  ten  years  even 
some  Jingoes  felt  the  time  had  come  for  a  lower 
income-tax.  Millions  spent  on  Mad  Mullahs,  cam- 
paigns in  India,  expeditions  to  Tibet,  Boxer  feuds, 
and  chastising  Kruger  for  not  giving  the  vote  to 


LORD  ROSEBERY'S  COMPLAINT       8i 

men  in  the  Transvaal  who  in  most  cases  would  not 
have  one  at  home, —  these  things  had  stimulated  a 
spirit  of  arbitration  in  many  an  imperialist  breast. 
Even  Mr.  Balfour  was  inclined  to  turn  over  a  new 
leaf.     He  said: 

"  In  future  we  shall  not  see  wars,  unless,  indeed,  we  can 
conceive  that  either  a  nation  or  a  ruler  should  arise  who 
feel  that  they  cannot  carry  out  their  schemes  of  aggrandize- 
ment except  by  trampling  upon  the  rights  of  their  neigh- 
bours. I  see  no  prospect  of  any  such  calamity  in  Europe. 
It  would  indeed  be  a  tragic  reversion  to  ancient  days  if 
Europe  had  again  to  make  a  coalition  against  any  too  am- 
bitious Power." 

After  that  great  utterance  a  few  words  on  the  se- 
cret articles  of  the  Anglo-French  Agreement  might 
have  aroused  a  very  notable  amount  of  interest. 

It  was  Lord  Rosebery,  however,  who  touched  di- 
rectly on  the  question  which  concerns  us  now.  He 
had  upset  a  good  many  people  in  June,  1904,  by  de- 
nouncing the  Anglo-French  Agreement.  Whether 
or  not  he  knew  anything  about  the  secret  articles,  he 
said  it  was  the  most  "  onesided  agreement  ever  con- 
cluded between  two  Powers  at  peace  with  each 
other,"  and  added  his  hopes  "  that  the  Power  which 
holds  Gibraltar  may  never  have  cause  to  regret  hav- 
ing handed  Morocco  over  to  a  great  military  Power." 
In  October,  1905,  he  said: 

"  I  cannot  understand  why  friendship  with  France  would 
involve  such  violent  polemics  with  Germany  as  now  rage 
between  the  two  countries,  and  which  I  do  not  believe  rep- 
resent the  real  feelings  of  the  two  nations,  though  they 
may  represent  the  feelings  of  some  or  all  of  their  Govern- 
ments;   of    that    I    know    nothing;    but    I    do   view    those 


82       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

polemics  as  a  serious  danger  to  peace,  as  poisonously  influ- 
encing the  two  nations,  and  the  growing  generations  of  the 
two  nations;  and,  therefore,  I  am  one  of  those  who  depre- 
cate most  sincerely  the  view  which  appears  to  prevail  in 
some  quarters,  that  cordial  relations  with  France  mean  ir- 
reconcilable animosity  to  Germany.  Remember,  that  these 
are  not  solitary  matters  with  which  we  are  dealing.  Those 
great  nations  represent  millions  of  men,  huge  fleets,  also 
prepared  for  war,  that  in  some  day  when  it  is  least  expected, 
the  feelings  of  a  nation  may  become  so  exasperated  that  the 
guns,  as  was  said  on  another  occasion,  may  almost  go  off 
by  themselves;  and  therefore,  I  beg  of  you  carefully  to 
think  of  the  heavy  responsibility  that  weighs  on  you  and 
your  representatives  with  regard  to  foreign  affairs." 

Only  a  few  days  before  Lord  Rosebery  warned 
the  country  of  the  dangers  which  beset  a  foreign  pol- 
icy that  breeds  violent  polemics  between  a  Power 
with  whom  we  had  entered  into  friendly  and  secret 
compacts,  and  one  that  felt  aggrieved  by  our  want 
of  diplomatic  courtesy,  Sir  Edward  Grey  spoke  on 
the  question  of  aUiances: 

"  People  do  say  with  perfect  truth,  that  any  question  of 
entering  into  a  definite  alliance  with  regard  to  future  con- 
tingencies with  any  Power  whatever  is  one  which  should 
be  carefully  guarded  and  watched.  An  alliance  which  ap- 
pears a  source  of  strength  to-day  might,  under  some  future 
conditions,  become  a  matter  of  embarrassment;  and,  w^ere 
the  policy  of  alliances  rashly  entered  upon,  I  quite  admit 
that  there  would  be  a  danger  that  this  country  might  be 
led  into  undesirable  entanglements.  That,  I  think,  is  per- 
fectly true;  and  all  that  should  be  borne  in  mind  whenever 
it  is  a  question  of  contracting  any  new  alliance  with  a  for- 
eign power." 

It  is  hard  to  believe  these  were  the  words  of  a 
man  who  in  a  few  months  would  consent  to  the  pro- 


WHY  KEEP  US  IN  DARKNESS?        83 

posal  from  the  French  Government  that  conversa- 
tions between  British  and  French  mihtary  and  naval 
experts  should  take  place.  What  might  England, 
and  poor  broken,  crushed,  outraged  Belgium,  to  say 
nothing  of  France,  have  been  spared  if  the  advice 
laid  down  by  himself  had  only  been  followed!  If 
we  had  not  been  led  into  undesirable  entanglements 
what  slaughter  would  have  been  avoided!  Or  if  all 
the  philosophies  and  systems  discovered  since  the  be- 
ginning of  this  war  had  been  known  to  the  journal- 
ists and  statesmen  who  have  told  us,  when  it  is  too 
late,  what  they  ought  to  have  known  before  Liege 
and  Louvain !  How  misled  In  foreign  affairs  we 
have  been  ever  since  1904!  It  is  perfectly  amaz- 
ing now  to  read  column  after  column  in  Liberal 
newspapers  of  but  a  year  or  two  ago  telling  us  to 
cultivate  friendship  with  Germans;  to  find  Minister's 
speeches  interspersed  with  expressions  of  admiration 
for  German  culture  and  town-planning;  —  while  all 
the  time,  they,  as  keepers  of  the  British  conscience, 
should  have  known  that  "  Germans  were  only  schem- 
ing to  destroy  us."  Treitschke,  Bernhardi  and 
Nietzsche  were  not  authors  black-listed  by  the  care- 
takers of  municipal  libraries,  or  placed  on  the  list 
of  forbidden  books  by  the  Home  Office.  Some  peo- 
ple, Indeed,  found  It  much  easier  to  get  the  works  of 
these  authors  than  to  get  information  of  secret  trea- 
ties and  understandings  from  the  Government. 
Surely  when  Lord  Haldane  was  at  the  War  Office 
the  Secret  Service  Department  notified  him  of  the 
existence  of  all  these  poisonous  authors.  Could 
Lord  Rosebery  have  imagined,  when  he  referred  to 
the  violent  polemics  of  1905,  that  all  the  journalists 
were  thoroughly  well-informed  as  to  the  real  rea- 


84       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

sons  why  we  should  be  at  daggers  drawn  with  Ger- 
many? It  was  not  always  thus.  Indeed  there  was 
a  time  when  Liberal  statesmen  and  journalists  took 
offence  at  vulgar  abuse  of  Germans.  When  a  Cabi- 
net Minister  referred  to  Germany  in  a  hostile  way, 
or  ventured  to  criticise  the  size  of  the  silver  used 
at  banquets  in  Hades,  indignant  Liberals  poured 
their  censure  on  his  head.  Mr.  Chamberlain,  who 
in  his  latter  days  liked  Germany's  fiscal  policy  better 
than  her  foreign  policy,  once  incurred  the  displeasure 
of  the  present  Foreign  Secretary  by  referring  to  the 
length  of  the  spoons  guests  should  use  when  they 
sup  with  the  Devil.  Sir  Edward  Grey  touched  on 
that  breach  of  table  manners  when  he  spoke  on  for- 
eign policy  at  Cheltenham  in  February,  1905  : 

"  They  would  hear  much  of  foreign  policy,  the  parrot 
cry  of  Conservatives  in  distress.  But  when  they  talked 
of  foreign  policy,  what  policy  did  they  mean?  Was  it  the 
policy  of  the  long  spoon,  or  of  the  Triple  Alliance  of  Great 
Britain,  the  United  States,  and  Germany  which  Mr.  Cham- 
berlain had  been  anxious  to  bring  about,  but  which  had  been 
dropped  because  the  countries  chiefly  concerned  did  not  take 
kindly  to  the  idea?  Did  they  mean  the  foreign  policy 
which  had  moved  British  ships  out  of  Port  Arthur  to  let  the 
Russian  ships  in  ?  It  was  well  to  remember  history  some- 
times, as  they  did  not  wish  these  things  to  be  repeated." 

Excellent  advice  after  the  fact.  It  is  hard  to  find 
fault  with  the  advice  given  to  the  electors  before 
1906  by  the  Foreign  Secretary.  It  is  well  to  remem- 
ber history,  difficult  as  that  task  seems  to  be  for 
diplomatists.  As  to  the  Anglo-French  Agreement, 
Sir  Edward  thought  the  spirit  of  it  preferable  to 
the  letter.  He  admitted  there  had  been  diplomatic 
friction  since  the  agreement  had  been  made.     He 


CARETAKERS  85 

also  thought  the  policy  of  the  Government  of  which 
Lord  Lansdowne  was  Foreign  Secretary  had  not 
been  distinguished  through  all  its  years  of  office  by 
consistency  and  continuity, —  meaning  continuity 
within  limits,  not  in  the  sense  that  Bergson  or  Sir 
Oliver  Lodge  would  use  the  term.  Continuity  in 
foreign  policy  to  the  ideal  diplomatic  mind  was  es- 
sential for  the  maintenance  of  the  Empire.  It  was, 
however,  practised  only  between  the  declining 
months  of  one  Government  and  the  adolescent 
months  of  its  successor.  It  is  a  term  more  honoured 
at  St.  Stephen's  than  at  Downing  Street.  That  the 
Government  should  truly  represent  the  people  was 
of  paramount  importance  in  directing  continuity  of 
foreign  affairs.  Mr.  Asquith  in  August,  1905,  be- 
fore he  became  Prime  Minister  dealt  with  this 
point: 

"  When  he  was  told  that  it  was  essential  to  our  inter- 
ests as  an  Empire  that  the  present  Government,  through 
Lord  Lansdowne,  should  go  on  under  existing  conditions 
managing  our  foreign  affairs,  he  pointed  out  that  exactly 
the  reverse  was  the  case.  They  could  not  have  a  state  of 
things  more  dangerous  for  the  stable  conduct  of  foreign 
relations  and  for  the  permanent  arrangements  of  great  and 
difficult  questions  with  external  Powers  than  one  in  which 
every  foreign  government  knew  perfectly  well  that  it  was 
dealing  with  caretakers,  with  persons  who  were  only  pro- 
visionally in  power,  and  who  had  lost  by  a  thousand  manifest 
and  indisputable  signs  the  confidence  of  the  very  country 
in  whose  name  they  professed  to  speak." 

Representation  here  means  that  the  Kingdom 
should  be  governed  by  a  party  that  has  lost  no  bye- 
elections. 

The  Anglo-French  Agreement  was  made  in  the 


86       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

last  year  of  the  Conservative  reign,  and  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Treaty  was  signed  after  the  last  session  of 
that  reign  closed.  Some  Liberal  statesmen  regarded 
these  treaties  with  favour,  but  there  was  one  who 
did  not  see  eye  to  eye  with  his  political  friends.  As 
to  the  Anglo-PVench  Agreement,  Lord  Rosebery  was 
opposed  to  it  from  the  first.  In  March,  1905,  he 
said: 

"  Let  me  take  another  agreement,  as  to  which  I  am  a 
well-known  and  conspicuous  heretic,  the  Anglo-French 
Agreement.  I  am  not  going  to  say  anything  here  about 
this  which  will  make  anybody's  hair  stand  on  end.  I  only 
wish  to  accentuate  my  own  position  in  that  matter,  and  to 
say  that,  while  desiring  as  earnestly  as  any  human  being 
in  these  islands  the  inestimable  boon  of  a  good  understand- 
ing with  France,  I  have  the  deepest  and  most  serious  doubt 
as  to  the  treaty  by  which  that  understanding  was  at- 
tained." 

Again  In  October,  1905,  he  referred  to  the  agree- 
ment: 

"  There  is  another  agreement  which  the  Government  has 
concluded  as  to  which  there  is  a  much  more  unanimous  as- 
sent in  this  country,  so  far  as  I  can  gather  —  I  mean  the 
agreement  with  France.  I  myself  am  sworn  down  not  to 
speak  of  that  agreement.  I  am  sorry  to  say  that  my 
prophecy  as  to  the  complications  which  must  be  the  inevita- 
ble result  has  only  been  too  abundantly  fulfilled." 

One  cannot  help  but  wonder  what  Lord  Rosebery 
would  have  said  if  he  had  known  of  the  secret  arti- 
cles attached  to  that  agreement.  Notwithstanding 
Mr.  Asquith's  statement  as  to  the  necessity  of  a  gov- 
ernment dealing  with  foreign  affairs  truly  represent- 
ing the  people  of  Britain,  Lord  Percy,  the  Conserva- 


A  NEW  POLICY  87 

tlve  Under-Secretary,  did  not  see  how  any  one  could 
for  a  moment  doubt  that  the  Liberal  party  would 
faithfully  fulfil  the  obligations  which  the  Goverrpment 
had  already  entered  Into  with  various  countries, — 
particularly  the  spirit  and  the  letter  of  the  under- 
standing which  they  had  made  with  France. 

In  December,  1905,  the  King  sent  for  Sir  Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman.  He  formed  a  ministry,  and 
in  the  opening  speech  of  the  General  Election,  the 
new  Prime  Minister  said: 

"  As  to  our  general  policy  to  our  neighbours,  our  general 
foreign  policy,  it  will  remain  the  same  in  Government  as 
it  was  in  Opposition.  It  will  be  opposed  to  aggression  and 
to  adventure,  it  will  be  animated  by  a  desire  to  be  on  the 
best  terms  with  all  nationalities,  and  to  co-operate  with 
them  in  the  common  work  of  civilization.  .  .  .  We  want 
relief  from  the  pressure  of  excessive  taxation,  and  at  the 
same  time  we  want  money  to  meet  our  own  domestic  needs 
at  home,  which  have  been  too  long  starved  and  neglected 
owing  to  the  demands  on  the  taxpayer  for  military  pur- 
poses abroad.  How  are  these  desirable  things  to  be  se- 
cured if  in  the  time  of  peace  our  armaments  are  maintained 
on  a  war  footing?  Remember  that  we  are  spending  at 
this  moment,  I  think,  twice  as  much  on  the  army  and 
navy  as  we  spent  ten  years  ago." 

The  new  Prime  Minister  set  to  work  at  once  to 
reduce  expenditure  on  armaments,  and  in  the  first 
two  years  of  office  the  naval  estimates  were  reduced 
by  over  £2,000,000.  Sir  Henry  Campbell-Banner- 
man died  In  April,  1908.  Then  in  1909  the  esti- 
mates jumped  up  suddenly  with  an  Increase  of 
£2,500,000.  Since  that  year  Britain  has  Increased 
her  expenditure  on  the  navy  from  £36,059,652  to 
£52,261,703,   while   in  the   same   period   Germany 


88       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

raised  her  expenditure  from  £20,090,000  to  £23,- 
284,531. 

In  the  Guildhall  speech,  of  1908,  Mr.  Asquith, 
Sir  Henry's  successor,  said: 

"  A  variety  of  circumstances  have  recently  caused  the 
relations  between  Great  Britain  and  Germany  to  become 
a  subject  of  active  public  discussion.  It  is  exactly  a  year 
since  the  German  Emperor  was  the  guest  of  your  predeces- 
sor, my  Lord  Mayor,  in  this  very  hall.  Some  of  us,  and 
I  was  one,  who  were  present  on  that  occasion,  cannot  for- 
get His  Majesty's  emphatic  and  impressive  declaration  that 
the  governing  purpose  of  his  policy  was  the  preservation 
of  the  peace  of  Europe,  and  the  maintenance  of  good  rela- 
tions between  our  two  countries.  It  is  in  the  spirit  of  that 
declaration,  the  spirit  which  aims  not  only  at  peace,  but  at 
good  will,  that  we  desire  to  deal  with  other  Powers,  with 
Germany  certainly  not  less  than  others." 

The  potentate  who  in  March,  1905,  upset  us  so 
much  by  his  visit  to  Tangier,  and  who  was  the  sub- 
ject of  many  a  journalistic  atrocity  for  poking  his 
nose  into  Moroccan  affairs,  was  in  a  few  short  years 
the  honoured  guest  of  my  Lord  Mayor  at  the  Guild- 
hall, the  palace  where  gastronomies  are  practised  only 
by  the  most  respectable  and  cultured  epicures  to  be 
found  near  London  on  the  ninth  of  November. 
Poor  Lord  Mayor,  little  did  he  know  that  he  took 
a  viper  to  his  bosom.  For  all  he  knew  the  Emperor 
might  have  had  a  copy  of  Thus  Spake  Zarathustra 
secreted  under  his  uniform.  As  a  matter  of  course 
the  Emperor's  peaceful  visit  was  followed  speedily 
by  a  period  of  panic.  There  is  nothing  like  em- 
phatic avowals  of  peace  for  unsettling  Jingoes.  Con- 
tinuity of  foreign  policy  was  again  backed  by  con- 


BEATING  THE  TOM-TOM  89 

tinuity  in  naval  policy.  The  reductions  made  under 
Sir  Henry  Campbell-Bannerman  did  not  suit  the 
Whigs,  who,  at  a  loss  for  information  as  to  what 
the  German  Emperor  really  meant  by  his  cryptic 
announcement  at  the  Guildhall,  adopted  the  sugges- 
tion of  an  agent  of  the  armament  ring  to  start  what 
might  be  called  a  "  World  Against  Us "  policy. 
True,  we  were  on  good  terms  with  France  and  Rus- 
sia, and  our  relations  with  Germany,  according  to 
the  Prime  Minister  and  the  German  Emperor,  were 
all  for  the  preservation  of  the  peace  of  Europe.  So 
amicable  were  the  relations  between  Britain  and  Ger- 
many, in  1908,  when  the  naval  estimates  were  in- 
troduced, that  the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty  and 
the  German  Emperor  exchanged  letters  of  banter, 
as  Lord  Rosebery  said  of  the  incident.  The  two 
Governments  without  alhance,  or  treaty,  or  entente, 
or  secret  articles,  were  bound  together  in  the  spirit 
which  aims  only  at  peace.  But  Lord  Cromer  did 
not  think  so.  Something  alarmed  him.  In  the 
House  of  Lords,  in  July,  1908,  he  said: 

"  What  I  would  ask,  in  the  present  condition  of  Europe, 
is  the  main  duty  which  devolves  on  the  Government  of  this 
country?  For  my  own  part,  I  have  no  sort  of  hesitation 
in  replying  to  this  question.  Their  main  duty  is  to  make 
provisions  betimes  for  the  European  conflict  which  may  not 
improbably  be  forced  on  us  before  many  years  have  elapsed. 
I  am  aware  that  the  mass  of  the  people  of  this  country,  who 
do  not  follow  foreign  affairs  with  any  very  close  attention, 
are  not  alive  to  the  possibility  of  any  such  conflict  taking 
place.  I  say  it  is  the  duty  of  a  Government  gifted  with 
both  patriotism  and  foresight,  who  have  means  of  informa- 
tion at  their  disposal  which  is  not  available  to  the  general 
public,  to  provide  betimes  for  that  danger  —  a  danger  of 


90       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

which  I,  in  common,  I  believe,  with  most  people  who  can 
speak  with  real  authority  on  foreign  affairs,  am  very  firmly 
convinced." 

Germany  was  the  country  Lord  Cromer  had  In 
mind;  there  was  no  other  country  in  Europe  that 
could  directly  force  a  European  conflict  on  us.  So 
all  the  fine  statements  of  the  Prime  Minister  and  the 
sophistical  utterances  of  the  Foreign  Secretary  did 
not  allay  the  agitations  of  those  men  who  had 
"  means  of  Information  "  at  their  disposal.  What 
information?  That  was  the  time  when  Mr.  MuU- 
iner  was  busy  finding  men  who  would  believe  his 
yarns  about  German  naval  expansion.  We  shall 
deal  later  on  with  that  "  Information."  Anyway, 
Lord  Cromer's  statement  was  more  than  a  warning; 
It  was  an  Indictment  of  the  Foreign  Oflice  system. 
It  was  also  a  reflection  on  the  Admiralty  and  the 
Government.  If  it  meant  anything  at  all  It  meant 
that  a  policy  of  secrecy,  hyperbole,  and  evasion,  en- 
abled the  Foreign  Secretary  and  the  First  Lord  of 
the  Admiralty  to  withhold  from  the  House  and  the 
country  the  real  state  of  affairs,  and  conceal  from 
the  people  the  nature  of  the  Information  Lord 
Cromer,  not  a  member  of  the  Government,  had  in 
mind  when  he  made  his  speech. 


CHAPTER  V 

ENEMIES 

The  people  is  a  beast  of  muddy  brain 
That  knows  not  its  own  strength,  and  therefore  stands 
Loaded  with  wood  and  stone;  the  powerless  hands 
Of  a  mere  child  guide  it  with  bit  and  rein; 
One  kick  would  be  enough  to  break  the  chain. 
But  the  beast  fears,  and  what  the  child  demands 
It  does;  nor  its  own  terror  understands, 
Confused  and  stupified  by  bugbears  vain. 
Most  wonderful!     With  its  own  hand  it  ties 
And  gags  itself  —  gives  itself  death  and  war 
For  pence  doled  out  by  kings  from  its  own  store. 
Its  own  are  all  things  between  earth  and  heaven; 
But  this  it  knows  not;  and  if  one  arise 
To  tell  this  truth,  it  kills  him  unforgiven. 
—  Campanella,  translated  by  John  Addington  Symonds. 

"  I  tell  you:  one  must  have  chaos  within  to  enable 
one  to  give  birth  to  a  dancing  star."  In  the  middle 
of  the  last  century  there  was  chaos  within  Germany, 
enough  to  give  birth  to  Nietzsche.  Schopenhauer 
the  pessimist,  Bismarck  the  Imperialist,  Strauss  the  ra- 
tionalist, Moltke  the  militarist,  Lassalle  the  philo- 
sophical socialist,  and  Treitschke  the  absolutist  — 
all,  in  their  various  directions,  labouring  In  a  Chris- 
tian country  —  the  strife  of  the  new  against  the  old, 
the  battle  between  evil  and  good  —  created  the  In- 
tellectual chaos  from  which  the  gentle,  fastidious,  re- 
tiring advocate  of  the  superman  burst  out  like   a 

91 


92       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

dancing  star.  The  Christian  state  which  in  its  busi- 
ness from  one  year's  end  to  another  denied  and  even 
derided  every  one  of  the  beatitudes  of  Jesus,  was 
the  field  that  awaited  Nietzsche's  work.  Intellec- 
tual riot  was  fast  overcoming  Hegelianism  and  Lu- 
theranism;  the  period  which  must  come  under  fun- 
damentally false  conditions  when  the  hypocrisy  and 
cant  of  society  are  fiercely  attacked  by  those  who 
are  bold  enough  to  point  out  where  life  is  not  Jived 
as  life  is  preached,  had  about  reached  its  meridian. 
Strong  men  had  surveyed  the  field  before  Nietzsche; 
Marx  had  done  something  to  prepare  the  ground; 
and  earlier  still.  Max  Stirner  had  put  in  the  blade 
of  his  uprooting  plough;  Michael  Bakunin  also  had 
left  traces  in  Germany  after  the  disturbances  of 
1849.  H^'S  pronouncement,  "  we  object  to  all  legis- 
lation, all  authority,  all  influence,  privilege,  patented, 
ofl^cial  and  legal,  even  when  it  has  proceeded  from 
universal  suffrage;  convinced  that  it  must  always 
turn  to  the  profit  of  a  dominating  and  exploiting  mi- 
nority, against  the  interests  of  the  immense  majority 
of  the  enslaved,"  found  an  echo  in  that  sublime 
phrase  of  Nietzsche,  "  where  the  State  ceaseth  there 
beginneth  that  man  who  is  not  superfluous." 

Christianity  had  been  on  its  trial, —  the  new 
"  evil."  Men  were  dissatisfied  with  the  verdict 
"  not  proven,"  and  spent  their  days  in  discovering 
fresh  evidence  against  it.  From  the  conflict  of  di- 
verse views  in  economics,  religion,  and  politics, 
Nietzsche  arose  with  his  lonely  David,  not  of  Israel, 
but  of  Sahara. 

It  was  time  for  a  new  philosophy.  Whether  the 
philosophy  of  the  superman  will  be  of  as  much  value 
to  mankind  as  the  disciples  of  Nietzsche  believe,  is 


WHAT  NIETZSCHE  TAUGHT         93 

not  of  great  consequence;  because  a  world  of  in- 
tellectual supermen  would  be  the  one  that  Nietzsche 
of  all  men  would  not  live  in,  even  if  the  "  much-too- 
many  "  had  passed  from  the  conditions  which  neces- 
sitated the  invention  of  the  State.  An  intellectual 
change  would  not  alter  the  position  of  the  superflu- 
ous man,  nor  make  men  practise  what  they  preach. 
Yet  it  may  be  probable  that  no  one  saw  so  clearly 
the  terrific  force  of  Dostoevsky's  Myshkin  as  Nietzs- 
che. Some  one  may  some  day  take  up  the  tangled 
skein  of  his  thought  and  connect  its  strands  with 
those  of  the  men  who  influenced  his  work. 

His  description  of  Europe  in  the  years  between 
i860  to  1880  will  stand;  from  music  to  women, 
from  philosophy  to  oratory,  from  alcohol  to  poli- 
tics, it  will  satisfy  the  most  persistent  investigator. 
Critic,  iconoclast,  and  illuminator  of  society  and  sys- 
tems, he  stands  pre-eminent.  He  soars  high  in 
many  respects  above  our  own  Carlyle  whom  he  dis- 
liked so  much.  He  thought  he  saw  In  Carlyle  the 
lack  of  those  fundamentals  he  despised.  But  in- 
tellectual and  physical  supermen  without  equal  rights 
—  not  equality  —  will  be  dispensable  giants  under 
proper  economic  conditions;  namely,  when  the  su- 
perfluous man  comes  into  his  own. 

Gerhart  Hauptmann,  so  it  is  reported,  said  that 
the  German  soldier  goes  to  the  front  with  a  copy 
of  Thus  Spake  Zarathustra  in  his  knapsack.  That  is 
a  pretty  tall  statement,  but  it  is  conceivable  that  many 
of  the  town-bred  soldiers  of  Germany  know  some- 
thing of  Nietzsche.  The  real  influence  of  Nietzsche 
has  not,  however,  shown  itself  in  any  of  the  actions  of 
the  German  people  up  to  the  present.  They  in  no  way 
appreciate  his  meaning  of  war  —  less  indeed  than 


94       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

English  journalists.  "  I  see  many  soldiers:  would  I 
could  see  many  warriors !  '  Uniform '  they  call 
what  they  wear:  would  it  were  not  uniform  what 
they  hide  under  it!  "  Prussians  have  not  the  sense 
of  humour  to  grasp  all  there  is  in  his  Joyful  Wisdom. 
This  is  written  with  all  respect  for  the  great  body 
of  literary  Britain  who  during  the  war  have  been 
industriously  picking  the  mote  out  of  German  eyes. 
There  is  nothing  even  savouring  of  the  individualism 
of  Nietzsche  in  German  life.  Even  Richard  Strauss 
in  his  tone-poem  caricatures  the  superman;  though 
he  has  made  an  attempt  recently  to  approach  Diony- 
sus. The  largest  political  body  in  Germany  is  so- 
cialistic—  anathema  to  Nietzsche,  the  Government 
is  bureaucratic !  —  invented  for  the  much-too-many, 
and  individualism  cannot  exist  in  an  army  or  navy; 
as  for  the  church, —  well,  as  there  has  never  been 
room  in  it  for  Jesus,  it  is  not  likely  that  any  lowlier 
individualist  may  attempt  to  declare  from  its  pulpits 
that  "  the  Kingdom  of  God  is  witliin  you." 

There  are  so  many  diverse  notions  of  Individual- 
ism that  it  may  be  opportune  to  ask.  What  is  the  in- 
dividualism of  Nietzsche?  True  individualism  it  is 
not,  for  it  is  without  economic  foundation.  His 
will-to-life-power  does  not  go  deep  enough;  it  lacks 
a  subsistence-basis  —  hence,  perhaps,  his  notion  of 
slaves.  It  is  exceedingly  difficult  to  place  a  funda- 
mental value  on  the  individualism  of  Nietzsche  for 
he  so  often  confuses  man  and  nature,  and  the  func- 
tions of  both.  Delve  into  his  philosophy  as  deeply 
as  you  will,  on  this  matter  astounding  contradictions 
abound;  he  is  so  full  of  multitudes,  as  Whitman 
would  say.     Then  in  the  search  for  fundamentals, 


MEANING  OF  "  EXPLOITATION  "       95 

Dionysus  appears  so  often  perhaps  to  mock  our  ex- 
ertions.    Take  the  passage: 

Exploitation  '  does  not  belong  to  a  depraved,  or  im- 
perfect, or  primitive  society:  it  belongs  to  the  Nature  of  the 
living  being  as  a  primary  organic  function;  it  is  a  conse- 
quence of  the  intrinsic  Will  to  Power  which  is  precisely  the 
will  to  life.  Granting  that  as  a  theory  this  is  a  novelty  — 
as  a  reality  it  is  a  fundarnental  fact  of  all  history:  let  us  be 
so  far  honest  to  ourselves!  " 

Nietzsche  here  assumes  he  is  propounding  some- 
thing new,  something  he  has  discovered  as  a  funda- 
mental fact,  but  the  word  "  exploitation  "  has  old 
and  new  meanings.  If  the  sentence  is  to  be  applied 
to  man's  right  to  exploit  equally  with  other  men  all 
natural  resources,  then  the  statement  is  compatible 
with  true  Individualism.  But,  if,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  statement  and  the  use  of  the  word  "  exploita- 
tion," are  to  be  applied  to  some  men's  power  to  ex- 
ploit the  labour  of  other  men,  then  it  refers  to  our 
old  enemy  Monopoly,  and  is  no  new  theory  or  fun- 
damental fact.  The  context  from  which  the  state- 
ment is  torn  refers  to  individuals;  but  "exploita- 
tion "  belonging  "  to  the  Nature  of  the  living  being 
as  a  primary  organic  function,"  is  a  phrase  which 
carries  the  understanding  back  to  man's  struggle 
with  Nature  for  subsistence,  and  the  fundamental 
basis  of  equal  rights  to  exploit  the  earth  for  the 
satisfaction  of  his  desires  and  needs.  Who  can  tell 
us  just  where  Nietzsche  stood  on  this  question? 
Georg  Brandes?  Perhaps!  Certainly  he  saw 
clearly  the  basic  fault  in  the  contentions  of  Marx  and 
Lassalle. 


96      HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

Yet,  it  would  not  be  strange  If  this  hater  of  every- 
thing German  was,  at  this  time,  shaping  in  the  minds 
of  German  soldiers  tendencies  against  established 
forms  in  the  Fatherland,  more  dangerous  than  all 
the  armaments  of  the  Allies  and  their  millions  of 
men  battling  east  and  west.  If  they  have  got  hold 
of  the  true  Nietzsche,  the  Nietzsche  who  saw  that 
"  pAirope  wishes  to  be  one  " —  then  it  is  probable 
that  Germans  may  now  be  in  the  throes  of  a  vast  in- 
tellectual upheaval. 

Though  he  strikes  without  mercy  at  the  God  made 
by  man,  the  vain,  malicious,  vindictive  God  of  a 
Christianity  which  is  all  that  Jesus  was  not,  Nietzs- 
che never  assails  the  religious  man:  "  rare  one,  sol- 
itary soul!  "  he  would  say  of  him.  God  is  associ- 
ated with  Christianity — "invented  by  Jews,"  — 
churches,  rituals,  etc.  Passages  In  Sanctus  Janiia- 
rius  reek  with  scorn  of  a  man-made  God.  The  gulf 
that  lies  between  Jesus  and  Nietzsche  is  not 
wide;  his  appreciation  of  Dostoevsky  is  the  finger- 
post which  points  that  way;  but  the  gulf  that  yawns 
between  Nietzsche  and  Christianity,  as  he  sees  it, 
cannot  be  spanned. 

Whether  Germans  know  the  elusive,  inspiring, 
nimble,  attractive  Nietzsche  or  no,  a  people  who 
have  a  literature  so  rich  in  wondrous  contradictions 
are  a  people  whom  the  world  must  reckon  with,  for 
they  are  capable  of  great  revolutions,  unless  an  ori- 
ental sickness  fall  upon  their  intelligence.  Through 
Nietzsche  back  to  Novalis, —  for  these  two  sickly 
ones  touched  at  many  points.  Both  in  different  gen- 
erations explored  many  of  the  bye-ways  of  intellec- 
tual life.  Like  Walt  Whitman,  Nietzsche  perhaps 
saw  tokens  at  the  wayside. 


MILITANT  CHRISTIANITY  97 

"  I  wonder  where  I  get  those  tokens, 

Did  I  pass  that  way  huge  times  ago  and  negligently  drop 
them?" 

Back  to  Novalls !  Well,  we  shall  see.  Anyway, 
no  thinker  who  brings  the  future  into  his  hour  of 
meditation  need  be  afraid  of  Nietzsche.  Truth  was 
evil  long  before  he  wrote.  A  list  of  "  evil  "  men 
would  take  us  back  to  Newton,  to  Galileo,  to  Jesus. 
Truth  is  always  "  evil  "  when  it  falls  upon  estab- 
lished forms. 

How  has  it  been  with  us?  The  antipathy  to  Ger- 
many, since  the  Kruger  telegram  and  Mr.  Chamber- 
lain's speech,  delivered  in  the  early  days  of  the  Boer 
War,  increased  in  venom  and  bitterness.  From 
1905  there  has  been  a  campaign  unremitting  in  its 
hatred,  though  at  intervals  checked  by  the  very  in- 
tensity of  its  spleen, —  as  a  fit  of  coughing  brought 
on  by  vociferous  anger  stops  for  a  while  the  reviling 
of  a  virago, —  that  has  on  several  occasions  brought 
the  two  countries  to  the  verge  of  hostilities.  The 
crusade  for  a  protective  tariff,  which  began  in  1902, 
taught  the  people  a  form  of  militant  Christianity  in 
commercial  affairs  which  roused  every  brutish  in- 
stinct and  subjugated  all  the  virtues  of  brotherhood. 
The  catchwords  of  the  propaganda  were  Bis- 
marckian.  Retaliation  was  one  of  the  words  to 
conjure  with;  and  "  Don't  take  it  lying  down!  "  was 
the  phrase  to  stir  lethargic  audiences  to  demonstra- 
tions of  vindictive  joy.  "  Hit  the  foreigner  back," 
and  "  Make  the  foreigner  pay  the  tax,"  were  ex- 
pressions which  rung  for  three  years  from  end  to  end 
of  this  Christian  land.  And  everything  made  in 
Germany  was,  to  a  large  section  of  the  British  peo- 


98       HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

pie,  worse  than  garments  worn  by  lepers.  All  the 
platform  changes  were  rung  on  the  seven  deadly 
sins,  making  virtues  of  them  for  the  needs  of  Mr. 
Chamberlain's  campaign.  Cobden's  platitudes  were 
laughed  to  scorn:  "  Peace  and  good-will  among  na- 
tions "  was  the  cry  of  Britain's  worst  enemies. 
Hundreds  of  thousands  of  working  men  and  women 
were  daily  told  that  the  hated  foreigner  took  the 
bread  out  of  the  mouths  of  the  children  of  British 
artisans.  Ministers  of  the  gospel  frequently  pre- 
sided over  protectionist  meetings  while  orators  dis- 
coursed the  most  blatant  rubbish  a  sensible,  God- 
loving  nation  ever  listened  to. 

No  Nietzschean  gospel  ever  went  so  far  in  that  re- 
spect.    Bands  of  landlords  and  manufacturers  con- 
nived at  getting  for  their  land  and  their  wares  from 
the  millions,  whose  purchasing  power  was  extremely 
low,  more  than  they  were  worth  in  a  free  and  open 
market.     All  the  greed,  envy,  and  enmity  of  com- 
mercialism were  let  loose  in  that  campaign  by  the 
maker  of  the  South  African  War,  to  cover  up  the 
misdeeds    of    the    Government    of    which    he    was 
Colonial  Secretary.     Lord  Hugh  Cecil,  in  referring 
to  the  campaign,  said,  "  Its  methods  were  repulsive. 
They  were  the  methods  of  dragooning."      Britain 
might  not  have  had  her  Treitschke,  but  she  had  her 
Chamberlain.     The   time  was  surely  ripe   for  the 
advent     of     a     British     Nietzsche.     Steadily     the 
churches  had  been  getting  emptier  and  emptier;  the 
divines  screamed  to  the  people  to  come  and  wor- 
ship God,  but  the  people  knew  in  a  dumb,  vague  way 
they  would  not  hear  much  about  the  All-Father  even 
if  they  took  the  trouble  to  go.     So  they  flocked  to 
Brotherhood  meetings  of  a  strictly  undenominational 


THE  STATE  OF  THE  POOR  99 

character;  and  those  who  liked  not  religious  serv- 
ices of  any  kind  thronged  to  the  platform  of  the 
atheist  or  the  rationalist  in  the  parks;  thousands  of 
others  preferring  the  public-house  to  the  squalor  of 
the  homes  they  are  now  shedding  their  blood  to  de- 
fend. 

With  the  aristocratic  class,  what  is  popularly 
thought  to  be  superman-philosophy  was  thought  if 
it  were  not  spoken.  At  the  end  of  1905,  it  would 
have  been  difficult  for  Diogenes  to  find  a  country 
under  the  sun  where  there  was  so  deep  a  contempt 
for  the  poor  and  the  meek  held  by  the  ruling  class. 
Many  British  villages  were  not  unlike  slave  com- 
pounds, and  few  were  the  men,  who  did  not  think 
politically  as  the  squires  thought,  who  dared  to  call 
their  souls  their  own.  Labourers  In  agriculture  at 
any  wage  from  twelve  to  sixteen  shillings  a  week; 
miners  living  In  hovels;  railway  porters  at  less  than 
a  pound  a  week;  and  cotton  operatives  packed  Into 
dull,  drab  streets  of  mean  houses  —  these  were  some 
of  the  millions  that  were  to  breed  a  race  of  men 
whose  destiny  it  would  be  to  write  on  foreign  bat- 
tlefields new  pages  on  the  might  of  Christian  Britain 
to  uphold  justice  and  national  righteousness.  That 
was  the  condition  of  Britain  after  the  close  of  the 
Boer  War. 

During  the  Boer  War  It  was  the  people  who  maf- 
ficked; since  the  beginning  of  this  war  sections  of  the 
press  have  mafficked;  the  people  have  been  strangely 
circumspect.  But  a  survey  of  the  newspapers  since 
the  close  of  the  Boer  War  reveals  an  almost  unin- 
terrupted exhibition  of  repellent  Jingoism  in  the  col- 
umns of  most  of  the  London  penny  papers.  In 
tracing  the  history  of  our  press  campaign  against 


100     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

Germany  one  has  to  go  back  to  the  time  when  the 
German  Emperor  cast  anchor  at  Tangier;  when  the 
British  pubHc,  and  perhaps  the  press,  were  ignorant 
of  the  secret  articles  to  the  Anglo-French  Agree- 
ment. In  that  year  there  was  a  reduction  of 
£3,500,000  in  our  navy  estimates.  This  might  have 
had  something  to  do  with  the  tremendous  outburst 
in  the  press  against  the  Emperor's  visit  to  Morocco. 
Nevertheless,  Jingo  journalistic  fury  was  of  such  a 
violent  character  that  Lord  Rosebery  viewed  the  at- 
tack with  grave  apprehension.  Even  Mr,  Brode- 
rick,  who  had  been  Secretary  for  War  in  a  Con- 
servative Administration,  was  moved  to  remark: 

"  There  could  be  no  personal  feelings  between  the  Gov- 
ernment of  this  country  and  Germany.  He  would  go  fur- 
ther and  say,  there  was  no  outstanding  question  of  any  de- 
scription betAveen  the  two  governments,  and  that  there  was 
nothing  that  should  raise  animosity  between  them,  and  that 
there  was  nothing  which  stood  between  them  and  friend- 
ship. All  the  suggestions  of  misunderstandings  might  be 
put  aside  with  those  stories  which  had  commended  them- 
selves to  some  minds,  of  plans  for  an  irruption  of  100,000 
soldiers  into  Schleswig-Holstein,  or  of  unexpected  and  en- 
tirely gratuitous  attacks,  which  might  serve  to  lubricate  the 
pens  of  some  pressmen,  but  which  would  get  short  shrift 
from  any  responsible  statesmen." 

There  was,  however,  more  truth  than  journalism 
in  the  report  about  an  invasion  of  Schleswig-Hol- 
stein. Responsible  political  leaders  in  France  un- 
derstood that  M.  Delcasse  told  his  friends  that  if 
Germany  and  France  quarrelled,  England  was  will- 
ing to  mobilize  her  fleet,  throw  a  force  of  100,000 
men  into  Schleswig-Holstein,  and  seize  the  Kiel 
Canal.     Neither  remonstrance  from  von  Biilow  in 


THE  YELLOW  PRESS  loi 

Berlin  nor  censure  from  our  leaders  stemmed  the 
flow  of  ink.  The  French  Agreement  was  made  the 
bone  of  contention  in  the  foreign  press;  in  Austrian, 
Italian,  and  German  journals  it  was  taken  as  a 
menace  to  the  Triple  Alliance,  and  in  the  yellow 
press  of  those  countries  a  bitter  agitation  against 
Britain  was  carried  on.  The  jaundiced  school  of 
writers  in  this  country  sent  their  shameful  screeds 
all  over  the  land  in  superlative  efforts  to  outdo  the 
acrimonious  stuff  published  abroad.  Soon  the  na- 
tion, or  that  part  of  it  which  revels  in  horrors,  de- 
voured the  literature  of  carnage,  and  went  to  bed 
with  a  twelve-inch  nightmare  and  woke  to  greet  the 
columns  of  vindictive  ravings  from  the  pens  of  hire- 
lings of  the  armament-ring.  How  much  of  all  the 
campaign  was  inspired  by  the  British  and  French  de- 
partments for  Foreign  Affairs  will  never  be  known; 
no,  not  any  more  than  the  millions  of  roubles  spent 
by  Russia  in  corrupting  a  section  of  the  foreign  press. 
Still  we  do  know  something  of  the  part  played  in  the 
degrading  affair  by  M.  Delcasse.  His  own  coun- 
tryman, M.  de  Pressense,  once  Foreign  Editor  of 
Le  Temps,  wrote : 

"  We  know  by  what  a  series  of  faults  an  excellent  situ- 
ation was  compromised.  M.  Delcasse,  inebriated  by  the 
entente  with  England,  of  which  he  had  been  but  an  elev- 
enth-hour artisan,  hypnotized  by  the  favour  of  the  Czar, 
thought  the  hour  had  struck  for  heroic  enterprises.  He 
dreamed,  if  he  did  not  conscientiously  project,  a  sort  of 
revanche  by  the  humiliation  of  Germany." 

In  Le  Gaulois,  July  I2th,  1905,  M.  Delcasse,  a 
short  time  after  his  downfall,  said: 

**  Of  what  importance  would  the  young  navy  of  Ger- 


102     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

many  be  in  the  event  of  war  in  which  England,  I  tell  you, 
would  assuredly  be  with  us  against  Germany?  What 
would  become  of  Germany's  ports  or  her  trade,  or  her 
mercantile  marine?  They  would  be  annihilated.  That  is 
what  would  be  the  significance  of  the  visit,  prepared  and 
calculated,  of  the  British  squadron  to  Brest,  while  the  re- 
turn visit  of  the  French  squadron  to  Portsmouth  will  com- 
plete the  demonstration.  The  entente  between  the  two 
countries  and  the  coalition  of  their  navies,  constitutes  such 
a  formidable  machine  of  naval  war  that  neither  Germany, 
nor  any  other  Power,  would  dare  to  face  such  an  over- 
whelming force  at  sea." 

And  this  was  the  man  who  was  Minister  for  For-  , 
eign  Affairs  in  France  when  the  Anglo-French 
Agreement  with  its  secret  articles  was  signed.  Yet 
there  are  journalists  in  Britain  who  lead  their  read- 
ers to  believe  that  they  are  informed  as  to  foreign 
affairs,  who  charge  Germany  with  having  provoked 
the  rise  in  naval  expenditure!  The  evidence  is  all 
the  other  way  about. 

Every  man  who  raised  his  voice  in  protest  against 
the  articles  of  the  Blue-Funk  school  was  assailed  as 
a  traitor  or  a  coward.  The  men  of  the  bulldog 
breed  wrote  from  behind  the  screens  of  editorial 
rooms  their  prodigious  fulminations  on  "  Little  Eng- 
enders "  and  Pro-Boers.  From  the  dust-bins  of 
the  Admiralty  and  the  War  Office  they  gathered 
flotsam  and  jetsam,  the  gossip  of  disappointed  half- 
pay  officers  and  clerks,  often  enough  the  rejected  in- 
formation of  servitors  not  required  again. 

Mr.  Bryce,  in  October,  1905,  pointed  to  the  dan- 
ger of  the  press  campaign: 

"  Press  reports,  press  attacks,  tend  to  inflame  and  irritate 
men's  minds.     When  you  are  told  day  after  day  that  some 


DISCREDITABLE  JOURNALISM      103 

one  is  hating  you  and  watching  his  chance  to  attack  you, 
you  may  begin  to  hate  him,  and  put  the  worst  construction 
on  innocent  acts.  Harm  has  already  been  done  which  may 
take  some  time  to  remove." 

Mr.  Morley  dealt  with  the  same  problem  in  his 
speech  at  Arbroath,  about  the  same  time  Mr.  Bryce 
spoke.     Mr.  Morley  said : 

"  (Foreign  Affairs)  are  the  most  obscure,  the  most  deli- 
cate, the  most  complex,  the  gravest  province  of  public  busi- 
ness, and  yet,  oddly  enough,  this  grave,  obscure,  delicate 
province  is  a  free  field,  where  people  find  it  most  easy  to 
be,  if  you  pardon  the  word,  cocksure,  where  they  think  it  is 
most  appropriate  to  fly  into  a  passion,  and  to  use  the  worst 
language  either  about  foreign  nations  or  about  those  of 
their  fellow-countrj'men  who  do  not  happen  to  agree  with 
them." 

Sir  Henry  Campbell-Bannerman  and  Sir  Edward 
Grey  also  laid  stress  in  their  speeches  on  the  neces- 
sity of  responsible  politicians  doing  something  to 
heal  the  breach  made  by  Jingo  journalists  between 
Great  Britain  and  Germany. 

Three  months  after  the  General  Election  the  yel- 
low press  got  down  to  work  in  real  earnest.  One 
paper  told  its  readers  that  "  there  never  was  a  Radi- 
cal Government  that  was  able  to  make  itself  re- 
spected abroad,  and  under  the  new  regime  at  West- 
minster, British  support  of  France  will  be  worth  pre- 
cious little.  And  with  the  defeat  of  France,  British 
prestige  must  inevitably  suffer;  but  this  is  no  more 
than  might  be  expected."  The  press  attack  was 
marvellously  effective.  Under  Mr.  Haldane  the 
Expeditionary  Force  was  reorganized,  on  a  mobi- 
lization basis,  for  service  abroad,  to  comprise  150,- 
000  men.     In  criticising  the  Haldane  scheme,  Lord 


104     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

Roberts,  in  the  House  of  Lords,  fanned  the  flames 
of  Jingo  feeling  in  the  country,  and  incidentally  gave 
the  yellow  press  scribes  some  material  for  future  ar- 
ticles : 

"  If  we  were  required  to  deal  with  '  a  Continental  situa- 
tion '  a  striking  force  of  much  greater  strength  than  150,- 
000  men  would,  in  my  humble  opinion,  be  needed,  if  not 
at  the  very  outset,  long  before  any  large  number  of  rein- 
forcements could  be  trained.  We  would  under  these  cir- 
cumstances be  fighting  against  a  most  carefully  organized 
army  between  two  and  three  millions  strong,  and  thoroughly 
fitted  in  all  respects  for  war,  the  commanders  of  which 
would  be  fully  cognizant  of  our  unpreparedness  and  would 
give  us  as  little  breathing  time  as  possible.  I  doubt  whether 
it  is  realized  in  this  country  that  the  Continental  armies, 
behind  their  vast  mobilized  strength,  possess  practically  un- 
limited reserves.  In  Germany,  for  instance,  though  it  is 
usually  supposed  that  only  about  five  million  men  would 
be  subject  to  the  extreme  demand  of  the  State,  there  are 
altogether  actually  no  less  than  ten  million  men  over  fight- 
ing age  who  have  passed  through  the  ranks  at  one  period 
or  another." 

Alarmists  generally  fastened  on  to  this  statement 
and  pushed  it  for  all  it  was  worth.  Lord  Halsbury 
went  so  far  as  to  say: 

"  As  for  Mr.  Haldane,  his  profession  of  economy,  com- 
bined with  neglect  of  the  military  opinion  of  Earl  Roberts 
and  other  experts,  afforded  a  serious  temptation  to  hostile 
countries  to  seek  the  first  opportunity  to  humiliate  and 
attack  us." 

In  the  autumn  of  1906  a  section  of  the  Tory  press 
did  its  best  to  whip  up  a  navy  scare  because  the  Gov- 
ernment reduced  the  estimates.  "  Patriotism  is 
thrown  to  the  winds,"  screamed  the  Daily  Mail. 


THE  PREMIER'S  ATTITUDE        105 

The  scares  promoted  by  the  yellow  press,  and  the 
bitter  attacks  on  our  Teutonic  neighbour  affected  the 
disposition  of  Germany  towards  the  Hague  conven- 
tion. Mr.  Balfour  did  not  hesitate  to  say  that  Sir 
Henry  Campbell-Bannerman's  attitude  was  hypo- 
critical, inasmuch  as  he  took  credit  for  strengthen- 
ing the  army  and  the  navy  while  he  attended  the 
Hague  peace  meetings  for  disarmament.  The 
Prime  Minister  told  his  audience  at  Manchester  that 
"  he  knew  that  we  have  been  suspected  of  a  wish, 
a  sinister  wish,  to  embarrass  Germany  by  raising  the 
question."      In   explaining  the   situation  he   said: 

"  We  thought  it  our  duty  to  seize  the  opportunity  which 
the  Hague  Conference  offered  for  seeing  whether  a  step 
might  not  be  taken  in  the  right  direction  for  reducing  arma- 
ments. I  think  we  were  right.  .  .  .  The  German  Govern- 
ment appears  to  believe  that  such  a  method  is  idle  and  il- 
lusory and,  as  they  hold  they  can  have  no  share  in  it,  I 
recognize  and  respect  the  candour  with  which  Prince  Biilow 
has  decided  to  stand  aside  from  the  discussion  altogether." 

The  scaremongers  kept  up  the  attack.  It  was 
suggested  that  "  the  Government  had  wrecked  the 
army  and  were  now  trying  to  wreck  the  navy."  The 
statements  of  the  panicmongers  however  reached 
such  a  limit  that  a  Tory  paper,  in  an  article  from  a 
well-informed  correspondent  on  naval  affairs,  said : 

"  The  nation  is  in  no  danger  whatever  from  the  navies 
of  Continental  Powers.  .  .  .  Notwithstanding  the  volume 
and  energy  of  attacks  on  the  Admiralty,  it  is  significant  that 
neither  in  the  House  of  Commons  nor  in  the  House  of 
Lords  has  a  single  division  been  taken  on  any  one  of  the 
questions  at  issue.  This  proves  that  either  the  Unionist  Op- 
position Is  Indifferent  to  or  ignorant  of  the  country's  impend- 
ing fate,  or  that  the  campaign  against  the  Admiralty  is  the 


io6     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

work  of  windbags  whose  puncture  and  perforation  by  facts 
will  be  followed  by  deflation." 

The  position  of  our  navy  with  those  of  Germany, 
France,  and  Russia  was  as  follows: 

Great  Britain         Germany,  France,  and  Russia. 
1,132,205    tons.  1,108,280   tons. 

Britain  exceeded  the  tonnage  of  the  next  three 
Powers  by  23,925  tons. 

Let  us  review  the  march  of  events.  The  Lans- 
downe-Delcasse  public  and  secret  agreements  about 
Morocco  were  signed  in  April,  1904.  Neither 
Britain  nor  France  notified  Germany  of  the  public 
agreement.  The  secret  agreement  meant  that 
France,  Spain,  and  Britain  had  contracted  to  violate 
the  integrity  and  independence  of  Morocco.  In 
March,  1905,  the  German  Emperor  visited  Tan- 
gier with  the  object  of  safeguarding  "  efficaciously 
the  interests  of  Germany  in  Morocco,"  to  use  his 
own  words  In  his  address  to  the  Sultan's  representa- 
tives. Then  followed  the  war  In  the  British  and 
Continental  press.  But  the  secret  articles  were  not 
made  known  until  six  years  after  the  visit  that  caused 
the  sensation  In  Britain  and  France.  In  January, 
1906,  Sir  Edward  Grey  agreed  with  the  French 
Government  that  conversations  should  take  place  be- 
tween British  and  French  military  and  naval  experts. 
In  the  autumn  of  1905,  M.  Delcasse  was  forced  to 
resign  his  portfolio,  and  Le  Matin  published  the 
story  of  Britain's  willingness  to  send  a  force  in  sup- 
port of  France  into  Schleswig-Holsteln.  In  April, 
1906,  the  Belgian  and  British  military  authorities  in 
Brussels  entered  into  arrangements  for  the  co-opera- 


A  DISHONEST  PRETEXT  107 

tion  of  a  British  Expeditionary  Force  of  150,000, 
with  the  Belgian  army  against  Germany.  Mr.  Hal- 
dane  announced  in  the  following  month  of  July  that 
the  force  had  been  reorganized  on  a  mobilization 
basis  of  150,000.  The  Act  of  Algeciras  was  signed 
April  7th,  1906,  sandwiched  between  the  consent 
given  by  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  the  British  and  French 
military  and  naval  conversations,  and  the  Brussels 
arrangement  for  Belgian  and  British  military  co- 
operation in  the  event  of  a  war  with  Germany. 
These  are  the  facts  which  cannot  be  denied  by  honest 
men.  It  may  of  course  be  necessary,  playing  the 
game  of  the  chancelleries,  for  diplomatists  and  gov- 
ernments to  deny  some  of  these  facts;  but  it  takes 
only  the  very  smallest  experience  to  know  what  the 
denials  of  Ministers  are  worth. 

The  murder  of  the  Austrian  archduke,  whether  he 
was  murdered  by  Russia,  or  Serbia,  or  Vienna,  had 
little  or  nothing  to  do  with  this  present  war.  It 
might  have  been  a  pretext  for  bringing  things  to  a 
head,  but  to  say  it  was  the  initial  cause  of  the  war  is 
the  most  unprincipled  falsehood  a  Jingo  journal  ever 
indulged  in.  This  war  had  long  beginnings;  they 
lay  in  the  "  pathos  of  distance  "  as  Nietzsche  would 
say.  Not  the  violation  of  the  integrity  and  inde- 
pendence of  Belgium,  but  the  violation  of  the  in- 
tegrity and  independence  of  Morocco.  Not  the  an- 
tique treaty  of  1839,  but  the  secret  articles  which  ac- 
companied the  Agreement  of  1904, —  which  were  not 
made  known  to  the  world  until  November,  191 1, 
wherein  Spain,  France,  and  Britain  had  contracted 
for  the  partition  of  Morocco. 

The  scaremongers  in  the  summer  of  1908  held 
high  carnival ;  the  Daily  Telegraph  spread  the  legend 


io8     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

that  the  Government  intended  to  float  a  loan  of 
£100,000,000,  so  that  we  might  be  able  to  build  a 
navy  large  enough  to  deal  with  Germany.  Early  in 
the  New  Year  there  was  a  great  deal  of  electricity 
in  the  diplomatic  air.  Austria  publicly  accused 
Britain  of  a  policy  of  deliberate  malevolence.  Sir 
Edward  Grey  repudiated  the  allegations  and  said 
they  were  sheer  inventions.  But  neither  the  Foreign 
Secretary's  protest  nor  the  assurances  of  other  Min- 
isters as  to  the  pacific  intentions  of  the  Government, 
seemed  to  allay  the  anxiety  of  Continental  Powers  or 
the  perturbations  of  the  alarmists  at  home. 

On  August  14th,  1908,  Mr.  Churchill,  at  Swansea, 
delivered  a  remarkable  speech  on  our  relations  with 
Germany.  This  speech  should  be  preserved,  for 
there  is  a  passage  in  it  that  makes  strange  reading 
now,  when  nearly  the  whole  of  the  British  press,  day 
after  day,  tells  us  that  the  German  people  are  a  bru- 
tish race,  trained  by  Sybel,  Treitschke,  and  Bern- 
hardi.  When  the  war  is  over,  diplomatic  relations 
will  be  resumed;  trade  will  spring  up  again  between 
the  two  peoples;  and  a  memory  of  what  some  men  in 
the  days  before  the  actual  strife  have  said  of  Ger- 
many and  the  German  people,  may  be  useful  in  estab- 
lishing once  more  those  relations  which  true  Chris- 
tian people  may  aspire  to  but  never  quite  enjoy. 
The  speech  to  be  quoted  from,  and  no  apology  is 
thought  necessary  for  the  length  of  the  extract,  was 
delivered  only  a  few  weeks  after  Lord  Cromer,  in 
the  House  of  Lords,  spoke  of  a  European  conflict 
which  might  be  forced  upon  us  before  many  years. 
Mr.  Churchill  said: 

"  I    think    it    is   greatly   to    be   deprecated    that    persons 
should   try  to  spread  the  belief  in   this  country   that  war 


FOOD  FOR  REFLECTION  109 

between  Great  Britain  and  Germany  is  inevitable.  It  is 
all  nonsense.  In  the  first  place,  the  alarmists  have  no 
grounds  whatever  for  their  panic  or  fear.  .  .  .  Look  at  it 
from  any  point  of  view  you  like,  and  I  say  you  will  come 
to  the  conclusion  in  regard  to  the  relations  between  Eng- 
land and  Germany  that  there  is  no  real  cause  of  difference 
between  them,  and  although  there  may  be  snapping  and 
snarling  in  the  newspapers,  and  in  the  London  clubs,  those 
two  great  people  have  nothing  to  fight  about,  have  no  prize 
to  fight  for,  and  have  no  place  to  fight  in.  .  .  . 

"  What  does  all  this  snapping  and  snarling  amount  to 
after  all?  How  many  people  do  you  suppose  there  are  in 
Germany  who  really  want  to  make  a  murderous  attack  on 
this  country?  I  do  not  suppose  in  the  whole  of  that  great 
population  of  fifty  or  sixty  millions  of  inhabitants  there  are 
ten  thousand  persons  who  would  seriously  contemplate  such 
a  hellish  and  wicked  crime;  and  how  many  do  you  think 
there  are  in  this  country?  I  do  not  believe  there  are  even 
that  number  to  be  found  in  our  country.  .  .  .  But  even  if 
the  fifteen  thousand  persons  whom  we  will  say  in  Germany 
and  this  country  desire  to  make  war  on  one  another  were 
as  influential  as  one  would  think  from  the  noise  they  make 
and  the  clatter  they  keep  up,  what  about  the  rest  of  us? 
What  about  the  one  hundred  millions  of  people  who  dwell 
in  these  islands  and  Germany?  Are  we  all  such  sheep? 
Is  democracy  in  the  twentieth  century  so  powerless  to  affect 
its  will?  Are  we  all  become  such  puppets  and  marionettes 
to  be  wire-pulled  against  our  interests  into  such  hideous 
convulsions?  I  have  a  high  and  prevailing  faith  in  the 
essential  goodness  of  great  people.  ...  I  have  come  here 
this  afternoon  to  ask  you  to  join  with  me  in  saying  that  far 
and  wide  throughout  the  masses  of  the  British  dominions 
there  is  no  feeling  of  ill-will  towards  Germany.  I  say 
we  honour  that  strong,  patient,  industrious  German  people, 
who  have  been  for  so  many  centuries  divided,  a  prey  to 
European  intrigue  and  a  drudge  amongst  the  nations  of  the 
Continent.     Now  in  the  fulness  of  time,  after  many  tribu- 


no     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

lations  they  have  by  their  virtues  and  valour  won  them- 
selves a  foremost  place  in  the  front  of  civilization.  I  say  we 
do  not  envy  them  their  good  fortune;  we  do  not  envy  them 
their  power  and  prosperity.  We  are  not  jealous  of  them; 
we  wish  them  well  from  the  bottom  of  our  hearts,  and  we 
believe  most  firmly  the  victories  they  will  win  in  science 
and  learning  against  barbarism,  against  waste,  the  victories 
they  will  gain  will  be  victories  in  which  we  shall  share,  and 
which,  while  benefiting  them,  will  also  benefit  us." 

It  is  sad  to  think  of  sentiments  such  as  those  ex- 
pressed by  Mr.  Churchill  six  years  ago,  and  then  of 
what  is  taking  place  now.  Looking  from  the  reign 
of  terror  which  now  exists  in  Belgium,  back  to  the 
days  when  English  statesmen  believed  the  German 
people,  "  by  their  virtues  and  valour  had  won  for 
themselves  a  foremost  place  in  the  front  of  civiliza- 
tion," it  is  difficult  to  associate  with  the  Germany  of 
Wagner  and  Richard  Strauss  and  Lenbach,  of  Goethe 
and  Schiller,  and  of  Schopenhauer  and  von  Hum- 
boldt, all  the  vandalism  of  Louvain,  Dinant,  and 
Malines. 


CHAPTER  VI 

PANICMONGERS 

"  And  he  will  lift  up  an  ensign  to  the  nations  from  afar, 
and  will  hiss  unto  them  from  the  end  of  the  earth:  and, 
behold,  they  shall  come  with  speed  swiftly: 

"  None  shall  be  weary  nor  stumble  among  them ;  none 
shall  slumber  nor  sleep;  neither  shall  the  girdle  of  their 
loins  be  loosed,  nor  the  latchet  of  their  shoes  be  broken: 

"  Whose  arrows  are  sharp,  and  all  their  bows  bent,  their 
horses'  hoofs  shall  be  counted  like  flint,  and  their  wheels" 
like  a  whirlwind: 

"  Their  roaring  shall  be  like  a  lion,  they  shall  roar  like 
young  lions:  yea,  they  shall  roar,  and  lay  hold  of  the  prey, 
and  shall  carry  it  away  safe,  and  none  shall  deliver  it. 

"  And  in  that  day  they  shall  roar  against  them  like  the 
roaring  of  the  sea:  and  if  one  look  unto  the  land,  behold 
darkness  and  sorrow,  and  the  light  is  darkened  in  the 
heavens  thereof." 

—  Isaiah. 

On  February  8th,  1909,  the  French  and  German 
Governments  made  a  declaration  of  their  intentions 
towards  Morocco.  This  was  done  so  that  the  two 
Governments  might  define  the  meaning  they  attached 
to  the  articles  of  the  Algeciras  Act  in  order  to  avoid 
misunderstanding  in  future.  The  German  Govern- 
ment recognized  the  special  political  Interests  of 
France  in  Morocco,  and  resolved  not  to  Impede  those 
interests.     The    Germans,    pursuing   only   economic 

Interests  In  Morocco,  promised  not  to  encourage  any 

III 


112     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

other  Power  which  might  strive  to  gain  economic 
privileges.  The  French  Government  reaffirmed  its 
strong  attachment  to  the  maintenance  of  the  inde- 
pendence and  integrity  of  the  Moroccan  Empire,  and 
contracted  not  to  obstruct  German  commercial  and 
industrial  interests  in  that  country. 

Whether  the  peoples  of  Europe  will  ever  again 
permit  any  diplomatic  traffickings  no  one  can  tell;  but 
if  they  do,  then  the  worst  that  can  happen  will  be  too 
good  for  them.  Perhaps  it  is  difficult  to  swallow  the 
perfidy  which  lies  in  the  statement  (in  the  document 
referred  to  above)  that  the  French  ambassador  at 
Berlin  in  February,  1909,  contracted  with  Germany 
to  maintain  the  independence  and  integrity  of  Mo- 
rocco; when  France  and  Spain,  with  the  sanction  of 
Lord  Lansdowne,  had  secretly  engaged  that  France 
and  Spain  should  partition  Morocco.  The  secret 
articles  were  not  published  until  November,  191 1. 
And  in  the  face  of  these  facts,  responsible  statesmen 
allow  the  public  to  be  told  that  Germany  was  the 
aggressor  and  deliberately  planned  a  war  against 
Britain !  Such  infamy  is  indeed  hard  to  swallow. 
Yet,  swallow  it  the  public  must,  if  democracy  is  ever 
to  have  a  chance  of  bringing  about  in  Europe  a  state 
of  affairs  that  corresponds  with  ordinary  mercantile 
honesty. 

But  are  the  Influences  that  use  the  press  too  pow- 
erful for  the  people  to  overcome?  When  the  public 
are  up  against  such  forces  as  armament  rings,  military 
and  naval  leagues,  panlcmongers,  and  the  advertising 
department  of  Foreign  Offices,  the  task  does  seem 
almost  too  much  for  the  masses.  The  cunning,  the 
subtlety,  the  avarice,  the  nepotism,  the  caste  power, 
and  the  secrecy,  that  shield  diplomatic  action,  are 


BALFOUR  LEADS  THE  CHORUS     113 

fearful  forces  arrayed  against  the  people  who  have 
not  yet  by  a  long  way  reached  political  freedom,  let 
alone  economic  liberty.  Think  of  the  events  of 
1909,  here  in  Britain,  and  then  try  to  estimate  what 
the  public  have  to  do. 

One  month  after  the  signing  of  the  German- 
French  declaration  respecting  Morocco,  Mr.  Mc- 
Kenna,  who  had  become  First  Lord  of  the  Ad- 
miralty, introduced  the  naval  estimates  which  showed 
an  increase  of  two  and  three-quarters  millions. 
They  were  met  with  a  contemptuous  note  of  rejection 
by  Mr.  Balfour.  "  Utterly  insufficient,"  he  flung 
out,  and  immediately  the  signal  was  given  for  one  of 
the  wildest  orgies  of  Jingo  feeling  the  country  has 
ever  suffered.  And  what  was  it  all  about?  The 
Government's  case  was  laid  down  by  Mr.  Asquith, 
who  said: 

"  The  first  assumption  was  that  the  German  paper  pro- 
gramme —  I  think  I  described  it  as  a  paper  programme  — 
was  one  which  might  not  be  realized,  and  certainly  would 
not  be  exceeded.  That  has  turned  out  not  to  be  true,  be- 
cause it  is  undoubtedly  the  case  —  I  speak  with  as  much 
reserve  as  I  can  about  it,  because  I  want  to  keep  strictly 
within  the  verifiable  truth  —  it  is  a  fact  that  during  the 
autumn  of  last  year  there  was  an  anticipation  with  four 
ships  which  belong  to  the  German  programme  of  1909— lO 
in  the  sense  that  orders  were  given,  materials  collected,  it 
may  be  that  in  one  or  two  cases,  possibly  in  more,  ships  were 
actually  laid  down." 

Acceleration  of  the  German  naval  programme  was 
the  cause  of  the  trouble  and  the  reason  why  our  esti- 
mates rose  suddenly  in  1909,  so  the  Government  said. 
But  both  Prince  von  Biilow  and  Admiral  von  Tirpitz 
denied  the  accusation.     Indeed,  the  German  Govern- 


114     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

ment  had  made  a  most  distinct  declaration  to  our 
Government  that  it  was  not  their  intention  to  accel- 
erate their  programme.  Referring  to  the  declara- 
tion of  the  German  Government,  Mr.  Asquith  said: 

"  As  a  Government,  believing  as  we  do  most  explicitly 
in  the  good  faith  of  those  declarations,  we  cannot  possibly 
put  before  the  House  of  Commons  and  Parliament  a  pro- 
gramme based  on  the  assumption  that  a  declaration  of  that 
kind  will  not  be  carried  out." 

It  will  be  seen,  in  spite  of  Mr.  Asquith's  words, 
that  the  declaration  was  thrown  to  the  winds,  and 
that  the  Government  in  a  few  weeks  was  swept  off  its 
feet  by  the  storm  of  Jingo  feeling  in  the  country. 
We  know  now  that  the  abominable  scare  was  the 
work,  not  of  a  German  Government  whose  word 
could  not  be  relied  on,  but  of  a  gang  of  British 
patriots  connected  with  the  armament-ring  on  the 
search  for  orders  and  dividends,  and  supported  by  a 
large  section  of  the  British  press  controlled  by  a  syn- 
dicate. A  Mr.  MuUiner,  once  managing  director  of 
the  Coventry  Ordnance  Company,  was  the  ostensible 
instigator.  In  the  habiliments  of  a  patriot,  he 
started  a  campaign  that  fostered  hatred  and  hostility 
in  millions  of  hearts  and  minds  in  both  Germany  and 
Britain.  So  early  as  May,  1906,  Mr.  Mulliner 
informed  the  Admiralty  that  the  Germans  were  mak- 
ing preparations  for  increasing  their  navy  to  vast 
proportions.  On  March  3rd,  1909,  Mr.  Mulliner 
gave  evidence  before  the  Cabinet  in  support  of  the 
information  he  had  brought  to  the  notice  of  the  Ad- 
miralty during  a  period  covering  nearly  three  years. 
In  the  History  of  a  Great  Scare,  Mr.  Ferris  says  of 
Mr.  Mulliner: 


MR.  MULLINER,  PATRIOT  115 

"  For  three  years,  in  fact,  this  gentleman  gave  himself 
to  the  work  of  propagating  the  myth  of  a  gigantic  expansion 
of  Krupp's  works,  in  particular,  and  of  German  accelera- 
tion in  general.  It  was  an  underground  campaign;  but  we 
gather  from  subsequent  letters  and  speeches  that  Mr.  Mul- 
liner's  information,  sent  first  to  the  War  Office  in  May, 
1906,  'was  passed  on  to  the  Admiralty,'  'was  discussed  by 
them  with  several  outsiders,'  and  then  '  passed  from  hand 
to  hand  so  that  hundreds  have  read  it.'  Of  this  '  informa- 
tion,' I  need  now  say  nothing  more  than  that,  as  soon  as  it 
became  public,  it  was  emphatically  contradicted  by  Messrs. 
Krupp,  through  Mr.  John  Leyland,  and  other  correspond- 
ents, and  after  some  years  it  was  practically  admitted  by 
the  Government  to  be  false,  and  that  time  has  proved  that 
it  never  had  any  real  basis.  It  was,  nevertheless,  propa- 
gated with  unremitting  zeal,  in  forms  more  and  more  lurid, 
and  with  the  gradual  assent  of  the  leaders  of  the  Opposi- 
tion." 

It  was  on  the  information  laid  by  Mr.  Mulliner 
before  the  Cabinet  on  March  3rd,  that  the  Govern- 
ment based  their  case  for  the  enormous  increase  in 
the  estimates.  How  deeply  convinced  the  Cabinet 
was  of  the  accuracy  of  the  information  presented  by 
Mr.  Mulliner,  in  spite  of  the  denials  of  the  German 
Chancellor  and  Admiral  von  Tirpitz,  is  to  be  gath- 
ered from  Mr.  Asquith's  speech  in  the  House  of 
Commons: 

"  If  any  one  will  refer  to  the  speech  I  made  a  year  ago, 
he  will  see  that  I  said  with  some  confidence  that  whereas  it 
would  take  the  Germans  thirty  months  to  build  one  of 
these  ships  we  could  do  it  in  twenty-four.  I  was  not,  of 
course,  committing  myself  precisely  to  the  number  of 
months,  but  I  did  maintain  that  we  had  a  substantial  ad- 
vantage in  the  rate  of  construction  which  would  always  en- 
able us  to  quickly  overtake  them  when  the  event  occurred. 


ii6     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

I  am  sorry  to  say  it  is  not  the  case.  I  believed  it  to  be  the 
fact  at  the  time  at  which  I  spoke,  but  there  has  been  such 
an  enormous  development  in  Germany  —  I  speak  quite 
frankly  to  the  House,  because  I  am  obliged  to  tell  them  these 
matters,  and  to  let  them  understand  why  we  economists 
have  presented  these  estimates  to  the  House  —  there  has 
been  such  an  enormous  development  in  Germany,  not  only 
in  the  provision  of  ship  yards  and  slips  on  which  the  bulk 
or  fabric  of  a  ship  can  be  built  or  repaired,  but,  what  is 
still  more  serious,  in  the  provision  of  gun-mountings  and 
armaments  of  those  great  monsters,  those  '  dreadnaughts ' 
which  are  now  the  dominating  type  of  ship.  Such  an  enor- 
mous development,  and  I  will  venture  to  say,  being  most 
anxious  not  to  excite  anything  in  the  nature  of  unneces- 
sary alarm  in  this  country,  such  an  enormous  development 
is  so  serious  from  our  national  point  of  view  that  we  could 
no  longer  take  to  ourselves  as  we  could  a  year  ago  with 
reason  the  consoling  and  comforting  reflection  that  we  have 
the  advantage  in  speed  and  the  rate  at  which  ships  can  be 
constructed." 

The  "  enormous  development  "  four  times  empha- 
sized by  Mr.  Asquith,  was  a  mere  figment  of  the 
mind  of  the  patriotic  Mr.  Mulliner.  Nevertheless, 
it  shows  to  what  base  uses  Prime  Ministers  may  be 
put,  and  how  difficult  it  will  be  for  the  people  to 
grapple  with  the  evils  of  Jingo  imagination.  This 
fact  stands  out  in  all  the  miserable  business:  the  dis- 
tinct declaration  of  the  German  Government  was 
ignored  by  the  British  Cabinet,  and  the  myth-spinning 
Mr.  MuUiner  was  believed  instead.  Though  Ad- 
miral von  Tirpitz  told  the  Budget  Committee  of  the 
Reichstag  on  March  17th,  that  there  would  be  only 
13  ships  ready  in  the  autumn  of  191 2,  the  Brit- 
ish Cabinet  figured  out  the  Mulliner  acceleration  to 
give    Germany    17    ships   ready   by    March,    19 12, 


WHAT  COULD  GERMANY  THINK?     117 

Mr.  Balfour,  who  would  "  o'ertop  old  Pelion," 
said  25  ships;  or,  in  any  case,  21.  Germany  had 
only  13  of  these  ships  in  full  commission  in  April, 
1 9 14  —  jive  years  after  Mr.  Balfour's  estimate  for 
three  years.  Mr,  Mulliner  had  the  leaders  of  the 
Government  and  the  Opposition  scared  out  of  their 
wits,  but  Messrs.  Asquith,  Balfour,  and  Mulliner 
were  wrong;  Admiral  von  Tirpitz  was  right.  On 
March  31st,  191 2,  the  Germans  had  only  nine 
dreadnaught  battleships  and  cruisers  ready. 

Now,  what  must  the  German  Government  have 
thought  of  the  intentions  of  the  BritishGovernment;  to 
whom  they  had  given  a  declaration  which  in  1909  was 
not  believed  and  three  years  later  was  proved  to  have 
been  adhered  to  in  every  particular?  Did  the  action 
of  the  British  Government  tend  to  allay  the  feeling 
between  the  two  countries  which  had  already  been 
described  by  statesmen  as  extremely  dangerous  to  the 
peace  of  Europe? 

Animosity,  already  embittered  in  a  newspaper  war 
extending  over  at  least  a  continuous  period  of  three 
years,  must  have  been  aggravated  beyond  all  bounds 
by  the  events  of  March,  1909.  The  solemn  warn- 
ings of  some  leaders  of  political  thought  in  the  coun- 
try had  little  or  no  effect  on  the  scaremongers 
and  the  armament  ring  agents.  The  taxpayers  of 
Britain,  and  the  rest  of  Europe  were  groaning  under 
the  terrible  burden  of  buying  implements  of  slaugh- 
ter; in  vain,  however,  they  cried  to  their  Govern- 
ments to  reduce  expenditure  on  armies  and  navies. 
And  the  more  the  people  demanded  reduction,  the 
more  millions  the  contractors  and  their  agents  in- 
sisted on  spending.  Sir  Edward  Grey,  on  March 
29th,  1909,  in  the  House  of  Commons,  said: 


ii8     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

"  The  great  countries  of  Europe  are  raising  enormous 
revenues,  and  something  like  one-half  of  them  is  being 
spent  on  military  and  naval  preparations.  You  may  call  it 
national  insurance,  that  is  perfectly  true;  but  it  is  equally 
true  that  one-half  of  the  national  revenue  of  the  great 
countries  in  Europe  is  being  spent  on  what  are,  after  all, 
preparations  to  kill  each  other.  Surely  the  extent  to  which 
this  expenditure  has  grown  really  becomes  a  satire  and  a 
reflection  upon  civilization." 

Yes,  and  any  Government  that  permits  any  Mr. 
Mulliner  to  direct  its  naval  policy  is  a  gross  satire 
and  a  reflection  upon  democracy.  The  enormous 
revenues  which  Governments  have  spent  during  the 
past  eight  years  on  armaments  have  been  attributed 
largely  to  the  false  information  spread  about  the 
world  by  panicmongers.  Take  Mr.  Balfour,  for 
instance,  who  heard  the  warning  of  the  Foreign  Sec- 
retary! Only  two  days  after  it  was  delivered,  Mr. 
Balfour  went  to  the  Guildhall  meeting,  attended 
mainly  by  shareholders  of  the  armament-ring,  and 
there  he  did  his  best  to  sway  the  crowd  In  the  direc- 
tion of  forcing  the  Government  to  spend  more  mil- 
lions on  preparations  to  kill  his  fellow-men.  Mr. 
Balfour  said: 

"  The  Government  plan  is  four  ships  this  year,  and  the 
preparation  for  a  possible  four  ships  on  April  ist  next  year. 
Do  these  April  ist  ships  belong  to  next  year's  programme, 
or  to  this  year's  programme?  If  they  belong,  as  I  think 
they  ought  to  belong,  to  this  year's  programme,  let  us  put 
them  into  this  year's  programme;  but  if  they  are  really  and 
genuinely  intended  to  belong  to  next  year's  programme, 
then  I  ask  what  your  situation  will  be  if  you  find  that  next 
year's  programme  proper,  I  mean  next  year's  programme 
irrespective  of  the  April  ist  ships,  is  itself  to  consist  of  eight 
ships,   and   I   think  very  likely  it  will   have  to  consist  of 


WHO  SHALL  PAY  THE  BILLS?      119 

eight  ships.  That  will  mean  you  will  attempt  to  build 
twelve  ships  next  year  against  four  this  year,  I  call  that 
preposterous." 

Preposterous,  indeed!  But  what  would  be  the 
effect  of  that  speech  in  Germany?  No  one  there 
would  say  "  preposterous."  They  would  probably 
think  British  ex-Ministers  must  have  gone  raving 
mad  when,  in  the  face  of  the  declaration  of  the  Ger- 
man Government,  Mr.  Balfour  could  tell  city  mag- 
nates and  their  clerks  that  he  wanted  the  Government 
to  build  eight  battleships  that  year.  Whether  the 
Germans  were  scared  or  not,  he  succeeded  in  scaring 
the  Government  almost  out  of  Its  senses.  In  the  en- 
suing months  both  Mr.  Asquith  and  Sir  Edward 
Grey  bowed  their  head  to  the  storm;  and  then  later 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  talked  about  ways  and  means  of 
raising  the  money.  Mr.  Asquith  assured  his  audi- 
ence at  Glasgow,  in  April,  that  both  he  and  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  had  given  the  most  explicit  pledge  to  the 
Commons  that,  if  the  necessity  should  arise,  four  ex- 
tra ships  would  be  ordered.  Naturally  the  agents  of 
the  armament  ring  took  good  care  that  the  necessity 
would  arise. 

When  Mr.  Lloyd  George  Introduced  his  budget  of 
1909  he  said: 

"  We  do  not  intend  to  put  in  jeopardy  the  naval  su- 
premacy which  is  essential  not  only  to  our  national  ex- 
istence, but  in  our  judgment,  to  the  vital  interests  of  western 
civilization.  But,  in  my  judgment,  it  would  also  be  an 
act  of  criminal  insanity  to  throw  away  eight  millions  of 
money,  which  is  so  much  needed  for  other  purposes,  on 
building  gigantic  flotillas  merely  to  encounter  mythical 
armadas.  That  is  why  we  propose  only  to  incur  this 
enormous  expenditure  when   the  need   for  it  arises.     We 


120     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

must  ensure  the  complete  security  of  our  shores  against  all 
real  dangers,  but  we  cannot  afford  to  build  navies  against 
nightmares.  .  .  .  However,  as  it  may  be  necessary  to  make 
arrangements  for  laying  down  all  the  eight  dreadnaughts 
on  April  1st,   1910.  .  .  ." 

Then  when  he  told  the  patriots  how  the  money  was 
to  be  raised  —  by  a  tax  on  land-values  —  a  cry  of 
pain  arose  from  landlords  and  plutocrats  all  over  the 
land.  One  hundred  German  sixteen-inch  guns  could 
not  have  wrought  half  the  panic  among  the  ruling 
classes  that  this  Budget  did.  The  cries  of  *'  in- 
vasion," and  "  raid,"  and  "  another  amendment  to 
the  German  Navy  Law,"  were  turned  to  howls  of 
"  confiscation,"  and  "  spoliation,"  and  "  robbery." 
All  talk  of  wanting  eight  dreadnaughts  was  stilled, 
and  fears  of  a  German  invasion  were  lost  in  the  hor- 
rors of  having  to  place  a  value  on  land.  If  the  Gov- 
ernment of  1906  had  that  year  introduced  a  Land- 
values  Budget  the  country  would  have  heard  little 
from  the  scaremongers, —  there  is  nothing  like  mak- 
ing patriots  pay  for  what  they  want.  But  in  1909 
they  cried  before  they  were  hurt.  There  was  really 
nothing  to  fear  in  the  Budget  for  it  had  not  reached 
a  Committee  stage;  the  Whigs  had  not  got  to  work 
on  it.  And,  indeed,  w^hen  they  had  re-modelled  Mr. 
Lloyd  George's  Budget  all  the  vital  part  of  it  was  de- 
stroyed, and  the  landlords  and  plutocrats  were  free 
to  give  their  attention  once  more  to  protecting  their 
acres  from  a  foe  they  dreaded  less  than  they  dreaded 
the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer. 

The  Budget's  salutary  effect  on  the  scaremongers 
may  be  gauged  by  the  tactics  of  the  Opposition,  On 
April  6th,  the  following  notice  was  issued  by  the  Op- 
position Whips  to  the  press : 


LAND- VALUES  BUDGET  121 

"  Arrangements  are  in  rapid  progress  for  the  organization 
after  the  recess  of  a  great  campaign  in  the  country  in  sup- 
port of  the  claim  for  the  immediate  building  of  the  four 
conditional  dreadnaughts.  The  keynote  of  the  agitation  is 
to  be  found  in  Mr.  Balfour's  speech  at  the  Guildhall,  on 
Wednesday  last,  March  31st: 

"  '  You  must  not  only  have  power  to  build,  you  must  build 
without  delay,  without  hesitation,  without  waiting  for  con- 
tingencies, for  obscure  circumstances,  for  future  necessities. 
You  must  build  now  to  meet  the  present  necessity.  For, 
believe  me,  the  necessity  is  upon  you.  It  is  not  coming  to 
you  in  July,  or  November,  or  April  next;  it  is  on  you  now. 
And  it  is  now  that  you  must  begin  to  meet  it.'  " 

The  urgency  of  the  campaign  in  the  mind  of  the 
author  of  The  Foundations  of  Belief,  seemed  to  be 
overwhelming.  But  the  Easter  recess  passed  away 
without  any  signs  of  the  great  campaign.  The  "  im- 
mediate need  "  was  forgotten  in  the  throes  of  the 
panic  caused  by  the  Land-values  Budget.  So  the  Op- 
position postponed  indefinitely  the  inevitable  vt^ar 
with  Germany;  and  the  energy  to  be  used  in  making 
preparations  to  meet  Germany  was  spent  in  discharg- 
ing gardeners,  gamekeepers,  and  footmen,  which  the 
terrible  Budget  could  not  let  them  keep.  Never  a 
shell-game  artist  at  a  country  fair  reached  the  limits 
of  buncombe  practised  by  the  Opposition  in  the 
spring  of  1909.  It  was  a  roaring  farce  ;  —  that  is,  it 
would  have  been  if  Germany  had  not  taken  it  for 
tragedy. 

The  amazing  position  of  a  world  at  peace  arming 
huge  battalions  and  launching  great  armadas,  forced 
Lord  Rosebery  to  make  the  following  comment: 

"  Without  any  tangible  reason  we  see  the  nations  pre- 
paring new  armaments.     They  cannot  arm  any  more  men 


122     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

on  land,  so  they  have  to  seek  new  armaments  on  sea,  piling 
up  these  enormous  preparations  as  if  for  some  great  Arma- 
geddon —  and  that  in  the  time  of  profoundest  peace.  .  .  . 
When  I  see  this  bursting  out  of  navies  everywhere,  when 
I  see  one  country  alone  asking  for  25  millions  of  extra 
taxation  for  warlike  preparations,  when  I  see  the  abso- 
lutely unprecedented  sacrifices  which  are  asked  from  us  on 
the  same  ground,  I  do  begin  to  feel  uneasy  at  the  outcome 
of  it  all  and  wonder  where  it  will  stop,  or  if  it  is  going 
to  bring  back  Europe  into  a  state  of  barbarism,  or  whether 
it  will  cause  a  catastrophe  in  which  the  working-men  of 
the  world  will  say,  '  we  will  have  no  more  of  this  madness, 
this  foolery  which  is  grinding  us  to  powder.'  " 

Lord  Rosebery  might  then  have  remembered  his 
criticism  of  the  French  Agreement;  he  might  have 
asked  if  any  secret  agreement  had  been  made  by  the 
Government  with  France;  he  might  have  asked  what 
Germany  thought  of  the  French  Government  since 
the  signing  of  the  new  declaration  earlier  in  that 
year.  What  were  all  the  sinister  designs  In  Britain 
and  Europe  that  caused  grave  apprehension  in  Ger- 
many? There  must  have  been  causes  other  than 
panics  and  scares  to  force  governments  to  spend  so 
much  money  on  armaments  in  times  of  peace.  Na- 
tions (meaning  peoples)  had  nothing  to  do  with  it, 
for  foreign  policy  was  kept  from  them,  and  in  mil- 
itary and  naval  affairs  the  people  were  usually  misin- 
formed. Governments,  and  governments  alone, 
were  responsible.  A  Continent  of  governments 
bound  by  treaties,  ententes,  and  agreements,  all  for 
"  the  preservation  of  the  peace  of  Europe,"  should 
not  be  torn  by  quarrels  over  sums  spent  on  armies  and 
navies;  not  if  diplomacy  were  worth  a  rag-man's  bag. 
But,  after  all,  so  long  as  secret  diplomacy  seeking 
peace  cannot  be  carried  on  without  armed  support,  it 


A  CONFESSION  OF  FAILURE        123 

is  useless  making  complaint  at  the  expense  of  the 
game.  The  utter  absurdity  of  the  position  can  be 
realized  at  once  when  our  Foreign  Secretary  was 
moved  to  make  such  a  confession  of  failure  as  the 
following: 

"  We  are  in  comparatively  calm  weather ;  we  are  not  in 
stormy  weather  in  foreign  politics  at  the  present  moment 
but  the  excessive  expenditure  on  armaments  makes  the 
weather  sultry." 

Secret  diplomacy  keeps  the  weather  comparatively 
calm,  but  the  armed  support  of  secret  diplomacy 
makes  the  atmosphere  thundery!  Was  there  ever 
such  unmitigated  nonsense?  "  I  want  to  be  friendly 
with  my  neighbour  but  he  Is  always  so  angry  when  he 
sees  my  gun  in  my  hand  and  the  man-trap  set  in  the 
backyard.  Most  unreasonable  creature  I  "  In  the 
same  speech  Sir  Edward  Grey  said  he  agreed  with 
every  word  Lord  Rosebery  said  on  the  same  ques- 
tion. Agree  ?  Yes, —  with  anything  but  the  re- 
moval of  the  trap  and  the  gun. 

There  was  another  naval  debate  in  the  House  of 
Commons  in  July,  1909,  when  Mr.  Asquith  pointed 
out  that  there  was  no  other  standard  by  which  our 
programme  could  be  determined  than  the  ship-build- 
ing facilities  and  programmes  of  other  nations.  He 
said: 

"  It  Is  for  that  reason,  and  for  that  reason  only,  that  we 
are  obliged  in  duty  to  consider  what  Germany  is  doing,  what 
Austria  is  doing,  what  Italy  is  doing,  what  France  is  doing 
—  all  friendly  nations  bound  to  us  by  ties  of  Intimacy,  cor- 
diality, and  even  affection,  and  all  nations  with  which  I  hope 
we  shall  never  have  cause  to  quarrel." 

Apart  from  the  cant  of  it,  why  France?     And 


124     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

why  not  Russia?  Did  France  at  that  time  stand  in 
the  same  position  to  Britain  as  any  one  of  the  Powers 
of  the  Triple  Alliance?  Mr.  Asquith  knew  very 
well  she  did  not.  The  terms  intimacy,  cordiality, 
and  affection,  were  mere  literary  tinsel  tacked  on  to 
give  a  glitter  to  an  otherwise  abject  apology  for  not 
ordering  the  four  "  contingent "  ships  in  March 
according  to  the  Mulliner-Balfour  demands.  The 
First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty  gave  the  most  prepos- 
terous reason  for  building  the  ships;  —  and  six 
months  later  he  referred  to  the  scare  of  the  spring 
of  1909,  and  said  that  it  had  not  the  slightest  founda- 
tion in  fact. 

During  the  General  Election  of  January,  1910, 
the  way  scares  were  manufactured  caused  much  dis- 
cussion, and  In  the  flood  of  oratory  which  poured 
from  Liberal  platforms  some  pretty  severe  criticism 
came  from  members  of  the  Government.  Mr. 
Churchill,  at  Leamington,  was  in  fine  fighting  form: 

"  They  had  obtained  the  services  of  an  Atheist  Socialist 
in  order  to  work  up  German  scares;  they  had  obtained  the 
services  of  an  Anglicized  German,  Mr.  Ellis  Barker,  whose 
name  used  to  be  Elsbacher,  in  order  to  work  up  a  socialist 
scare;  they  were  going  about  spending  their  days  decrying 
British  industry,  and  representing  British  workmen  as  a 
miserable  set  of  broken-down  creatures;  they  utilized  their 
Tory  Admiral,  Lord  Charles  Blatchford  —  he  meant  Lord 
Charles  Beresford  —  to  electioneer  on  their  behalf  by 
threatening  to  reveal  naval  secrets;  they  clamoured,  the 
whole  crowd  of  them  —  from  the  Daily  Mail  downwards 
—  for  16,000  men  more  to  be  added  to  the  navy,  and  they 
proposed  to  pay  these  gallant  fellows  when  they  had  been 
enlisted  by  taxing  the  bread  and  meat  of  their  wives.  .  .  . 
Their  leader  went  about  the  country  labouring  to  provoke 
distrust  and  ill-will  with  Germany  by  what,  to  quote  the 


INFAMY  AND  SLANDER  125 

fine-cut  phrase  of  the  Prime  Minister,  was  the  loose  private 
talk  of  an  anonymous  tourist." 

As  the  election  progressed  the  Conservatives 
found  it  necessary  to  resort  to  the  navy  again  for 
party  ammunition.  All  the  old  mottoes  and 
"  props  "  used  in  March,  1909,  were  taken  from  the 
property  room  and  renovated.  The  Jingoes  let 
themselves  go  with  a  vengeance,  and  their  statements 
reached  the  high-water  mark  of  infamy.  Mr.  Burns 
pointed  out  how  the  Jingo  press,  after  the  Naval 
Review,  had  lauded  the  navy,  and  remarked  on  its 
magnificent  strength.  "  Now  the  same  news- 
papers," he  said,  "  talked  of  a  vanished  navy  and 
asked  if  we  had  a  navy  at  all.  There  was  no  lan- 
guage scornful  enough  to  condemn  such  conduct." 
Mr.  Churchill,  at  Frome,  on  January  27th,  1910, 
had  to  revert  to  the  campaign  of  slander  of  his  polit- 
ical opponents: 

"  The  attitude  of  the  Conservative  party  with  regard  to 
the  navy  has  been  a  disgrace  to  that  party.  It  was  the  most 
contemptible  policy  ever  pursued  by  a  great  party;  it  was 
a  policy  of  trying  to  raise  a  panic  without  reason,  a  policy 
of  trying  to  raise  ill-will  between  two  great  nations  without 
cause,  a  policy  of  decrying  and  belittling  the  fleet  and  trying 
to  get  money  out  of  the  pockets  of  the  weak  and  the  poor. 
It  was  the  lowest  depths  to  which  any  great  party  had  ever 
sunk." 

The  denunciation  was  not  a  whit  too  strong.  Mr. 
Balfour  seemed  to  compete  with  the  veriest  tub- 
thumper  in  out-and-out  recklessness.  At  Hadding- 
ton, he  said:  "  I  understand  that  the  Governments 
say  that  we  have  got  a  great  many  ships,  and  the 
number  is  so  considerable  that  we  need  not  fear  any 


126     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

aggression  from  any  other  Power.  Those  ships,  of 
the  number  of  which  they  boasted,  were  the  ships 
that  we  left  behind." 

The  Times  of  January  26th,  19 10,  gave  the  fol- 
lowing comparison  of  strength  of  the  naval  forces 
actually  in  commission  in  home  waters,  when  Mr. 
Balfour  resigned  office,  and  at  the  beginning  of  19 10, 
when  the  Liberals  entered  on  the  fifth  year  of  office: 

Battle-  First-class  Smaller  Cruis- 

ships  Cruisers  ers.  Gunboats 

1904    16  13                      30 

1910    44  37                     58 

Destroy-  Torpedo  Sub- 

ers  boats  marines 

1904    24  16  nil 

1910    121  88  59 

That  was  the  true  position  when  Mr.  Balfour 
spoke  at  Haddington,  and,  if  he  had  taken  the 
ordinary  precaution  of  looking  at  the  figures  before 
the  meeting,  he  must  have  known  that  he  was  not 
speaking  the  truth.  But  the  policy  of  trying  to  raise 
ill-will  passed  all  bounds  of  tub-thumping  decency 
when  Mr.  Balfour,  at  Hanley,  said: 

"  Go  about  at  this  moment  if  you  will,  and  consult  the 
statesmen  and  diplomatists  of  the  lesser  Powers,  and  I  am 
perfectly  confident  that  you  will  find  among  them  an  abso- 
lute unanimity  of  opinion  that  a  struggle  sooner  or  later 
between  this  country  and  Germany  is  inevitable.  I  do  not 
agree  with  them,  but  that  is  their  opinion.  They  have 
watched  with  the  closest  interest,  but  not,  I  think,  always 
with  perfect  comprehension,  that,  to  foreigners,  most  myste- 
rious thing,  English  public  opinion,  and  they  have  come  to 
the  conclusion,  I  believe  utterly  wrongly,  that  we  are  not 


HOW  THE  WAR  WAS  BRED        127 

alive  to  the  sense  of  our  responsibilities,  and  that  nothing  can 
stir  us  to  a  recognition  of  our  position,  and  that,  therefore, 
we  are  predestined  to  succumb  in  some  great  contest,  the 
occasion  for  which  nobody  can  foresee,  to  a  country  which 
does  face  facts,  which  is  alive  to  its  responsibility,  and  which 
talks  little  and  does  much.  And  so  far  has  this  depre- 
ciatory view  of  the  virility  of  the  manhood  of  Great  Britain 
gone  that  I  have  known  Germans,  not  connected  with  the 
Government,  but  men  of  position  and  character,  men  en- 
gaged in  great  affairs,  who  if  you  talk  to  them  about  the 
adoption  of  Tariff  Reform  by  this  country,  actually  say, 
'  Do  you  suppose  we  should  ever  allow  Great  Britain  to 
adopt  Tariff  Reform  ?  '  I  do  not  press  private  and  irre- 
sponsible conversations  more  than  they  ought  to  be  pressed, 
but  the  idea  of  any  man  of  education  and  character  outside 
this  country  should  have  the  audacity  to  say  that  Great 
Britain  is  not  to  settle  its  own  taxation  according  to  its  own 
ideas,  makes  my  blood  boil." 

This  contemptible  exhibition  of  the  "  mind-I-don't- 
believe-it-myself,"  kind  of  gossip,  led  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  to  say  that: 

"  It  is  the  kind  of  society  tittle-tattle  heard  at  tea-tables 
where  they  sandwiched  their  toast  with  horrible  things  about 
Germany  and  Radicals,  and  about  their  nearest  and  dearest 
friends,  too.  ...  It  was  not  merely  the  manner  and 
method  and  style  of  the  worst  society  scandal-monger  of  the 
most  cowardly  type,  but  it  created  bad  blood  between  neigh- 
bours." 

In  such  manner  the  war  that  was  "  bound  to 
come,"  was  made  to  come.  The  inevitable  strife 
was  encouraged  in  every  conceivable  way.  Money, 
energy,  and  brains  were  not  spared  in  setting  up  the 
plant,  and  in  obtaining  the  raw  material,  for  the  man- 
ufacture of  electioneering  goods  of  a  highly  inflam- 
mable nature.     The  highest  names  in  the  land  were 


!28     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

lent  to  all  this  despicable  trade  of  making  war  be- 
tween two  nations.  Lord  Charles  Beresford  said, 
"  He  did  not  wish  to  make  the  navy  a  party  thing, 
but  one  had  to  get  into  Parliament  somehow."  And 
that  was  how  he  got  in.  To  get  to  St.  Stephen's 
somehow  was  the  main  object  of  the  attack,  and  if 
relations  were  strained  between  the  British  and  Ger- 
man peoples  in  the  attempt  then  it  was  an  accident  of 
electioneering  only  to  be  justified  by  the  defeat  of  the 
Government's  Land  Budget. 

After  the  General  Election,  magazines  and  re- 
views continued  to  publish  articles  on  naval  affairs 
which  drew  comparisons  between  Britain  and  Ger- 
many. No  one  who  followed  closely  the  trend  of 
events  could  come  to  any  other  conclusion  but  that 
Germany  was  the  one  Power  in  all  Europe  we  had 
to  arm  against.  In  the  summer  of  19 lo,  a  partic- 
ularly belligerent  class  of  Jingo  in  the  clubs  talked 
freely  of  the  war  that  was  "  bound  to  come." 
"  Smash  'em  now,"  was  the  phrase  heard  in  certain 
quarters.  The  British  amateur  Bernhardis,  when 
they  were  not  magnifying  the  German  navy  tenfold, 
were  saying  the  empire  had  gone  to  ruin  under  the 
management  of  Messrs.  Lloyd  George  and  Com- 
pany. In  the  debate  in  the  House  of  Commons  on 
the  navy,  July,  19 10,  Mr.  Asquith  said: 

'*  There  is  another  point,  a  very  important  point,  which 
was  raised  which  I  agree  is  a  matter  for  great  regret.  I 
mean  that  the  increase  in  our  naval  expenditure  should  have 
been  associated,  in  so  far  as  it  has  been  associated,  with 
the  notion  that  we  are  in  any  sense  hostile  to  or  entertain 
hostile  designs  against  the  friendly  nation  of  Germany. 
Nothing  is  further  from  the  truth.  I  can  say  with  most 
perfect    sincerity    that    our    relations   with    Germany    have 


NAVAL  FIGURES  129 

been,  and  at  this  moment  are,  of  the  most  cordial  char- 
acter. I  look  forward  to  increasing  warmth  and  fervour 
and  intimacy  in  those  relations  year  by  year.  I  welcome, 
as  every  man  on  both  sides  with  any  sense  of  true  patri- 
otism welcomes,  all  the  various  agencies  and  movements  by 
which  the  two  peoples  are  getting  more  and  more  to  un- 
derstand each  other,  I  do  not  believe  the  German  Gov- 
ernment would  in  the  least  subscribe  to  the  view  which 
has  been  imputed  to  the  German  nation  in  the  article  just 
quoted,  that  our  naval  preparations  are  directed  against 
them,  any  more  than  I  subscribe  to  the  view  that  the  Ger- 
man naval  preparations  are  directed  against  us.  Germany 
has  her  own  policy  to  pursue,  her  own  interests  to  safe- 
guard." 

This  extraordinary  statement  was  made  in  a  de- 
bate which  positively  reeked  with  comparisons  made 
against  Germany.  It  was  said  about  twelve  months 
after  the  Prime  Minister  preferred  the  declarations 
of  the  unutterable  MuUiner  to  the  declaration  of  the 
German  Chancellor  and  Admiral  von  Tirpitz.  In 
the  same  debate  Mr.  Asquith  gave  the  British  and 
German  figures  of  the  number  of  dreadnaughts  to  be 
ready  for  war  in  April,  19 13.  Britain  was  to  have 
25  and  Germany  21.  What  the  figures  were  worth 
so  far  as  Germany  was  concerned  may  be  shown  by 
an  answer  to  a  question  put  to  Mr.  Churchill  on 
March  23,  19 14.  He  then  said  Germany  would 
have  14  dreadnaughts  ready  on  April  ist,  19 14,  but 
on  April  22nd  the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty  re- 
duced the  number  to  13.  It  is  a  strange  way  to 
foster  confidence  and  intimacy.  Anyway,  the  Prime 
Minister's  rebuke  had  little  or  no  effect  on  the  Oppo- 
sition leader.  He  went  to  Glasgow  in  October, 
1 9 10,  and  there  delivered  another  alarmist  speech. 


I30     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

He  could  not  understand  why  "  there  should  be  slips 
not  used,  on  which  no  ship  is  being  built,"  and  he  said 
he  did  "  not  believe  the  margin  in  British  strength 
has  ever  in  our  history  through  the  last  hundred 
years  —  more  than  a  hundred  years  —  sunk  so  low 
as  that."  If  Mr.  Balfour  had  taken  the  trouble  to 
look  at  the  Navy  League  Annual,  published  at  the 
time  he  made  the  speech,  he  would  have  found  the 
position  of  the  two  fleets  to  be  as  follows: 

Dreadnoughts  and  pre-dreadnaughts. 

1910     1911     1912  1913 

British 48         52         60         67 

German    — .,. .       22         25         29         37 

If  the  combination  of  Powers  is  taken  In  the  same 
class  of  ships,  it  will  be  seen  that  Britain  and  France^- 
without   Russia,    had   an   enormous   preponderance 
over  the  Triple  Alliance: 

1910 

British  and  French 63 

Germany,  Austria,  and  Italy. .        34 

The  marvel  of  it  all  was  the  fact  that  Mr.  Balfour 
and  his  friends  knew  that  they  could  make  such  state- 
ments with  impunity.  They  knew  their  audiences, 
and  the  statements  they  made  on  the  navy  and  Ger- 
many reflected  the  standard  of  intelligence  of  their 
political  supporters.  Yet,  notwithstanding  the  evi- 
dence supplied  by  the  Admiralty,  the  Navy  League, 
and  even  the  Daily  Telegraph,  which  in  October  pub- 
lished an  article  from  "  Our  Naval  Correspondent," 
showing  how  German  dreadnaught-building  had  re- 
ceived a  serious  setback,  owing  to  the  Germans  learn- 
ing that  we  had  a  new   13.5-in.  gun,   and  that  in 


I9II 

I9I2 

1913 

67 

81 

88 

38 

43 

48 

A  MORBID  APPETITE  131 

consequence  "  the  whole  of  the  preparatory  work, 
which  had  been  practically  completed  in  April  last, 
will  now  have  to  be  done  afresh/'  Mr.  Balfour,  at 
Nottingham,  in  November,  said : 

"  Whether  or  not  the  Government  have  now  awakened 
out  of  their  sleep,  whether  or  not  they  do  seriously  propose 
to  deal  with  a  situation  which  is  full  of  peril  —  I  know  not 
if  they  are  still  slumbering  —  no  matter  what  charges  of 
partisanship  are  levelled  at  us,  we  will  fight  for  a  strong 
navy." 

Never  was  there  a  stronger  case  of  Increase  of 
appetite  growing  by  what  it  fed  on. 


CHAPTER  VII 

INSURANCE 

"  Moreover,  neither  should  a  city  be  thought  happy,  nor 
should  a  legislator  be  commended,  because  he  has  so  trained 
the  people  as  to  conquer  their  neighbours;  for  in  this  there 
is  a  great  inconvenience;  since  it  is  evident  that  upon  this 
principle  every  citizen  who  can  will  endeavour  to  procure 
the  supreme  power  in  his  own  city;  which  crime  the 
Lacedaemonians  accuse  Pausanias  of,  though  he  enjoyed  such 
great  honours.  Such  reasoning  and  such  laws  are  neither 
political,  useful,  nor  true ;  but  a  legislator  ought  to  instil  those 
laws  on  the  minds  of  men  which  are  most  useful  for  them, 
both  in  their  public  and  private  capacities.  The  rendering 
a  people  fit  for  war  that  they  may  enslave  their  inferiors, 
ought  not  to  be  the  care  of  the  legislator;  but  that  they  may 
not  themselves  be  reduced  to  slavery  by  ot'^'e'-s.  In  the  next 
place,  he  should  take  care  that  the  object  cf  his  government 
is  the  safety  of  those  who  are  under  it,  and  not  a  despotism 
over  all;  in  the  third  place,  that  those  only  are  slaves  who 
are  fit  to  be  only  so.  Reason  indeed  concurs  with  experi- 
ence in  showing  that  all  the  attention  which  the  legislator 
paj's  to  the  business  of  war,  and  all  other  rules  which  he 
lays  down,  should  have  for  their  object  rest  and  peace;  since 
most  of  those  states  (which  we  usually  see)  are  preserved  by 
war,  but,  after  they  have  acquired  a  supreme  power  over 
those  around  them,  are  ruined;  for  during  peace,  like  a 
sword,  they  lose  their  brightness;  the  fault  of  which  lies  in 
the  legislator,  who  never  taught  them  how  to  be  at  rest." 

—  Aristotle. 

The  policy  of  European  naval  expansion  since  the 
beginning  of  the  century  is  to  be  attributed  to  dis- 

132 


WAR-BREEDING  133 

trust  arising  out  of  secret  foreign  policy.  No  one 
can  read  the  miserable  story  in  all  its  sequence  of 
diplomatic  action,  and  events  of  aggression,  without 
seeing  clearly  how  closely  allied  are  the  dates  of 
ententes,  agreements,  secret  arrangements  between 
naval  and  military  experts,  and  the  alteration  in  the 
German  Naval  Law.  It  is  true  the  British  and  Ger- 
man peoples  have  during  the  period  been  treated  to 
declarations  of  good-will  from  the  representatives  of 
both  Governments,  and  our  Foreign  Secretary  has 
returned  the  fine  sentiments  of  German  Chancellors 
and  Admiral  von  Tirpitz,  as  to  peaceful  intentions 
going  hand  in  hand  with  naval  estimates  year  by  year. 
In  the  Commons  we  have  had  flowing  passages  con- 
taining assurances  of  affection;  and  Ministers  have 
dwelt  long  in  many  debates  on  the  perfect  under- 
standings between  the  two  Governments  as  to  the 
protection  of  interests  which  would  never  clash. 
Dreadnaughts  and  battalions  were  the  mere  adjuncts 
of  colonizing  schemes  which  every  great  civilizing 
Power  must  in  these  progressive  days  pursue  in  the 
Interests  of  its  surplus  population.  Men  who  ven- 
tured to  express  their  fears  of  such  schemes  were  by 
the  many  set  down  as  "  Little  Englanders,"  unim- 
portant persons  who  could  never  appreciate  the  real 
scheme  of  empire,  owing  to  their  dislike  of  blood- 
shed. "  Timid,  sallow  looking  wretches,"  so  one 
paper  described  them,  "  with  more  brain  than  pluck," 
who  could  not  understand  why  the  nations  should 
spend  more  and  more  on  arms  for  murder  while  the 
protests  of  international  love  increased.  The  ques- 
tions and  doubts  of  these  folk  were  by  the  Jingoes 
usually  thrust  aside  as  the  grumblings  of  pacifists, 
who  neither  knew  what  love  of  country  meant,  nor 


134     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

ever  felt  the  thrill  of  joy  that  all  the  pomp  and  cir- 
cumstance of  empire  brings  to  men  who  think  im- 
perially. Germany  had  a  Bernhardi,  but  Britain 
had  a  Bernhardi  class,  which  lived  and  moved  and 
had  its  being  in  war.  It  thought  of  nothing  else  but 
war,  and  it  was  recruited  from  all  sections  of  society. 

We  have  heard  the  diplomatist  defined  as  the  man 
who  lies  abroad  for  his  country's  good;  but  it  was  not 
until  1909  Britain  discovered  the  men  who  did  it  at 
home  for  the  same  purpose.  Those  who  passed  the 
limits  of  what  was  strictly  true  in  1909,  all  worked 
for  their  country's  good.  It  was  their  excessive 
patriotism  that  forced  them  to  exceed  the  bounds  of 
decency  and  truth.  But  now  their  supporters  will 
say,  "  Where  would  England  have  been  if  they  had 
not  insisted  on  a  big  navy?  "  This  question  is  al- 
ready being  put  to  pacifists.  But  another  question 
might  be  asked,  and  it  is  this:  "  Should  we  be  now 
at  war  with  Germany  if  the  infamous  Jingo  campaign 
of  1909  had  not  been  waged?"  To  what  extent 
that  campaign  of  bitterness  and  hatred  against  Ger- 
many helped  to  make  this  war  possible  no  one  but 
those  who  passed  through  it  can  tell.  Still,  blame- 
able  as  the  Jingoes  may  be,  we  all  must  take  our 
share  of  responsibihty. 

The  excuses  of  Ministers  for  the  blunders  con- 
nected with  the  estimates  for  1909  reached  the 
height  of  absurdity  when  the  estimates  of  19 10  were 
introduced.  How  were  they  to  know  Messrs.  Mul- 
liner  and  Company  were  wrong?  and  Admiral  von 
Tirpitz  and  the  manager  of  Krupps  were  right? 
How  were  the  Cabinet  to  know  the  real  reason  for 
the  changes  in  the  German  Naval  Law?  Mr. 
McKenna  in  March,  191 1,  told  the  House  that  the 


WAS  IT  GERMANY'S  FAULT?       135 

German  Fleet  Law  came  into  existence  in  1905,  the 
year  before  the  Liberals  took  office,  and  that  Ger- 
many then  spent  only  £1 1,000,000  on  her  navy;  but 
since  that  time  there  had  been  two  alterations  of  a 
very  drastic  character  which  called  for  an  expendi- 
ture of  £22,000,000,  in  191 1.  From  that  statement 
the  man  in  the  street  had  to  infer  that  the  Germans 
forced  the  pace  in  the  armament  race  without  the 
slightest  provocation  from  us.  In  how  many  debates 
on  naval  estimates  have  members  on  both  sides  of 
the  House  argued  that  Germany,  and  Germany 
alone,  was  to  blame  for  all  the  excessive  expenditure 
on  armaments  because  she  had  altered  her  Naval 
Law?  So  many  people  have  accepted  this  reason  as 
the  only  one  that  it  might  be  well  now  to  see  what 
there  is  in  it.  The  dates  on  which  the  German 
Naval  Law  was  amended  were  June  5th,  1906,  and 
April  1 8th,  1908.  The  alteration  of  June,  1906, 
increased  the  number  of  large  cruisers  to  be  built  un- 
der the  Fleet  Law  by  six;  that  of  April,  1908, 
increased  the  number  of  battleships  by  four.  Now, 
no  definite  reason  has  ever  been  given  by  Foreign 
Secretary,  or  First  Lord,  or  Prime  Minister,  for  the 
changes  in  the  German  Naval  Law.  If  questions 
had  been  put  to  Ministers  on  this  point  it  is  quite 
possible  no  answer  would  have  been  given.  For  sev- 
eral years  only  four  members  of  the  Cabinet  could 
have  given  a  proper  answer.  After  the  death  of  Sir 
Henry  Campbell-Bannerman  only  three  Ministers 
knew  the  real  reason  for  the  alteration  in  the  German 
Naval  Law,  until,  perhaps,  the  spring  of  19 12. 
When  the  Cabinet  as  a  whole  learned  the  answer  to 
that  question  is  not  known  publicly,  but  the  approxi- 
mate date  can  be  guessed  without  much  compunction. 


136     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

Early  in  1908  there  were  rumours  of  a  disquieting 
nature  about  the  departments  connected  with  the 
Foreign  Office,  the  Admiralty,  and  the  War  Office; 
that  we  were  committed  to  the  obligations  of  war  in 
case  France  were  attacked  by  a  third  Power. 
Since  that  time  many  military,  naval,  and  Foreign 
Office  men  have  known  pretty  accurately  to  what 
extent  we  were  committed;  but  not  until  we  were  on 
the  very  verge  of  a  European  calamity  was  the  pub- 
lic taken  into  the  confidence  of  the  Cabinet  and  told 
the  true  reason  for  all  the  armament  troubles  and 
international  anxieties  which  have  affected  us  since 
1906.  The  Foreign  Secretary  in  his  speech  in  the 
House,  on  August  3rd,  19 14,  revealed  the  secret 
which  had  been  marvellously  well  kept  from  the  gen- 
eral public  for  eight  years  and  a  half;  that  in  Janu- 
ary, 1906,  he  had  authorized  conversations  between 
British  and  French  naval  and  military  experts  to  take 
place,  and  that  he  had  spoken  to  Sir  Henry  Camp- 
bell-Bannerman,  Mr.  Asquith,  and  Mr.  Haldane 
about  it,  and  had  received  their  sanction. 

From  the  time  of  the  commencement  of  the  Ger- 
man Naval  Law  until  the  Liberals  came  into  office 
in  1906,  there  can  be  no  doubt  as  to  who  forced  the 
pace.  In  battleships  alone  our  superiority  in  1901 
was  112  per  cent.,  in  1902  it  was  120  per  cent.,  in 
1903  it  was  165  per  cent.,  and  in  1904  it  went  up  to 
190  per  cent.  Taking  the  five  years  before  the  Ger- 
man Naval  Law  came  into  existence,  we  find  the  ex- 
penditure on  the  British  navy,  under  Mr.  Goschen, 
increased  by  about  £10,000,000.  In  introducing  his 
last  naval  Budget,  Mr.  Goschen  told  the  House  in 
1900  that  Germany  was  starting  a  programme  of 
shipbuilding  at  a  cost  of  £70,000,000,  to  be  spread 


ESTIMATES  COMPARED,  137 

over  a  period  of  sixteen  years.  The  rise  in  expendi- 
ture during  the  first  five  years  of  the  German  Naval 
Law  does  not  show  any  evidence  of  Germany  forcing 
the  pace.  In  1900  Britain  spent  £32,055,000,  and 
Germany  spent  £7,472,000;  in  1904  Britain  spent 
£42,431,000,  and  Germany  £11,659,000.  Another 
test  in  expenditure,  the  three  Power  test,  shows  that 
in  1900  Britain  spent  £1,110,000  more  than  Ger- 
many, France  and  Russia  combined;  and  in  1904 
Britain  spent  £6,360,000  more  than  the  same  three 
Power  combination.  The  first  dreadnaught  was 
built  by  Britain  in  1904-5,  and  the  work  was  com- 
pleted in  thirteen  months.  Bombastically  our  papers 
announced  to  the  world  that  we  had  created  a  revolu- 
tion in  shipbuilding,  and  had  practically  made  scrap 
of  most  of  the  big  ships  of  other  Powers. 

The  first  alteration  in  the  German  Naval  Law  was 
made  on  June  5th,  1906,  about  six  months  after  the 
agreement  between  the  British  and  French  Govern- 
ments authorizing  conversations  to  take  place  be- 
tween naval  and  military  experts.     After  January, 

1906,  the  tendency  of  the  figures  is  startling.  The 
combination  of  Britain  and  France  under  naval  and 
military  experts,  coming  shortly  after  the  Delcasse  in- 
terview in  Le  Gaulois,  and  the  Lauzanne  revelations 
in  Le  Matin,  in  October,  1905,  forced  Germany  to 
alter  her  Naval  Law.  The  effect  of  the  combination 
against  Germany  is  remarkable.  In  1906  Britain 
reduced  her  naval  expenditure  by  £1,679,754,  and 
France  increased  her  amount  by  £255,275  ;  Germany 
raised  her  expenditure  by  £704,501.     The  next  year, 

1907,  Britain  reduced  her  estimates  by  £52,587;  and 
France  also  reduced  her  expenditure  by  £516,445; 
Germany  raised  her  estimates  by  £1,618,053.     Then, 


138     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

in  1908,  Britain  increased  the  amount  spent  on  the 
navy  by  £900,000,  and  France  also  raised  her  expend- 
iture, by  £310,515;  Germany  then  increased  her 
naval  expenditure  by  £2,972,637.  The  net  result  of 
the  authorization  of  conversations  between  the  Brit- 
ish and  French  naval  and  military  experts  was  to 
force  Germany  to  raise  her  expenditure  on  her  navy 
by  £5,295,191  in  three  years.  The  work  of  isola- 
tion was  begun,  and  Germany  set  about  making  full 
preparations  for  meeting  her  "  peaceful  "  neighbours 
east  and  west. 

The  second  alteration  of  the  German  Naval  Law 
took  place  on  April  i8th,  1908.  The  reasons  for 
the  second  change  in  the  Naval  Law  are  not  far  to 
seek.  German  naval  experts  now  held  that  they 
would  have  to  reckon  in  future  with  Great  Britain, 
France,  and  Russia.  Speaking  on  the  naval  pro- 
grammes of  great  Powers,  Sir  Edward  Grey,  in  Jan- 
uary, 1908,  said: 

"  When  I  see  the  great  programmes  of  naval  expenditure 
which  are  being  produced  in  some  other  countries,  I  think  it 
right  that  the  attention  of  this  country  should  be  devoted  to 
these  programmes,  because  if  they  are  carried  out  in  their 
entirety  it  will  undoubtedly  become  necessary  for  us  in  the 
interests,  not  of  the  Empire,  but  for  the  preservation  of  our 
independence  and  for  our  own  safety  at  home  to  make  fur- 
ther increases  in  our  own  navy." 

Now  the  only  great  Power  he  could  have  had  in 
mind  was  Germany.  France  was  out  of  the  ques- 
tion and  Russia  was  not  a  Power  we  could  then  count 
against  us.  If  the  Foreign  Secretary  had  other 
Powers  than  Germany  in  mind  they  must  have  been 
those  of  the  Triple  Alliance.  He  knew  when  he 
made  that  speech  that  the  military  and  naval  experts 


EDUCATION  IN  ANARCHISM       139 

of  France  and  Britain  were  then  formulating  plans 
for  the  General  Staffs;  and  he  must  have  known  the 
real  reasons  for  Germany's  naval  expansion  since 
1906.  The  speech  was  really  a  feeler;  it  was  the 
Foreign  Secretary's  way  of  preparing  Liberals  in  the 
country  for  a  change  of  naval  policy.  It  was  his 
way  of  covering  up  the  blunder  he  made  in  1906,  and 
screening  the  work,  of  his  department,  together  with 
the  plans  of  the  experts;  and  throwing  the  blame  of 
expansion  in  armaments  on  Germany,  the  victim  of 
our  Foreign  Office  policy  of  secrecy.  When  one 
thinks  of  the  way  the  general  public,  and  indeed  lead- 
ing Liberals,  have  been  misled  in  these  affairs  since 
1906,  it  is  in  itself  enough  to  make  any  thinking  per- 
son an  anarchist.  Governments  that  cannot  be 
straightforward  with  a  people  to  whom  they  are  only 
servants, —  because  the  systems  at  the  Admiralty  and 
the  Foreign  Office  are  based  on  secrecy, —  should  at 
least  be  honest  about  the  difficulties  which  secret  sys- 
tems raise;  and  should  inform  the  public  as  to  the 
dangers  and  disabilities  which  make  true  representa- 
tive government  impossible,  and  peace  a  system  of 
grinding  taxation. 

In  the  autumn  of  1907  Britain  concluded  an  agree- 
ment with  Russia.  Both  Governments  engaged  to 
respect  the  integrity  and  independence  of  Persia; 
they  declared  that  they  had  no  intention  of  changing 
the  political  status  of  Afghanistan;  and  they  con- 
tracted to  respect  the  territorial  integrity  of  Tibet. 
This  agreement  removed  many  of  the  old  contentions 
which  lay  between  Britain  and  Russia.  Taken  with 
the  policy  of  isolating  Germany,  it  was  not  calculated 
to  mollify  the  German  Government.  Besides,  Rus- 
sia was  the  ally  of  France.     Nevertheless,  the  Ger- 


I40     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

man  Emperor  visited  London  in  the  autumn  of  1907, 
and  was  a  guest  at  the  Guildhall.  On  that  occasion 
the  Emperor  gave  an  emphatic  and  impressive  dec- 
laration, to  use  Mr.  Asquith's  words,  that  the  gov- 
erning purpose  of  his  policy  was  the  preservation  of 
the  peace  of  Europe,  and  the  maintenance  of  good 
relations  between  our  two  countries.  A  people 
never  knows  quite  where  it  stands  internationally  so 
long  as  there  is  only  one  royal  family  in  Europe,  and 
it  certainly  perplexed  many  sober  citizens  to  learn 
that  the  potentate  which  caused  Britain  so  much 
anxiety  in  1905  was  enjoying  city  hospitality  in  1907. 
It  was  puzzling.  But  stranger  events  were  soon  to 
happen. 

On  March  6th,  1908,  there  appeared  In  the  Times 
the  following  letter  from  its  military  correspondent, 
under  the  title,  "  Under  which  King?  ": 

"  I  consider  it  my  duty  to  ask  you  to  draw  the  attention 
of  the  public  to  a  matter  of  grave  importance.  It  has  come 
to  my  knowledge  that  His  Majesty  the  German  Emperor 
has  recently  addressed  a  letter  to  Lord  Tvveedmouth  on  the 
subject  of  British  and  German  naval  policy,  and  it  is  af- 
firmed that  this  letter  amounts  to  an  attempt  to  influence, 
in  German  interests,  the  Minister  responsible  for  our  Navy 
Estimates." 

This  was  too  much  for  the  Jingoes.  It  was  one 
thing  inviting  the  German  Emperor  to  sample  our 
turtle,  but  quite  another  when  he  invited  the  First 
Lord  of  the  Admiralty  to  reduce  the  naval  estimates. 
Outraged  Jingoes  rose  to  the  occasion  with  unprece- 
dented alacrity.  The  question  was  raised  in  the 
House  of  Lords,  and  Lord  Rosebery  intervened  in 
the  debate  to  defend  Lord  Tweedmouth  from  the 
bitter  attacks  of  the  Yellow  press.     He  said: 


MISREPRESENTATIONS  141 

"  I  gather  from  the  newspapers,  which  seem  to  have  been 
singularly  well-informed  of  late,  that  the  German  Emperor 
was  somewhat  disquieted  by  a  letter  which  appeared  in  the 
public  prints,  in  which  very  pointed  note  was  taken  of  him- 
self. And  if  I  am  still  to  believe  the  public  prints,  he  wrote 
a  letter,  partly  of  banter,  to  my  noble  friend  the  First  Lord 
of  the  Admiralty  on  this  subject,  to  which  my  noble  friend 
replied,  in,  I  suppose,  as  much  a  tone  of  banter  as  one  in 
his  situation  can  employ  towards  such  a  potentate  as  the 
German  Emperor.  Out  of  this  we  have  seen  a  whole  world 
of  absolutely  insane  inferences  drawn  —  that  the  German 
Emperor  was  attempting  to  influence  my  noble  friend,  with  a 
view  to  cut  down  the  Navy  Estimates,  to  check  the  progres- 
sion of  our  armaments,  to  neutralize  the  defensive  activities 
of  our  nation,  and  in  some  subterranean  manner  to  subvert 
the  whole  constitution  of  the  British  Government.  Surely 
that  is  placing  ourselves,  our  Government,  our  institutions, 
in  a  supremely  ridiculous  position.  .  .  .  What  then  is  the 
lesson  I  draw  from  the  excitement  produced  by  this  very 
slight  incident?  It  is  this  —  that  the  responsibility  of  the 
press  both  in  England  and  Germany  should  be  realized  by 
that  press,  and  that  they  should  not  lash  both  nations  into  a 
state  of  soreness  which  some  day  may  amount  to  exaspera- 
tion and  may  produce  the  gravest  dangers  to  European 
peace." 

A  copy  of  the  Kaiser's  letter  has  recently  appeared 
in  a  London  journal,  and  there  is  not  one  word  in  it 
to  justify  the  statement  made  by  the  Times  corre- 
spondent. It  in  no  way  attempts  to  influence  the 
naval  plans  of  our  Admiralty.  What  the  letter  con- 
tains is  a  protest  against  scaremongers  in  high  quar- 
ters; and,  in  all  fairness  to  the  German  Emperor,  it 
must  be  said  he  had  very  good  reason  to  protest. 
The  following  paragraphs  from  the  letter  indicate 
the  character  of  the  whole  of  it: 


142     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

"  During  my  last  pleasant  visit  to  your  hospitable  shores 
I  tried  to  make  your  authorities  understand  what  the  drift 
of  the  German  Naval  Policy  is.  But  I  am  afraid  that  my 
explanations  have  been  either  misunderstood  or  not  believed, 
because  I  see  the  '  German  Danger '  and  the  *  German 
Challenge  to  British  Naval  Supremacy '  constantly  quoted 
in  the  different  articles.  The  phrase,  if  not  repudiated  or 
corrected,  sown  broadcast  over  the  country  and  daily  dinned 
into  British  ears,  might  in  the  end  create  most  deplorable 
results.  ...  It  is  absolutely  nonsensical  and  untrue  that 
the  German  Naval  Bill  is  to  provide  a  Navy  meant  as  a 
'  challenge  to  British  Naval  Supremacy.' 

"  It  is  very  galling  to  the  Germans  to  see  their  country 
continually  held  up  as  the  sole  danger  and  menace  to  Britain 
by  the  whole  press  of  the  different  contending  parties;  con- 
sidering that  other  countries  are  building  too,  and  there  are 
even  larger  fleets  than  the  German.  Doubtless  when  party 
faction  runs  high  there  is  often  a  lamentable  lack  of  dis- 
crimination in  the  choice  of  the  weapons;  but  I  really  must 
protest  that  the  '  German  Naval  Programme '  should  be 
the  only  one  for  exclusive  use,  or  that  such  a  poisoned  one 
should  be  forged  as  the  '  German  Challenge  to  British 
Supremacy  at  Sea.'  " 

Now  when  this  letter  was  published  some  editorial 
paragraphs  accompanied  it,  in  which  the  following 
statement  was  made : 

*'  At  the  same  time,  the  Imperial  German  Navy  was  mak- 
ing swift  and  steady  progress;  and  its  menace  to  British 
supremacy  aroused  considerable  alarm  in  this  country.  Al- 
though the  British  navy  held  a  superiority  over  the  German 
navy  in  ships  not  of  the  'dreadnaught '  type,  the  balance  in 
'  dreadnaughts '  was  virtually  even." 

Virtually  even !  Let  us  see.  The  sentences  refer 
to  the  naval  situation  as  it  was  at  the  time  the  Kaiser 
wrote  to  Lord  Tweedmouth,  February  14th,  1908. 


A  TATTERED  SCARECROW         143 

Britain  had  then  four  dreadnaughts,  and  Germany 
had  not  one.  Will  it  be  believed  in  the  face  of  that 
statement  from  a  London  penny  paper,  published 
October  30th,  19 14,  that  we  had  seven  dread- 
naughts  afloat  before  Germany  had  one  ready  for 
sea?  That  is  just  the  kind  of  stuff  the  scares  were 
made  of.  But  to  return  to  Lord  Rosebery's  state- 
ment about  the  Kaiser's  letter. 

The  yellow  press  took  little  heed  of  his  ominous 
words.  Any  bit  of  club-room  gossip  was  gathered 
for  Jingo  fuel,  and  the  campaign  of  envy  and  hatred 
pushed  for  all  it  was  worth  in  both  Britain  and  Ger- 
many. In  the  House  of  Commons  the  pacifists 
raised  a  debate  on  the  motion  of  Mr.  Murray  Mac- 
donald  to  reduce  expenditure  on  armaments,  but  it 
was  defeated  by  320  to  73.  The  navy  estimates 
were  introduced  on  March  9th,  the  same  day  the 
Kaiser-Tweedmouth  letters  were  discussed  in  the 
Lords,  and  revealed  an  increase  of  £900,000.  Mr. 
Balfour  raised  at  once  the  question  of  German  supe- 
riority, which  only  existed  in  his  imagination,  and  laid 
the  basis  of  the  scare  which  culminated  in  the  orgy 
of  mendacity  of  March,  1909. 

After  the  estimates  of  1908,  the  policy  of  reducing 
naval  armaments  was  buried,  and  time  was  beginning 
to  show  that  Continental  friendships  were  expensive 
affairs  for  Britain  to  indulge  in.  But  what  else  could 
be  expected?  After  the  death  of  Sir  Henry  Camp- 
bell-Bannerman,  the  Whigs  got  control  of  the  Cab- 
inet. Peace  was  in  doubt.  Retrenchment  was  blown 
to  the  winds,  and  Reform  turned  into  socialistic 
channels.  The  old  watchwords  of  Liberalism  were 
dropped,  and  the  Gladstonian  tags  fitted  no  perora- 
tions.    An  effective  Opposition  could  have  made  po- 


144     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

litical  hay  of  the  Government,  but,  torn  with  internal 
dissension,  it  languished  inept  and  fatuous.  The 
future  looked  dark,  for  democracy  with  the  Cabinet 
assuming  more  power,  the  rights  of  private  members 
disappearing,  the  doings  of  the  Foreign  Office  be- 
coming more  and  more  shrouded  in  mystery,  and  the 
growth  of  influence  of  armaments  rings  over  the 
Admiralty  and  the  War  Office.  The  redeeming 
features  after  1908,  were  the  Budget  of  1909,  and 
the  Parliament  Act. 

In  looking  back,  no  one  with  an  impartial  eye  can 
detect  any  other  course  open  to  the  governments  but 
one  of  increasing  expenditure  on  armies  and  navies. 
Agreements  with  France,  and  Russia,  and  Japan,  to 
say  nothing  of  all  the  other  serious  aggravations  re- 
ferred to  by  Ministers  in  their  speeches  over  and 
over  again,  could  have  no  other  result  in  Europe 
than  arming  the  nations  for  Armageddon.  The 
more  agreements  we  made,  the  more  Germany  be- 
came impressed  with  the  fact  that  she  was  the  one 
Power  in  all  the  world  Britain  was  arming  against. 
Her  press  from  the  summer  of  1909,  scarcely  ever 
ceased  from  pointing  that  out  to  the  German  people. 
When  the  scare  of  1908  was  at  its  height.  Ministers 
here  protested  they  had  no  intention  of  trying  to  iso- 
late Germany;  but  it  was  too  late.  Leading  French 
publicists  said  the  opposite;  many  of  them  frankly 
condemned  the  policy  of  the  Entente  which  had  the 
effect  of  isolating  Germany.  Sir  Edward  Grey,  who 
was  responsible  for  our  making  so  many  friendships, 
tried  to  make  the  country  believe  that  the  Govern- 
ment had  no  designs  against  Germany  when  they 
drew  up  agreements  with  Russia  and  France.  Yet 
on  April  ist,  1908,  before  the  German  Naval  Law 


HOW  WE  STOOD  145 

was  amended   for  the   second  time,  the  navies  of 
Britain,  France  and  Germany  stood  as  follows: 

Armoured 

Battleships       Cruisers  Destroyers 

Great   Britain    57  34  142 

France    21  19  48 

Germany    22  8  61 

How  could  any  German,  whether  educated  by 
Kant  or  Nietzsche,  in  the  face  of  these  figures  listen 
for  a  moment  to  the  amiable  phrases  of  the  Foreign 
Secretary  about  there  being  no  desire  on  the  part  of 
Britain  to  isolate  Germany?  Germans,  generally, 
could  not  possibly  believe  that  there  was  no  intention 
on  the  part  of  a  large  section  of  the  British  press  and 
people,  in  the  spring  of  1909,  to  isolate  their  country. 
Ministers  have  always  striven  to  keep  the  public 
mind  fixed  on  British  and  German  naval  development 
only,  just  as  if  Britain  stood  in  her  old  position  of 
splendid  isolation.  It  would  not  have  suited  the 
Foreign  Office  game  to  let  the  people  know  that  our 
understandings  with  France  and  Russia  seriously  af- 
fected the  naval  programmes  of  Germany.  It  had 
been  said  that  the  only  reason  why  Germany  altered 
her  Naval  Law  In  1908,  was  for  the  purpose  of  pro- 
viding work  for  her  dockyards  where  trade  was 
almost  at  a  standstill,  and  the  workers  were  on  the 
point  of  rioting.  It  is  true,  trade  was  exceeding 
bad  In  Germany  In  1907,  and  1908.  But  the  Ger- 
man Government  was  not  as  philanthropic  as  all  that. 
More  likely  the  big  firms  demanded  more  orders,  as 
they  did  In  Britain,  and  their  demands  fitted  In  with 
foreign  and  naval  policy.  Anyway,  the  alteration  of 
the  German  Naval  Lav/  did  not  make  enough  differ- 


146     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

ence  to  scare  the  wits  out  of  our  Jingoes  and  the  Gov- 
ernment. Without  a  Naval  Law,  the  Entente  Pow- 
ers, from  the  time  of  the  big  scare,  1909,  up  to  this 
year,  simply  smothered  all  Germany's  attempts  to 
become  mistress  of  the  sea.  The  figures  of  new  con- 
struction from  1909  to  1 9 14  will  never  convince  any 
German  that  our  policy  was  other  than  one  of  com- 
plete isolation: 

Great  Britain         France  Russia  Germany 

1909     £11,076,551      £4,517,766      £1,758,487      £10,177,062 

1910     14,755,289  4,977,682  1,424,013         11,392,856 

19"     15,148,171  5.876,659  3,216,396         11,710,859 

1912     16,132,558  7,114,876  6,897,580         11,491,187 

1913     16,883,875  8,893,064         12,082,516         11,010,883 

1914     18,676,080         11,772,862         13,098,613         10,316,264 

These  figures  speak  volumes.  They  tell  their 
own  story  of  isolation.  The  rise  in  the  expenditure 
of  the  French  and  Russian  Governments  on  their 
navies  is  seen  to  be  stupendous.  And  while  the 
patriot  is  thinking  about  foreign  friendships  It  might 
be  well  to  give  a  thought  in  passing  to  the  armament 
ring  of  Great  Britain,  to  Messrs.  Schneider,  and  to 
Messrs.  Krupp,  and  figure  up  what  they  were  getting 
out  of  the  wholesale  trade  of  murdering  millions. 
Talk  about  big  business !  These  four  countries  In  one 
year  spend  over  £50,000,000  on  new  construction 
alone.  Ten  per  cent,  of  It  makes  a  tidy  dividend  for 
large  numbers  of  "  apostles  of  peace."  Jingoism  is 
the  best  and  biggest  business  on  the  two  continents. 

Now,  no  fair-minded  Britisher  can  look  at  the 
figures  and  say  that  they  prove  in  the  slightest  degree 
that  Germany  intended  to  smash  Britain.  The  wild- 
est notions  of  German  naval  expansion  have  been 
sedulously  sown  in  this  country  for  years.  Since  Mr. 
Balfour's  pilgrimage  in  1909,  it  is  not  surprising  to 
hear  men,  usually  well-informed  in  civil  matters,  say 


IF  YOU  WERE  A  GERMAN         147 

that  the  *'  Germans  are  spending  many  millions  more 
on  their  navy  than  we  are  on  ours."  But  that  is  one 
of  the  tricks  of  the  trade,  for  the  agents  of  war  know 
their  pubhc,  and  a  certain  class  of  patriot  as  a  rule 
will  believe  any  yarn  told  by  a  Lord  or  a  front-bench 
man. 

Is  it  too  much  to  ask  those  people  who  insist  on 
saying  Germany  provoked  this  war  to  "  smash  us," 
to  try  to  place  themselves  in  the  position  of  an  intel- 
ligent German,  one  sufficiently  interested  in  foreign 
affairs  to  inquire  what  France  and  Russia,  two  coun- 
tries allied  against  Germany,  were  spending  on  their 
navies;  and  then  say  Germany  was  wholly  responsible 
for  the  European  conflagration?  It  is  the  fashion 
now  to  try  to  focus  public  attention  on  the  White 
Papers,  just  as  it  was  for  Ministers  to  keep  the  public 
mind  bent  on  Germany's  navy;  but  White  Papers 
record  only  mere  incidents  in  this  affair;  they  deal 
with  only  a  little  of  the  doings  of  diplomatists.  This 
business  began  before  Sir  Edward  Grey  went  to  the 
Foreign  Office.  Our  White  Paper  in  itself  is  only 
useful  for  salving  the  consciences  of  well-meaning 
Christians.  There  is  a  lot  of  history  connected  with 
this  war  not  to  be  found  anywhere  in  any  White 
Paper. 

Think  of  the  German  who  knew  about  the  secret 
articles  to  the  Anglo-French  Agreement;  who  re- 
membered the  1905  scandal  connected  with  the 
alleged  Schleswig-Holstein  invasion  by  the  British  in 
support  of  France;  who  had  a  lively  recollection  of 
the  work  of  M.  Delcasse;  and  who,  in  the  spring  of 
this  year,  saw  the  figures  of  France's  new  construc- 
tion raised  from  £4,977,682  in  1910  to  £1 1,772,862 
in  1914;  —  and  then  imagine  his  feelings  when  he 


148     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

read  British  Ministers'  statements  about  having  no 
desire  to  isolate  Germany.  It  is  all  very  well  for  the 
man  who  is  engrossed  in  the  pohtics  of  his  own  coun- 
try to  say,  "Germany  forced  the  pace!"  to  say, 
"  Germany  meant  to  smash  us,"  and  "  It  was  bound 
to  come,  and  the  sooner  the  better."  But  surely  in 
the  name  of  all  that  is  reasonable,  for  the  future 
guidance  of  the  people,  for  the  welfare  of  the  democ- 
racies statesmen  now  prate  so  much  about,  is  it  not  of 
the  greatest  importance  that  the  people  should  learn 
the  full  lesson  of  what  foreign  policy  and  the  armed 
support  of  that  policy  means  ?  It  is  of  course  useless 
to  talk  about  the  Golden  Rule  while  Christian  nations 
are  busy  making  an  abattoir  of  Europe,  but  it  should 
be  possible  for  thinking  men  and  women,  for  a  mo- 
ment or  two,  to  put  themselves  in  the  shoes  of  a 
fellow-German.  Try  it  for  a  moment.  Forget 
Bernhardi,  Nietzsche,  and  all  that  British  literary 
giants,  scientists,  and  theologians,  have  said  about 
them.  Then  think  of  Russia,  and  all  Russia  meant 
to  a  German.  A  man  who  lived  through  the 
Crimean  War  can  appreciate  what  that  means. 
Perhaps  it  is  quite  impossible  for  one  of  us  to  feel 
what  a  German  would  feel  on  seeing  the  Russian  fig- 
ures for  new  construction:  in  1910  Russia  spent 
£1,424,013,  and  in  1914  she  spends  £13,098,613! 
Now  look  at  the  figures  of  the  two  great  combina- 
tions, the  Triple  Alliance  and  the  Triple  Entente: 

NEW  CONSTRUCTION,  1914 

Triple  Triple 

Entente  Alliance 

Great  Britain  £18,676,080  Germany    £10,316,264 

France     11,772,862  Austria    4,051,976 

Russia    13,098,613  Italy    3,237,00a 


Triple  Entente   £43)547i555      Triple  Alliance £17,605,240 


WHO  WAS  ACCELERATING?        149 

The  pacific  intentions  of  the  Entente  Powers 
amounted  to  a  two  and  a  half  Power  standard  at 
least.  It  must  be  plain  that  no  assurances  of  the 
peaceful  intentions  of  Britain,  or  the  Entente  Pow- 
ers, could,  at  any  time  since  the  death  of  Sir  Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman,  carry  the  slightest  influence  in 
Germany  against  the  actions  of  our  Foreign  Office. 
The  preparations  for  this  war  were  in  the  making 
shortly  after  the  festivities  of  Toulon  and  Kron- 
stadt,  and  the  Anglo-French  Agreement  of  1904  was 
the  first  step  Britain  took  in  the  diplomatic  game  of 
isolating  Germany. 

The  debate  in  the  House  in  March,  191 1,  con- 
tained some  striking  statements  from  Ministers. 
The  First  Lord  had  to  admit  he  was  completely  mis- 
led in  1909.  The  facts  were  right,  but  the  infer- 
ences were  wrong.  The  German  Government  was 
quite  right  as  to  their  programme;  no  acceleration 
was  to  take  place.  It  was  Britain,  not  Germiany, 
that  was  guilty  of  acceleration.  Mr.  McKenna  said 
the  effect  of  building  the  four  contingent  ships  of 
1909,  "  has  merely  accelerated  the  date  of  comple- 
tion by  a  couple  of  years  of  two  of  the  ships,  and  will 
have  incidentally  the  effect  of  relieving  the  estimates 
in  the  year  afterwards."  No  relief  came  to  justify 
that  statement.  The  expenditure  went  up  higher 
and  higher  each  year.  Both  the  gross  expenditure, 
and  the  money  for  new  construction  went  up  by  leaps 
and  bounds  after  1909.  Sir  Edward  Grey  described 
the  situation  with  a  humour  of  which  he  was  quite 
unconscious : 

"  Before  I  speak  strongly  on  that  point  (the  evil  of  in- 
creasing expenditure  on  armaments)  I  should  be  misleading 
the  honourable  member  and  the  House  if  because  I  speak  and 


150     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

feel  strongly  on  that  point  I  gave  any  impression  that  the 
Navy  Estimates  now  before  the  House  were  more  than  the 
Government  think  is  necessary  to  meet  the  requirements  of 
the  case  this  year.  The  First  Lord  has  had  a  very  difficult 
task.  He  has  had  to  stand  against  panic  and  scare,  notably 
in  the  election  before  last,  greatly  fomented  by  the  calcu- 
lations made  by  the  right  honourable  gentleman  (Mr,  Bal- 
four) which,  when  the  calculations  proved  to  be  mistaken 
disappeared.  .  .  .  We  certainly,  I  think,  cannot  be  accused 
of  having  forced  the  pace.  Our  Navy  Estimates  for  1909 
are  said  to  have  given  provocation.  They  have  not  given 
rise  to  increased  naval  expenditure  in  Germany,  or,  I  believe, 
in  any  other  country.  The  last  addition  to  the  German 
Naval  programme  was  settled  by  law  in  1908." 

The  Foreign  Secretary  did  not  know  of  increased 
naval  expenditure  in  Germany,  or  in  any  other  coun- 
try; but  it  was  necessary  for  Britain  to  introduce  esti- 
mates showing  an  increase  of  nearly  £4,000,000. 
Yet  no  one  could  accuse  Britain  of  forcing  the  pace ! 
The  Foreign  Secretary  made  that  statement  in  the 
House  on  the  very  day  when  the  First  Lord  said  the 
alteration  of  the  German  Naval  Law  was  the  cause 
of  our  raising  our  expenditure.  The  debate  was 
full  of  instruction  as  to  the  value  of  panics,  and  the 
statement  of  the  Jingo  press  and  armament  ring 
agents. 

In  April,  191 1,  there  was  a  debate'  in  the  House 
of  Lords  on  Compulsory  Military  Service.  Lord 
Roberts  led  the  attack  on  the  voluntary  system. 
Lord  Haldane,  who  was  told  in  1906  of  the  secret 
arrangement  for  conversations  to  take  place  between 
British  and  French  military  and  naval  experts,  re- 
plied, and  let  some  light  fall  on  the  international 
situation,  in  a  passage  the  significance  of  which  has 
been  overlooked.     He  said: 


''COMMANDER  OF  THE  FORCES"     151 

"  The  German  Chancellor,  in  a  speech  to  which  the  noble 
earl  referred,  spoke  of  the  willingness  of  his  country  to 
exchange  naval  information  with  this  country,  a  course 
which,  if  taken,  must  tend  in  some  degree  to  reduce  the 
risk  of  scares,  which  have  done  so  much  to  force  up  the 
naval  estimates,  not  only  in  this  country,  but  in  other  coun- 
tries. Moreover,  with  France  and  Russia  we  are  in  agree- 
ment, and  a  war  in  defence  of  the  Indian  frontier  against 
Russia  appears  less  likely  now  than  it  has  appeared  for  gen- 
erations. ...  I  have  always  thought  that  the  true  Com- 
mander of  the  Forces  in  this  country,  naval  and  military, 
is  not  the  sailor  or  the  soldier,  but  the  Foreign  Secretary." 

It  is  evident,  now  that  we  have  the  figures  for  ex- 
penditure, that  the  invitation  of  the  German  Chancel- 
lor was  not  accepted.  His  "  solemn  declaration  "  of 
1909  was  ignored,  and  a  panic  "  without  foundation 
in  fact  "  was  the  factor  that  did  "  so  much  to  force 
up  the  naval  estimates."  Still  the  chief  point  of 
interest  in  Lord  Haldane's  extraordinary  speech  was 
the  admission  that  we  were  in  agreement  with  both 
France  and  Russia,  and  the  inference  to  be  drawn  is 
that  there  was  no  necessity  for  arming  against  those 
countries.  Speeches  delivered  in  the  House  of 
Lords  do  not  at  best  receive  the  attention  from  the 
press  and  from  the  public  they  deserve.  They  do, 
however,  engage  the  attention  of  diplomatists  and 
legislators  in  foreign  countries,  and  the  fact  that 
Lord  Haldane  regarded  the  Foreign  Secretary  as 
Commander  of  the  Forces  must  have  occasioned  no 
small  surprise  on  the  Continent. 

The  Moroccan  trouble  in  the  summer  of  191 1 
brought  Germany  and  Britain  to  the  verge  of  war. 
A  little  bit  of  a  German  gunboat,  the  Panther,  visited 
Agadir,   and  scared  the  British  Empire  out  of  its 


152     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

wits.  As  for  the  Panther,  the  press  soon  made 
leviathan  out  of  a  herring.  In  all  the  sordid  his- 
tory of  British  Foreign  Office  deals,  there  is  nothing 
so  unutterably  discreditable  as  the  business  connected 
with  the  Agadir  incident.  Germany  was  a  party  to 
the  Act  of  Algeciras  of  1906,  a  "  scrap  of  paper" 
containing  123  articles,  which  confirmed  the  pledges 
of  the  Powers  to  uphold  the  independence  and  in- 
tegrity of  Morocco.  The  separate  Franco-German 
declaration  of  February,  1909,  has  already  been  re- 
ferred to;  and  the  secret  articles  to  which  Britain 
was  an  accomplice,  whereby  Spain  and  France  were 
to  partition  Morocco,  it  must  be  remembered,  were 
not  made  public  until  November  after  the  visit  of 
the  Panther  to  Agadir.  Now  the  real  reason  for 
the  appearance  of  the  Panther  at  Agadir  was  this : 
Germany  saw  France  occupy  Fez,  with  the  inten- 
tion of  staying  there;  and  Spain  in  occupation  of 
El-Kasr  and  Larash;  both  countries  having  tens  of 
thousands  of  soldiers  spread  over  the  northern  dis- 
tricts of  Morocco.  Therefore,  as  a  party  to  the 
Algeciras  Act,  and  as  a  partner  of  France,  in  the 
Declaration  of  1909,  she  was  not  inclined  to  stand 
aloof  while  France  and  Spain  partitioned  Morocco. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  admitted  in  the  House  that  he  was 
in  favour  of  the  French  descent  on  Fez;  but  he,  of 
course,  would  give  no  reason  why  he  approved  the 
French  expedition.  Secret  articles,  and  backstairs 
understandings,  placed  the  British  Government  in 
an  unenviable  position.  That  the  whole  of  our 
naval  and  military  forces  should,  because  of  the  com- 
mitments of  the  Foreign  Office,  be  placed  at  the  dis- 
posal of  French,  and  Spanish,  and  British  gangs  of 
concessionaires,  land-grabbers,  and  financial  sharks, 


THE  POINT  OF  VIEW  153 

operating  in  and  about  European  foreign  offices,  was 
to  say  the  least  an  abominable  act  of  treachery  to 
the  people.  And  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George  should 
lend  himself  to  that  kind  of  work  is  enough  to  make 
one  despair  of  trusting  any  Radical,  once  he  enters 
a  Cabinet.  What  would  he  have  said  of  the  busi- 
ness if  he  had  been  in  Opposition!  If  Lord  Lans- 
downe,  say,  had  been  Foreign  Secretary,  what  would 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  have  said  of  a  British  Govern- 
ment lending  its  naval,  military  and  diplomatic 
strength  to  those  who  made  of  northern  Africa  what 
Belgium  made  of  the  Congo? 


CHAPTER  VIII 

APOSTLES  OF   PEACE 

"  That  friendly  relations  may  ultimately  be  established  be- 
tween England  and  Germany  without  the  arbitrament  of 
war  I  earnestly  hope  and  occasionally  believe.  It  depends 
mainly  on  the  English  people.  They  must  not  allow  them- 
selves to  rest  in  self-complacency,  nor,  in  ignorant  nervous- 
ness as  to  the  susceptibilities  of  foreign  powers,  slacken  their 
efforts  to  increase  the  present  power  of  the  navy.  They 
must,  moreover,  insist  on  military  reforms  absolutely  neces- 
sary if  England  is  to  maintain  her  place  among  the  nations, 
and  that  the  destinies  of  this  country  shall  be  in  the  hands 
of  persons  acquainted  with  the  march  of  opinion  and  with 
the  strength  and  tendency  of  political  forces  in  the  leading 
countries  of  Europe.  Those  who  counsel  Englishmen  to  be 
vigilant  in  these  matters  are  true  Apostles  of  Peace,  Eng- 
land and  Germany  will  never  be  brought  together  until  the 
Germans  thoroughly  realize  that  there  is  no  hope  of  substi- 
tuting as  the  symbol  of  sea  power  the  German  eagle  for  the 
white  ensign  of  the  British  Navy." 

—  Sir  Rowland  Blennerhassett 
in  The  National  Review,  December,  1903. 

It  has  been  said  that  every  politician  sooner  or 
later  must  eat  his  own  words  and  swallow  his  own 
principles.  The  exigencies  of  party  warfare  de- 
mand metamorphosis  at  some  stage  or  another; 
nothing  is  more  potent  in  bringing  these  changes 
about  than  office;  it  is  the  sarcophagus  of  the  ideal- 
ist.    A  man  may  be  never  so  firm  in  his  principles 

154 


PRINCIPLES  AND  OFFICE  155 

when  he  is  a  private  member;  but  once  he  is  taken 
within  the  walls  of  a  Government  department  the 
lime  of  It  seems  to  eat  through  him  and  petrify  his 
soul.  The  House  Itself  is  bad  enough  in  this  re- 
spect, and  it  has  been  called,  not  without  reason, 
the  mausoleum  of  ideals.  But  a  private  member 
need  not  vote  unless  he  likes;  he  might  support  his 
party  in  some  legislation  and  vote  against  it  on  meas- 
ures he  objects  to,  or  not  vote  at  all.  It  is  different 
when  a  man  takes  office;  he  must  conform  to  the 
tradition  of  the  department  or  resign  his  post.  Few 
resign,  voluntarily.  The  attractions  outweigh  the 
shock  one's  principles  must  undergo.  The  "  slings 
and  arrows  "  of  criticism  from  an  Opposition  press 
may  be  hard  to  bear,  but  there  are  only  between 
fifty  or  sixty  posts  of  honour  in  the  Government,  and 
opportunity  comes  but  once  to  the  young  man  with- 
out lineage  or  a  safe  seat.  Ambition  nursing  an 
ideal  on  a  back-bench,  stirred  by  the  vigour  of  its 
principles,  murmurs  to  it,  "  it  will  not  be  so  with 
thee."  That  is  what  "  makes  calamity  of  so  long 
life."  We  bear  the  ills  of  office,  rather  than  fly  to 
others  we  know  not  of. 

•  •  •  •  •  •  « 

After  the  machinations  of  our  Foreign  Office  In 
191 1,  Germany  could  have  no  doubt  at  all  that  the 
policy  of  the  Entente  Powers  was  to  Isolate  Ger- 
many by  any  means  and  at  all  costs.  There  were  in 
the  autumn  of  191 1  men  In  France  who  did  not 
hesitate  to  speak  severely  on  the  question  of  Isolat- 
ing Germany,  though  leading  statesmen  in  England 
denied  the  charge  in  vain.  Our  naval  policy  dic- 
tated by  the  "  Commander  of  the  Forces,"  no  doubt, 
was  continued  by  Mr.  Churchill  when  he  was  made 


156     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

First  Lord  and  in  one  of  the  first  speeches  he  de- 
livered after  he  took  charge  of  the  navy,  he  said: 

**  Our  naval  preparations  are  necessarily  based  upon  the 
naval  preparations  of  other  Powers.  .  .  .  Next  year  the 
Naval  Law  .  .  .  prescribes  that  the  limit  of  expansion  has 
been  reached,  and  that  the  annual  quota  of  new  ships  added 
to  the  German  navy  will  fall  to  half  the  quota  of  recent 
years.  Hitherto  that  law^,  as  fixed  by  Parliament  has  not 
been  in  any  way  exceeded,  and  I  gladly  bear  witness  to  the 
fact  that  the  statements  of  the  German  Ministers  about  it 
have  been  strictly  borne  out  by  events.  Such  is  the  state 
of  affairs  in  the  world  to-day  that  the  mere  observance  of 
that  law,  without  an  increase,  would  come  to  Europe  as  a 
great  and  sensible  relief." 

Again  we  have  it  from  a  Minister  that  the  Ger- 
man Government  kept  strictly  to  the  letter  of  their 
declaration  and  did  not  accelerate  building;  but  the 
old  bogey  of  basing  our  policy  on  the  preparations 
ma(ie  by  other  Powers  is  laid  down  again  by  the  new 
First  Lord.  After  the  admission  of  Lord  Haldane 
that  we  were  in  agreement  with  France  and  Russia, 
it  would  have  been  more  straightforward  to  have 
said  our  naval  policy  is  based  on  the  preparations 
of  Germany,  or  the  Triple  Alliance.  The  Admiralty 
however  stuck  to  the  keep-it-dark  policy  of  the  For- 
eign Office.  In  both  departments  secrecy  was  es- 
sential for  the  needs  of  the  "  experts,"  no  matter 
how  inimical  that  policy  might  be  to  the  interests  of 
the  people.  Still  it  was  like  getting  money  out  of 
the  taxpayer  under  false  pretences.  First  scare 
him  to  death,  and  then  rob  him.  And  the  policy  is 
not  to  be  excused  because  it  may  be  said  that  the 
taxpayer  seemed  to  like  it;  nor  is  it  to  be  forgiven 
because  the  fleets  of  the  Triple  Alliance  are  com- 


NEW  CONSTRUCTION  157 

paratively  idle  at  present.  What  must  be  consid- 
ered is  to  what  extent  that  policy  fostered  inter- 
national hatred  and  strife.  Look  at  the  figures  for 
191 1  and  19 1 2,  and  see  the  way  the  game  was 
worked : 

NEW  CONSTRUCTION  OF  ENTENTE  POWERS  AND 
TRIPLE  ALLIANCE 

igii  IQI2 

Great    Britain    £15,148,171  £16,132,558 

France     5,876,659  7,114,876 

Russia     3,216,396  6,897,580 

£24,241,226  £30,145,014 

Germany     £11,710,859  £11,491,187 

Italy    2,677,302  3,227,000 

Austria     3,125,000  5,114,206 

£17,513,161  £19.832,393 

So  basing  our  naval  preparations  on  the  naval 
preparations  of  other  Powers  could  have  no  other 
meaning  in  practice  than  working  in  with  France  and 
Russia  against  the  preparations  of  the  Triple  Al- 
liance. When  the  latter  showed  an  increase  of  £2,- 
319,232,  it  was  necessary  for  our  preparations  to 
be  increased  by  £5,903,788,  for  one  year.  But  the 
public  are  not  supposed  to  know  that  the  prepara- 
tions of  France  and  Russia  have  always  been  re- 
garded by  Germany  as  the  chief  factors  governing 
her  naval  policy. 

The  debates  in  the  House  of  Commons  and  the 
House  of  Lords  on  the  Moroccan  trouble  were 
notable  in  many  respects.  Mr.  John  Dillon's  criti- 
cism of  the  actions  of  the  Foreign  Office  was  one  of 
the  most  brilliant  pieces  of  denunciation  heard  in 
the  House  for  many  a  day.  Even  so,  the  public 
stood   outside,    oblivious   of   its   meaning   to   them. 


158     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

Their  attitude  might  be  summed  up  in  the  cry  of  the 
man,  at  a  poHtical  meeting  in  the  North,  who  said, 
"  To  hell  with  Foreign  Affairs, —  when  am  I  going 
to  get  thirty  bob  a  week?"  There  is,  however,  a 
passage  in  Mr.  Dillon's  speech  which  must  be  remem- 
bered: 

"  I  do  not  believe  any  representative  assembly  in  the  his- 
tory of  the  world  has  ever  been  called  upon  to  discuss  a 
matter  so  vital  and  so  far-reaching  as  that  which  the  House 
of  Commons  has  before  it  to-day  to  consider,  and  with  so 
absolute  a  lack  of  information.     This  present  discussion  in 
this  respect  beats  all  records.     The  House  was  summoned 
for  this  discussion   to-day  without  any  papers  whatsoever. 
What  is  it  that  the  House  ought  to  have  had  before  we  were 
asked  to  embark  on  this  discussion  ?     We  ought  to  have  had 
a  Bhie  Book  containing  the  diplomatic  history  of  the  Mo- 
roccan   question,    including   the    secret    treaty   with    Spain. 
The  Algeciras  Act  has  already  been  published.     I  refer  to 
the  secret  treaty  with  Spain,  published  for  the  first  time  the 
other  day,  and  which  the  Foreign  Minister  of  France  de- 
clared three  weeks  ago  he  had  never  heard  of,  and  was  not 
aware  of  the  existence  of  a  treaty  to  which  this  country  was 
a   party.     We  should   have  had   the  text   of   the   German 
Agreement  of    1909,  with  an  explanation  of  how  it  came 
about  that  France  jockeyed  Germany  in  regard  to  that  agree- 
ment, and  withdrew  from  carrying  into  effect  —  a  matter 
that  was  one  of  the  immediate  causes  of  the  recent  friction. 
We  ought  at  all  events  to  have  had  an  account  of  diplo- 
matic correspondence  between  the  four  great  Powers  inti- 
mately   interested    in    the    question    of     Morocco,     as    is 
customary  to  be  given  to  the  House  of  Commons  on  such  an 
occasion.     This  would  have  enabled  members  of  the  House 
before    the    debate    commenced,    to    form    a    really    well- 
grounded    judgment    upon    the    whole    matter.     We    have 
heard  a  good  deal  to-night  of  the  secrecy  of  the  Foreign  policy 
of  this  country.     It  is  no  use  attempting  to  deny  it.     Those 


FRANCE  "BLEW  THE  GAFF"   159 

of  us  who  have  been  a  long  time  in  this  House,  and  can 
remember  the  methods  of  the  Foreign  Office  twenty-five 
years  ago,  know  as  a  matter  of  fact,  which  cannot  be  suc- 
cessfully denied,  that  the  Foreign  Office  policy  has  become 
during  the  last  ten  years  progressively  more  secret  every 
year.  Until  this  present  year  this  has  gone  on,  when  the 
intense  pressure  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  the  danger  of  war 
has  forced  the  hands  of  the  Minister  to  give  some  time  for 
the  discussion  of  Foreign  Office  affairs.  For  ten  years  the 
Foreign  policy  of  this  country  has  been  conducted  behind 
an  elaborate  screen  of  secrecy.  Some  of  us  pointed  out 
years  ago  that  the  secrecy  of  Foreign  Affairs  was  the  inevi- 
table and  logical  result  of  that  new  departure  which  was 
heralded  about  ten,  years  ago,  and  which  we  heard  praised 
once  more  on  the  floor  of  this  House  to-night.  I  refer  to 
what  is  known  as  the  policy  of  the  continuity  of  the  Foreign 
policy  of  this  country;  of  the  withdrawal  of  the  Foreign 
policy  of  this  country  from  the  sphere  of  party  politics." 

Mr.  Dillon  might  have  thanked  his  stars  that  he 
got  as  much  as  he  did,  for  If  the  Paris  papers,  Le 
Temps  and  Le  Matin,  had  not  published  the  secret 
articles  for  the  partition  of  Morocco  between  Spain 
and  France,  precious  little  Information  would  have 
been  volunteered  on  the  subject  by  the  Foreign  Sec- 
retary. There  was  a  passage  in  the  speech  of  the 
Foreign  Secretary  that  should  be  noted;  for  It  indi- 
cates his  attitude  of  mind  towards  Germany,  and, 
indeed,  shows  how  utterly  futile  it  was,  while  such 
sentiments  were  expressed,  to  try  to  make  Germans 
believe  that  the  policy  of  our  Foreign  Office  aimed 
at  anything  else  than  isolation.  Sir  Edward  Grey 
said: 

"  One  does  not  make  new  friendships  worth  having  by 
deserting  old  ones.  New  friendships  by  all  means  let  us 
make,  but  not  at  the  expense  of  the  ones  which  we  have. 


i6o     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

I  desire  to  do  all  I  can  to  improve  the  relations  with  Ger- 
many, as  I  shall  presently  show.  But  the  friendships  which 
we  have,  have  lasted  now  some  years,  and  it  must  be  a 
cardinal  point  of  improvement  of  relations  with  Germany 
that  we  do  not  sacrifice  one  of  those.  And  what  I  desire 
and  what  I  hope  may  be  possible,  though  it  may  seem  diffi- 
cult at  the  present  time,  is  that  the  improved  relations  may 
be  such  as  will  improve  not  only  ourselves,  but  those  who 
are  our  friends." 

The  warmth  of  the  proposal  must  have  chilled 
the  lady  to  the  marrow.  And  this  after  all  the  in- 
dignity and  contumely  thrust  on  Germany  by  our 
Foreign  Office  since  1904!  No  one  who  cares  to 
look  at  the  speeches  of  the  Foreign  Secretary  in  and 
out  of  the  House,  could  deny  that  his  consistently 
frigid  overtures  to  Germany  for  "  affection  "  and 
"  friendship  "  was  one  of  the  chief  features  of  his 
administration.  What  hope  was  there  of  better  re- 
lations with  our  own  stock  when  we  were  in  diplo- 
matic agreement  with  Germany's  ancient  foes, 
France  and  Russia?  Would  the  Foreign  Secretary 
say  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance  helped  in  any  way 
to  bring  about  improved  relations  with  Germany? 
Why  talk  about  making  new  friendships  by  desert- 
ing old  ones,  when  the  policy  of  making  the  old 
ones  was  the  cause  of  limiting  the  number  of  new 
ones  ? 

Mr.  Bonar  Law,  the  new  leader  of  the  Opposi- 
tion, in  striking  contrast  to  the  speech  of  Sir  Edward 
Grey,  referred  to  Germany  with  warmth: 

"  It  is  an  idea  prevalent,  especially  on  the  Continent,  that 
there  is  in  this  country  a  feeling  of  hostility  to  Germany. 
In  my  opinion  that  belief  is  entirely  unfounded.  So  far  as 
I  am  concerned  —  the  House  will  acquit  me  of  egotism  in 


MR.  LAW  ON  ''THE  INEVITABLE"     i6i 

making  these  remarks;  I  am  making  them  not  only  because 
I  happen  to  be  the  leader  of  the  party  behind  me,  but  also 
because  I  think  I  can  express  the  view  of  the  great  mass  of 
our  countrymen  —  so  far  as  I  am  concerned,  I  never  had, 
and  certainly  have  not  now,  any  such  feeling.  During  my 
business  life  I  had  daily  commercial  intercourse  with  Ger- 
many. I  have  many  German  friends,  I  love  some  German 
books  almost  as  much  as  our  favourites  in  our  own  tongue, 
and  I  can  imagine  few,  if  any,  calamities  which  would  seem 
so  great  as  a  war,  whatever  the  result,  between  us  and  the 
great  German  people.  I  hear  it  also  constantly  said  — 
there  is  no  use  shutting  our  eyes  and  ears  to  obvious  facts  — 
that  owing  to  divergent  interests,  war  some  day  or  other 
between  this  country  and  Germany  is  inevitable.  I  never 
believe  in  these  inevitable  wars.  ...  If,  therefore,  war 
should  ever  come  between  these  two  countries,  which  heaven 
forbid,  it  will  not,  I  think,  be  due  to  irresistible  natural 
laws.     It  will  be  due  to  the  want  of  human  wisdom." 

He  might  have  added,  all  wars  are  due  to  want 
of  human  wisdom.  War  begins  where  wisdom 
ends.  Lord  Morley,  in  the  House  of  Lords,  in  the 
Moroccan  debate,  contributed  a  fine  passage  on  Ger- 
many's position  in  the  world  of  art,  science,  and  lit- 
erature : 

"  Whether  France,  or  Italy,  or  Germany,  or  England  has 
made  the  greatest  contribution  in  the  history  of  modern 
civilization  —  however  that  speculative  controversy  may  be 
settled,  this  at  least  is  certain,  that  those  are  not  wrong  who 
hold  that  Germany's  high  and  strict  standard  of  competency, 
the  purity  and  vigour  of  her  administration  of  affairs,  her 
splendid  efforts  and  great  success  in  all  branches  of  science, 
her  glories  —  for  glories  they  are  —  in  art  and  literature, 
and  the  strength  and  character  and  duty  in  the  German 
people  entitle  her  national  ideals  to  a  supreme  place  among 
the  greatest  ideals  which  now  animate  and  guide  the  world. 


1 62     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

Do  not  let  us  forget  all  that.  German  ambition  is  a  per- 
fectly intelligible  and  even  lofty  ambition.  Who  can  won- 
der that  a  community  which  has  made  the  enormous 
advances  in  every  field  that  Germany  has  made,  certainly 
since  1866,  in  maritime  power  and  wealth  and  population, 
should  desire  to  find  territories  where  her  surplus  population 
may  emigrate  and  establish  themselves  without  losing  either 
their  nationality  or  their  ideals  of  modern  life.  There  is 
the  place  in  the  sun.  In  all  these  great  achievements  I  have 
ventured  to  enumerate  there  is  the  German  place  in  the  sun." 

It  is  so  strange  nowadays  to  think  that  any  re- 
sponsible statesman  ever  held  such  views.  Lord 
Morley  must  have  heard  of  Treitschke  and  Nietzs- 
che, to  say  nothing  of  all  the  other  poisoners  of 
the  German  mind.  Thus  Spake  Zarathustra  was 
published  long  before  Lord  Morley  spoke  that  day 
in  the  Lords.  Prussian  militarism  was  not  unknown 
in  191 1,  and  what  Bismarck  had  said  was  no  For- 
eign Office  secret.  Let  us  hope  that  Lord  Morley 
knows  the  whole  truth  of  the  matter  now  that  he  has 
had  an  opportunity  of  reading  the  British  news- 
papers since  the  beginning  of  the  war.  But  then 
he  might  quote  from  his  own  Aphorisms  that, 
*'  People  who  get  their  wisdom  out  of  books  are 
like  those  who  have  got  their  knowledge  of  a  coun- 
try from  the  descriptions  of  travellers.  Truth  that 
has  been  picked  up  from  books  only  sticks  to  us  like 
an  artificial  limb,  or  a  false  tooth,  or  a  rhinoplastic 
nose;  the  truth  we  have  acquired  by  our  own  think- 
ing is  like  the  natural  member." 

Early  in  January,  19 12,  the  fateful  year,  Lord 
Rosebery  spoke  on  Foreign  Affairs  at  Glasgow. 
He  was  no  lover  of  the  Franco-British  Agreement. 


CRITICS  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY      163 

In  Glasgow,  after  six  years  of  Liberal  foreign  pol- 
icy, he  said: 

"  This  we  do  know  about  our  foreign  policy,  that,  for 
good  or  for  evil,  we  are  now  embraced  in  the  midst  of  the 
Continental  system.  That  I  regard  as  perhaps  the  gravest 
fact  in  the  later  portion  of  my  life.  We  are,  for  good  or 
for  evil,  involved  in  a  Continental  system,  the  merits  of 
which  I  do  not  pretend  to  judge,  because  I  do  not  know 
enough  about  it,  but  which,  at  any  rate,  may  at  any  time 
bring  us  into  conflict  with  armies  numbering  millions,  and 
our  own  forces  would  hardly  be  counted  in  such  a  war  as 
they  stand  at  present." 

Lord  Rosebery  was  Foreign  Secretary  of  this 
country  in  1886  and  in  1892.  He  knew  the  tradi- 
tions of  the  Foreign  Office,  and  his  experience  of 
Cabinet  affairs  fitted  him  peculiarly  as  a  critic  of  the 
Foreign  Office  policy  which  committed  us  to  a  Conti- 
nental system.  But  he  was  not  the  only  critic;  there 
were  many  other  fully  qualified  critics  of  foreign 
policy,  who,  in  19 12,  knew  Britain  had  been  en- 
meshed in  the  Continental  system.  And  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  was  fully  conscious  of  the  opinion  of  his 
critics : 

"  I  do  know  that  a  considerable  amount  of  fault  has  been 
found  with  what  some  people  think  is  and  what  they  call 
my  foreign  policy,  but  which,  of  course,  ought  not  to  be 
called  my  foreign  policy  because  it  is  quite  impossible  for 
any  individual  Foreign  Minister  to  carry  out  a  policy  which 
is  not  also,  in  its  main  lines,  the  policy  of  the  Cabinet  of 
which  he  is  a  member." 

That  statement  was  true  up  to  a  point;  but  it  was 
a  little  wide  of  strict  accuracy  in  regard  to  the  au- 


1 64     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

thorization  of  the  conversations  between  the  British 
and  French  mihtary  and  naval  experts.  The  Cab- 
inet as  a  whole  was  not  told  until  long  after  the  con- 
versations were  begun.  Anyway,  many  people 
blamed  the  Foreign  Secretary  for  the  misunderstand- 
ings which  existed  between  Germany  and  ourselves. 
So  deep  was  the  feeling  of  animosity  that  the  two 
Governments  In  January  consented  to  the  visit  of  a 
British  Minister  to  Berlin  with  the  object  of  making 
a  frank  statement  that  would  dispel  the  notion  that 
Britain  had  sinister  designs  on  Germany.  In  the  de- 
bate on  the  address,  Mr.  Asquith  said: 

"  Both  Governments,  the  German  Government  and  our 
own,  have  been  and  are  animated  by  a  sincere  desire  to 
bring  about  a  better  state  of  understanding.  In  the  course 
of  last  month  we  had  indications  that  the  visit  of  a  British 
Minister  to  Berlin  would  not  be  unwelcome,  and  might 
facilitate  the  attainment  of  our  common  object." 

Later  in  his  speech  the  Prime  Minister  gave  an 
indication  of  the  gravity  of  the  situation  which  arose 
in  the  summer  and  autumn  of  191 1 : 

"  We  are  told  that  there  are  masses  of  people  in  Ger- 
many who  firmly  believe  that,  at  some  time  or  times  during 
the  summer  and  autumn  of  last  year  we  were  meditating 
and  even  preparing  an  aggressive  attack  upon  their  coun- 
try, and  that  the  movements  of  our  fleets  were  carefully 
calculated  with  that  object  in  view.  I  am  almost  ashamed 
to  have  to  contradict  so  wild  and  so  extravagant  a  fiction. 
It  is  pure  invention.  There  is,  I  need  hardly  assure  the 
House,  not  a  shadow  of  foundation  for  it,  nor  was  there 
anything  anywhere,  or  at  any  time,  of  an  aggressive  or 
provocative  character  in  the  movements  of  our  ships.  But 
the  very  fact  that  such  rumours  find  credence,  not,  indeed, 
with  the  German  Government,  but  in  the  minds  of  large 


"A  REGRETTABLE  SYMPTOM"     165 

numbers  of  intelligent  and  fair-minded  people  in  Germany, 
is,  surely,  in  itself  a  significant  and  most  regrettable 
symptom." 

The  Prime  Minister  might  have  added  that  it  was 
also  a  regrettable  symptom  that  large  masses  of  in- 
telligent people  in  our  own  country  had  very  good 
reason  for  believing  implicitly  the  same  "  extrava- 
gant fiction." 

In  the  Reichstag,  the  day  after  the  debate  In  the 
House  of  Commons,  the  German  Chancellor,  Herr 
von  Bethmann  Hollweg,  gave  his  version  of  Lord 
Haldane's  visit: 

"  When  the  English  Minister  of  War,  Lord  Haldane, 
was  here  he  talked  over  with  us  —  without  authorization  to 
enter  into  binding  agreements,  but  nevertheless  at  the  in- 
stance of  the  British  Cabinet  —  the  points  in  which  the 
interests  of  the  two  countries  come  into  contact — (hear, 
hear,  in  all  parts  of  the  House)  — with  the  object  of  estab- 
lishing a  basis  for  relations  of  greater  confidence.  (Hear, 
hear.)  The  exchange  of  views,  which  was  heartily  wel- 
comed on  our  side,  took  place  in  numerous  conversations  of 
an  exhaustive  and  frank  description,  and  will  be  continued. 
(Cheers.)  I  do  hope  that  the  House  will  agree  with  me 
that  I  cannot  at  this  stage  of  the  matter  speak  about  the 
details.  ('Quite  right!')  But  I  do  not  wish  to  delay  in 
communicating  to  the  Reichstag  the  fact  of  the  conversations 
and  the  nature  of  their  aims.      (General  cheers.)" 

The  basis  for  relations  of  greater  confidence  was 
blown  into  the  air  three  months  after  the  visit  to 
Berlin.  *'  Strategy  must  respond  to  policy,"  said 
Lord  Haldane,  on  March  21,  "  the  policy  of  the  For- 
eign Office."  The  navy  estimates  were  introduced 
on  March  i8th,  and  they  registered  a  superficial  de- 
crease of  £307,100,  but  before  the  year  was  over 


1 66     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

there  was  an  increase  of  £2,498,624.  The  two- 
Power  standard  was  abandoned,  and  a  new  policy 
directed  straight  against  Germany  adopted.  In  pre- 
senting the  estimates  to  the  House,  Mr.  Churchill 
said: 

"  I  propose,  with  the  permission  of  the  House,  to  lay  bare 
to  them  this  afternoon  with  perfect  openness  the  naval  situ- 
ation. It  is  necessary  to  do  so  mainly  with  reference  to 
one  Power.  I  regret  that  necessity,  but  nothing  is  to  be 
gained  by  using  indirect  modes  of  expression.  On  the  con- 
trary, the  Germans  are  a  people  of  robust  mind,  whose 
strong  and  masculine  sense  and  high  courage  do  not  recoil 
from  and  are  not  offended  by  plain  and  blunt  statements  of 
fact  if  expressed  with  courtesy  and  sincerity.  Anyhow,  I 
must  discharge  my  duty  to  the  House  and  the  country. 
The  time  has  come  when  both  nations  ought  to  understand, 
without  ill-temper  or  disguise,  what  will  be  the  conditions 
under  which  naval  competition  will  be  carried  on  during 
the  next  few  years." 

It  was  a  bold  policy  initiated  by  the  new  First 
Lord;  candour  and  openness  would  certainly  be  wel- 
come features  of  the  new  administration.  It  was 
a  good  point  gained  to  know  it  was  henceforth  un- 
necessary for  us  to  consider  France  and  Russia  as  a 
combination  of  naval  force  against  us.  There  was 
one  passage  in  the  speech  which  was  not  quite  as 
frank  as  it  might  have  been: 

*'  All  slowing  down  by  Germany  will  be  accompanied 
naturally  on  our  larger  scale  by  us.  I  have  to  say  *  within 
certain  limits,'  because,  of  course,  both  Great  Britain  and 
Germany  have  to  consider,  among  other  things,  the  build- 
ing of  other  Powers,  though  the  lead  of  both  these  coun- 
tries is  at  present  very  considerable  over  any  other  Power 
besides  each  other." 


FOR  GERMANY  TO  CONSIDER      167 

If  France  and  Russia,  separately  or  combined, 
were  no  longer  factors,  which  Britain  had  to  con- 
sider in  framing  nav^y  estimates,  were  they  not  for- 
midable factors  to  Germany?  Her  policy  was  con- 
trolled by  the  actions  of  three  Powers,  one  of  which, 
Britain,  aimed  at  an  overwhelming  superiority  in 
itself  against  Germany.  The  figures  for  new  con- 
struction of  France  and  Russia  in  that  year  should 
have  proved  to  Mr.  Churchill  the  utter  hopelessness 
of  relying  on  such  an  argument.  Germany  had  to 
reckon  with  the  nations  of  the  Franco-Russian  Al- 
liance, the  Anglo-French  Agreement,  the  Anglo- 
Russian  Agreement,  and  the  plans  of  General  Staffs 
arising  out  of  the  conversations  between  the  British 
and  French  military  and  naval  experts;  to  say  noth- 
ing of  whatever  other  secret  commitments  there 
might  be  connected  with  the  diplomacy  of  the  En- 
tente Powers.  "  Strategy  must  respond  to  policy, 
the  policy  of  the  Foreign  Office!"  What  earthly 
chance  was  there  for  a  holiday  for  a  year?  Mr. 
Churchill  was  undoubtedly  sincere  when  he  made  the 
suggestion;  but  so  long  as  France  and  Russia  were  the 
governing  factors  in  German  naval  policy  the  thing 
was  impossible.  Though  we  gained  a  considerable 
amount  of  kudos  for  making  the  suggestion,  time 
has  shown  how  futile  the  notion  was  from  the  first. 

The  debate  on  the  navy  estimates  of  March,  19 12, 
is  worth  reading  again  and  again.  Lord  Charles 
Beresford  made  a  frontal  attack  of  great  severity, 
on  the  First  Lord,  and  his  speech  was  of  great  value 
for  the  manner  in  which  he  proved  how  much  to 
blame  we  were  in  inspiring  irritation  and  hatred  in 
Germany  by  our  bombast  and  our  methods.  He 
quoted  many  German  papers  to  show  how  the  speech 


1 68     HOW  DIPLOiMATS  MAKE  WAR 

of  the  new  First  Lord,  at  Glasgow,  earlier  in  the 
year,  was  received  by  the  press  of  the  Fatherland, 
and  blamed  the  Admiralty  for  all  the  unrest  in  Ger- 
man naval  spheres.  Later  in  the  debate  Mr.  Robert 
Harcourt  referred  to  Bernhardi's  book,  Germany 
and  the  Next  IFar: 

"  I  have  read  in  the  last  day  or  two  a  very  interesting 
book,  by  a  German  General,  General  Bernhardi,  and  it 
bears  out  a  good  deal  that  the  noble  Lord  said.  It  is  not 
a  piece  of  Jingo  pamphleteering,  but  a  serious  military  con- 
sideration of  what  the  writer  calls  in  his  title  Germany  and 
the  Next  War.  It  is  far  more  depressing  than  the  worst 
Chauvinistic  literature,  because  it  gives  a  feeling  of  hope- 
lessness in  the  unshakable  conviction  of  a  representative 
German  that  we  are  inspired  by  active  and  aggressive  ani- 
mosity against  his  country.  I  only  take  a  sentence  or  two 
from  that  book.     He  says: 

"'The  Moroccan  negotiations  of  the  summer  of  191 1 
gave  an  irrefutable  demonstration  of  the  unqualified  hos- 
tility of  England  against  us.  It  was  clearly  shown  that 
England  is  determined  to  prevent  by  force  every  real  exten- 
sion of  German  power.  One  can  scarcely  doubt  that  Eng- 
land is  thinking  in  dead  earnest  of  attacking  Germany  in 
certain  circumstances.' 

"  He  speaks  of  the  increase  of  the  English  fleet  as  a 
preparation  for  aggressive  war,  and  he  says: 

"  *  It  is  impossible  to  regard  the  English  preparations  as 
merely  measures  of  defence.  The  English  Government 
know  well  that  Germany  cannot  think  on  her  side  of  attack- 
ing England,  because  such  an  attempt  is  in  itself  hope- 
less.' 

"  He  points  out  that  the  Entente  with  France  is  really 
a  warlike  alliance  against  Germany,  and,  as  to  a  land  war, 
he  points  out  that  probably  Germany  will  be  supported  by 
Austria,  though  nothing  is  said  about  Italy,  but  he  specific- 
ally says  that  in  a  sea  war  it  is  practically  certain  that  Ger- 


MAKING  THE  LION  ROAR  169 

many  will  stand  absolutely  alone,  and  he  repeats  again, 
writing,  I  presume,  for  the  German  public,  that  he  regards 
an  attack  on  England  as  absolutely  hopeless.  .  .  .  What 
after  all  has  been  the  result  of  all  these  firm  resolves  and 
panic  programmes?  Have  we  frightened  Germany  out  of 
building?  Have  we  even  convinced  her  of  our  sincerity? 
We  have  only,  apparently,  unhappily  produced  the  impres- 
sion, false,  as  I  earnestly  believe,  of  bitter  and  unrelenting 
hostility.  She  is  firmly  convinced  that  we  are  forcing  her 
deliberately  into  a  position  of  isolation." 

Not  long  after  the  holiday  idea  was  started,  Lord 
Haldane,  who  visited  Berlin  to  allay  the  fears  of  the 
Germans  as  to  our  naval  and  military  designs,  broke 
out  in  a  fresh  place,  and,  in  London,  in  June,  he 
said  : 

"  Keep  up  a  fleet  and  secure  command  of  the  sea,  and 
then  their  problem  was  a  simple  one.  ...  At  no  distant 
time  we  ought  to  be  the  most  powerful  military  and  naval 
nation  combined  which  the  world  had  ever  seen." 

Was  that  one  of  the  sentences  used  In  the  "  ex- 
haustive "  conversations  in  Berlin  at  the  beginning 
of  the  year,  which  gave  so  much  satisfaction  to  the 
German  Chancellor?  Surely  the  rapid  changes,  the 
comings  and  goings  of  Ministers,  the  fine  phrases, 
and  polite  Interchanges,  following  on  the  heels  of 
bitter  recrimination,  give  some  justification  to  those 
men  who  jeer  at  the  whole  business  as  a  put-up  job 
to  keep  the  peoples  of  Europe  and  Britain  In  a  state 
of  economic  slavery;  a  kind  of  twentieth  century 
Monarchlal  League  for  the  preservation  of  the 
thrones,  royal  and  republican,  of  European  states. 

Then  Lord  Crewe  followed  Lord  Haldane  with 
a  little  flag  waving,  presumably  to  show  Germany 


I70     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

how  keen  we  were  to  rest  for  a  year  on  our  naval 
laurels,  while  Germany  lost  a  year  in  competition 
with  France  and  Russia.  Our  superiority,  as  Lord 
Crewe  understood  it,  when  he  spoke  in  the  House 
of  Lords  early  in  July,  was  of  such  a  nature  that  the 
suggestion  of  a  naval  holiday  must  have  struck  Ger- 
many as  a  rather  cruel  joke.     Lord  Crewe  said: 

"  So  far  as  our  existing  position  in  any  part  of  the  world 
is  concerned  we  are  not  afraid  to  declare  that  we  consider 
the  security  of  the  country  is  achieved.  .  .  .  Taking  March 
31st,  this  year,  we  find  that  we  have  sixteen  battleships  and 
battle  cruisers  of  the  dreadnaught  type  as  against  fifteen 
possessed  by  all  other  Powers  in  European  waters." 

It  was  then  a  period  of  all-round  congratulation 
that  the  scare,  "  without  the  slightest  foundation  in 
fact,"  of  1909,  had  been  the  means  of  placing  the 
British  navy  in  a  position  to  tackle  the  Triple  Al- 
liance and  a  few  smaller  states  thrown  in.  Minis- 
ters, however,  did  not  stop  to  consider  what  the 
other  side  of  the  account  was:  the  effect  on  Ger- 
many. They  did  not  see  the  items  the  other  page 
would  bear  within  three  years.  Visualization  is  not 
a  Ministerial  gift.  The  prophecy  of  BernhardI  was 
not  a  subject  for  Cabinet  discussion,  and  the  repeated 
warnings  of  the  British  pacifists  were  contemptuously 
flung  aside  by  the  "  apostles  of  peace  "  as  mere 
drivel  of  drooling  millennialists. 

The  naval  position  in  the  Mediterranean  was  the 
subject  of  a  debate  in  the  Lords  later  in  July.  Lord 
Haldane  admitted  the  country  was  face  to  face  with 
one  of  the  most  trying  naval  situations  that  had  ex- 
isted for  a  very  long  time : 

■'The  Government  have  m^de  up  their  minds  that  the 


A  TRUST  BETRAYED  171 

position  of  this  country  depends  on  sea  power.  We  have 
told  the  only  Power  which  is  our  rival  —  we  have  told  them 
in  the  most  friendly  fashion  —  that  that  is  our  view,  and 
whatever  efforts  may  be  put  forth,  they  must  reckon  on  our 
making  efforts  still  greater  than  any  they  make." 

The  German-speaking  amateur  diplomatist,  as  he 
was  referred  to  by  the  Opposition  leader,  gave  a 
comic  touch  to  a  friendly  bit  of  advice.  Still,  it  is 
hard  to  believe  such  a  statement  could  be  made  by 
Lord  Haldane  only  six  months  after  his  visit  to 
Berlin.  Anyway,  it  was  a  sad  commentary  on  the 
suggestion  for  a  naval  holiday. 

At  this  time  there  is  perhaps  no  sadder  reflection 
one  can  indulge  In  than  the  position  of  the  masses 
in  Europe  from  19 12  to  the  middle  of  July,  19 14. 
In  Britain  at  any  rate  the  millions  of  workers  went 
about  their  business  utterly  oblivious  of  the  Conti- 
nental danger.  Those  who  addressed  large  audi- 
ences frequently  can  testify  there  was  no  notion  of 
war  in  the  minds  of  the  people.  Safe  In  the  idea 
that  a  great  navy  was  our  supreme  insurance  against 
strife,  they  laughed  at  the  prognostications  of  the 
orators  of  the  Lord  Roberts  school.  Ireland  was 
the  topic  one  party  dealt  with,  almost  to  the  ex- 
clusion of  all  others.  Sir  Edward  Carson  bemoaned 
the  fact  that  all  his  labours  could  not  rouse  the  Brit- 
ish electorate  out  of  their  profound  apathy  and  un- 
willingness to  regard  that  question  from  his  point 
of  view.  They  knew  nothing  of  the  Imminence  of 
battle.  No  Minister  warned  them;  labour  leaders 
were  as  ignorant  as  themselves  of  our  jeopardy  in 
being  entangled  in  the  Continental  system.  The 
wealth-producers  of  these  Islands,  somehow,  in  a 
strange  subconscious  way,  relied  on  a  Liberal  Gov- 


172     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

ernment  keeping  them  out  of  the  tolls  of  rotten  di- 
plomacy and  the  schemes  of  militarists.  Their 
faith,  their  patience,  their  credulousness,  are  quali- 
ties that  make  one  sad  to  think  on  now  that  their 
homes  are  making  vast  sacrifices  of  bread-winners, 
and,  later  on,  the  weak  ones  left  behind  will  have 
to  bear  the  greater  part  of  the  cost.  There  were 
warnings,  but  as  they  came  not  from  members  of 
the  Government  little  heed  was  paid  to  them.  In 
the  House  of  Commons,  on  the  Defence  Vote,  in 
Committee  of  Supply,  Mr.  Bonar  Law  said: 

"My  instinct  tells  me  that  there  is  no  danger;  but  my 
reason,  such  as  it  is,  is  in  conflict  with  instinct.  But  when 
I  use  my  judgment  as  best  I  can  in  considering  what  the 
facts  of  the  position  are,  I  say  deliberately  that  in  my  judg- 
ment Lord  Roberts  did  not  exaggerate  when  he  said  the 
other  day  that  this  country  had  never  been  in  a  position  of 
greater  peril." 

What  did  Lord  Roberts  know?  Was  his  alarm 
occasioned  because  we  were,  as  Lord  Rosebery  said, 
for  good  or  for  evil,  now  embraced  in  the  midst  of 
the  Continental  system?  Did  Lord  Roberts  knew 
that  an  outbreak  of  hostilities  on  the  Continent,  no 
matter  how  slight  the  cause,  might  at  any  time  drag 
us  into  a  great  European  struggle?  What  peril 
were  we  in?  And  why  were  we  in  peril?  Was  all 
Lord  Roberts'  activity,  in  urging  the  Government  to 
adopt  drastic  military  changes,  for  the  purpose  of 
raising  an  army  large  enough  to  meet  all  require- 
ments of  our  commitments?  Did  Lord  Roberts 
know  that  we  were  committed  to  the  obligations  of 
war,  and  that  we  were  bound  to  assist  France,  if 
she  were  attacked  by  a  third  Power?     The  secrets 


WHY  GERMANY  ALONE?  173 

of  foreign  policy,  no  matter  how  well  they  are  kept 
from  the  rank  and  file  of  the  House  and  the  general 
public,  are  often  enough  the  common  property  of  a 
certain  class  whose  connections  are  always  in  touch 
with  the  departments  and  the  great  armament  firms. 
It  is  "  not  in  the  interest  of  the  public  "  to  answer 
questions  in  the  House,  when  a  member  asks  for 
information  from  Ministers  which  has  been  the 
gossip  of  clubs  and  dinner  tables.  This  Govern- 
ment has  treated  the  private  members  of  the  House, 
as  to  foreign  policy  and  naval  affairs,  as  if  they  were 
Sunday-school  scholars  not  of  an  age  to  read  Deu- 
teronomy, Why,  even  the  girls  at  Queen's  College 
had  the  benefit  of  the  militant  and  brilliant  Cramb! 
In  July,  191 2,  just  two  years  before  the  first 
despatch  from  Germany  in  the  White  Paper,  Mr. 
Churchill  made  a  statement  on  the  Supplementary 
Naval  Estimates,  on  our  position  in  the  North  Sea_ 
and  in  the  Mediterranean.  In  this  amazing  addi- 
tion to  the  estimates  introduced  in  the  year  of  the 
Berlin  visit,  and  the  year  of  the  suggested  holiday, 
we  find  the  First  Lord  striking  out  in  another  direc- 
tion, not  because  the  new  German  Navy  Law,  be  it 
observed,  increased  in  new  construction  of  capital 
ships,  but  because  of  the  increase  of  striking  force 
of  ships  of  all  classes  available  at  all  seasons  of  the 
year.  Here  it  should  be  pointed  out  that  there  had 
been  no  increase  at  all  in  the  money  spent  by  Ger- 
many on  new  construction:  in  191 1  she  spent  £11,- 
710,859,  in  1912,  £11,491,187,  in  1913,  £11,010,- 
883,  and  in  1914,  £10,316,264.  A  steady  reduction 
in  the  figures  for  new  construction.  But  suppose  all 
the  arguments  laid  down  by  the  First  Lord  were 
accepted;  was  it  fair,  In  making  a  statement  of  the 


174     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

position  in  the  North  Sea  and  in  the  Mediterranean, 
to  lead  the  country  to  believe  that  Germany  alone 
was  the  factor  which  affected  our  policy?  The  Cab- 
inet must  have  known  in  July  that  the  plans  of  the 
British  and  French  General  Staffs  were  complete, 
and  that  we  should  have  to  defend  the  northern  and 
western  coasts  of  France  while  her  fleet  was  con- 
centrated in  the  Mediterranean.  Did  Germany 
know  that  much?  What  are  military  and  naval  at- 
taches for  if  they  fail  to  learn  facts  of  that  nature? 
Anyway,  in  times  of  peace  it  is  no  difficult  business 
for  one  navy  to  know  pretty  accurately  the  general 
disposition  of  another,  particularly  when  that  other 
navy  happens  to  be  its  chief  rival. 

A  thousand  rushing  currents  were  carrying  us  on 
in  the  autumn  of  19 12  to  the  European  whirlpool. 
Lord  Roberts  and  Lord  Curzon,  in  October,  spoke, 
at  Manchester,  on  Compulsory  Military  Service. 
The  feeling  abroad  had  been  intensely  aggravated 
by  the  trend  of  events  in  Britain,  but  the  speech  of 
Lord  Roberts  did  even  more  to  create  deep  bitter- 
ness than  the  policy  of  our  Admiralty.     He  said: 

"  Now  at  the  present  day,  in  the  year  1912,  just  as  in 
1866  and  just  as  in  1870,  war  will  take  place  the  instant 
the  German  forces  by  land  and  sea  are,  by  their  superiority 
at  every  point,  as  certain  of  victory  as  anything  in  human 
calculation  can  be  made  certain.  '  Germany  strikes  when 
Germany's  hour  has  struck.'  That  is  the  time-honoured 
policy  of  her  Foreign  Office.  That  was  the  policy  relent- 
lessly pursued  by  Bismarck  and  Moltke  in  1866  and  in 
1870;  it  has  been  her  policy  decade  by  decade  since  that 
date;  it  is  her  policy  at  the  present  hour.  And,  gentlemen, 
it  is  an  excellent  policy.  It  is,  or  should  be,  the  policy  of 
every  nation  prepared  to  play  a  great  part  in  history." 


THE  PUBLIC  —  MOSTLY  FOOLS     175 

This  speech  was  not  only  deeply  resented  in  Brit- 
ain; it  caused  in  Germany  an  acrimonious  flood  of 
comment  to  be  poured  out  in  her  press.  Our  own 
Evening  Standard  said  such  language  would  be 
"scarcely  justifiable  if  it  (Germany)  were  at  open 
war  with  us."  In  the  House  several  members  raised 
at  question  time  the  wisdom  of  a  Field  Marshal  of  the 
British  army  making  such  speeches,  but  they  got  little 
encouragement  from  the  Foreign  Secretary  and  the 
Minister  for  War.  The  Foreign  Secretary  icily  de- 
clined to  do  anything.  Lord  Roberts  was  free  to 
go  up  and  down  the  country  breathing  out  threaten- 
ings  and  slaughter  against  Germany,  but  Tom  Mann 
had  to  cool  his  heels  in  a  cell  for  giving  soldiers  the 
advice  of  Tolstoy!  The  bitter  agitation  of  the  con- 
scriptionists  continued  all  through  the  autumn,  and 
Germany  was  the  one  country  referred  to  in  their 
bellicose  speeches.  The  men  who  fomented  war 
were  "  apostles  of  peace  "  and  true  Englishmen,  the 
men  who  worked  for  peace  were  traitors  and 
cowards.  It  was  an  edifying  spectacle;  one  to  make 
a  cage  full  of  monkeys  silent  with  envy.  And  the 
public  thought  little  about  it.  Well  might  Chamfort 
cry,  "  The  public !  —  how  many  fools  does  it  take  to 
make  a  public?  "  The  position  at  the  end  of  19 12, 
and  some  events  that  followed  hard  upon  that  year, 
remind  one  of  the  agitation  of  the  Corinthians  in 
the  first  book  of  Thucydides'  Peloponnesian  War, 

"  It  becomes  you  ratlier,  on  many  accounts,  with  manly 
confidence  to  declare  for  war.  The  oracle  of  a  god  pre- 
scribes it;  that  god  himself  has  promised  his  assistance;  and 
the  rest  of  Greece  is  ready  to  join  you  in  the  contest,  some 
from  a  principle  of  fear,  and  some  from  a  principle  of 
interest.     Neither  on  you  will  the  first  breach  of  the  peace 


176     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

be  charged.  The  god  who  advises  war  plainly  judges  that 
to  be  already  broken :  you  will  only  act  to  redress  its  viola- 
tion: for  the  breach  is  not  to  be  charged  on  those  who  armed 
to  revenge  it;  but  on  those  who  were  the  first  aggressors. 
Since  then  war,  considered  in  every  light,  appears  honour- 
able in  regard  to  you,  ye  Lacedaemonians:  since  we  with 
united  voices,  encourage  you  to  it,  as  most  strongly  requisite 
for  our  general  and  separate  interests,  defer  no  longer  to 
succour  the  Potidaeans,  Dorians  by  descent,  and  besieged  by 
lonians  (the  reverse  was  formerly  the  case),  and  to  recover 
again  the  liberty  of  others.  The  business  will  admit  of  no 
longer  delay,  when  some  already  feel  the  blow;  and  others, 
if  it  once  be  known  that  we  met  here  together,  and  durst 
not  undertake  our  own  defence,  will  in  a  very  little  time 
be  sensible  of  the  same.  Reflect  within  yourselves,  confed- 
erates, that  affairs  are  come  to  extremities:  that  we  have 
suggested,  the  most  advisable  measures;  and  give  your  ballot 
for  war.  Be  not  terrified  at  its  immediate  dangers;  but 
animate  yourselves  with  the  hope  of  a  long-lasting  peace  to 
be  procured  by  it;  for  a  peace  produced  by  war  is  ever  the 
most  firm;  but  from  tranquillity  and  ease  to  be  averse  to 
war,  can  by  no  means  abate  or  dissipate  our  danger.  With 
this  certain  conclusion,  that  a  state  in  Greece  is  started  up 
into  a  tyrant,  and  aims  indifferently  at  the  liberty  of  us  all, 
her  arbitrary  plan  being  partly  executed,  and  partly  in  agi- 
tation —  let  us  rush  against,  and  at  once  pull  her  down." 

We  know  well  what  happened  to  the  Lacedse- 
monians. 

Nineteen  hundred  and  twelve  was  undoubtedly  a 
fateful  year  for  Great  Britain,  and  November  in 
that  year  was  a  fateful  month.  Wild  speeches  were 
delivered  up  and  down  the  country  on  the  navy  and 
the  territorial  forces.  On  November  14th,  London 
was  struck  by  a  Tory  orgy.  There  was  a  meeting  at 
the  Albert  Hall  for  the  leaders  of  the  Opposition;  at 


INTERESTING  INTERCHANGE      177 

the  Queen's  Hall  one  for  the  back-benchers;  and 
at  the  Hippodrome  another  for  Mr.  R.  G.  Knowles 
the  comedian,  and  the  Ulster  party.  It  was  a  great 
night  in  the  history  of  empire.  At  the  Queen's  Hall 
Lord  Percy  gave  his  audience  a  shock: 

*'  It  would  require  courage  to  tell  the  country  the  truth 
that  they  are  living  in  a  '  fool's  paradise,'  and  that  it  was 
not  merely  our  army  but  the  army  of  France  which  was  our 
present  defence  against  German  invasion.  And  it  was  a 
base  betrayal  of  our  obligations  not  to  be  able  to  support 
France  with  an  adequate  military  force  of  our  own." 

That  was  a  pretty  strong  statement  to  make  by 
one  who  was  not  remotely  connected  with  the  For- 
eign Office  when  the  Anglo-French  Agreement  was 
drawn  up.  Precisely  what  effect  that  statement 
had  upon  the  Government  Is  hard  to  tell,  but  it  is 
nevertheless  true  that  eight  days  after  it  was  made 
Sir  Edward  Grey  wrote  to  the  French  ambas- 
sador, M.  Cambon,  reminding  him  of  the  under- 
standing of  January,  1906,  authorizing  conversa- 
tions to  take  place  between  French  and  British  mili- 
tary and  naval  experts.  The  letter  stated  that  the 
experts  had  consulted  together  from  time  to  time, 
and  though  nothing  of  a  binding  nature  limited  the 
actions  of  either  Government,  in  the  event  of  one 
of  the  countries  being  attacked  by  a  third  Power  they 
would  immediately  discuss  whether  both  Govern- 
ments should  act  together;  further,  if  the  measures  in- 
volved action,  the  Governments  would  at  once  take 
into  consideration  the  plans  of  the  General  Staffs. 
M.  Cambon  replied  confirming  the  terms  of  the 
agreement.  Why  Sir  Edward  Grey  should  ex- 
change letters  with  the  French  ambassador  at  that 


178     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

time  on  this  grave  matter,  is  hard  to  tell,  unless  the 
speech  of  Lord  Percy  had  embarrassed  the  Foreign 
Office;  but  there  seems  to  have  been  no  other  rea- 
son. There  was  a  rumour  in  London  before  the 
19th,  to  the  effect  that  German  reservists  in  the 
United  Kingdom  had  received  notice  that  they  might 
be  required  to  return  to  Germany  within  twenty-four 
hours.  Questions  were  asked  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons as  to  the  disposition  of  the  fleet  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean and  the  number  of  ships  there  to  guard  Brit- 
ish interests.  Mr.  Churchill  said  there  were  only 
three  armoured  cruisers  there,  if  account  was  not 
taken  of  those  refitting  at  Gibraltar,  between  Octo- 
ber 17th  and  November  3rd.  Mr,  Yerburgh  asked 
whether  it  was  the  policy  of  the  Government  at  the 
beginning  of  the  year,  and  before  the  introduction 
of  the  naval  estimates,  practically  to  withdraw  our 
battleships  from  the  Mediterranean;  but  the  First 
Lord  declined  to  deal  with  the  question.  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  in  his  letter  to  the  French  ambassador 
pointed  out  that  the  disposition  of  the  French  and 
British  fleets  respectively  at  that  moment  was  not 
based  upon  an  engagement  to  co-operate  in  war. 
That  was  surely  a  most  extraordinary  statement  for 
the  Foreign  Secretary  to  make.  Was  it  true?  Lord 
Haldane  dubbed  the  Foreign  Secretary,  "  Com- 
mander of  the  Forces,"  and  he  also  told  us  that 
"  strategy  depends  on  policy,  the  policy  of  the  For- 
eign Office."  Yet  our  command  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean, three  weeks  before  he  wrote  to  M.  Cambon, 
amounted  to  an  effective  force  of  only  three  ar- 
moured cruisers,  which  the  First  Lord  considered  an 
ample  fleet.  Evidently  the  plans  of  General  Staffs 
were  well  in  hand  at  that  time,  and  it  was  left  to 


BELGIUM  BESTIRS  HERSELF       179 

France  to  look  after  the  Mediterranean  while  we  de- 
voted our  naval  attention  to  the  northern  coasts  of 
France  and  the  North  Sea.  How  far  the  plans  of 
General  Staffs  operated  we  may  never  know,  but  it 
is  a  significant  fact  that  an  event  of  an  extraordinary 
nature  happened  in  Belgium  just  about  the  time  the 
Foreign  Secretary  exchanged  letters  with  M.  Cam- 
bon. 

In  November,  19 12,  the  Belgian  House  of  Par- 
liament held  a  secret  sitting  at  the  instance  of  the 
Belgian  King  in  order  to  consider  urgent  precaution- 
ary measures.  King  Albert  had  become  possessed 
of  facts  of  a  threatening  nature.  These  he  disclosed 
to  the  Parliament,  which  listened  attentively  to  his 
warnings,  and  immediately  adopted  a  drastic  mili- 
tary programme  which  had  been  delayed  for  thirty 
years,  and  which  King  Leopold  II  had  advocated  in 
vain.  The  drastic  programme  raised  the  war 
strength  of  the  Belgian  army  to  150,000  for  the 
field  army,  60,000  for  auxiliary  services,  and  130,- 
000  for  garrisons;  340,000  men  in  all.  A  gigantic 
force  for  a  country  of  seven  and  a  half  millions; 
and  when  it  is  understood  that  Belgium  was  believed 
to  be  protected  by  five  great  Powers  from  aggres- 
sion, such  a  military  force  needs  a  deal  of  ex- 
planation. 

Now  what  had  Belgium  to  fear  in  191 2?  She 
knew  that  three  of  the  signatories  of  the  Treaty  of 
1839  were  allied,  and  that  Germany  was  not  work- 
ing amicably  with  the  Entente  Powers.  It  is  scarcely 
believable  that  her  Foreign  Office  did  not  know  that 
the  French  and  British  military  and  naval  experts 
were  formulating  plans  for  the  General  Staffs.  But 
did  Belgium  know  that  these  plans  included  the  pos- 


I  So     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

sibility  of  her  territory  being  used  as  the  battlefield 
of  a  war  with  Germany  against  the  Entente  Powers? 
Was  it  not  common  talk  in  military  circles  that  in  the 
event  of  a  war  between  Germany  and  France  that 
Germany  would  be  forced  to  invade  Belgium? 
Could  the  plans  of  General  Staffs,  in  the  circum- 
stances, leave  Belgium  out  of  consideration?  As- 
suredly not.  The  notion  is  too  utterly  preposterous 
to  waste  arguments  upon  for  a  moment.  There  was 
only  one  route  for  rapid  advance  Germany  could 
take  and  that  was  through  Belgium. 

The  information  the  King  of  the  Belgians  had  to 
impart  to  his  Parliament  was  closely  connected  with 
the  subject  of  the  letters  exchanged  by  Sir  Edward 
Grey  and  M.  Cambon.  From  the  facts  it  is  plain 
that  neither  France  nor  Great  Britain  was  in  a  posi- 
tion to  protect  her  neutrality  and  independence. 
And  to  compare  what  was  done  by  Lord  Granville 
in  1870  with  the  present  crisis,  is  to  ignore  the  fact 
that  Great  Britain  in  1870  had  no  agreement  with 
either  France  or  Germany.  She  was  then  in  a  posi- 
tion to  insist  on  the  signatories  of  the  Treaty  of  1839 
observing  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  All  the  talk 
of  Ministers  on  this  point,  since  the  end  of  July, 
19 14,  has  not  been  worth  the  ink  to  print  it. 

It  was  laid  down  in  1908  by  the  Foreign  Secretary 
that: 

"  We  cannot  recognize  the  right  of  any  Power  or  State 
to  alter  an  international  treaty  without  the  consent  of  the 
other  parties  to  it.  We  cannot  ourselves  recognize  the  result 
of  any  such  action  till  the  other  Powers  have  been  consulted, 
including  especially  in  this  case  Turkey,  who  is  one  of  the 
other  Powers  most  closely  concerned.  Because,  if  it  is  to 
become  the  practice  in  foreign  politics  that  any  single  Power 


''SANCTITY  OF  TREATIES"        i8i 

or  State  can  at  will  make  abrupt  violations  of  international 
treaties,  you  will  undermine  public  confidence.  .  .  .  You 
cannot  expect  to  see  expenditure  on  armaments  diminished 
if  people  live  under  the  apprehension  that  treaties  can  be 
suddenly  altered  without  the  consent  of  all  the  Powers  who 
are  parties  to  them." 

It  Is  to  be  regretted  that  the  spirit  as  well  as  the 
letter  of  an  essential  principle  of  the  law  of  nations, 
subscribed  to  by  the  Powers  in  London  in  1871 
(which  is  the  law  upon  which  the  Foreign  Secretary 
based  his  statement)  was  not  followed  by  Britain  in 
every  diplomatic  affair  since  1904. 


CHAPTER  IX 

*'  NOT   IN   THE    PUBLIC   INTEREST  " 

"  Somewhere  there  are  still  people  and  herds,  but  not  with 
us,  my  brethren:  with  us  there  are  states. 

The  state?  What  is  that?  Well!  now  open  your  ears, 
for  now  I  deliver  my  sentence  on  the  death  of  peoples. 

The  state  is  called  the  coldest  of  all  cold  monsters.  And 
coldly  it  lieth;  and  this  lie  creepeth  out  of  its  mouth:  '  I, 
the  state,  am  the  people.' 

It  is  a  lie!  Creators  they  were  who  created  the  peoples 
and  hung  one  belief  and  one  love  over  them;  thus  they 
served  life. 

Destroyers  they  are  who  lay  traps  for  many,  calling  them 
the  state:  they  hung  a  sword  and  a  hundred  desires  over 
them. 

Whatever  a  people  is  left,  it  understandeth  not  the  state 
but  hateth  it  as  the  evil  eye  and  a  sin  against  customs  and 
rights. 

This  sign  I  show  unto  you:  every  people  speaketh  its  own 
tongue  of  good  and  evil  —  not  understood  by  its  neighbour. 
Every  people  hath  found  out  for  itself  its  own  language  in 
customs  and  rights. 

But  the  state  is  a  liar  in  all  tongues  of  good  or  evil: 
whatever  it  saith,  it  lieth ;  whatever  it  hath,  it  hath  stolen. 

False  is  everything  in  it;  with  stolen  teeth  it  biteth,  the 
biting  one.     False  are  even  its  intestines. 

Confusion  of  languages  of  good  and  evil.  This  sign  I 
show  unto  you  as  the  sign  of  the  state.  Verily,  this  sign 
pointeth  to  the  will  unto  death!  Verily,  it  waveth  hands 
unto  the  preachers  of  death! 

182 


VAIN  IMAGINATIONS  183 

Far  too  many  are  bom:  for  the  superfluous  the  state  was 
invented. 

Behold,  behold,  how  it  allureth  them,  the  much-too-many ! 
How  it  devoureth,  cheweth,  and  masticateth  them!  " 

—  Nietzsche. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  go  further  back  than  191 1, 
the  first  year  of  this  Parhament,  for  evidence  of 
the  Foreign  Office  and  the  Admiralty's  method  of 
hoodwinking  members  and  shielding  their  own 
systems  of  evasion,  hyperbole,  and  secrecy.  This 
Government  is  not  the  first  to  set  up  absolutist  sys- 
tems in  the  departments,  but  from  Liberal  statesmen 
the  mass  of  people  expect  democratic  treatment. 
When  Toryism  finished  Its  mad  career  in  1905,  the 
vast  majority  of  the  electorate  imagined  Tory  meth- 
ods would  be  Interred  with  the  party.  "  Not  in  the 
public  interest,"  was  the  phrase  It  was  thought  might 
satisfy  over-curious  Conservatives,  but  Radicals  were 
not  to  be  put  off  with  cryptadla.  However  galling 
it  may  be  to  make  such  an  admission  in  these  "  demo- 
cratic "  days,  it  must  be  confessed  that  the  House 
of  Lords  is  not  the  only  place  that  thrives  upon  an 
hereditary  system.  All  departments  more  or  less 
live  and  move  and  have  their  being  just  as  prolific 
noble  houses  do;  with  this  difference,  of  course,  that 
permanent  ofl'icials  are  not  so  easily  shifted.  He- 
redity is  the  evil  Influence  which  has  destroyed  De- 
mocracy; and  now,  like  Oswald  Alvlng,  it  is  struck 
down  just  as  it  was  about  to  ask  for  the  sun.  Yes, 
continuity  of  the  diplomatic  errors  of  our  predeces- 
sors Is  the  reason  for  our  deplorable  position  in 
Europe. 

In  the  early  days  of  the  first  session  of  this  Par- 
liament the  Government  hung  up  the  stereotyped  text, 


1 84     HOW  DIPLOiMATS  MAKE  WAR 

"  Not  In  the  public  Interest,"  to  scare  off  the  Inquisi- 
tive. A  private  member  asked  the  Secretary  for 
Foreign  Affairs  whether  he  had  responded  to  the 
speech  of  the  German  Chancellor  (In  which  was  ex- 
pressed the  opinion  that  an  open  and  confident  ex- 
change of  views  would  do  much  to  remove  suspicion 
arising  from  naval  and  military  expenditure)  and 
whether  he  could  lay  upon  the  table  of  the  House 
any  papers  relating  thereto?  The  Under-Secretary 
replied  that  the  Informal  discussions  were  continuing, 
and  the  Government  hoped  that  they  would  "  help 
to  promote  the  maintenance  and  growth  of  the  ex- 
isting friendly  relations  between  the  two  countries  "; 
but,  "  it  would  not  be  In  the  public  interest  to  lay 
papers." 

To  understand  thoroughly  how  thick  a  barrier 
members  had  to  pierce  to  get  at  the  source  of  infor- 
mation which  determined  the  action  of  the  Admir- 
alty in  1909  (to  build  the  four  extra  ships)  one  has 
only  to  look  through  the  long  series  of  questions  put 
to  Mr.  McKenna,  and  the  evasive  replies  given  by 
him  during  the  first  weeks  of  the  session.  Behind 
the  sign,  "  Not  In  the  public  Interest,"  the  Govern- 
ment hid  their  errors  of  judgment  and  all  the  crimi- 
nal machinations  of  the  scaremongers  outside  the 
House.  Publicity  is  considered  to  be  one  of  the 
blessings  of  our  Parliamentary  procedure;  but  there 
are  affairs  of  vital  interest  to  the  public  that  private 
members  cannot  get  at:  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
probably  because  of  the  congestion  of  business, 
floods  of  oratory  unstemmed  for  at  least  eight  hours 
a  day  for  four  days  each  week,  and  much  Is  over- 
looked by  the  press  that  should  for  mere  party  rea- 
sons be  given  to  the  public.     Sometimes  a  question 


A  LIE,  AND  ITS  RESULTS  185 

is  put  which  contains  matter  of  deep  importance  to 
the  people,  but  a  non-committal  reply,  or  an  evasive 
answer,  checks  the  interest  it  would  have  if  revela- 
tion and  not  secrecy  were  the  chief  aim  and  desire 
of  Ministers.  Take  the  following  question  and  re- 
ply which  passed  almost  without  comment  in  the 
House  and  the  press.  The  date  was  March  8th, 
1911  : 

*'  Mr.  Jowett  asked  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs  if,  during  his  term  of  office,  any  undertaking,  promise, 
or  understanding  had  been  given  to  France  that,  in  certain 
eventualities,  British  troops  would  be  sent  to  assist  the  opera- 
tions of  the  French  army? 

"Mr.  McKinnon  Wood  (Under-Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs)  :     '  The  answer  is  in  the  negative.'  " 

Numbers  of  members  knew  the  answer  was  un- 
true, but  not  even  a  single  supplementary  question 
was  put.  The  sacred  veil  over  foreign  affairs  must 
not  be  torn  aside.  It  is,  however,  more  than  prob- 
able the  Under-Secretary  believed  the  answer  he 
gave  was  quite  true.  We  know  now  the  answer 
should  have  been,  "  Yes!  "  But  if  that  answer  had 
been  given  there  would  have  been  great  diplomatic 
trouble  in  the  chancelleries  of  Europe;  and,  which 
is  of  deeper  concern,  the  Government  would  have 
suffered  an  immediate  storm  of  protest  from  the  ver- 
tebrata  of  the  Liberal  party  in  the  country.  Many 
members  were  loath  to  press  the  question  because 
they  had  nothing  but  rumour  to  go  on;  and  there  was, 
besides,  this  to  be  considered,  namely:  the  pledges 
given  to  the  constituencies  to  support  the  Govern- 
ment in  bringing  certain  first-class  measures  of  re- 
form to  the  Statute   Book.     This  was  indeed  the 


1 86     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

ever-restraining  reason  why  so  many  Radicals  did 
not  vote  against  the  Government  on  naval  expendi- 
ture. So  the  complexities  and  the  multiplicities  of 
our  Parliamentary  system  make  it  an  almost  impos- 
sible feat  for  a  member  at  all  times  to  vote  accord- 
ing to  his  conscience.  The  legislator  after  all  Is  the 
real  Jesuit. 

Foreign  Affairs  got  precious  little  discussion  in 
the  House  in  191 1.  In  19 10  there  was  less;  no 
Foreign  Office  vote  was  put  down  that  year.  Many 
complaints  on  all  sides  of  the  House  were  heard, 
that  so  little  opportunity  should  be  given  to  members 
to  worm  a  statement  of  policy  out  of  the  Foreign 
Secretary.  The  Anglo-Russian  Agreement  was 
made  the  subject  of  severe  criticism  on  a  day  when 
the  debate  on  Foreign  Affairs  was  interrupted  at  a 
quarter  past  eight  by  a  long  discussion  on  a  railway 
bill !  But,  if  foreign  affairs  got  little  attention,  the 
army  certainly  came  in  for  particular  notice;  and 
Mr.  Haldane's  reorganization  of  the  Expeditionary 
Force  was  subjected  to  criticism  from  the  militarists. 
It  was  awkward  for  the  Minister  for  War  to  deal 
effectively  with  the  censure  poured  upon  him,  for 
the  debate  was  more  in  the  nature  of  a  sham  fight 
than  a  real  battle.  One  felt  that  Mr.  Haldane  was 
doing  the  best  he  could  to  meet  the  demands  of  Gen- 
eral Staffs;  but  that  it  would  never  do  to  carry  out 
all  the  suggestions  of  the  military  experts  for  fear 
of  alarming  his  own  party,  who  knew  nothing  about 
the  secret  understanding  the  Foreign  Secretary  had 
made  with  the  French  Government.  Several  Op- 
position members  found  it  very  difficult  to  make 
headway  against  the  secret;  and  in  their  speeches 
only  slight  references  were  made  to  the  Expedition- 


UNEASY  SUSPICIONS  187 

ary  Force  having  to  meet  Continental  armies.  Some 
members  frankly  said  its  numbers  were  insufficient; 
Sir  Reginald  Pole-Carew  said,  "  it  would  be  murder 
to  send  them." 

The  navy  estimates  brought  about  one  of  the  most 
instructive  debates  of  the  session.  Private  members 
on  the  Liberal  side  completely  riddled  the  forecasts 
of  Ministers  made  in  1909  and  19 10,  as  to  the  naval 
position  of  Germany,  though  they  were  unable  to 
check  the  headlong  rush  of  our  armaments.  That 
debate  was  particularly  interesting;  for  in  It  Mr. 
Dillon,  in  referring  to  France,  proved  himself  a 
far  bolder  man  than  all  the  Opposition  soldiers  were 
In  the  debate  on  the  army.     Mr.  Dillon  said: 

** '  I  interjected  an  observation  on  Monday  in  the  speech 
of  one  of  the  speakers  who  was  talking  about  this  question 
of  building  against  the  Triple  Alliance,  and  who  insisted 
for  the  safety  of  this  Empire  on  building  against  the  Triple 
Alliance.  I  said,  What  about  France?  I  thought  that  one 
of  the  glories  of  the  British  Government  had  been  that  it 
had  formed  an  Entente  with  France.' 

"Mr.  Lee:  *  It  is  not  the  same  thing  as  an  alliance.' 
"  Mr.  Dillon :  '  I  should  like  to  know  what  it  is.  Some 
of  us  have  had  very  uneasy  feelings  since  the  other  day  we 
read  that  M.  Pichon,  the  Foreign  Minister  for  France, 
spoke  of  constant  military  conversations  going  on  with  Eng- 
land. I  say  that  there  is  a  very  uncomfortable  feeling  among 
many  honourable  members  that  there  is  a  secret  alliance  with 
France,  or  some  understanding  which  is  not  known  to  the 
members  of  this  House,  and  if  we  are  to  be  told  that  that 
is  the  result  of  all  these  alliances  and  understandings,  this 
country  must  be  prepared  to  build  not  according  to  the  two 
Power  standard,  but  up  to  the  three  Power  standard  which 
was  put  forward  here  to-night.'  " 

Why  Mr.  Dillon  should  be  alarmed  at  a  state- 


1 88     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

ment  made  by  the  French  Foreign  Secretary  (when 
in  answer  to  a  question  put  by  Mr.  Jowett  only  eight 
weeks  earlier  our  own  Foreign  Secretary  said  that 
no  undertaking,  promise,  or  understanding,  had  been 
given  to  France)  was  very  strange.  Perhaps  Mr. 
Dillon  did  not  believe  ©ur  Foreign  Secretary.  Any- 
way, he  showed  a  superb  disregard  for  the  courtesies 
which  should  acknowledge  the  privilege  of  all  public 
departments  to  keep  their  secrets  from  private  mem- 
bers. 

A  fortnight  after  Mr.  Dillon's  reference  to  the 
statements  made  by  M.  Pichon,  the  French  Foreign 
Minister,  Mr.  Jowett  put  another  question  to  the 
Foreign  Secretary: 

"  Mr.  Jowett  asked  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  if,  when  he  came  into  office,  there  was  in  existence 
any  understanding  or  undertaking,  expressed  or  implied,  in 
virtue  of  which  Great  Britain  would  be  under  obligations  to 
France  to  send  troops,  in  certain  eventualities,  to  assist  the 
operations  of  the  French  army? 

"Sir  Edward  Grey:  'The  extent  of  the  obligations  to 
which  Great  Britain  was  committed  was  that  expressed  or 
implied  in  the  Anglo-French  Convention  laid  before  Parlia- 
ment. There  was  no  other  engagement  bearing  on  the 
subject.'  " 

The  Cabinet  perhaps  acted  on  the  method  of 
Solon  who  in  his  original  constitution  denied  the 
people  initiative,  and  allowed  them  only  to  propose 
what  had  first  been  thoroughly  considered  and  ap- 
proved by  the  senate.  Let  us  say  then  that  in 
March,  191 1,  the  Cabinet  were  not  agreed  on  the 
matter  referred  to  in  Mr.  Jowett's  question,  and  the 
time  had  not  arrived  for  letting  the  House  into  the 
confidence  of  the  Foreign  Secretary.     But  then  there 


SUPPRESSIO  VERI  189 

is  this  to  be  remembered:     Did  all  the  Cabinet  in 
March,  191 1,  know  any  more  than  Mr.  Jowett? 

For  an  example  of  the  Government's  method  of 
hanging  out  the  sign,  "  Not  in  the  public  interest," 
the  following  is  hard  to  beat: 

"  Mr.  Yerburgh  asked  the  Prime  Minister  whether,  in 
stating  in  his  speech  on  our  standard  of  naval  strength  on 
26th  May,  1909,  that  the  end  was  to  ensure  for  this  country 
in  any  conceivable  condition,  and  against  all  possible  hazards, 
unassailable  naval  superiority  which  would  give  us  complete 
command  of  the  sea,  and  make  any  attempt  to  interfere  with 
any  part  of  the  Empire  or  sea-borne  commerce  an  impossi- 
bility, he  is  to  be  understood  as  ruling  out  of  calculation,  in 
computing  our  requisite  naval  strength,  the  fleets  of  any 
other  Power  with  whom  we  may,  at  the  time,  be  on  terms 
of  intimate  friendship? 

"The  Prime  Minister:  'I  do  not  think  that  matters 
of  this  kind  can  be  conveniently  or  adequately  dealt  with  by 
question  and  answer.  I  can  only  refer  the  hon.  member  to 
the  speech  which  he  quotes  and  to  the  speech  made  on  the 
same  occasion  by  the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty.' 

"  Mr.  Arthur  Lee:  '  Is  the  right  hon.  gentleman  aware 
that  in  his  absence  an  entirely  new  definition  of  the  two- 
Power  standard  was  laid  down  by  the  Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs?  ' 

"  The  Prime  Minister:     '  I  am  not  aware  of  that.' 

"Mr.  Yerburgh:  'May  I  ask  whether  or  not  we  are 
to  understand  that  the  Government  arrived  at  no  decision 
upon  this  particular  question?  Is  the  right  hon.  gentleman 
not  aware  that  this  is  a  question  of  supreme  importance,  and 
that  in  arriving  at  our  standard  of  naval  strength  previous 
governments  had  regard  to  the  power  of  the  fleets  of  other 
countries?  ' 

"  The  Prime  Minister:  '  I  think  this  question  shows  the 
inconvenience  of  dealing  with  these  matters  by  way  of  ques- 
tion and  answer.' 


I90     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

"Mr.  James  Hope:  'May  I  ask  whether  it  takes  a 
longer  time  to  make  a  battleship  or  an  enemy? 

Most  pertinent  this  last  question,  and  not  easily 
answered;  one  Indeed  requiring  notice. 

On  the  motion  for  adjournment  for  the  Easter  re- 
cess, Mr.  Swift  MacNelU  raised  the  subject  of 
secrecy  in  foreign  affairs.     He  said: 

"  From  generation  to  generation,  you  have  allowed 
treaties  involving  the  highest  international  obligations  —  in- 
volving questions  of  peace  and  war  —  to  be  taken  absolutely 
out  of  the  hands  of  the  House.  It  is  no  exaggeration  to  say, 
so  far  as  international  policy  is  concerned,  you  have  rendered 
the  House  as  little  effectively  powerful  as  any  man  walking 
over  Westminster  Bridge.  Over  and  over  again  treaties 
involving  matters  of  life  and  death,  involving  questions  of 
first-class  importance,  have  been  ratified  behind  the  back  of 
Parliament.  .  .  .  The  people  themselves  must  be  allowed  to 
know  all  about  this  diplomacy  and  what  it  is.  And  there 
should  be  no  secrecy  in  regard  to  high  diplomatic  statecraft 
about  it.  The  House  of  Commons  is  ample  judge  of  what 
is  discreet  and  what  is  indiscreet,  and  it  is  a  complete  ab- 
surdity for  others  to  treat  us  as  children  or  for  us  to  allow 
ourselves  to  be  so  treated  in  matters  of  such  high  interna- 
tional importance  as  those  involving  questions  of  peace  and 


war." 


The  Foreign  Secretary  replied  that  there  must  be 
secrecy  up  to  a  certain  point,  and  that  the  ratification 
of  treaties  was  one  of  far  too  great  Importance  to  be 
discussed  on  an  occasion  of  that  kind;  and  he  asked 
the  House  to  bear  in  mind  that  not  until  the  House 
of  Commons  was  really  free  to  devote  Itself  to  the 
discussions  of  Imperial  affairs  would  It  get  control. 

The  House  had  not  long  to  wait  for  an  illustra- 
tion of  the  gravity  of  the  charge  directed  by  Mr. 


WHO  NEEDED  SUCCOUR?  191 

Swift  MacNelll  against  the  Foreign  Office.  On 
May  2nd,  191 1,  a  question  was  put  down  concerning 
the  French  expedition  to  Fez : 

"  Mr.  Dillon  asked  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs  whether  the  British  Government  had  been  consulted 
by  the  French  Government  in  reference  to  the  proposed 
military  operations  against  Fez;  and  whether  the  British 
Government  had  in  any  way  approved  or  made  itself  re- 
sponsible for  this  attack  on  the  independence  of  the  Empire 
of  Morocco? 

"  The  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  (Sir  Edward 
Grey)  :  '  His  Majesty's  Government  have  been  informed 
by  the  French  Government  of  the  measures  which  are  being 
adopted  for  the  succour  of  Europeans  in  Fez,  and  they  under- 
stand that  information  has  also  been  given  to  other  Govern- 
ments. The  action  taken  by  France  is  not  intended  to  alter 
the  political  status  of  Morocco,  and  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment cannot  see  why  any  objection  should  be  taken  to  it.'  " 

Now  who  were  the  Europeans  to  be  succoured? 
Well,  in  the  first  place  they  were  not  in  Fez.  In  the 
second  place  they  were  all  powerful  enough  to  dis- 
pense with  the  services  of  the  British  Government. 
Many  of  the  people  asking  succour  were  great  bank- 
ers, armament  makers,  British  newspaper  corre- 
spondents, philanthropic  millionaires  intimately  con- 
nected with  royalties,  and  sundry  "  representatives  " 
of  the  people.  Succour!  these  were  the  gangs  that 
bled  Morocco  to  death.  Anyway,  the  military  op- 
erations of  the  French  against  Fez  were  merely  steps 
taken  to  destroy  that  "  scrap  of  paper,"  the  Al- 
geciras  Act.  The  secret  articles  of  1904  were  not 
then  made  public.  So  when  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment could  not  see  why  any  objection  should  be  taken 
to  the  military  operations  against  Fez,  the  British 


192     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

Government  were  really  fulfilling  all  the  obligations 
of  its  secret  diplomacy,  knowing  the  public  of  Britain 
would  acquiesce  because  it  would  be  misinformed  by 
the  Jingo  press  in  league  with  the  advertising  de- 
partment of  the  Foreign  Office. 

What  really  went  on  in  and  about  Fez  has  been 
fully  described  by  M.  Francis  de  Pressense: 

"  At  this  point  the  Comite  du  Maroc  and  its  organs  sur- 
passed themselves.  They  organized  a  campaign  of  systematic 
untruth.  Masters  of  almost  the  entire  press,  they  swamped 
the  public  with  false  news.  Fez  was  presented  as  threatened 
by  siege  or  sack.  A  whole  European  French  Colony  was 
suddenly  discovered  there,  living  in  anguish.  The  ultimate 
fate  of  the  women  and  children  was  described  in  the  most 
moving  terms.  ...  At  all  costs  the  Europeans,  the  Sultan, 
Fez  itself  must  be  saved.  ...  As  ever  from  the  beginning 
of  this  enterprise,  the  Government  knew  nothing,  willed 
nothing  of  itself.  With  a  salutary  dread  of  complications  it 
would  have  preferred  not  to  move,  perhaps,  even,  had  it 
dared,  to  withdraw  from  the  hornet's  nest.  But  the  greater 
fears  it  experienced  from  another  quarter  prevailed;  those 
inculcated  by  the  so-called  patriotic  shoutings,  the  concerted 
clamours  of  the  orchestra  of  which  the  Comite  du  Maroc 
holds  the  baton,  and  whose  chief  performers  are  to  be  found 
in  Le  Temps  and  Le  Matin.  The  order  to  advance  was 
given.  .  .  .  Already  while  the  expedition  was  on  its  way, 
light  began  to  pierce.  Those  redoubtable  rebels  who  were 
threatening  Fez  had  disappeared  like  the  dew  in  the  morning. 
Barely  did  a  few  ragged  horsemen  fire  off  a  shot  or  two 
before  turning  around  and  riding  away  at  a  furious  gallop. 
A  too  disingenuous,  or  too  truthful,  correspondent  gave  the 
show  away.  The  expeditionary  force  complains,  he  gravely 
records,  of  the  absence  of  the  enemy;  the  approaching  harvest 
season  is  keeping  all  the  healthy  males  in  the  fields!  Thus 
did  the  phantom  so  dexterously  conjured  by  the  Comite  du 
Maroc  for  the  benefit  of  its  aims  disappear  in  a  night.  .  .  , 


OFFICIAL  BLINDNESS  193 

Avowals  and  disclosures  then  began  in  right  earnest.  One 
of  the  correspondents  who  had  contributed  his  share  to  the 
concert  of  lying  news,  wrote  with  an  admirable  sang-froid 
that,  in  truth,  there  had  been  some  exaggeration,  that,  in 
point  of  fact,  at  no  moment  had  the  safety  of  Fez  and  its 
inhabitants  been  seriously  menaced ;  that  the  idea  of  a  regu- 
lar siege  and  of  a  sudden  capture  had  been  alike  chimerical 
and  that,  moreover,  so  far  as  the  provisioning  of  the  place 
was  concerned,  he  could  reassure  the  most  timorous  that 
there  was  sufficient  corn  in  the  city  to  feed  the  whole  popu- 
lation, plus  the  expeditionary  column,  for  more  than  a  year! 
The  farce  was  played.  After  Casablanca,  Fez!  France 
without  realizing  it,  without  wishing  it,  almost  without  know- 
ing it,  had  taken  a  decisive  step.  An  indefinite  occupation 
of  the  capital  was  the  natural  prelude  to  a  Protectorate. 
For  the  clever  men  who  had  invented  and  executed  the 
scenario  there  only  now  remained  the  task  of  reaping  the 
fruit  of  their  efforts.  The  era  of  concessions,  profits,  divi- 
dends, was  about  to  open.  Premature  joyfulness!  It  was 
the  era  of  difficulties  which  was  at  hand." 

His  Majesty's  Government  could  not  see  why  any 
objection  should  be  taken  to  it!  The  Foreign  Office 
could  not  see  that  it  marked  the  beginning  of  the  end 
of  European  peace  1 

But  the  people  are  helpless.  They  are  being 
ground  to  powder  every  day  by  the  diplomatic  ma- 
chine which  never  in  the  history  of  European  affairs 
consummated  a  single  treaty  that  worked  for  the  real 
benefit  of  the  people.  Juggernaut!  Look  where 
the  car  has  passed  across  the  fair  plain  of  western 
Europe.  Who  can  describe  the  woe  this  Kumbha- 
karna  has  wrought!  Not  until  "  a  crescent-headed 
arrow  from  Rama's  bow  "  strikes  down  the  foul  idol, 
which  Bright  fifty  years  ago  thought  overthrown, 
will  the  people  know  any  rest  from  war. 


194     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

As  an  example  of  how  quickly  news  travels  across 
the  desert  to  the  House  of  Commons  when  British 
**  interests  "  are  in  "  danger,"  and  how  easy  it  is  for 
"  British  subjects  "  who  are  not  in  danger  to  find 
British  legislators  eager  to  force  the  Government 
to  move  something  of  an  extensive  military  character 
to  protect  them,  the  following  taken  from  Hansard, 
April  25th,  191 1,  is  a  gem: 

"Major  Archer-Shee:  *I  beg  to  ask  the  Secretary  of 
State  for  Foreign  Affairs  whether  he  can  inform  the  House 
as  to  the  number  of  British  subjects  residing  in  Fez  at  the 
present  time,  and  what  steps  the  Government  propose  tak- 
ing to  safeguard  British  interests  in  that  part  of  Morocco?' 

"Mr.  McKinnon  Wood  (Under  Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs)  :  '  The  number  of  British  subjects  resid- 
ing at  Fez  on  March  27th,  191 1,  apart  from  persons  of 
Moorish  parentage,  was  ten.  Of  these,  six  were  women  and 
two  were  children.  His  Majesty's  Government  do  not 
contemplate  any  active  measures.  They  consider  that  the 
arrangements  being  made  under  French  supervision  will 
afford  the  necessary  protection  to  British  subjects  at  Fez. 
No  special  measures  appear  to  be  called  for  to  safeguard 
British  interests  in  that  part  of  Morocco.' 

"Mr.  Dillon:  'Has  the  Government  any  information 
which  would  give  them  cause  for  believing  that  there  is  any 
danger  to  Europeans  ?  ' 

"  Mr.  McKinnon  Wood:  '  No,  we  have  no  such  infor- 
mation.' 

"Mr.  Remnant:  'May  I  ask  whether  any  representa- 
tions have  been  made  to  the  French  Government  to  carry 
out  the  suggestions?' 

"  Mr.  McKinnon  Wood:  *  No  representations  have  been 
made  to  the  French  Government.' 

"Major  Archer-Shee:  'May  I  ask  whether  it  is  in- 
tended to  co-operate  with  other  Governments  should  it  be- 
come necessary  to  send  a  large  force  to  pacify  Morocco  ?  ' 


PLEDGING  THE  "INTERESTS"      195 

"  Mr.  McKinnon  Wood :  *  No  occasion  has  arisen  to 
make  us  contemplate  any  such  action.' 

"Mr.  Remnant:  'May  I  ask  the  hon.  gentleman 
whether  he  will  ask  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs  whether  it  is  his  intention  to  make  representations, 
and,  if  so,  whether  he  will  do  so  at  once?' 

"Mr.  McKinnon  Wood:  'There  is  no  necessity  to 
make  representations.' 

"Major  Archer-Shee:  'In  view  of  the  unsatisfactory 
nature  of  the  reply,  I  beg  leave  to  move  the  adjournment 
of  the  House  to  call  attention  to  a  definite  matter  of  urgent 
public  importance,  namely,  the  attitude  to  be  adopted  by 
this  country  in  the  event  of  extensive  military  operations 
being  required  for  the  pacification  of  Morocco.' 

"Mr.  Dillon:  'This  is  for  the  purpose  of  creating  a 
scare.'  " 

Major  Archer-Shee  did  not  get  the  adjournment 
of  the  House.  But  the  ten  British  subjects  in  Fez 
must  have  been  deeply  grateful  to  the  British  legis- 
lators who  were  so  anxious  to  protect  them  when 
they  were  in  no  danger.  And  no  doubt  British  "  in- 
terests "  felt  under  a  debt  which  we  hope  was  paid 
according  to  service  rendered.  What  Is  the  good 
of  having  a  Foreign  Office  If  It  cannot  be  urged  by 
members  of  the  House  of  Commons  to  do  something 
for  British  "  Interests  "  ? 

On  May  23rd,  the  Foreign  Secretary  said  the 
French  Government  had  no  choice  but  to  relieve  Fez 
with  the  least  possible  delay.  When  Mr.  Dillon 
asked  whether  the  House  was  not  entitled  to  know 
to  what  extent  this  country  was  committed  to  "  this 
Ill-omened  and  cruel  expedition,"  the  Foreign  Sec- 
retary replied,  "  We  are  not  committed  at  all." 
The  secret  articles  and  letters  connected  with  the 
Anglo-French  Agreement  were  not  yet  made  public. 


196     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

But  Article  VIII  of  the  Agreement  of  1904,  stated, 
"  The  Agreement  which  may  be  come  to  on  the  sub- 
ject between  France  and  Spain  shall  be  communi- 
cated to  His  Britannic  Majesty's  Government."  A 
convention  was  drawn  up  between  France  and  Spain 
on  October  3rd,  1904,  for  the  partition  of  Morocco, 
A  copy  of  this  secret  treaty  was  sent  by  the  French 
ambassador  to  Lord  Lansdowne,  who  in  acknowl- 
edging it  said,  "  I  need  not  say  that  the  confidential 
character  of  the  Convention  entered  into  by  the 
President  of  the  French  Republic  and  the  King  of 
Spain  in  regard  to  French  and  Spanish  interests  in 
Morocco  is  fully  recognized  by  us,  and  will  be  duly 
respected."  No,  we  were  not  committed, —  not 
publicly.  Well  might  Mr.  Swift  MacNeill  say,  "  It 
is  a  complete  absurdity  for  others  to  treat  us  as 
children,  or  for  us  to  allow  ourselves  to  be  so  treated 
in  matters  of  such  high  international  importance  as 
those  involving  questions  of  peace  and  war." 

After  Casablanca,  Fez;  and  after  Fez,  Agadir. 
Early  in  July,  Germany  set  about  taking  a  hand  in 
the  Moroccan  business.  Publicly,  she  was  as  much 
concerned  in  the  economic  arrangements  of  the  Pow- 
ers In  Morocco  as  France  or  Britain.  In  February, 
1909,  she  had  signed  a  declaration  with  France 
maintaining  the  integrity  and  independence  of  Mo- 
rocco. The  Panther  at  Agadir  was  an  indication  of 
what  the  German  Government  thought  of  the  French 
expedition  to  Fez.  Questions  were  asked  In  the 
House  of  Commons,  but  the  Government  Immedi- 
ately put  out  the  sign,  "  Not  In  the  public  Interest  " ; 
and  leaders  of  the  Opposition,  following  the  tradi- 
tion of  continuity,  respected  the  feelings  of  the  For- 
eign Office.     The  first  question  was  asked  on  July 


"AGAINST  PUBLIC  INTEREST"     197 

3rd,  and  although  Captain  Faber  asked  "  if  it  were 
not  safe  for  British  men-o'-war  to  go  "  to  Agadir, 
the  Government  made  no  statement  until  the  27th, 
July,  and  then  the  Prime  Minister  choked  discus- 
sion.    He  said: 

"  Too  close  an  analysis)  at  the  present  moment  of  causes 
and  antecedents  might  provoke  in  more  than  one  quarter 
recrimination  and  retorts,  which  it  is  on  every  ground  de- 
sirable to  avoid  .  .  .  and  I  would  venture,  in  the  general 
interest,  to  make  a  strong  appeal  to  the  House,  not  on  the 
present  occasion  to  enter  into  further  details  or  open  up 
controversial  ground." 

After  a  protest  from  Mr.  Ramsey  Macdonald 
against  the  flamboyant  speech  delivered  in  the  city 
by  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  the  House  settled  down  to 
talk  about  any  other  foreign  affairs  but  Morocco 
and  the  Panther.  The  next  time  the  question  was 
raised  was  in  November.  After  the  publication  of 
the  secret  articles  in  the  Paris  papers,  Le  Temps 
and  Le  Matin,  the  British  Government  decided  to 
let  the  House  of  Commons  see  them.  Late  in  No- 
vember Sir  Edward  Grey  made  his  statement  on  the 
Moroccan  affairs,  and  the  House  had  an  opportunity 
of  speaking  its  mind  on  secret  diplomacy,  without 
really  appreciating  the  real  gravity  of  the  business. 
The  Prime  Minister,  relieved  no  doubt  that  the  Gov- 
ernment escaped  so  lightly,  said : 

"  The  House  has  heard  from  my  right  honourable  friend 
the  Foreign  Secretary,  and  I  believe  has  heard  with  uni- 
versal satisfaction,  that  the  world  is  now  in  possession  of 
the  whole  of  our  treaty  obligations  on  this  subject.  There 
is  no  secret  arrangement  of  any  sort  or  kind  which  has  not 
been  disclosed,  and   fully  disclosed,  to  the  public,   and  we 


198     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

ask,  from  that  point  of  view,  that  our  conduct  should  be 
judged  by  the  measure  of  our  treaty  obligations  which  mem- 
bers of  the  House  are  able  to  ascertain  precisely  for  them- 
selves." 

That  was  good  news.  And  when  the  Prime  Min- 
ister emphasized  the  fact  on  December  6th,  191 1,  in 
reply  to  a  question  put  by  Mr.  Gordon  Harvey, 
numbers  of  members  thought  the  ugly  rumour  of 
our  being  under  war-obligations  to  France  would  be 
utterly  dispelled.     The  Prime  Minister  said: 

"  As  has  been  stated,  there  were  no  secret  engagements 
with  France  other  than  those  that  have  now  been  published, 
and  there  are  no  secret  engagements  with  any  foreign  Gov- 
ernment that  entail  upon  us  any  obligation  to  render  military 
or  naval  assistance  to  any  other  Power."  ^ 

Later  in  that  month  we  learned  that  all  treaties 
had  not  been  made  public: 

"Mr.    Swift   MacNeill:     'Do   I    understand   the   right 

^  In  the  December,  1911,  issue  of  the  Revieiu  of  Reviews  Mr. 
W.  T.  Stead  had  something  to  say  on  the  Moroccan  Crisis: 

"  We  were  nearly  involved  in  the  stupendous  catastrophe  of  a 
gigantic  war  with  the  greatest  of  all  the  World-Powers  in  order 
to  enable  France  to  tear  up  the  Treaty  of  Algeclras  by  taking  pos- 
session of  the  Empire  of  Morocco  whose  independence  and  in- 
tegrity we  were  pledged  to  defend.  It  is  not  to  our  interest  to 
make  over  to  France  a  vast  domain  in  Northern  Africa.  .  .  .  The 
fact  remains  that  in  order  to  put  France  in  possession  of  Morocco 
we  all  but  went  to  war  with  Germany.  We  have  escaped  war, 
but  we  have  not  escaped  the  natural  and  abiding  enmity  of  the 
German  people.  Is  it  possible  to  frame  a  heavier  indictment  of 
the  foreign  policy  of  any  British  Ministry?  The  secret,  the  open 
secret  of  this  almost  incredible  crime  against  treaty  faith,  British 
interests,  and  the  peace  of  the  world,  is  the  unfortunate  fact  that 
Sir  Edward  Grey  has  been  dominated  by  men  at  the  Foreign  Office 
who  believe  all  considerations  must  be  subordinated  to  the  one 
supreme  duty  of  thwarting  Germany  at  every  turn,  even  if  in  so 
doing  British  interests,  treaty  faith  and  the  peace  of  the  world  are 
trampled  underfoot.     I  speak  that  of  which  I  know." 


WHY  NOT  ANARCHISM?  199 

honourable  gentleman  to  say  that  there  are  other  secret 
treaties  besides  the  secret  treaty  recently  disclosed  between 
this  country  and  France  ?  ' 

"Sir  Edward  Grey:  'Does  the  hon.  gentleman  mean 
between  this  country  and  France?' 

"Mr.  MacNeill:  'Between  this  country  and  any  other 
country.     We  know  about  France.' 

"Sir  Edward  Grey:  'Yes,  sir;  there  are  other  engage- 
ments that  have  not  been  published.'  " 

We  have  recently  been  throwing  a  deal  of  con- 
tempt on  the  doctrine  that  Might  Is  Right,  but 
wherein  does  the  Kaiser's  Government  differ  from 
ours  In  foreign  policy?  Are  ethics  any  nearer  poli- 
tics In  any  modern  European  state  than  they  were 
In  Machlavelli's  time?  For  those  who  hold  the  no- 
tion that  a  Government  stands  In  the  ethical  posi- 
tion of  an  Individual  and  In  Its  operations  It  should 
always  be  actuated  by  the  ethics  which  should  gov- 
ern the  actions  of  an  Individual,  let  It  be  observed 
that  responsibility  cannot  be  fixed  on  a  Government 
as  It  can  be  fixed  on  the  individual;  and  ethics  and 
responsibility  cannot  be  divorced.  Is  It  possible  to 
fix  responsibility  on  this  Government?  Some  one 
says  It  Is  responsible  to  the  people.  What,  In  the 
sense  that  an  Individual  Is  responsible  for  his  ac- 
tions? No,  Indeed.  In  the  case  of  the  Individual 
when  he  lies,  or  steals,  or  murders,  there  is  no  shift- 
ing responsibility;  but  in  the  case  of  a  Government 
where  is  personal  responsibility  to  be  fixed? 

Is  It  any  wonder  that  the  world  of  thought  Is 
shaken  every  now  and  then  by  a  Stirner,  or  a  Baku- 
nin,  or  a  Nietzsche?  Statesmen  must  not  always 
scoff  at  the  notion  that  "  for  the  superfluous  the  state 
was  Invented."     Injustice  and  poverty,  hatred  and 


200     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

war,  will  continue  so  long  as  men  can  shift  responsi- 
bility. 

"  The  ultimate  purpose  of  the  State  is  not  to  rule  men, 
to  keep  them  in  fear,  to  subject  them  to  the  will  of  others, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  to  allow  each  as  far  as  possible  to  live 
in  security,  that  is,  to  preserve  for  each  his  natural  right  to 
live  without  harm  to  himself  or  to  his  neighbour.  No,  I 
repeat,  the  object  of  the  State  is  not  to  transform  reasonable 
beings  into  animals  or  automata;  its  object  is  to  enable  the 
citizens  to  develop  in  security  their  bodies  and  their  minds, 
freely  to  employ  their  reason.  The  true  end  of  the  State 
therefore  is  liberty." 

Spinoza  sounds  a  bit  old-fashioned,  but  what 
other  basis  is  there  for  a  State?  How  far  Britain 
is  removed  from  the  foundation  laid  down  by  Spi- 
noza is  a  question  which  to  try  to  answer  would  fill 
any  political  economist  with  despair. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE    POWER   TO    WAR 

Gone  By  and  utter  Nothing  are  all  one; 

Why,  then,  does  this  creating  still  go  on? 

Gone  by?     What  means  it?  —  What  a  sorry  trade! 

Making,  and  making  nothing  of  what's  made. 

And  then  this  nothing  evermore  we  see 

Making  pretence  a  something  still  to  be. 

So  on  it  goes,  the  same  dull  circle  spinning  — 

'Twere  better  with  the  Eternal  Void  beginning! 

—  Goethe. 

Now  to  turn  aside  for  a  little  while  from  the  Foreign 
Office,  and  the  endeavours  of  members  to  elicit  re- 
liable information  concerning  diplomacy  and  the 
traffickings  of  ambassadors,  we  will  fix  our  attention 
on  the  War  Office.  On  July  4th,  19 12,  the  year  of 
the  Berlin  Conversations,  Mr.  Amery  moved  to  re- 
duce the  army  estimates  by  £100.  From  the  debate 
which  followed  we  must  quote  at  some  length,  so 
that  it  may  be  clearly  understood  how  the  policy  of 
secrecy  works  in  relation  to  members  "  in  the  know," 
and  those  who  can  only  rely  on  the  statements  of 
Ministers;  and  consequently,  with  regard  to  these 
affairs,  do  not  know  until  it  is  too  late  to  protest. 
Mr.  Amery  said: 

"  My  object  is  to  draw  the  attention  of  the  Committee 
to  the  gravity  of  the  military  situation  as  a  whole,  and  to 
the  urgent  necessity  of  bringing  our  military  preparations 

201 


202     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

into  some  sort  of  correspondence  with  our  general  national 
policy.  The  point  I  wish  to  insist  upon  to  the  Committee 
is  that  we  should  face  the  logical  consequences  of  the  policy 
to  which  this  country  already  stands  committed  with  the 
general  approval  of  the  great  majority  on  both  sides  of  the 
House,  and  that  we  should  shape  our  military  preparations 
by  the  same  standard  by  which  our  naval  preparations  are 
invariably  determined  —  the  standard,  I  mean,  of  the  force 
we  may  have  to  encounter  in  war.  It  is  common  ground 
to  us  all  in  this  House  that  we  must  at  any  cost  and  at  all 
hazards  maintain  the  supremacy  of  the  British  navy  against 
the  growing  menace  of  German  rivalry  at  sea.  It  is  also 
common  ground,  at  any  rate  among  the  great  majority  of 
us,  that  the  domination  of  Europe  by  a  great  military  power 
which  is  also  our  greatest  rival  at  sea  would  in  the  long  run 
make  the  retention  of  our  naval  supremacy  impossible,  and 
consequently  the  maintenance  of  France  as  an  independent 
great  Power  in  Europe  is,  in  the  present  situation,  not  only 
an  honourable  obligation,  but  a  vital  interest  to  the  safety 
of  this  country.  It  is  also  common  ground  that  in  certain 
eventualities,  eventualities  which  seemed  by  no  means  remote 
less  than  a  year  ago,  we  should  be  prepared  to  send  a  mili- 
tary force  to  France  to  assist  her.  What  ought  also  to  be 
common  ground,  and  no  less  common  ground  than  those 
matters  I  have  already  mentioned,  is  that  the  force  thus  sent 
should  be  adequate  to  achieve  its  purpose.  If  we  send  a 
force  at  all,  and  it  is  agreed  that  we  should  send  it —  [Hon. 
Members:  "No!"]  It  is  by  the  great  majority  on  both 
sides  of  this  House,  and  if  we  send  a  force  at  all  we  should 
send  it  to  make  sure  of  victory  and  not  to  share  a  defeat." 

The  members  who  cried  "  No  "  perhaps  remem- 
bered the  replies  to  Mr.  Jowett's  questions  in 
March,  191 1,  when  he  asked  if  we  were  under  obli- 
gations to  send  troops  to  the  assistance  of  France. 
They  were  relying  no  doubt  on  the  negative  reply 
returned  by  the  Minister,  and  not  then  thinking  of  a 


A  CLEAR  PROPHECY  203 

secret  system  which  precluded  the  possibility  of  a 
truthful  answer  to  such  questions.  Be  that  as  it 
may,  Mr.  Amery  had  no  compunction  in  speaking 
his  mind  forcibly  on  the  matter.  Further,  he  be- 
came prophetic: 

"  Why  should  we  not  have  from  the  Secretary  of  State 
for  War  an  equally  clear,  explicit  statement  of  the  relative 
forces  which  w^ould  take  the  field  in  France  and  Belgium 
at  the  outbreak  of  that  same  conflict,  and  an  equally  clear 
recognition  from  him  of  the  duty  of  the  War  Office  to  pro- 
vide a  force  which  would  make  it  unlikely  that  a  German 
attack  upon  France  would  succeed,  and  therefore  in  the 
highest  degree  improbable  that  the  attack  would  ever  be 
attempted?  .  .  .  The  question  I  should  like  the  right  hon- 
ourable gentleman  to  answer  is  whether  or  not  we  have  a 
military  force  strong  enough  to  render  France  secure  in  the 
event  of  an  attack.  Has  any  right  hon.  gentleman,  ad- 
dressing this  House,  ever  put  that  question  before  us? 
Do  we  even  pretend  to  face  it?  Let  me  remind  the  Com- 
mittee that  since  the  crisis  of  last  year  Germany  has  added 
very  considerably  to  her  navy.  Immediately,  and  with  the 
assent  of  every  one,  we  responded  by  a  substantial  increase 
of  our  navy.  May  I  also  remind  the  Committee  that  since 
that  same  crisis  Germany  has  added  8o,ooo  men  to  her  army 
for  the  express  purpose  of  strengthening  the  force  that  is  to 
march  through  Belgium  to  crush  the  French  left.  It  is  upon 
our  Expeditionary  Force  that  the  brunt  of  that  march  would 
fall.  Has  any  responsible  Minister  come  down  to  this 
House  and  asked  even  a  single  battalion  to  be  added  to 
the  strength  of  our  army?  " 

This  was  all  deeply  interesting  matter,  for  Mr. 
Amery  was  not  remotely  connected  with  the  London 
Times,  and  as  members  knew  from  many  bouts  at 
question-time,  earlier  in  the  year,  the  military  cor- 
respondent of  the  Times  was  the  editor  of  the  Army 


204     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

Review,  with  a  room  at  the  War  Office.  At  any 
rate,  Mr.  Amery  knew  so  much  that  some  members, 
who  knew  no  more  than  Ministers  cared  to  tell 
them,  scoffed  defiantly  at  Mr.  Amery's  knowledge. 
One  more  quotation  from  his  extraordinary  speech: 

"  Our  opponents  will  have  the  choice  of  two  objectives. 
They  can  attempt  either  to  interfere  with  the  despatch  of 
the  Expeditionary  Force  or  to  cover  an  invasion,  a  counter- 
stroke  intended  either  to  bring  us  to  our  knees  or,  at  any 
rate,  to  prevent  a  considerable  part  of  the  Expeditionary 
Force  from  going,  and  so  to  clear  the  field  for  the  German 
advance  through  Flanders." 

Now  if  the  information  Mr.  Amery  gave  to  the 
House  was  authentic,  what  becomes  of  all  the  indig- 
nation of  Ministers  at  Germany's  violation  of  the 
neutrality  and  independence  of  Belgium?  General 
Staffs  were  hard  at  work,  and  it  might  safely  be  Im- 
puted that  they  did  not  leave  the  Belgian  military 
authorities  ignorant  of  their  plans.  After  Mr. 
Amery  the  House  heard  Sir  Reginald  Pole-Carew: 

"  I  want  to  say  a  word  about  the  Expeditionary  Force. 
We  have  been  told  by  the  hon.  member  who  has  just 
spoken  that  the  preparations  of  the  Government  are  grossly 
inadequate,  and  I  entirely  agree  with  him.  I  do  not  think 
that  those  preparations  exist.  I  did  not  ask  to  see  that  blue 
envelope  because  I  did  not  wish  to  have  my  tongue  tied  by 
anything  that  it  might  have  contained.  Also  I  want  to 
know  why  it  should  be  '  secret ' ;  who  is  it  who  is  to  be 
kept  in  ignorance?  Is  it  that  the  people  of  this  country  are 
to  be  kept  in  the  dark  and  hoodwinked  and  not  to  be  allowed 
to  know  what  the  preparations  are  which  are  necessary  for 
their  safety?  Is  it  that  reason?  Is  it  that  our  enemies  are 
not  to  know?  I  venture  to  think  that  the  most  probable 
enemy  we  have  at  the  present  moment  can  give  the  right 


A  PARTY  IN  IGNORANCE  205 

hon.  gentleman  points  in  information.  Is  it  those  we 
hope  to  be  our  allies?  I  think  that  is  the  most  dangerous 
question  of  the  whole  lot.  If  you  choose  to  hoodwink  your 
friends  —  and  I  am  sorry  to  say  the  present  Government 
have  done  so  with  great  success  —  if  you  think  you  are  de- 
ceiving your  enemies,  neither  is  so  bad  as  to  attempt  to 
deceive  those  whom  you  hope  will  be  your  allies  abroad  and 
to  whom  you  are  making  promises  which  I  do  not  think  you 
can  carry  out.     I  say  that  is  a  most  dangerous  proceeding." 

The  statements  of  Mr.  Amery  and  Lt.-Gen.  Sir 
Reginald  Pole-Carew  were  not  refuted  by  the  Min- 
ister for  War;  indeed  the  War  Office  authorities  in 
the  House  did  not  refer  at  all  to  the  matter  of  our 
being  pledged  to  send  the  Expeditionary  Force  to 
the  assistance  of  France  in  a  war  with  Germany. 
Small  wonder  Germany  wished  to  know  if  she  might 
have  a  free  hand.  The  Opposition  at  no  time  since 
the  autumn  of  19 10  seemed  to  be  in  doubt  about 
our  engagement  with  the  French.  Only  the  rank 
and  file  of  the  Liberal  party  remained  ignorant  of 
the  full  measure  of  our  diplomatic  liabilities,  and 
though  many  back-bench  Liberals  severely  criticised 
the  foreign  policy  of  the  Government,  the  Ministry 
left  them  to  endure  the  sneers  and  jeers  of  the  Oppo- 
sition "  In  the  know."  It  would  be  hard  to  find  In 
the  pages  of  any  book  by  a  German  militarist  a 
specimen  of  grosser  contempt  for  pacifists  than  that 
displayed  by  the  Government  In  those  days.  Well, 
there  Is  a  kind  of  loyalty  that  deserves  to  be  treated 
with  contempt!  There  was,  however,  no  doubt  In 
French  official  and  press  circles  as  to  our  engage- 
ment. Mr.  Buxton,  In  the  Foreign  Office  debate  of 
July,  19 1 2,  quoted  from  the  Nouvelle  Revue,  one 
of  the  most  prominent  Paris  reviews,  a  statement 


2o6     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

lurid  enough  to  satisfy  the  supporters  of  M.  Del- 
casse: 

"  We  intend  to  have  war.  After  forty  years  of  a  heavily 
armed  peace,  we  can  at  last  utter  this  opinion,  without  the 
serious  readers  of  a  French  review  shaking  in  their  shoes. 
.  .  .  France  is  ready  to  strike  and  to  conquer  as  she  was 
not  ready  forty  years  ago,  and  she  will  not  be  in  four  or 
five  years  to  come,  owing  to  the  annual  divergent  numbers 
of  the  birth  rate  in  each  country.  .  .  .  We,  the  attacking 
party,  will  have  arranged  with  England  that  their  fleet  .  .  . 
will  have  followed  .  .  .  the  remains  of  the  whole  German 
navy  into  German  waters." 

Later  in  July  another  attack  was  made  on  the 
supplementary  naval  estimates  by  Mr.  Middlemore, 
one  of  the  most  persistent  of  the  Opposition  in  ques- 
tioning the  Admiralty  as  to  our  preparedness.  He 
said  ; 

"  Then  we  had  some  criticisms  from  the  Prime  Minister. 
He  said  the  Vote  was  not  to  threaten  the  Triple  Alliance. 
He  left  Italy  entirely  out.  The  Triple  Alliance  is  an  as- 
sociation of  three  Powers  to  fight  under  certain  circum- 
stances, and  I  cannot  conceive  how  this  can  be  judiciously, 
fairly,  patriotically,  and  wisely  left  out,  and  if  one  leaves 
it  out,  as  far  as  one's  self  is  concerned,  we  must  remember 
that  we  have  an  entente,  and  that  if  the  three  Powers  attack 
France  we  shall  have  to  defend  France,  or  else  the  entente 
is  a  sham  which  ought  never  to  have  been  made.  It  is  per- 
fidious Albion  again." 

Though  the  question  of  secret  treaties  was  brought 
up  several  times  during  the  long  autumn  and  winter 
session  no  information  was  given  by  Ministers  as  to 
whether  we  were  involved  with  France  or  not.  The 
correspondence  between  the  Foreign  Secretary  and 
the  French  ambassador  passed  in  November,  but 


A  SECOND  LIE  207 

nothing  about  it  was  communicated  to  the  House. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  next  session,  Lord  Hugh 
Cecil  raised  the  question  of  secret  engagements  in 
the  debate  on  the  Address.  The  passages  are  of 
such  extraordinary  interest  they  are  worth  quoting 
in  full  from  the  official  report: 

"  Lord  Hugh  Cecil :  '  The  right  hon.  gentleman  made 
reference  to  foreign  affairs,  and  there  is  one  aspect  of 
them,  of  not  so  controversial  a  character  as  others,  on 
which  I  should  like  to  say  a  few  words.  The  right  hon. 
gentleman  and  his  colleagues  are  generally  believed  —  I 
speak  with  the  utmost  diffidence  in  regard  to  allegations 
which  may  not  be  well  founded  —  to  have  entered  into  an 
engagement,  or,  to  speak  more  accurately,  to  have  given 
assurances,  which  in  the  contingency  of  a  great  European 
war  would  involve  heavy  military  obligations  on  this  coun- 
try. We  do  not  suspect  the  Prime  Minister  or  the  Foreign 
Secretary  of  pursuing  anything  but  a  pacific  foreign  policy, 
and  we  are  far  from  saying  that  their  policy  is  in  any  way 
an  aggressive  one ;  but  certainly  we  believe,  if  the  stories 
current  are  true,  the  policy,  if  it  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  an 
aggressive  one,  is  adventurous.' 

"The  Prime  Minister:  'Will  the  noble  lord  define  a 
little  more  definitely  what  he  means?  ' 

"Lord  Hugh  Cecil:  'I  am  only  anxious  not  to  use 
words  which  will  convey  anything  but  perfectly  fair  criti- 
cism in  a  matter  of  this  sort,  and  any  ambiguity  in  what 
I  have  said  is  due  to  the  fact  that  I  do  not  wish  to  go  be- 
yond the  necessities  of  the  case.' 

"The  Prime  Minister:     'I  do  not  complain.' 

"Lord  Hugh  Cecil:  'There  is  a  very  general  belief 
that  this  country  is  under  an  obligation,  not  a  treaty  obli- 
gation, but  an  obligation  arising  out  of  an  assurance  given 
by  the  Ministry  in  the  course  of  diplomatic  negotiations,  to 
send  a  very  large  armed  force  out  of  this  country  to  operate 
in  Europe.     That  is  the  general  belief.     It  would  be  very 


2o8     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

presumptuous  of  any  one  who  has  not  accessi  to  all  the  facts 
in  possession  of  the  Government  — ' 

"The  Prime  Minister:  'I  ought  to  say  that  it  is  not 
true.' 

"Lord  Hugh  Cecil:  *I  am  very  glad  to  have  elicited 
that  explanation.  It  is  certainly  widely  believed  that  the 
Government  have  engaged  in  a  military  policy  of  an  ad- 
venturous kind,  and  I  certainly  think,  if  that  is  right,  that 
it  would  involve  very  important  considerations  when  you 
come  to  consider  what  are  the  military  resources  of  this 
country.  We  shall  have  a  debate  on  that  point.  It  is  im- 
possible, as  the  late  Sir  Henry  Campbell-Bannerman  was 
fond  of  emphasizing,  to  judge  of  the  military  policy  of  this 
or  any  other  country,  unless  you  enter  into  the  understand- 
ings or  obligations  involved  by  its  foreign  policy.  It  is 
quite  impossible  for  this  House  fully  to  criticise  the  military 
policy  of  the  Government  unless  they  know,  at  any  rate, 
what  it  is  the  Government  expect  the  army  to  do.  It  cer- 
tainly would  follow  that  if  you  were  prepared,  as  no  recent 
Government  has  attempted  to  be  prepared,  to  take  an  im- 
portant military  part  in  the  early  stages  of  a  great  European 
war  upon  the  Continent,  the  military  preparations  of  other 
Governments,  and  of  this  Government  in  the  earlier  years 
of  its  tenure  of  office,  were  not  sufficient.  Let  me  add  that 
I  am  not  indicating  or  hinting  that  we  ought  to  have  com- 
pulsory military  service.  There  is  no  one  who  dislikes 
compulsory  military  service  in  any  shape  or  form  more  than 
I  do,  and  I  should  never  be  convinced  in  its  favour  by  any 
argument  excepting  that  which  showed  it  to  be  urgently 
necessary  for  the  protection  of  the  country.  It  is  a  matter 
for  very  grave  consideration,  if  we  are  getting  into  a  posi- 
tion in  which  obligations  become  binding  upon  us,  whether 
the  voluntary  system  will  ultimately  bear  the  strain.  I  do 
not  believe  any  Government  will  adopt  a  compulsory  mili- 
tary service  unless  the  case  is  strong  enough  to  be  brought 
about  by  general  consent.  But  what  we  have  to  be  afraid 
of  is  that  we  will  get  into  such  a  position  that  the  military 


DID  NOT  THE  PREMIER  KNOW?     209 

obligations  of  this  country  may  become  so  heavy  that  the 
voluntary  system  may  break  down.  I  hope  that  the  For- 
eign Secretary  and  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War  may  be 
able  to  co-ordinate  the  foreign  policy  and  the  military  pol- 
icy in  order  to  show  how  the  military  policy  and  the  foreign 
policy  fit  together  —  how  far  the  military  resources  of  the 
country  are  really  sufficient  to  carry  out  the  obligations 
thrown  upon  those  resources  by  the  foreign  policy  of  the 
Government.  I  think  that  is  a  matter  of  very  great  im- 
portance.' " 

Now,  why  did  the  Prime  Minister  say,  "  I  ought 
to  say  that  it  is  not  true  "?  Was  he  shielding  the 
Foreign  Secretary,  or  was  he  a  victim  of  the  despi- 
cable system  of  secrecy  that  necessitates  so  much 
lying  in  connection  with  foreign  affairs?  Was  the 
Prime  Minister  not  informed  as  to  the  exchange  of 
letters  between  Sir  Edward  Grey  and  M.  Cambon, 
only  a  little  more  than  three  months  before  the  de- 
bate? That  is  probable,  but  it  must  be  remembered 
that  the  Foreign  Secretary  in  his  speech  on  August 
3rd,  told  the  House  that  the  letters  were  exchanged 
after  the  Cabinet  had  seriously  considered  the  mat- 
ter. It  is  so  hard  to  believe  the  Prime  Minister 
wilfully  misled  the  House. 

When  the  House  reached  the  army  estimates,  ten 
days  after  the  debate  referred  to  above,  Major- 
General  Sir  Ivor  Herbert  dealt  with  the  agitation 
of  the  conscrlptionlsts  In  the  country,  and  said: 

"  When  I  was  interrupted  just  now  I  was  about  to  quote 
the  words  of  Lord  Roberts  with  regard  to  the  use  of  this 
great  force.  He  said :  *  It  is  to  carry  out  our  bounden 
duty  to  the  Continental  alliance  for  the  maintenance  of  the 
balance  of  power  in  Europe.'  It  never  was  contemplated 
by  the  present  Government  and  I  am  certain  it  never  will 


2IO     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

be  contemplated  by  them,  that  we  should  maintain  half  a 
million  of  men  here  for  use  in  an  expedition  on  the  Conti- 
nent for  the  maintenance  of  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe. 
.  .  .  We  have  no  such  bounden  duty  to  a  Continental 
Alliance.  The  Prime  Minister  the  other  day  interjected 
an  absolute  denial  when  he  was  questioned  by  the  noble 
lord,  the  Member  for  Oxford,  as  to  whether  we  had  any 
such  bounden  duty.  He  said  that  there  was  nothing  of  the 
sort.  It  would  be  the  duty  of  any  Government  before 
entering  into  such  responsibility  as  that  to  make  it  known 
in  this  House." 

On  March  24th,  the  question  of  treaty  obligations 
was  raised  again;  two  members  asked  the  Prime 
Minister  if  the  country  was  under  any,  and,  if  so, 
what,  obligation  to  France  to  send  an  armed  force 
in  certain  contingencies  to  operate  In  Europe.  To 
the  questions  the  Prime  Minister  replied: 

"  As  has  been  repeatedly  stated,  this  country  is  not  under 
any  obligation  not  public  and  known  to  Parliament  which 
compels  it  to  take  part  in  any  war." 

There  was  nothing  in  the  questions  about  the  coun- 
try being  compelled  to  take  part  In  any  war,  but  the 
reply  was  accepted  as  a  complete  answer  to  the  ques- 
tions. He  also  said,  "  If  war  arises  between  Euro- 
pean Powers  there  are  no  unpublished  agreements 
which  will  restrict  or  hamper  the  freedom  of  the 
Government  or  of  Parliament  to  decide  whether  or 
not  Great  Britain  should  participate  in  a  war." 

Though  the  denials  of  the  Prime  Minister  lulled 
the  fears  of  his  supporters,  those  "  in  the  know  " 
were  not  so  easily  gulled. 

Towards  the  end  of  March,  1913,  Mr.  Churchill 
introduced  the  navy  estimates,  and  adverted  to  the 


THE  POWER  OF  A  LIE  211 

suggestion  of  a  "  naval  holiday."  The  estimates 
amounted  to  £46,309,300,  but  the  gross  expenditure 
before  the  year  ended  rose  to  £49,625,636.  Within 
a  week  or  two  of  the  First  Lord's  announcement,  the 
Jingo  press  of  this  country  poured  out  a  stream  of 
wicked  lies  to  the  effect  that  Germany's  answer  to 
Mr.  Churchill's  offer  of  a  "  naval  holiday  "  was  a 
greatly  swollen  programme.  The  terror-strikers 
and  the  blood-spilling  brigade  worked  hard  to  raise 
another  panic.  In  the  House  the  every-man-a-sailor 
party  cried  for  more  ships,  more  money,  and  more 
men.  The  position  in  the  Mediterranean  was  very 
freely  discussed.     Mr.  Lee  said: 

"  There  is  the  vital  question  of  the  Mediterranean,  and 
here  I  would  again  remind  the  Committee  of  the  very  pre- 
cise, dramatic  and  important  statement  made  by  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  Colonies  last  autumn,  which  was  endorsed  by 
the  Prime  Minister,  in  which  he  said:  'We  shall  maintain 
our  position  there,  both  on  land  and  sea,  to  as  full  an  extent 
as  we  have  ever  done  in  the  past,  and  in  doing  so  we  shall 
depend  upon  no  alliance  or  understanding,  actual  or  im- 
plied, but  upon  our  own  forces.'  The  First  Lord  in  his 
Navy  Memorandum  showed  that,  in  191 5,  Austria  and  Italy 
combined  would  have  ten  '  dreadnaughts,'  and  that  our 
squadron  of  four  battle  cruisers  and  four  armoured  cruisers 
would  not  suffice  to  fill  our  requirements,  and  that  this 
matter  must  be  reconsidered.  We  shall  have,  by  that  time, 
no  ships  to  spare  in  home  waters  for  this  purpose.  It  is, 
therefore,  clear  that  if  this  policy  is  carried  out  we  must 
practically  build  a  new  squadron  for  service  in  the  Medi- 
terranean, and,  what  is  more,  we  must  begin  it  immediately." 

Lord  Charles  Beresford  suggested  that  Mr. 
Churchill  must  "  be  trusting  to  France  to  guard  the 
Mediterranean."     It  was,  however.  Sir  C.  Kinloch- 


212     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

Cooke  who  brought  out  clearly  the  peculiarity  of  our 
understanding  with  France.     He  said : 

"  -The  First  Lord  bids  us  take  comfort  in  the  fact  —  these 
are  his  own  words  —  that, 

"  '  in  conjunction  with  the  Navy  of  France,  our  Medi- 
terranean Fleet  would  make  a  combined  force  superior  to 
all  possible  combination.' 

"  A  remarkable  statement,  look  at  it  how  you  will,  and 
one  I  think  the  Committee  will  agree  somewhat  difficult  to 
reconcile  with  the  recent  pronouncement  of  the  Prime  Min- 
ister as  to  our  understanding  with  France  in  the  matter 
of  armaments.  In  one  case  we  have  the  Prime  Minister 
repudiating  an  obligation  on  our  side  of  any  kind,  and  in 
the  other  we  have  the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty  relying 
for  the  safety  of  our  Eastern  Empire,  our  trade  and  our 
food  supply,  upon  the  assistance  which  he  presumes  will  be 
ready  at  any  moment  to  be  given  to  us  by  France." 

Remarkable,  Indeed !  but  not  so  strange  when  the 
whole  course  of  the  tortuous  business  is  traced  from 
the  time  Sir  Edward  Grey  consented  to  the  conver- 
sations in  1906.  It  would  have  been  remarkable 
if  contradiction  and  evasion  had  not  followed  as  a 
consequence  of  the  Foreign  Secretary's  secret  diplo- 
macy. Prevarication  seems  to  have  become  the  first 
law  of  secret  diplomacy  since  the  Algeciras  Act  was 
signed.  Still,  truth  will  out,  though  not  always  from 
the  mouths  of  babes  and  sucklings.  In  August, 
1 913,  Lord  Haldane,  in  the  House  of  Lords,  placed 
the  Prime  Minister  in  an  invidious  position,  when 
he  said: 

"  I  do  not  think  it  would  be  reasonable  or  wise  for  any 
Government  to  keep  a  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean  equal  to 
the  fleets  of  Austria  and  Italy  combined,  because  the  burden 
would  be  simply  enormous,  and  there  is  no  justification  for 


MR.  CHURCHILL'S  SUGGESTION     213 

it.  .  .  .  France  has  in  the  Mediterranean  a  fleet  almost  as 
great  as  the  fleet  of  Austria  and  Italy  combined,  and  if  you 
take  into  account  that  we  are  on  the  most  friendly  relations 
with  France,  and  that  our  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean  is  a 
substantial  one,  then,  looking  at  the  balance,  you  have  a 
situation  which  cannot  be  described  as  unsatisfactory." 

Thus  to  the  First  Lord's  name  must  be  added  the 
name  of  the  then  Lord  Chancellor  of  England  as  be- 
ing at  variance  with  the  Prime  Minister  and  the  For- 
eign Secretary  as  to  our  obligation  to  France.  But 
when  the  Prime  Minister  in  191 1  said  that  the 
rumours  of  war  in  the  summer  of  that  year  were 
"  extravagant  fictions  "  and  nothing  but  "  pure  in- 
vention," humble  members  of  the  House  should  not 
be  surprised  when  Ministers  make  contradictory 
statements  in  connection  with  diplomacy. 

It  may  be  well  to  take  one  last  look  at  the  "  na- 
val hoHday "  suggestion.  In  October,  1913,  Mr. 
Churchill  went  to  Manchester,  and  there  he  had  an- 
other fling  at  his  pet  scheme  for  reducing  armaments. 
In  the  spring,  when  the  estimates  were  introduced, 
the  Jingoes  spread  reports  of  a  vast  increase  in  the 
German  estimates.  Mr.  Churchill  recognized  that 
it  would  not  be  possible  for  either  Germany  or  our- 
selves, even  if  the  two  nations  were  agreed,  to  stand 
still  for  a  whole  year  unless  other  Powers  could  be 
persuaded  to  do  likewise,  but  he  anticipated  that  if 
Great  Britain  and  Germany  took  the  lead  in  ap- 
proaching other  European  Powers,  their  great  in- 
fluence would  insure  good  prospects  of  success. 
Nevertheless  he  said: 

"  Now  we  say,  while  there  is  plenty  of  time,  in  all  friend- 
ship and  sincerity  to  our  great  neighbour  Germany:  'If 
you  will  put  oH  beginning  your  two  ships  for  twelve  months 


214     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

from  the  ordinary  date  when  you  would  have  begun  them, 
we  will  put  off  beginning  our  four  ships,  in  absolute  good 
faith,  for  exactly  the  same  period.'  " 

That  seemed  to  the  layman  a  fairly  reasonable 
proposal.  But  was  it  feasible?  If  we  glance  at  the 
figures  of  the  Triple  Entente  and  the  Triple  Al- 
liance we  shall  see  that  Great  Britain  was  in  a  posi- 
tion to  say  to  Germany,  "  After  the  scandalous  way 
you  have  been  treated  by  Entente  diplomacy,  the 
Government  is  determined  to  show  that  its  fine  words 
on  good  relations  and  peaceful  intentions  mean  some- 
thing substantial;  therefore  it  will  bring  pressure  to 
bear  on  the  partners  of  the  Triple  Entente  to  desist 
from  building  ships  in  the  year  19 14."  With  the 
French  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean,  and  the  northern 
and  western  coasts  of  France  undefended,  the  propo- 
sition would  not  have  been  so  Quixotic  as  it  appears. 
Anyway,  at  the  time  it  was  worth  any  sacrifice  to 
convince  Germany  that  our  policy  was  not  one  of 
isolating  her  in  Europe.  The  figures  for  gross  ex- 
penditure and  for  new  construction  were  well  above 
a  two  Power  standard  in  favour  of  the  Triple  En- 
tente : 

GROSS  EXPENDITURE,  1913 

Great    Britain    ...    £49,625,636      Germany     £23,030,633 

France     21,292,422      Austria      7.332,703 

Russia     25,392,784      Italy      13,333.762 


Triple  Entente     ..    £96,310,842      Triple   Alliance     .  £43,697,098 

NEW  CONSTRUCTION,  1913 

Great    Britain    ...    £16,883,875      Germany     £11,010,883 

France     8,893,064      Austria     3,288,937 

Russia     12,082,516      Italy      3.933,ooo 

Triple  Entente     ..    £37,859,455      Triple   Alliance     .  £18,232,820 


FRUITS  OF  FALSEHOOD  215 

It  Is  a  pity  Mr.  Churchill  was  not  in  a  position 
to  tell  the  people  of  England  that  he  had  arranged 
with  France  to  leave  the  Mediterranean  to  her  fleet 
while  England's  looked  after  the  Channel  and  the 
North  Sea.  If  he  could  have  broken  down  the  bar- 
riers of  the  criminal  policy  of  secrecy,  and  have  been 
perfectly  frank  about  the  naval  position,  he  might 
have  carried  the  vast  majority  of  the  people  with 
him.  He  might  have  said  that  the  panicky  reports 
of  the  spring  with  regard  to  the  swollen  estimates 
of  the  German  Government  were  not  true,  and  that 
it  would  be  worth  while  removing  all  suspicion  from 
the  minds  of  German  statesmen;  but  that  this  could 
be  done  only  by  a  bold  declaration  that  we  shall  not 
build  any  ships  this  year, —  or  next,  if  it  could  not  be 
arranged  for  this  year.  Hidebound  tradition,  how- 
ever, held  him  fast  in  its  grip;  and  his  proposal  only 
served  to  blind  those  of  his  fellow-countrymen  who 
prefer  to  do  anything  but  study  these  affairs  for 
themselves.  As  it  was,  the  suggestion  made  no 
headway  in  England  and  the  Germans  took  it  for  a 
sorry  joke. 

In  the  spring  of  19 14,  the  debates  which  were 
raised  on  the  defence  of  the  Empire  and  the  strategic 
position  of  the  forces  in  the  Mediterranean,  revealed 
the  profound  dissatisfaction  of  well-informed  mem- 
bers as  to  the  value  of  the  Entente,  and  the  policy 
of  the  "  Commander  of  the  Forces  "  as  to  foreign 
affairs  generally.  The  navy  estimates  reached  the 
colossal  figure  of  £52,261,703,  and  many  men  began 
to  wonder  whether  ententes  were  not  after  all  fear- 
fully expensive  luxuries;  particularly  when  the  arma- 
ment burden  was  so  unfairly  apportioned.  When 
one  partner  in  an  entente,  with  little  risk  of  a  land 


2i6     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

war,  has  to  spend  twice  as  much  on  her  navy  as  either 
of  her  two  partners,  it  is  time  to  ask  what  return 
will  she  ever  get  for  the  crushing  burden  thrown  upon 
her  workers?  But  secret  understandings  and  en- 
tangling alliances  must  be  paid  for,  no  matter  who 
objects,  and  no  matter  how  much  lying  such  a  policy 
may  entail.  When  the  Foreign  Office  hands  over 
the  fate  of  a  nation  to  military  and  naval  experts, 
and  the  people  permit  a  system  which  gives  the  For- 
eign Secretary  the  power  of  a  "  Commander  of  the 
Forces,"  and  lets  him  conduct  his  business  without 
Parliamentary  control, —  then  the  nation  must  not 
complain  when  it  is  asked  to  settle  the  bill  of  costs. 
But  it  should  be  remembered  that  new  generations 
will  have  to  bear  their  share  of  the  burden.  The 
people  of  the  next  generation  will  look  at  the  history 
of  this  terrible  war  with  calm  deliberation.  They 
will  not  be  blinded  by  the  passions  let  loose  by  our 
foreign  policy  during  the  past  eight  years,  which 
make  it  almost  impossible  for  men  of  to-day,  fighting 
for  their  national  existence,  to  see  the  long  sequence 
of  error,  mendacity,  and  stupidity  which  has  brought 
this  awful  crime  to  fruition.  But  reason  will  re- 
turn; other  views  will  replace  those  which  are  domi- 
nant to-day;  and  history  will  repeat  itself  in  this  case 
as  surely  as  it  has  done  in  the  case  of  every  other 
war.  Then,  in  the  process  of  reconsideration,  the 
verdict  will  be  given  against  all  those  forces  which 
have  brought  the  nations  of  Europe  to  the  slaughter 
and  devastation  of  an  Armageddon.  A  rider  will 
accompany  that  verdict,  blaming  secret  diplomacy, 
the  Jingo  press,  the  armament  ring,  and  the  polyglot 
gangs  of  concessionaires,  for  embroiling  this  nation 
in  the  strife. 


MORE  LIES  217 

Some  more  questions  about  our  obligations  to  en- 
gage in  military  operations  on  the  Continent  must  be 
recorded  here.  The  Foreign  Secretary  replied  to 
both  of  them.  The  first  one  was  put  on  April  28th, 
1914: 

**  Mr.  King  asked  the  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs 
whether  he  is  aware  that  demands  have  been  recently  put 
forward  for  a  further  military  understanding  between  the 
Powers  of  the  Triple  Entente  with  a  view  to  concerted 
action  on  the  Continent  in  case  of  certain  eventualities;  and 
whether  the  policy  of  this  country  still  remains  one  of  free- 
dom from  all  obligations  to  engage  in  military  operations  on 
the  Continent? 

"The  Secretary  (Sir  Edward  Grey):  'The  answer  to 
the  first  part  of  the  question  is  in  the  negative,  and  as 
regards  the  latter  part  the  position  now  remains  the  same 
as  stated  by  the  Prime  Minister  in  answer  to  a  question  in 
this  House  on  the  24th,  March,  1913.'  " 

The  Prime  Minister  had  said  the  country  was  un- 
der no  obligation;  there  were  no  agreements  which 
would  restrict  or  hamper  the  freedom  of  the  Gov- 
ernment or  of  Parliament. 

Then  two  questions  were  put  on  June  nth,  19 14: 

"  Mr.  King  asked  whether  any  naval  agreement  has  been 
recently  entered  into  between  Russia  and  Great  Britain;  and 
whether  any  negotiations,  with  a  view  to  enable  agreement, 
have  recently  taken  place  or  are  now  pending  between  Russia 
and  Great  Britain? 

"  Sir  William  Byles  asked  the  Secretary  of  State  for  For- 
eign Affairs  whether  he  can  make  any  statement  with  regard 
to  an  alleged  new  naval  agreement  between  Great  Britain 
and  Russia;  how  far  such  agreement  would  affect  our  rela- 
tions with  Germany;  and  will  he  lay  papers? 

"Sir    Edward    Grey:     'The    hon.    member    for    North 


2i8     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

Somerset  asked  a  similar  question  last  year  with  regard 
to  the  military  forces,  and  the  hon.  member  for  North 
Salford  asked  a  similar  question  also  on  the  same  day, 
as  he  has  done  again  to-day.  The  Prime  Minister  then 
replied  that,  if  war  arose  between  European  Powers,  there 
were  no  unpublished  agreements  which  would  restrict  or 
hamper  the  freedom  of  the  Government  or  of  Parliament 
to  decide  whether  or  not  Great  Britain  should  participate 
in  a  war.  That  answer  covers  both  the  questions  on  the 
paper.  It  remains  as  true  to-day  as  it  was  a  year  ago.  No 
negotiations  have  since  been  concluded  with  any  Power  that 
would  make  the  statement  less  true.  No  such  negotiations 
are  in  progress,  and  none  are  likely  to  be  entered  upon  so 
far  as  I  can  judge.  But  if  any  agreement  were  to  be  con- 
cluded that  made  it  necessary  to  withdraw  or  modify  the 
Prime  Minister's  statement  of  last  year,  which  I  have 
quoted,  it  ought,  in  my  opinion,  to  be,  and  I  suppose  that 
it  would  be,  laid  before  Parliament.'  " 

Less  than  two  months  before  the  outbreak  of  hos- 
tilities, this  was  the  way  the  British  House  of  Com- 
mons was  treated  by  Ministers  of  a  Government 
which  began  its  career  in  1906,  under  the  old  Liberal 
flag  that  bore  the  motto,  "  Peace,  Retrenchment, 
and  Reform  " !  Well  might  the  socialists  cry  at 
meetings  when  Liberals  have  asked  for  the  demo- 
cratic forces  to  pull  together,  "Liberals,  forsooth! 
your  Government  has  never  been  Liberal  since  the 
Liberal  Leaguers  got  control  of  the  Cabinet!" 
Only  those  who  have  borne  the  brunt  of  the  political 
fighting  in  the  country  know  how  hard  the  task  has 
been  to  keep  the  old  Radicals  in  the  fighting  line 
while  this  Government  has  been  enmeshed  in  the  en- 
tanglements of  a  Continental  system  through  its  mad 
imperial  desires  and  its  secret  foreign  policy. 
Twitted  by  the   Conservatives   for   "  a  meek  sub- 


A  VEHEMENT  PROTEST  219 

serviency  "  in  the  division  lobby,  and  a  "  grotesque 
impotency  "  under  an  autocratic  Ministry;  and,  on 
the  other  hand,  charged  by  the  socialists  as  support- 
ers of  gangs  of  British  and  foreign  capitalists  syn- 
dicated for  the  business  of  exploiting  the  natives  of 
Africa  and  Asia  (besides  acquiescing  In  the  nefari- 
ous designs  of  the  armament  ring  to  rob  the  wealth- 
producers  of  the  country)  members  who  sacrificed 
some  of  their  principles  in  order  to  get  land  reform, 
constitutional  reform,  and  franchise  reform,  found 
in  the  end  that  such  benefits  as  they  had  gained  were 
mere  dross  as  considered  against  the  crime  of  par- 
ticipating in  a  European  war. 

So  late  as  June  29th,  19 14,  the  true  position  of 
the  House  in  relation  to  foreign  affairs  was  de- 
scribed by  Mr.  Swift  MacNeill,  in  the  debate  on  the 
Foreign  Office  Vote.     He  said: 

"  If  we  are  not  to  know  the  reality  of  things  it  would 
be  better  if  we  had  no  debates  in  this  House  on  foreign  pol- 
icy. Member  after  member  gets  up  and  says  what  to  the 
best  of  his  information  are  the  true  facts  of  the  case,  but 
none  of  these  hon.  members  are  furnished  with  official 
information  as  they  would  be  furnished  with  on  any  matter 
of  domestic  policy.  I  think  it  is  an  amazing  thing  to  see 
how  the  House  is  crowded  on  matters  of  naval  defence,  and 
to  see  how  this  House  of  Commons  allows  itself  to  be  treated 
as  a  child  in  matters  which  are  the  springs  of  policy  them- 
selves —  in  matters  which  create  wars,  and  for  which  these 
naval  defences  are  themselves  required.  It  would  be  im- 
mensely better  if  there  were  fewer  millions  spent  on  the 
Navy,  and  there  was  an  open  public  policy  as  to  our  rela- 
tions with  other  Powers.  ...  I  say  that  the  Houses  of 
Parliament  so  far  as  foreign  policy  is  concerned  are  abso- 
lutely impotent.  .  .  .  This  House  of  Commons  has  no 
power  to  declare  war  or  to  make  peace.     These  preroga- 


220     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

tives  of  the  Crown  are  practically  invested  in  the  Ministers, 
and  exercised  by  them.  In  foreign  affairs  they  are  not 
responsible.  The  Ministry  of  England  can  declare  war 
to-day  without  consulting  the  House  of  Commons.  Per- 
haps it  will  be  said  that  is  all  right,  and  that  the  House  of 
Commons  has  the  power  of  stopping  supplies.  Yes,  but  no 
House  of  Commons  with  ordinary  patriotic  feeling  would 
dream  of  stopping  supplies  when  that  means  the  mainte- 
nance and  protection  of  soldiers  abroad,  whatever  may  be 
the  facts  of  the  war.  Therefore,  the  Cabinet  has  power  to 
make  peace  and  to  declare  war;  to  make  this  country  enter 
into  the  very  highest  and  most  momentous  international 
transactions,  and  has  a  power  which  it  has  not  in  connection 
with  the  narrowest  turnpike  Bill.  Can  any  one  imagine  a 
Committee  of  Parliament,  such  as  the  Cabinet  is,  should  be 
able  to  put  the  country  under  the  most  intense  national 
obligation,  and  to  bind  the  lives  and  destinies  and  properties 
of  the  subject  ?  " 

Outside  of  Germany  the  bureaucracy  of  Berlin  has 
had  no  more  implacable  opponents  than  the  Radicals 
of  Britain.  For  nearly  twenty  years  it  has  been 
pointed  out  In  speeches  and  pamphlets  as  the  great 
Continental  stumbling  block  in  the  road  to  a  fuller 
and  deeper  understanding  among  the  workers  of  the 
great  Powers.  The  whole  system  of  Government 
at  Berlin  has  been  utterly  disliked  by  the  progres- 
sive people  of  this  country,  because  it  practically  lies 
in  the  hands  of  a  special  set  of  men  dominated  by 
the  Kaiser.  Under  his  will  the  bureaucracy  shaped 
the  course  of  peace  and  war  and  social  affairs,  while 
little  or  no  political  power  rested  in  the  hands  of  the 
vast  majority  of  the  German  people.  Absolute  in 
all  things  that  concern  the  destiny  of  a  people,  the 
Kaiser  stood  for  all  those  economic  and  political 
abominations  the  British  people  had  fought  in  their 


TWEEDLEDEE  AND  TWEEDLEDUM     221 

land  for  hundreds  of  years  to  overthrow;  grievances 
they  had  been  to  some  extent  successful  in  removing. 
Have  they  then  fought  in  vain?  What  is  the  posi- 
tion in  this  year  of  19 15  ?  A  Cabinet  with  absolute 
power  to  plunge  the  nation  within  a  week  into  a 
European  war,  to  carry  out  obligations  the  House  of 
Commons  were  told  less  than  eight  weeks  before 
hostilities  commenced  did  not  exist;  but  which  the 
Government  confessed,  when  it  was  too  late,  were 
entered  into  more  than  eight  years  ago.  The  end 
of  our  constitutional  struggle,  then,  is  to  set  up  an 
absolute  Cabinet  in  place  of  an  absolute  monarch 
and  an  all-powerful  House  of  Lords. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE   WORK   OF   DIPLOMATISTS 

"There  is  another  great  gulf  which  separates  the  differ- 
ences between  Austria  and  Russia,  howsoever  they  may  be 
decided,  from  the  affairs  of  the  Western  Powers.  Britain 
and  Germany,  Italy  and  France  are  at  peace.  They  desire 
peace;  they  need  peace;  there  is  no  ground  of  quarrel  be- 
tween them  —  absolutely  none.  They  have  only  to  con- 
tinue to  pursue  together  the  simple  and  sincere  policy  they 
have  been  following,  they  have  only  to  trust  one  another 
in  this  time  of  trouble,  they  have  only  to  take  hold  of  one 
another's  hands  in  confidence  and  good-will,  and  there  is 
no  power  under  the  sky  that  can  drive  them  from  the  paths 
of  sanity  and  honour.  No  one  can  measure  the  conse- 
quences of  a  general  war.  The  original  cause  would  soon 
be  lost  in  the  greater  and  more  terrible  issues  which  would 
be  raised.  .  .  .  The  only  epitaph  which  history  could  write 
on  such  a  catastrophe  would  be  that  this  whole  generation 
of  men  went  mad  and  tore  themselves  to  pieces." 

—  Winston  Churchill,  November,  1912. 

That  epitaph  will  serve  for  the  stone  that  will  be 
raised  by  our  heirs  on  the  grave  of  our  madness. 
Never  was  peace  needed  by  the  peoples  of  Europe 
so  urgently  as  in  June,  19 14.  But  men  went  mad 
in  July;  statesmen  led  the  way,  pushed  by  diploma- 
tists, and  kings  followed;  not  along  the  paths  of  san- 
ity and  honour,  but  into  those  terrible  labyrinths 
where  reason  is  abandoned  by  all  who  enter  in.  In 
19 14  the  economic  and  political  condition  of  Britain 

222 


A  CLEAR  SKY  223 

and  Ireland  was  serious  enough  to  employ  fully  all 
the  wisdom  of  our  statesmen.  Declining  trade; 
grave  labour  trouble  approaching;  the  revolt  in  the 
army;  Ulster's  preparation  for  civil  war;  sedition 
in  the  Privy  Council  and  in  India;  riots  in  South 
Africa  and  Dublin;  were  only  some  of  the  outstand- 
ing features  of  our  own  disorders. 

When  Parliament  met  on  February  loth,  1914, 
the  King's  speech  contained  two  striking  points  on 
foreign  affairs: 

"  My  relations  witli  Foreign  Powers  continue  to  be 
friendly.  I  am  happy  to  say  that  my  negotiations,  both 
with  the  German  Government  and  the  Ottoman  Govern- 
ment as  regards  matters  of  importance  to  the  commercial 
and  industrial  interests  of  this  country  in  Mesopotamia,  are 
rapidly  approaching  a  satisfactory  issue,  while  questions 
which  have  long  been  pending  with  the  Turkish  Empire  in 
respect  to  regions  bordering  on  the  Persian  Gulf  are  in  a 
fair  way  towards  an  amicable  settlement." 

There  seemed  to  be  no  international  friction  in 
Europe ;  the  chancelleries  gave  no  indication  of  the 
coming  storm.  Even  the  Balkans  seemed  to  be  at 
rest.  At  home  all  was  strife.  The  Government, 
entering  on  its  fourth  year  of  office  under  the  Par- 
liament Act,  had  to  deal  for  the  third  and  last  time 
with  the  Home  Rule  Bill.  Many  other  highly  con- 
tentious measures,  in  various  stages  of  legislative  de- 
velopment, were  to  be  dealt  with.  The  church,  the 
land,  and  the  ascendency  parties  were  intensely 
alarmed;  and  urgent  was  their  work  in  the  country 
to  forestall  at  any  cost  the  power  of  the  Parliament 
Act  to  pass  measures  against  the  opposition  of  the 
House  of  Lords.  The  Unionists  had  succeeded  on 
two  occasions  in  turning  the  House  of  Commons 


224     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

into  a  disorderly  place;  and  threats  were  made  again 
and  again  to  use  similar  methods  in  the  new  session. 
The  old  ways  of  reason  and  argument  were  fast 
giving  place  to  riot  and  clamour.  No  one  could 
look  forward  to  the  passing  of  the  Home  Rule  Bill 
with  certainty  that  the  House  would  conduct  itself 
decorously.  Another  pot-house  brawl  was  the  least 
that  could  be  expected.  For  the  time  being,  foreign 
affairs  and  armaments  were  forgotten.  In  the  re- 
cess some  Ministers  had,  however,  referred  to  these 
questions  in  their  speeches.  Lord  Haldane  at  Hox- 
ton  on  January  15th,  19 14,  said: 

"  During  the  eight  years  in  which  the  Government  had 
been  in  office  the  peace  of  Europe  had  been  preserved.  The 
Great  Powers  had  grouped  themselves;  the  piling  up  of 
armaments  had  gone  on;  we  had  increased  our  armaments; 
and  Europe  was  an  armed  camp,  but  an  armed  camp  in 
which  peace  not  only  prevailed,  but  in  which  the  indications 
were  that  there  was  a  far  greater  prospect  of  peace  than 
ever  there  was  before.  No  one  wanted  war.  If  arma- 
ments were  piled  up  it  was  not  for  aggression  but  for  fear. 
That  would  go  in  time,  and  would  certainly  go  if  the 
beneficent  tendency  of  the  last  few  years  was  kept  up,  and 
if  this  country  preserved  its  policy  while  remaining  in  one 
of  the  groups,  yet  seeking  to  bring  about  good  relations  be- 
tween that  group  and  the  other  group.  It  was  with  pleas- 
ure that  he  thought  of  the  great  power  for  good  of  the  two 
statesmen  in  Europe,  Dr.  Bethmann-HoUweg  and  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey.  These  two  had  worked  for  all  they  were 
worth,  and  we  had  seen  the  fruits  of  it  during  a  period  of 
great  anxiety  and  crisis,  when  probably  without  that  group 
system  we  might  have  had  a  conflagration  in  Europe. 
These  groups  had  a  new  value  and  meaning.  They  did  not 
exist  to  break  the  peace,  but  to  keep  the  peace." 

This  only  about  six  months  before  Europe  was 


A  SAD  RETROSPECT  225 

engulfed  in  the  horror  of  the  centuries!  There  was 
then  no  doubt  in  Lord  Haldane's  mind  as  to  the  way 
the  two  heads  (Sir  Edward  Grey  and  Dr.  von  Beth- 
mann-Hollweg)  of  the  armed  groups,  the  Entente 
and  the  AlHance,  had  worked  for  the  peace  of  Eu- 
rope. No  one  wanted  war!  The  groups  did  not 
exist  to  break  the  peace  but  to  keep  the  peace  I  It 
is  like  a  grotesque  nightmare  now  to  read  such  a 
speech,  delivered  only  a  few  short  months  before 
the  greatest  nations  of  Europe  plunged  into  war. 
To  read  that  speech,  now  that  nine  nations  are  at 
war,  and  try  to  get  one  gleam  of  hope  for  democracy 
out  of  all  the  gloom  of  battlefields  is  a  task  of  utter 
despair.  Every  sophism,  every  platitude,  every 
pretext  of  statesman,  diplomatist,  soldier  and  sailor 
for  armaments,  groups,  and  treaties  has  been 
smashed  to  atoms.  Truth,  like  a  battered  drab,  in 
burning  shame  hides  her  head  in  the  shadows  of  an 
empty  brothel.  Either  Lord  Haldane  knew  then 
he  was  not  speaking  the  truth  or  numbers  of  British 
journalists  who  have  written  on  diplomacy  since  the 
war  began  are  brazen  liars.  Both  cannot  be  right; 
but  as  Lord  Haldane,  with  all  his  political  faults,  is 
one  of  the  great  intellectual  forces  in  Britain,  and 
would  be  apt  to  know  what  he  was  talking  about, 
the  jingoists  of  the  gutter-press  may  be  left  to  enjoy 
what  they  earn.  Lord  Haldane  was  a  bad  prophet; 
and  though  he  told  us  so  recently  as  July,  191 5,  that 
he  "  was  bound  to  make  friendly  speeches,"  he  might 
have  had  the  courage  to  tell  the  country  earlier  all 
he  learned  in  Berlin  in  19 12.  Here  is  the  curse  of 
the  whole  despicable  business  of  diplomacy:  a  man 
like  Lord  Haldane  must  make  friendly  speeches 
(which  in  this  case  meant  hiding  the  truth)   when 


226     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

he  had  not  the  "  smallest  doubt  about  the  Imperative 
necessity  of  our  taking  part  in  the  war," —  as  he  told 
us  in  July,  1915. 

It  is  almost  a  futile  task  to  attempt  to  reconcile 
the  utterances  of  our  statesmen  made  before  July, 
1914,  with  those  delivered  since  the  war  began.  To 
those  who  would  urge  the  excuse  that  members  of 
a  Cabinet  cannot  speak  straightforwardly  on  deli- 
cate questions  of  foreign  affairs  for  fear  of  precipi- 
tating an  international  crisis,  it  might  be  asked  what 
particular  benefit  have  the  people  derived  from  the 
policy  of  secrecy  and  hyperbole?  If  the  conduct 
of  foreign  affairs  precludes  the  possibility  of  the 
truth  being  given  to  the  people,  is  it  necessary  to  mis- 
lead them  by  making  friendly  speeches?  Would  it 
not  be  better  to  preserve  an  ironclad  silence?  Why 
tell  the  people  anything  about  foreign  affairs  and 
armaments?  Perhaps  the  policy  of  the  future  will 
be :  get  the  money  and  say  nothing.  A  rhetorical 
loss  might  at  any  rate  mean  a  dialectical  gain. 

Take  another  instance  of  where  statesmen's  ut- 
terances before  the  war  come  in  conflict  with  the 
screeds  of  jingoists.  Sir  Edward  Grey  spoke  at 
Manchester  in  February,  19 14,  on  International  Af- 
fairs and  Armaments.     He  said: 

"  While  British  naval  expenditure  is  a  great  factor  in  the 
naval  expenditure  of  Europe,  the  forces  which  are  making 
that  expenditure  increase  generally  are  really  beyond  our 
control.  I  admit  that  we  had  some  responsibility  originally 
in  building  the  first  dreadnought.  No  doubt  we  are  open 
to  the  criticism  that  we  set  the  example.  ...  At  the  pres- 
ent moment  what  is  causing  the  increase  of  dreadnoughts 
in  Europe?  It  is  going  on  without  reference  to  British 
expenditure.     The  ships  which   Germany  is  going  to   lay 


CONTRADICTIONS  227 

down  in  this  coming  year  are  being  laid  down  to  carry  out 
a  naval  programme,  a  naval  law  (which  cannot  be  altered 
without  the  consent  of  the  Reichstag),  which  was  laid  down 
many  years  ago  and  a  naval  law  which  would  not  be  altered 
this  year  by  anything  we  could  do.  When  you  come  to 
the  shipbuilding  of  France,  Austria,  and  Italy,  and  ask 
yourself  why  they  are  building  dreadnoughts,  I  do  not  think 
you  can  say  in  the  case  of  any  one  of  them  that  they  are 
building  dreadnoughts  because  of  British  shipbuilding. 
Whatever  motives  they  have,  it  is  not  competition  with  us 
in  particular  which  is  causing  them  to  build  dreadnoughts, 
and  if  we  were  to  decide  to  build  nothing  this  year  or  next 
year,  I  do  not  believe  it  would  cause  any  alteration  in  the 
shipbuilding  of  the  other  great  Powers  of  Europe  as  a  direct 
consequence." 

In  the  first  place  this  statement  proves  conclu- 
sively how  preposterous  was  the  notion  of  Mr. 
Churchill's  naval  holiday,  and  how  absurd  is  the 
grudge  of  the  Jingo  press  against  Germany  for  not 
adopting  the  suggestion  of  Mr.  Churchill.  In  the 
second  place  Sir  Edward  Grey  laid  the  spectre  of 
Germany's  violation  of  her  naval  pledges  to  us,  and 
the  surreptitious  acceleration  of  her  naval  pro- 
gramme. In  the  third  place  it  proves  positively  that 
Germany  was  not  building  against  us,  and  that  we 
were  blameful  in  forcing  the  armament  pace. 

One  has  only  to  go  to  Hansard  or  the  public 
prints  to  find  speeches  of  Ministers  which  contradict 
ninety-nine  per  cent,  of  the  stuff  published  against 
Germany  as  to  her  foreign  affairs,  naval  and  military 
development,  literature,  music  and  science.  But 
what  is  to  be  done  with  a  public  largely  fed  on  the 
garbage  printed  in  most  of  the  British  dailies  and 
weeklies  now  that  war  is  a  paying  game  for  jingo- 
ists?     It  was  bad  enough  in  times  of  panic  before 


228     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

hostilities  began;  but  now  every  day  in  the  week 
the  public  is  brutally  assaulted  by  columns  in  the 
press  more  dangerous  to  the  British  people  than  all 
the  Kaiser's  legions  past  and  to  come.  At  the  din- 
ner of  the  Foreign  Press  Association,  May,  19 14, 
Sir  Edward  Grey  said  the  press  "  controlled  the 
atmosphere,  and  the  temperature  of  the  atmosphere 
would  decide  what  policy  it  might  be  possible  for 
Governments  to  carry  out."  Whether  or  not  the 
foreign  press  controlled  the  atmosphere  at  the  time 
of  the  Balkan  crisis,  there  is  no  doubt  about  the  con- 
trol of  atmosphere  of  the  British  press  now.  De- 
cent journalism  lies  under  a  cloud  of  suspicion  and 
dare  not  deal  thoroughly  with  all  the  causes  which 
brought  about  the  war.  The  worst  features  of 
Prussian  administration  are  rampant  in  the  land,  and 
a  free  press  has  been  ousted  by  a  press  free  chiefly 
to  lie  and  traduce  honourable  men.  But  it  is  not  the 
people's  fault  that  the  culture  of  frenzy  and  fright 
is  the  order  of  the  day;  it  is  the  fault  of  the  Gov- 
ernment. The  people  have  not  been  given  a  chance 
to  select  a  culture  compatible  with  true  liberty. 
Slaves  must  take  the  culture  their  masters  impose. 
If  there  was  one  reform  more  than  another  needed 
in  Britain  in  the  spring  of  19 14  it  was  education. 
Nationally  not  one-half  as  much  was  spent  on  educa- 
tion as  on  the  navy.  But  the  navy  was  all  right. 
And  the  army  was  ready.  The  Minister  for  War 
in  the  Commons  on  March  loth  said,  "We  stand 
well  for  the  purposes  of  immediate  war  on  any  basis 
which  you  may  consider.  .  .  ."  The  First  Lord  of 
the  Admiralty  told  the  House  of  Commons  that 
forty  merchant  ships  had  been  armed  with  two  4.7 
guns  apiece.     On  the  debate  on  the  Naval  Position 


PERTINENT  QUESTIONS  229 

in  the  Mediterranean,  March  1 8th,  Sir  Edward  Grey 
was  sure  "  the  good  understandings  which  have  ex- 
isted and  which  exist  between  ourselves  and  France 
and  Russia  have  undoubtedly  during  the  last  trou- 
blous times  contributed  to  the  peace  of  Europe.  .  .  . 
We  consider  that  they  make  for  peace."  The  de- 
bates in  the  Commons  on  the  Army  and  Navy  were 
of  deep  interest.  Mr.  Amery  intervened  again  and 
dealt  with  the  position  in  Europe : 

"  It  is  not  a  question  of  our  dealing  single-handed  with 
one  of  the  great  European  Powers.  We  have  been  com- 
mitted by  our  foreign  policy  to  the  support  of  a  certain 
grouping  of  Powers  and  it  is  our  duty  to  supply  not  only 
naval  strength  but  military  strength  to  prevent  that  group- 
ing being  broken  down.  What  good  would  it  be  to  us 
winning  a  victory  at  sea  if  our  allies  were  crushed  and  de- 
feated on  land?  " 

Then  In  the  debate  on  the  Navy  Estimates, 
March  i8th,  19 14,  the  question  of  our  position  in 
Europe  was  raised  by  several  members.  Lord 
Charles  Beresford  dealt  severelywith  the  First 
Lord: 

"  I  ask  the  First  Lord :  Are  we  going  to  trust  to  France 
to  defend  us  in  the  Mediterranean?  That  is  a  very  definite 
question.  If  we  are,  what  are  we  to  give  France  in  re- 
turn? It  has  come  out  quite  lately  that  we  have  not  got 
an  Expeditionary  Force  that  we  could  send  away  to  France 
if  France  needed  it.  The  Secretary  for  War  could  not 
answer  that  question,  and  we  know  —  everybody  knows  — 
we  could  not  afford  to  send  that  Expeditionary  Force  away 
if  England  and  France  were  engaged  in  a  war  against  some 
one  else.  I  say  that  is  a  very  dangerous  position.  We  are 
metaphorically  to  sell  our  friends.  They  are  to  look  after 
our  enormous   interests   in   the   Mediterranean   because  we 


230     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

cannot  have  a  fleet  there.  What  are  we  going  to  do  for 
France?  It  may  be  very  disagreeable  but  we  are  liable 
with  these  ententes  and  alliances.  When  we  had  command 
of  the  sea  and  trusted  to  our  own  right  hands  we  wanted 
no  ententes  and  alliances  and  the  British  Fleet  was  a  factor 
for  peace." 

Yes,  indeed:  and  Lord  Charles  Beresford  was  not 
alone  in  casting  back  a  glance  to  the  days  of 
Britain's  splendid  Isolation.  There  were  many  men 
who  heartily  disliked  the  International  prospect,  but 
on  reflection  they  consoled  themselves  with  the  as- 
surances so  often  given  by  the  Prime  Minister  and 
the  Foreign  Secretary  that  we  were  under  no  obliga- 
tion to  give  armed  support  to  France  or  Russia. 
In  the  Commons  Sir  Mark  Sykes  and  Mr.  Herbert 
delivered  speeches  full  of  foreboding  as  to  Russian 
influence  and  aspiration.  When  the  question  of 
troops  for  Ulster  was  raised,  Colonel  Burn  asked  the 
Foreign  Secretary  '*  whether  in  the  event  of  troops 
being  employed  in  Ulster  over  an  extended  period, 
the  Government  are  in  a  position  to  carry  out  our 
military  understanding  with  France."  Sir  Edward 
Grey  said  the  Prime  Minister  could  not  "  undertake 
to  reply  to  a  purely  hypothetical  question." 

It  was  a  stormy  session  and  the  House  lost  heavily 
In  dignity  while  the  Government  gained  little  in 
prestige.  The  party  of  law  and  order  preached 
sedition  and  anarchy  in  the  House  and  in  the  coun- 
try, and  the  young  bloods  of  Toryism  at  the  same 
time  planned  to  stop  procedure  by  shouting  Minis- 
ters down.  Manners  fell  to  the  depths  of  vulgarity, 
and  wisdom  in  disgust  often  flew  away  and  found 
refuge  in  the  jug-and-bottle  corners  of  lowly  pubs. 

How  was  it  with  Germany  before  the  murder  of 


GERMANY'S  SPECIAL  AIM  231 

the  archduke?  First,  let  us  avoid  making  the  mis- 
take of  many  publicists  that  every  speech  of  Kaiser 
or  Chancellor  which  bristled  with  phrases  of  Treits- 
chke  was  aimed  at  Britain.  Bernhardi  has  told  us 
war  with  England  was  hopeless  from  the  German 
position,  and  he  can  be  accepted  as  an  authority.  It 
was  hopeless.  With  our  navy  for  the  North  Sea, 
and  France  guarding  the  Mediterranean,  no  one 
save  a  Jingo  lunatic  could  really  believe  for  a  mo- 
ment that  the  time  had  come  for  Germany  to  try  her 
strength  with  us.  Bernhardi  said,  "  The  English 
Government  knows  well  that  Germany  cannot  think 
on  her  side  of  attacking  England,  because  such  an 
attempt  Is  in  itself  hopeless."  Furthermore,  in  the 
report  sent  in  the  summer  of  19 13  from  Berlin  to 
M.  Pichon,  the  then  French  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  (see  No.  5,  in  French  Yellow  Book),  we  are 
told: 

"  It  is  hardly  likely  that  Germany  will  take  the  risk  if 
France  can  make  it  clear  to  the  world  that  the  Entente 
Cordiale  and  the  Russian  Alliance  are  not  merely  diplomatic 
fictions  but  realities  which  exist  and  will  make  themselves 
felt.  The  English  fleet  inspires  a  wholesome  terror.  It  is 
well  known,  however,  that  victory  on  sea  will  leave  every- 
thing in  suspense.  On  land  alone  can  a  decisive  issue  be 
obtained." 

What  then  was  Germany's  special  aim  In  Europe 
in  the  spring  of  last  year?  Russia.  Most  undoubt- 
edly; and  Germany  made  no  pretence  of  hiding  her 
design.  Russia  was  regarded  as  a  peril.  Dr.  Dil- 
lon himself  said,  "  Among  the  new  or  newly  intensi- 
fied currents  of  political  life  now  traversing  the  Con- 
tinent of  Europe,  none  can  be  compared  in  Its  cul- 


232     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

tural  and  political  bearings  and  Influence  with  the 
rivalry  between  the  Slav  and  Teutonic  races."  The 
feeling  In  Russia  was  quite  as  deep  as  It  was  in 
Germany.  "  Europe  is  not  big  enough  for  both 
Slav  and  German  aspirations,"  was  the  way  a  Rus- 
sian put  it  two  winters  ago.  Men  who  are  steeped 
in  the  atmosphere  of  the  chancelleries  are  prone  to 
give  their  opinions  in  the  colours  of  the  last  foreign 
oflice  they  have  visited,  and  that  is  the  only  way 
one  can  explain  so  much  of  the  bewildering  rubbish 
written  in  the  British  reviews  since  the  beginning  of 
the  war.  It  might  have  been  planned  by  Germany 
to  force  Russia  into  a  conflict;  Germany  might  have 
arranged  with  Austria  to  take  the  murder  of  the 
archduke  as  the  favourable  moment  for  forcing 
Russia's  hand;  Germany  might  have  counted  at  one 
time  on  the  Triple  Alliance  holding  good  in  the  event 
of  war;  but  that  Germany  was  prepared  last  year  for 
a  struggle  in  which  she  and  Austria  alone  would  meet 
the  Triple  Entente  and  Belgium,  is  an  assumption 
which  the  facts  do  not  support.  At  least  as  early  as 
the  beginning  of  July,  19 14,  when  the  tip  came  from 
Rome  to  London,  Germany  must  have  known  for 
certain  that  she  could  not  count  on  Italy.  There 
were,  however,  many  other  problems  of  a  political 
nature  that  might  have  urged  the  Kaiser  and  his 
friends  to  find  a  solution  of  them  in  a  big  war.  So- 
cial Democracy  was  one,  and  a  serious  one.  In  the 
forefront  of  their  programme,  at  the  last  General 
Election,  was  placed.  Abolition  of  Compulsory  Mili- 
tary Service;  then  the  vote  of  Social  Democracy  in- 
creased by  1,250,000,  and  the  party  became  the  big- 
gest In  the  Reichstag.  At  bye-elections  the  Kaiser 
saw    Social    Democracy   win   its   way   Into   Junker 


GERMANY'S  HOME  AFFAIRS        233 

strongholds.  Moreover,  the  problem  of  the  unem- 
ployed taxed  the  wit  of  the  bureaucrats  at  headquar- 
ters to  the  utmost;  and  during  the  winter  of  19 13 
they  did  not  know  how  to  grapple  effectively  with 
it.  Germany  was  faced  with  another  winter  of  still 
greater  trade  depression,  and  the  position  may  be 
imagined  by  what  the  Berliner  Tageblatt  said  then 
about  unemployment:  "Things  are  the  same  all 
over  the  Empire.  Whoever  looks  about  our  build- 
ing-places, factories,  offices,  and  public  businesses 
knows  that  work  is  often  going  on  only  at  half- 
power, —  that  is,  where  it  has  not  ceased  altogether. 
At  the  present  moment,  dismissals  not  only  of  or- 
dinary workmen,  but  also  of  clerks  and  other  em- 
ployes, are  more  numerous  than  probably  at  any 
time  in  the  past."  Prices  were  rising  higher  and 
higher;  discontent  was  growing  in  every  district; 
and  the  "  enemy  at  home,  -  to  use  Prince  Henry  of 
Prussia's  phrase  for  Social  Democracy,  were  ex- 
tremely restless. 

Furthermore,  the  dislike  of  Prussian  arrogance 
on  the  part  of  the  southern  German  States  had  been 
growing  In  Intensity  since  the  days  of  Prince  Ho- 
henlohe.  Bavaria  was  not  seeing  eye  to  eye  with 
Prussia  In  the  all-military  ambitions  of  the  Kaiser. 
There  was  not  that  unanimity  in  the  Empire  that 
some  writers  believe;  and  in  many  small  States  there 
was  grave  discontent  when  the  new  taxation  for 
military  purposes  was  Imposed,  not  so  long  ago. 
Saxony,  Wiirttemberg,  and  Bavaria  were  not  happy 
under  Prussian  rule;  they  had  lost  much  of  their  in- 
dividuality, their  ambitions  and  characteristics,  in  the 
confederation.  There  may  be  more  than  a  few  who 
live  in  these  smaller  States  who  will  not  spend  many 


234     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

days  in  mourning  if  Prussia  is  overthrown  in  this 
struggle. 

Let  us  for  a  moment  look  at  the  territorial  ques- 
tion. All  imperial  ambition  on  the  Continent  must 
have  a  western  goal.  Germany  with  a  population 
of  65,000,000  finds  her  way  blocked  by  Holland 
with  a  home  population  of  only  6,000,000,  and 
colonies  containing  over  800,000  square  miles;  finds 
her  way  blocked  by  Belgium  with  a  population  of 
7,500,000;  and  again  finds  her  way  blocked  by 
France  with  a  population  of  40,000,000.  These 
countries  standing  in  the  way  of  her  westward  prog- 
ress all  have  far  superior  maritime  advantages;  be- 
sides, Germany  has  no  outlet  to  the  Mediterranean. 
Her  geographical  position,  for  a  great  maritime 
power,  is  not  dignified;  so  German  opinion  has  often 
said.  Indeed  It  has  been  pointed  out  by  great  mer- 
chants in  articles  on  this  matter  that  international 
justice,  whatever  that  may  be,  is  not  meted  out  to 
Germany  for  her  gigantic  development  in  ships  and 
sea-borne  commerce.  The  German  says,  "  You  peo- 
ple don't  know  what  we  have  done;  we  have  two 
lines,  the  Hamburg-American  and  the  North  Ger- 
man Lloyd,  with  a  tonnage  of  over  2,000,000." 
To  this  the  German  thinks  the  great  western  nations 
reply,  "  Build  your  Vaterlands  in  the  Baltic,  and  be 
content  with  Hamburg  and  Bremen  for  your  ports, 
though  you  have  to  spend  an  extra  day  in  getting  to 
the  Atlantic.  Don't  come  bothering  us  with  your 
worries."  Nevertheless,  it  Is  just  as  well  these  na- 
tions should  realize  the  Vaterland  is  typical  of  Ger- 
many's ambition.  She  was  built  for  the  west.  Con- 
sider Germany's  disadvantages,  those  under  which 
she  must  compete,  and  then  think  of  the  recent  rise 


A  GLIMPSE  OF  FRANCE  235 

of  Russia  and  her  unrivalled  resources.  Russia  also 
must  push  west.  She  is  no  more  content  to  build 
the  fleets  of  her  maritime  dreams  on  the  Baltic  than 
Germany  is  to  build  those  of  her  present  need. 
Russia  is  pressing  Germany,  urging  her  west,  fur- 
ther west,  every  year;  and  the  enormous  weight  of 
140,000,000  of  people  in  European  Russia,  with  al- 
most unparalleled  attractions  for  financiers,  is  a  bat- 
tering-ram the  Teutonic  people  cannot  withstand  for 
long,  without  something  breaking.  But  the  great 
western  maritime  nations  say,  "  What  we  have,  we 
hold."  Germany  replies,  "  Then  we  must  have  a 
look  at  your  title  deeds,  for  Russia  intends  to  have 
a  look  at  ours." 

The  position  in  France  was  chaotic  enough  to  in- 
spire the  Kaiser  with  hope  of  tackling  Russia  with- 
out effective  French  aid.  It  is,  however,  not  likely 
that  the  Kaiser  accepted  all  the  statements  of  the 
gossips  as  to  French  unpreparedness.  True,  there 
were  the  revelations  in  the  French  Senate,  and  the 
campaign  against  the  new  conscription  laws.  Cer- 
tainly France  was  looking  forward  to  bigger  strikes 
than  those  she  had  left  behind.  New  conscription 
laws  might  help  to  avert  Industrial  catastrophes 
such  as  that  which  threatened  France  in  Briand's 
day;  but  on  the  other  hand  labour  was  making  cer- 
tain that  in  the  future  no  strike  would  go  off  at  half- 
cock.  Jaures  was  a  power  for  peace,  and  always  an 
outspoken  critic  of  French  foreign  policy.  It  was 
Jaures  more  than  any  one  who  brought  about  the 
downfall  of  Delcasse  in  1905. 

Italy  was  suffering  from  a  most  unpopular  war  in 
Africa.  There  were  scandals  connected  with  mili- 
tary administration;  the  unpreparedness  of  the  army 


236     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

to  meet  European  complications  was  notorious. 
The  greatest  strike  she  had  ever  known  had  alarmed 
the  authorities  from  one  end  of  the  country  to  an- 
other; and,  what  is  of  some  consequence,  when 
journalists  and  statesmen  were  praising  Italy  for  her 
neutrality,  anti-Austrian  feeling  was  far  more  evi- 
dent than  was  her  chagrin  at  the  action  of  France 
and  the  speech  of  M.  Poincare  about  the  seizure  of 
French  steamers  by  the  Italians. 

It  has  been  said  by  Italian  statesmen  that  Austria 
wished  to  send  in  August,  19 13,  an  ultimatum  to 
Servia,  "  substantially  identical  with  that  sent  last 
July,"  and  that  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  commu- 
nicated the  information  to  the  Italian  ex-Premier, 
Signor  Giolitti.  Italy,  however,  declined  to  support 
her  ally  in  a  war  against  Servia,  and  Germany  also 
refused  to  be  a  party  to  that  note.  Post  belhim  liter- 
ature, of  many  colours,  contains  a  great  number  of 
striking  contradictions.  In  the  official  documents 
published  by  the  Governments  not  only  are  there  to 
be  found  innumerable  alterations  of  dates  and  sup- 
pressions of  facts,  but  also  stupid  errors  which  reveal 
peculiar  kinks  and  cavities  in  the  diplomatic  memory. 
Take,  for  instance,  the  revelations  of  the  Italian  ex- 
Premier  as  to  the  communication  of  the  Marquis  di 
San  Giuliano  in  August,  19 13,  that  Austria  then  de- 
sired to  send  to  Servia  an  ultimatum  "  substantially 
Identical  with  that  sent  last  July." 

M.  Barrere,  the  French  ambassador  at  Rome,  on 
July  27th,  19 14,  sent  to  his  Government  the  follow- 
ing information: 

"  The  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  returned  to  Rome  this 
evening,  and  I  saw  him  immediately  after  his  arrival.  He 
spoke  to  me  of  the  contents  of  the  Austrian  note,  and  as- 


ITALY  PLAYING  SAFE  237 

sured  me  that  he  had  had  no  previous  knowledge  of  them 
whatever.  He  was  well  aware  that  the  note  was  to  be 
vigorous  and  energetic  in  character,  but  he  had  no  idea 
that  it  could  take  such  a  form.  I  asked  him  if  it  was  true, 
as  is  stated  in  certain  newspapers,  that  in  this  connexion 
he  had  expressed  in  Vienna  approval  of  Austrian  action, 
and  had  given  the  assurance  that  Italy  would  fulfil  her 
duties  as  an  ally  towards  Austria.  He  replied,  '  In  no  way 
have  we  been  consulted ;  we  have  been  told  nothing  what- 
ever. We  have  therefore  had  no  reason  to  make  any  com- 
munication of  this  nature  in  Vienna.'  " 

The  Marquis  meant,  presumably,  that  a  "  sub- 
stantially identical  "  note  had  been  submitted  to  him 
by  the  Austrian  Government  in  August,  19 13,  but 
he  had  no  diplomatic  recollection  of  it  when  he  saw 
the  note  of  July,  19 14.  So  free  from  all  the  preju- 
dices of  common  life  are  the  minds  of  diplomatists, 
that  Austria's  wish  to  crush  Servia  made  no  differ- 
ence at  all  to  the  friendship  of  the  Powers  of  the 
Triple  Alliance;  their  relations  moved  along  as 
smoothly  after  the  knowledge  of  Austria's  desire  as 
before.  Italy  in  all  probability  knew  exactly  what 
the  true  state  of  affairs  was,  and  as  she  was  not 
ready  to  undertake  the  cost  of  another  war,  in  which 
Austria  would  find  not  Servia,  but  Russia,  the  domi- 
nant force  arrayed  against  her,  Italy  played  for 
safety.  Her  wisdom  In  that  was  counted  for  right- 
eousness by  those  countries  which  benefited  through 
her  ulterior  motives ;  then  the  Entente  Powers  were 
so  delighted  with  her  decision  to  remain  neutral  that 
they  all  desired  to  let  her  have  the  honour  of  join- 
ing the  forces  of  the  Allies  in  the  field. 

After  a  period  of  diplomatic  huckstering  with 
Germany  and  Austria  —  whom  she  could  not  sup- 


238     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

port  in  an  offensive  war  —  she  decided  to  make  a 
seventh  against  her  former  allies  and  joined  in  the 
fray  "  for  the  sake  of  honour,  justice,  and  Christi- 
anity." 

The  revelations  of  Italian  diplomatists  seem  to 
throw  the  onus  of  instigating  the  war  on  Austria;  an 
unpopular  thing  to  do,  for  the  information  of  Aus- 
tria's desire  to  send  an  ultimatum  to  Servia  in  Au- 
gust, 19 13,  makes  it  awkward  for  those  who  insist 
on  placing  the  authorship  of  the  Austrian  note  of 
July  24th,  1 9 14,  on  the  Kaiser. 

Racial  feeling  in  Austria  was  deep.  Her  many 
different  races  were  not  living  in  peace  and  content- 
ment under  the  Dual  Monarchy.  Industrial  de- 
pression in  the  large  towns  was  quite  as  severe  as 
it  was  in  Germany.  Vienna  had  become  fretfully 
expectant  of  riots.  High  prices  and  low  wages  were 
problems  which  gave  the  Government  grave  concern; 
and  the  housing  difficulties  in  Vienna  were  growing 
every  day  in  intensity,  more  alarming  indeed  to  the 
Imperial  Government  than  Narodna  Odbrana. 
Austria  was  threatened  with  as  grave  an  internal 
crisis  as  any  country  ever  faced. 

And  Russia,  the  latter-day  heaven  of  French  and 
British  financiers.  How  was  it  with  Russia?  Bar- 
ricades on  Monday,  with  yells  of  "  Down  with  the 
Government!  "  and  solidarity  on  Tuesday  with  hal- 
lelujahs of  "Freedom  for  Slavs!"  A  change  so 
electrical  that  it  completely  paralyzed  the  French. 
From  strikes  such  as  Russia  had  never  known,  to 
one  complete  accord  in  twenty-four  hours,  was  one 
of  the  most  mysterious  conjuring  tricks  any  govern- 
ment ever  accomplished  with  a  people.  No  one  in 
western  Europe  believed  the  Little  Father  and  the 


A  KALEIDOSCOPIC  TURN  239 

Icon  were  so  powerful.  It  must  have  startled  the 
German  Emperor  and  Count  Berchtold  out  of  their 
diplomatic  wits!  What  had  become  of  all  the  un- 
rest In  the  army?  What  about  Russia's  largely- 
advertised  unpreparedness  for  war?  How  could 
a  country  whose  financial  condition  was  said  to  be 
desperate,  be  enthusiastic  for  war?  And  so  soon 
after  the  crushing  defeat  Inflicted  by  Japan!  No 
wonder  many  marvelled  at  the  change.  This,  the 
country  that  sent  her  ships  down  the  North  Sea  a 
few  years  ago  when  her  Admirals  were  scared  to 
death  by  a  lot  of  innocent  trawlers !  This,  the  Rus- 
sia whose  monarch  not  so  long  ago  dare  not  land  In 
England!  Where  were  anarchism,  nihilism,  and 
the  Intellectuals?     Was  Siberia  forgotten? 

To  the  keen  observer  of  European  affairs,  not 
affected  In  his  views  with  the  schemes  and  Intrigues 
of  the  chancelleries,  the  change  which  overcame  the 
workers  In  the  different  nations  during  July  was  most 
amazing.  From  predictions  of  tumbling  thrones  to 
war-like  unanimity  In  a  few  days,  beat  all  the  aspira- 
tions of  Monarchlal  Leagues  to  smithereens.  But 
how  many  publicists,  now  so  busy  whitewashing  En- 
tente Powers,  realize  all  those  great  political  causes 
which  underlie  the  actions  of  all  the  Powers  In  July, 
19 14?  It  Is  not  remembered  that  Russia,  not  so 
many  years  ago,  was  regarded  in  British  diplomatic 
circles  as  a  danger  to  the  peace  of  Europe,  and  a 
Power  beyond  the  European  pale,  inimical  to  west- 
ern civilization.  As  our  diplomatists  looked  upon 
Russia  in  Lord  Granville's  day,  so  have  German 
diplomatists  looked  upon  her;  at  least  since  she 
fostered  the  growth  of  Slav  power  in  the  Balkans. 
Germany's  fears  of  Russia  to-day  are  the  fears  of 


240     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

Britain  in  our  fathers'  time.  Germany  knew  that 
it  was  predicted  that  the  Slav  would  be  all  ready  in 
19 1 6  to  try  conclusions  with  her.  Who  would  at- 
tempt the  task  of  trying  to  convince  German  and 
Austrian  diplomacy  that  Russia  diplomacy  was  not 
at  the  back  of  the  Greater  Servian  propaganda?  It 
is  all  very  well  to  concentrate  public  attention  on  the 
task  that  lies  before  Britain  now,  but  some  one  must 
think  of  what  the  future  is  to  be.  And  it  is  not 
wise  to  hide  the  diplomatic  welter  behind  this  busi- 
ness from  the  people  who  are  supposed,  by  short- 
sighted journalists  and  politicians,  to  pass  from  it 
into  an  era  of  peace,  and  milk  and  honey.  Alison 
told  us  long  ago  that  the  civilization  of  western  Eu- 
rope must  finally  fall  before  the  fresh  vigour  of  the 
rude  but  mighty  hordes  of  Russia  and  northern  Asia. 
Nietzsche,  too,  was  conscious  of  that  probability. 
All  highly  industrialized  civilizations  must  in  the 
long  run  go  under  to  millions  of  pastoralists.  It  is 
not  so  long  since  deeply  religious  men  and  women 
in  Britain  prayed  earnestly  to  be  protected  from  the 
power  of  Russia.  The  Russia  of  Tolstoy  and  of 
Dostoevsky  is  not  the  Russia  we  have  to  fear,  or 
the  one  Germany  fears.  It  is  the  Russia  of  grand 
dukes,  exploiting  financiers,  corrupt  bureaucrats,  and 
a  diplomacy  which  aims  at  Slav  domination  in  Cen- 
tral Europe ! 

Now,  to  look  into  the  White  Paper  and  try  to  un- 
ravel the  maze  of  diplomatic  entanglements.  The 
Austrian  archduke  was  murdered  at  Serajevo,  June 
28th.  There  followed  a  strange  diplomatic  silence 
for  three  weeks.  The  first  despatch  in  the  White 
Paper  is  dated  July  20th,  and  it  was  sent  by  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  to  our  ambassador  at  Berlin,  not  Vienna. 


QUESTION  AND  ANSWER  241 

What  had  been  taking  place  in  the  chancelleries  since 
June  28th?  The  Austrian  royalty  had,  after  many 
family  squabbles,  buried  the  archduke,  and  by  the 
time  our  Foreign  Office  began  despatch-making,  the 
world  outside  diplomacy  had  begun  to  forget  that 
there  had  been  an  archduke  to  bury.  Not  until 
July  27th,  was  the  question  of  Austria  and  Servia 
referred  to  in  the  House  of  Commons.  Then  Sir 
Edward  Grey  told  the  House  that  he  had  proposed 
a  conference  the  day  before.  He  was  asked  by  Mr. 
Lawson  if  it  were  true  that  the  German  Emperor 
had  that  morning  accepted  the  principle  of  media- 
tion which  the  Foreign  Secretary  had  proposed.  Sir 
Edward  Grey's  reply  to  that  question  was,  "  I  under- 
stand that  the  German  Government  are  favourable 
to  the  idea  of  mediation  in  principle  as  between 
Austria-Hungary  and  Russia,  but  that  as  to  the  par- 
ticular proposal  of  applying  that  principle  by  means 
of  a  conference  which  I  have  described  to  the  House, 
the  reply  of  the  German  Government  has  not  yet 
been  received." 

Now  let  us  see  where  we  are.  The  special  fleet 
mobilization  took  place  on  July  13th.  In  despatch 
No.  66,  French  Yellow  Book,  M.  de  Fleuriau, 
French  charge  d'affaires  at  London,  informed  his 
Government  on  July  27th  that: 

"  The  attitude  of  Great  Britain  is  confirmed  by  the  post- 
ponement of  the  demobilization  of  the  Fleet.  The  First 
Lord  of  the  Admiralty  took  this  measure  quietly  on  Friday 
on  his  own  initiative." 

That  Friday  was  July  24th;  the  day  after  the 
Austrian  note  was  delivered  to  the  Servian  Govern- 
ment. 


242     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

The  fleet  sailed  from  Weymouth  on  July  27th: 
as  the  Times  of  that  day  said,  "  a  welcome  earnest 
of  our  intention  to  be  ready  for  any  course  which 
the  national  interests  may  render  desirable."  The 
Foreign  Secretary  had  been  in  communication  with 
ambassadors  since  July  20th.  Not  for  a  week,  after 
the  first  despatch  was  sent  did  the  House  of  Com- 
mons get  a  word  from  the  Foreign  Secretary  about 
the  business;  and  then  the  gist  of  his  statement  was 
that  he  had  proposed  a  conference  of  four  Powers, 
France,  Italy,  Germany,  and  Great  Britain.  But  a 
great  deal  had  happened  before  he  made  that  pro- 
posal. Though  he  told  the  House  that  Britain  had 
no  title  to  interfere  so  long  as  the  dispute  was  one 
between  Austria-Hungary  and  Servia  alone,  he  was 
fully  conscious  when  he  saw  the  German  ambassador 
on  July  20th,  that  a  war  between  any  of  the  great 
Powers  over  Servia  would  be  detestable,  and  the  Ger- 
man ambassador  "  agreed  wholeheartedly  in  this 
sentiment."  On  the  23rd,  Sir  Edward  saw  Count 
Mensdorff  and  learned  from  him  that  all  would  de- 
pend upon  Russia,  but  that  he  was  under  the  impres- 
sion that  the  attitude  in  Petersburg  had  not  been 
favourable  recently.  The  Austrian  note  to  Servia 
was  published  on  the  24th. 

The  despatch  of  July  24th  from  Petersburg,  No. 
6  in  the  White  Paper,  is  a  document  of  great  sig- 
nificance. Our  ambassador  in  this  despatch  says  that 
M.  Sazonof,  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs, said  some  of  Austria's  demands  were  quite  im- 
possible of  acceptance.  He  hoped  that  the  British 
Government  would  not  fail  to  proclaim  their  solidar- 
ity with  Russia  and  France.  The  French  ambassa- 
dor at  the  same  time  told  our  representative  that 


M.  SAZONOF'S  PLEA  243 

France  would  fulfil  all  the  obligations  entailed  by  her 
alliance  with  Russia.  When  the  British  ambassador 
pointed  out  that  Britain's  interests  in  Servia  were  nil, 
and  that  he  saw  no  reason  why  Russia  should  expect 
any  declaration  of  solidarity  from  Britain  to  support 
Russia  and  France  unconditionally  by  force  of  arms, 
M.  Sazonof  replied  that  Britain  must  not  forget  that 
the  general  European  question  was  involved;  Britain 
could  not  efface  herself  from  the  problems  then  at 
issue.  Our  ambassador  said  that  M.  Sazonof  and 
the  French  representative  continued  to  press  him 
for  a  declaration  of  complete  solidarity.  The  Rus- 
sian Minister  said  that  he  thought  Russian  mobiliza- 
tion would  at  any  rate  have  to  be  carried  out.  In 
concluding  the  despatch  our  ambassador  said  it 
seemed  to  him  from  the  language  held  by  the  French 
ambassador,  that,  even  if  Britain  declined  to  join 
them,  France  and  Russia  were  determined  to  make 
a  stron.o;  stand. ^ 

None  of  this  was  communicated  to  the  House 
when  the  Foreign  Secretary  made  his  statement  on 
the  27th.  What  on  earth  then  was  the  good  of  say- 
ing our  interests  in  Servia  were  nil,  when  the  Russian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  had  decided  on  July 
24th,  "  that  the  general  European  question  was  in- 
volved, the  Servian  question  being  but  a  part  of  the 
former  "?  Russia  began  to  mobilize  on  July  25th, 
according  to  the  Czar's  own  telegram  to  the  Kaiser. 
In  Vienna,  the  Austrian  Minister  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs told  the  Russian  representative  that  the  Dual 
Monarchy  felt  that  its  very  existence  was  at  stake, 

iThis  sentence,  and  the  one  in  the  despatch  referring  to  the  re- 
turn of  the  French  President  and  the  President  of  the  Council  from 
Russia  to  France,  are  suppressed  from  the  French  Yellow  Book. 


244     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

and  that  the  step  taken  (the  strong  note  to  Servia 
with  a  short  time-limit)  had  caused  great  satisfac- 
tion throughout  the  country.  That  meant  the  Dual 
Monarchy,  Austria-Hungary,  must  be  preserved 
from  internal  disorder  at  all  costs.  Germany  said 
it  was  a  matter  which  concerned  Austria  and  Servia 
exclusively,  and  that  other  Powers  should  keep  out 
of  it,  owing  to  different  treaty  obligations.  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  in  the  toils  is  one  of  the  most  pathetic 
pictures  in  history;  European  entanglements  were 
then  weaving  the  net  for  his  destruction.  The 
retiarii  of  the  Continental  system  were  not  so  nice 
about  the  rules  of  the  arena  as  our  Foreign  Secre- 
tary. How  powerless  he  was  to  avert  the  strife  is 
shown  in  his  own  despatch  of  the  24th  to  our  ambas- 
sador at  Paris,  No.  10: 

"  M.  Cambon  said  that,  if  there  was  a  chance  of  medi- 
ation by  the  four  Powers,  he  had  no  doubt  that  his  Govern- 
ment would  be  glad  to  join  in  it ;  but  he  pointed  out  that 
we  could  not  say  anything  in  St.  Petersburg  till  Russia  had 
expressed  some  opinion  or  taken  some  action.  ...  I  said 
that  I  had  not  contemplated  anything  being  said  in  St. 
Petersburg  until  after  it  was  clear  that  there  must  be 
trouble  between  Austria  and  Russia." 

But  the  French  ambassador  told  him  that  it  would 
be  too  late  after  Austria  had  once  moved  against 
Servia.  The  first  communication  Sir  Edward  sent 
to  Russia  was  on  July  25th,  when  he  instructed  our 
ambassador  that  Austria  had  explained  that  the  note 
to  Servia  was  not  an  ultimatum,  but  a  step  with  a 
time-limit.  Russia  did  not  however  accept  that  view. 
She  was  willing  enough  to  leave  the  question  in  the 
hands  of  the  four  Powers,  if  Servia  would  appeal 
to  them  to   arbitrate.     In  the  despatch  from   our 


QUIS  CUSTODIET  CUSTODES?      245 

ambassador  at  Petersburg,  July  25th,  No.   17,  we 
learn: 

"  On  my  expressing  the  earnest  hope  that  Russia  would 
not  precipitate  war  by  mobilizing  until  you  (Sir  Edward 
Grey)  had  had  time  to  use  your  influence  in  favour  of 
peace,  his  Excellency  (Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs) assured  me  that  Russia  had  no  aggressive  intentions, 
and  she  would  take  no  action  until  it  was  forced  on  her. 
Austria's  action  was  in  reality  directed  against  Russia.  She 
aimed  at  overthrowing  the  present  status  quo  in  the  Balkans, 
and  establishing  her  own  hegemony  there.  He  did  not  be- 
lieve that  Germany  really  wanted  war,  but  her  attitude  was 
decided  by  ours.  If  we  took  our  stand  firmly  with  France 
and  Russia  there  would  be  no  war.  If  we  failed  them  now, 
rivers  of  blood  would  flow,  and  we  would  in  the  end  be 
dragged  into  the  war.  I  said  that  England  would  play 
the  role  of  mediator  at  Berlin  and  Vienna  to  better  purpose 
as  friend  who,  if  her  counsels  of  moderation  were  disre- 
garded, might  one  day  be  converted  into  an  ally,  than  if 
she  were  to  declare  herself  Russia's  ally  at  once.  His 
Excellency  said  that  unfortunately  Germany  was  convinced 
that  she  could  count  on  our  neutrality.  I  said  all  I  could 
to  impress  prudence  on  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
and  warned  him  that  if  Russia  mobilized,  Germany  would 
not  be  content  with  mere  mobilization,  or  give  Russia  time 
to  carry  out  hers,  but  would  probably  declare  war  at  once." 

The  day  before  that  conversation  took  place  the 
British  House  of  Commons  had  been  discussing  a 
Housing  Bill.  The  House  was  up  the  next  day,  and 
who  of  its  great  body  of  private  members  had  the 
faintest  conception  of  what  was  taking  place  in  diplo- 
matic circles?  Well  might  Juvenal  ask  who  shall 
guard  the  guardians  themselves. 

From  Berlin  our  ambassador  telegraphed  to  Sir 
Edward  Grey  that  the  German  Minister  for  Foreign 


246     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

Affairs  said  that  he  had  given  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment to  understand  that  the  last  thing  Germany 
wanted  was  a  general  war,  and  that  he  would  do  all 
in  his  power  to  prevent  such  a  calamity.  If  the  re- 
lations between  Austria  and  Russia  became  threaten- 
ing he  was  quite  ready  to  fall  in  with  Sir  Edward's 
suggestion  as  to  the  four  Powers  working  in  favour 
of  moderation  at  Vienna  and  Petersburg.  The 
Servian  reply  did  not  satisfy  Austria,  and  her  Min- 
ister left  Belgrade  on  the  25th.  Sir  Edward  then 
telegraphed  to  Petersburg  that  in  his  opinion  the  only 
chance  of  peace  was  for  the  four  Powers  to  join  in 
asking  the  Austrian  and  Russian  Governments  not 
to  cross  the  frontier,  and  to  give  time  for  the  four 
Powers  acting  at  Vienna  and  Petersburg  to  try  and 
arrange  matters.  Desperate  efforts  were  made  by 
Sir  Edward  Grey  on  the  25th,  and  26th,  to  bring 
about  the  conference,  but  without  success.  The  Brit- 
ish ambassador  at  Vienna  telegraphed  on  the  27th, 
that  "  the  country  had  gone  wild  with  joy  at  the 
prospect  of  war  with  Servia,  and  its  postponement 
or  prevention  would  undoubtedly  be  a  great  disap- 
pointment. It  seemed  to  him  that  the  Austrian 
note  was  so  drawn  up  as  to  make  war  inevitable." 
France  was  willing  to  join  the  conference,  but  until  it 
was  known  that  the  Germans  had  spoken  at  Vienna 
with  some  success,  she  thought  it  would  be  dangerous 
for  the  French,  Russian,  and  British  ambassadors  to 
do  so. 

That  is  a  fair  summary  of  what  had  taken  place 
when  Sir  Edward  Grey  made  his  statement  to  the 
House  on  Monday,  July  27th.  Now,  Germany 
would  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  suggestion  of  the 
four  Powers  acting  together,  for  it  had  the  appear- 


THE  CZAR'S  TELEGRAM  247 

ance  of  a  court  of  arbitration;  and  she  preferred  an 
exchange  of  views  between  the  Austrian  and  Russian 
Governments.  In  despatch  No.  43,  our  ambassador 
at  BerHn  recorded  a  conversation  he  had  on  July 
27th,  with  the  German  Minister  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs: 

"  Secretary  of  State  said  that  as  yet  Austria  was  only 
partially  mobilizing,  but  that  if  Russia  mobilized  against 
Germany  latter  would  have  to  follow  suit.  I  asked  him 
what  he  meant  by  '  mobilizing  against  Germany.'  He  said 
that  if  Russia  only  mobilized  in  the  south,  Germany  would 
not  mobilize,  but  if  she  mobilized  in  north,  Germany  would 
have  to  do  so  too,  and  Russian  system  of  mobilization  was 
so  complicated  that  it  might  be  difficult  exactly  to  locate  her 
mobilization.  Germany  would  therefore  have  to  be  very 
careful  not  to  be  taken  by  surprise." 

But  Germany  was  taken  by  surprise ;  for  although 
Russia  might  not  have  begun  mobilizing  on  the  north, 
she  had  been  mobilizing  on  the  south  for  two  days, 
and  her  complicated  system  of  mobilization  was  com- 
plicated further  by  a  rumour  which  was  sent  out 
that  she  feared  an  insurrection  in  Russian  Poland. 
The  British  ambassador  at  Petersburg  urged  the 
Russian  Government  on  the  27th,  to  defer  the  mo- 
bilization ukase  for  as  long  as  possible,  and  that 
troops  might  not  be  allowed  to  cross  the  frontier 
even  when  it  was  issued.  To  this  the  Russian  Min- 
ister for  Foreign  Affairs  replied  that,  until  the  issue 
of  the  Imperial  ukase,  no  effective  steps  towards 
mobilization  could  be  taken;  and  the  Austrian  Gov- 
ernment would  profit  by  delay,  in  order  to  complete 
her  military  preparations,  if  it  were  deferred  too 
long.  Yet  the  Czar  in  his  telegram  to  the  Kaiser 
said  on  July  30th,  "  The  military  measures  now  com- 


248     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

ing  Into  operation  were  decided  upon  five  days  ago 
for  reasons  of  defence  against  Austria's  prepara- 
tions " ! 

Later  in  the  day  on  the  27th,  our  ambassador  at 
Petersburg  sent  word  that  Russia  rejected  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey's  proposal  of  a  conference  of  the  four 
Powers.  Direct  conversation  between  Vienna  and 
Petersburg  was  to  be  Russia's  way  of  dealing  with 
the  question. 

In  reading  the  British  White  Paper,  one  should 
bear  In  mind  that  It  was  not  In  the  hands  of  mem- 
bers of  Parliament  until  August  6th ;  and  that,  shortly 
after  the  war  began,  the  great  mass  of  the  British 
people  learned  through  our  press  that  everything 
German  was  "Potsdam  nonsense"  and  chicanery; 
that  the  German  ambassador  at  London  was  worse 
than  a  fool;  that  the  German  Chancellor  planned  the 
whole  calamity;  and  that  nothing  In  our  diplomatic 
relations  with  Germany  should  be  accepted  from 
German  sources  as  containing  a  scintilla  of  truth. 
Editors  and  journalists  of  German  extraction  have 
done  not  a  little  in  educating  British  opinion  up  to 
that  standard  of  patriotism  which  rejoices  in  the  no- 
tion that  all  opponents  are  liars.  Notwithstanding, 
Sir  Edward  Grey  had  to  deal  with  the  German  For- 
eign Office,  and  extend  the  courtesies  of  diplomacy 
to  the  German  ambassador  up  to  the  time  he  left 
London.  On  July  27th,  Sir  Edward  sent  a  despatch 
to  our  ambassador  at  Berlin  saying: 

"  German  ambassador  has  informed  me  that  German 
Government  accept  in  principle  mediation  between  Austria 
and  Russia  by  the  four  Powers,  reserving,  of  course,  their 
right  as  an  ally  to  help  Austria  if  attacked.  He  has  also 
been  instructed  to  request  me  to  use  influence  in  St.  Peters- 


SIR  EDWARD  IN  THE  TOILS       249 

burg   to   localize  the  war   and   to   keep   up   the  peace  of 
Europe." 

Whether  the  information  tendered  by  the  German 
ambassador  was  to  be  accepted  as  an  honest  en- 
deavour on  Germany's  part  to  assist  in  keeping  peace 
or  not,  it  was  too  late  to  bring  the  conference  to  work 
effectually;  for  Russia  had  that  day  decided  that 
direct  conversation  between  Vienna  and  Petersburg 
should  be  the  method  of  finding  a  solution.  But  the 
pressure  of  France  and  Russia  was  too  much  for  the 
British  Foreign  Secretai-y.  What  our  ambassador 
at  Petersburg  told  him  on  the  24th,  was  the  chief 
consideration, —  namely,  British  solidarity  with 
Russia  and  France, —  was  begun  by  him  on  the  27th, 
the  day  he  told  the  House  of  Commons  that  it  was 
necessary  in  the  Interests  of  peace  to  suspend  all 
military  operations  pending  the  result  of  the  confer- 
ence. The  very  day  he  urged  the  German  ambassa- 
dor to  press  for  moderation  on  Austria's  part,  he 
sent  the  following  despatch  to  our  ambassador  at 
Petersburg : 

"  I  have  been  told  by  the  Russian  ambassador  that  in 
German  and  Austrian  circles  impression  prevails  that  in 
any  event  we  (Britain)  would  stand  aside.  His  Excellency 
deplored  the  effect  that  such  an  impression  must  produce. 
This  impression  ought,  as  I  have  pointed  out,  to  be  dis- 
pelled by  the  orders  we  have  given  to  the  First  Fleet,  which 
is  concentrated,  as  it  happens,  at  Portland,  not  to  disperse 
for  manoeuvre  leave.  But  I  explained  to  the  Russian  am- 
bassador that  my  reference  to  it  must  not  be  taken  to  mean 
that  anything  more  than  diplomatic  action  was  promised." 

Orders  were  issued  to  the  Fleet  on  the  25th.  The 
third  Fleet  was  mobilized  on  the  13th.     Several  pa- 


250     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

pers,  with  well-informed  naval  correspondents,  have 
told  us  "  Mr.  Churchill  was  almost  the  only  Minister 
who  appreciated  the  gravity  of  the  situation,  and  is 
understood  to  have  given  early  orders  '  on  his  own  ' 
for  the  mobilization  of  the  entire  British  Fleet," 
and  "  a  fortnight  before  the  Servian  coup.  .  .  . 
Italy  was  told  there  was  going  to  be  a  storm  .  .  . 
the  English  ambassador  got  the  tip.  Hence  the  as- 
sembly of  the  whole  Fleet  for  inspection  by  the  King. 
Mr.  Churchill's  extraordinary  courage,  decision,  and 
foresight  were  never  excelled  by  his  great  ancestor. 
England,  thanks  to  Mr.  Churchill,  begins  the  war 
at  her  selected  moment,  not  at  the  chosen  moment 
of  the  Mad  Dog  of  Europe."  These,  and  many 
statements  of  the  same  kind,  were  made  at  the  out- 
break of  hostilities.  No  one  will  wish  to  take  one 
bit  of  credit  from  Mr.  Churchill  for  his  courage, 
foresight  and  administrative  skill,  but  here  we  are 
dealing  with  diplomacy,  and  Mr.  Churchill  was  First 
Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  not  Foreign  Secretary. 
Therefore,  when  Sir  Edward  Grey  sent  despatch  No. 
47  to  Petersburg,  the  Admiralty  intended  France 
and  Russia  to  understand  that  the  British  Fleet  was 
all  for  the  solidarity  of  the  Entente  Powers,  no  mat- 
ter what  the  Foreign  Secretary  said.  But  the  House 
of  Commons  as  a  whole  knew  nothing  about  it  at 
all,  save  that  "  British  interests  in  Servia  were  nil," 
and  that  the  European  situation  was  exceedingly 
grave. 

On  the  day  the  hint  was  given  in  a  despatch  to 
Russia  that  the  Fleet  was  ready,  Russia  took  a  firmer 
attitude  towards  Austria.  M.  Sazonof  said,  "  It 
seems  to  me  that  England  Is  In  a  better  position  than 
any  other  Power  to  make  another  attempt  at  Berlin 


MARKING  TIME  251 

to  Induce  the  German  Government  to  take  the  neces- 
sary action.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  key  of  the 
situation  is  to  be  found  at  Berlin."  Our  ambassador 
at  Petersburg  spoke  to  M.  Sazonof  on  the  27th,  and 
learned  from  him  that  he  required  Austria  to  guar- 
antee the  integrity  of  Servia  and  respect  her  rights 
as  a  sovereign  State.  The  position  seemed  not  hope- 
less, however,  for  our  ambassador  at  Vienna  in  des- 
patch No.  s^y  told  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  the  Russian 
ambassador  at  Vienna  had  just  returned  from  Peters- 
burg, and  knew  the  views  of  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment and  the  state  of  Russian  public  opinion: 

"  He  (Russian  ambassador  at  Vienna)  had  just  heard  of 
a  satisfactory  conversation  which  the  Russian  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  had  yesterday  with  the  Austrian  ambassador 
at  Petersburg.  The  former  agreed  that  much  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  note  to  Servia  had  been  perfectly  rea- 
sonable; and  in  fact  they  had  practically  reached  an  under- 
standing as  to  the  guarantees  which  Servia  might  reasonably 
be  asked  to  give  to  Austria-Hungary  for  her  future  good 
behaviour." 

So  the  game  of  diplomatic  chess  was  carried  on 
for  at  least  a  week.  Despatching  to  this  capital 
and  that  capital,  interviewing  this  Excellency  and 
that  Minister,  recording  the  gossip  of  one  chancel- 
lery and  another,  while  the  military  and  naval  men 
behind  all  the  mask  of  diplomacy  were  preparing  for 
the  conflict  which  those  "  In  the  know  "  were  for 
the  most  part  eager  to  begin.  On  July  28th,  the 
Prime  Minister  told  the  House,  "  There  are  no  new 
developments  sufficiently  definite  to  enable  any  fur- 
ther statement  to  be  made,  but  we  hope  that  no  un- 
favourable inference  will  be  drawn  from  this.  I  can- 
not say  more."     He  said  he  had  no  definite  Informa- 


252     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

tion  that  hostilities  had  broken  out,  yet  In  despatch 
56,  our  ambassador  at  Vienna  was  informed  by  the 
Austrian  Under-Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs, that  "  a  skirmish  had  already  taken  place  on 
the  Danube,  In  which  the  Servians  had  been  the  ag- 
gressors." The  moving  of  the  British  Fleet  stiffened 
the  attitude  of  Russia,  and  action  on  the  part  of 
Servia  was  at  no  time  undertaken  without  the  ad- 
vice of  Russia,  if  we  are  to  believe  a  tenth  of  all  the 
rumours  which  came  surging  from  the  east  during 
the  first  weeks  of  the  war.^ 

The  sincerity  of  Germany  was  questioned  in  des- 
patch No.  60,  when  the  German  Secretary  of  State 
refused  to  join  the  conference  of  the  four  Powers,  and 
at  the  same  time  said  he  desired  to  work  with  Britain 
for  the  maintenance  of  general  peace.  Where  was 
the  British  Fleet  on  July  28th?  Did  the  action  of 
the  Admiralty  Inspire  the  German  Foreign  Office 
with  confidence  In  working  with  us  to  maintain  the 
general  peace?  What  other  fleet  was  there  In  the 
North  Sea  that  so  urgently  required  the  attention 
of  our  Admiralty  on  July  27th?  Anyway,  whether 
Germany  tried  to  Influence  Austria  along  the  lines 
of  moderation  or  not,  our  ambassador  at  Vienna  tele- 
graphed on  the  28th,  that  "  the  Austrian  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  declared  that  Austria-Hungary 
could  not  delay  warlike  proceedings  against  Servia, 
and  would  have  to  decline  any  suggestion  of  negotia- 
tions on  the  basis  of  Servian  reply.  Prestige  of 
Dual  Monarchy  was  engaged,  and  nothing  could  now 
prevent  conflict." 

i"The  future  of  Servia  is  secure  now  that  it  is  the  object  of 
Your  Majesty's  gracious  solicitude,"  so  Prince  Alexander  of  Servia 
telegraphed  to  the  Czar. 


INEFFECTUAL  NEGOTIATIONS     253 

What  had  happened  to  force  Austria  to  drop  the 
conversations  with  Russia  that  were  progressing  in 
Petersburg  two  or  three  days  earher?  Two  mat- 
ters of  vital  importance:  one  was  the  consideration 
of  Entente  soHdarity,  which  was,  indeed,  of  far 
greater  consequence  to  Russia  than  mere  diplomatic 
armed  support;  and,  the  second  was  the  skirmish  on 
the  Danube,  where  Servia  had  been  the  aggressor. 
War  was  declared  by  Austria  on  Servia  that  day. 
Then  Sir  Edward  Grey  dropped  his  proposal  of  a 
conference  like  a  hot  brick,  and  sent  word  to  the 
British  ambassador  at  Berlin  that  "  as  long  as  there 
is  a  prospect  of  a  direct  exchange  of  views  between 
Austria  and  Russia,  I  would  suspend  every  other  sug- 
gestion, as  I  entirely  agree  that  it  is  the  most  prefer- 
able method  of  all."  The  German  Government  then 
accepted  the  principle  of  mediation  between  Austria 
and  Russia  by  the  four  Powers;  but  again  it  was  too 
late,  for  Russia  decided  to  issue  the  Imperial  ukase 
for  mobilization  on  the  29th  without  "  any  aggressive 
intention  against  Germany."  That,  so  the  Russian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  informed  the  Russian 
ambassador  at  London,  put  an  end  to  the  idea  of 
direct  communications  between  Austria  and  Russia. 
Then  the  British  Cabinet  was  urgently  desired  to  In- 
fluence Austria  to  suspend  military  operations  against 
Servia. 

It  Is  amazing  how  the  chancelleries  labour  with 
child-like  deceptlveness  to  cover  up  the  work  of  their 
armed  support.  Russia  began  military  preparations 
on  the  25th,  according  to  the  Czar,  but  the  mobiliza- 
tion ukase  was  not  Issued  until  the  29th;  yet  on  the 
28th,  M.  Sazonof  wanted  Austria  to  suspend  her 
military  operations  after  Servia  had  begun  hostili- 


254     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

ties  on  the  27th.  The  way  the  world  has  been  duped 
by  the  preposterous  terminology  of  the  chancelleries 
is  one  of  the  wonders  of  the  age.  Why,  on  the 
28th,  it  was  known  at  the  Berlin  Foreign  Office  that 
Russia  had  mobilized  fourteen  army  corps  in  the 
south;  the  German  Imperial  Chancellor  told  our  am- 
bassador that  much  when  the  latter  telegraphed  to 
Sir  Edward  Grey  that  his  Austrian  colleague  said 
"  that  a  general  war  was  most  unlikely,  as  Russia 
neither  wanted  nor  was  in  a  position  to  make  war!  " 
If  the  people  of  Europe  will  only  apply  some  sense 
and  understanding  to  a  study  of  the  British  White 
Paper  they  will  find  evidence  enough  in  it  to  condemn 
every  diplomatist  concerned. 

A  great  feature  of  the  system  of  education  en- 
tered on  by  our  press  in  the  early  stages  of  the  war, 
was  the  German  refusal  to  join  Sir  Edward  Grey's 
conference.  That  was  a  great  black  mark  against 
Germany.  Learn  from  despatch  No.  72  what  our 
ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  said  on  the  28th: 
"  As  regards  the  suggestion  of  conference,  the  am- 
bassador (German)  had  received  no  instructions, 
and  before  acting  with  me,  the  French  and  Italian 
ambassadors  are  still  waiting  for  their  final  instruc- 
tions." Then  after  Russia  issued  the  mobilization 
ukase,  and  Austria  had  declared  war  on  Servia,  our 
ambassador  at  Vienna  sent  the  following  despatch, 
No.  74: 

"  I  am  informed  by  the  Russian  ambassador  that  the  Rus- 
sian Government's  suggestion  has  been  declined  by  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Government.  The  suggestion  was  to  the 
effect  that  the  means  of  settling  the  Austro-Servian  conflict 
should  be  discussed  directly  between  the  Russian  Minister 
for   Foreign   Affairs   and    the   Austrian   ambassador   at    St. 


REASONS  FOR  WAR  255 

Petersburg,  who  should  be  authorized  accordingly.  The 
Russian  ambassador  thinks  that  a  conference  in  London  of 
the  less  interested  Powers,  such  as  you  have  proposed,  offers 
now  the  only  prospect  of  preserving  peace  of  Europe,  and  he 
is  sure  that  the  Russian  Government  will  acquiesce  willingly 
in  your  proposal.  So  long  as  opposing  armies  have  not  actu- 
ally come  in  contact,  all  hope  need  not  be  abandoned." 

Yet  two  days  earlier  the  Russian  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  and  the  Austrian  Ambassador  at 
Petersburg  had  practically  reached  an  understand- 
ing! 

Can  any  one  believe  in  the  face  of  all  the  shuffling, 
wobbling  threats  and  restraints,  that  either  Austria 
or  Russia  desired  peace  wholeheartedly?  Some- 
thing,—  only  lightly  hinted  at  in  the  White  Paper, — 
was  thrusting  both  Governments  on.  Peace  to  both 
meant  very  grave  internal  disorder;  war  carried  the 
chance  of  consolidating  their  various  peoples.  Small 
wonder  a  distinguished  personage  was  heard  to 
gasp  on  August  ist,  "  Oh,  for  ten  minutes  of  splen- 
did isolation!  " 

From  Berlin  news  came  on  the  29th,  that  there 
was  depression  at  the  German  Foreign  Office.  The 
Secretary  of  State  was  "  much  troubled  by  reports 
of  mobilization  in  Russia,  and  of  certain  military 
measures,  which  he  did  not  specify,  being  taken  in 
France.  He  subsequently  spoke  of  these  measures 
to  my  French  colleague,  who  informed  him  that 
French  Government  had  done  nothing  more  than 
the  German  Government  had  done,  namely,  recalled 
officers  on  leave.  His  Excellency  denied  German 
Government  had  done  this,  but  as  a  matter  of  fact 
it  is  true."  Far  more  than  that  was  true;  the  Brit- 
ish Fleet  was  then  a  long,  long  way  from  Tipperary. 


256     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

Anyway,  Russian  officers  left  Switzerland  as  early 
as  July  15th. 

It  was  on  July  28th  that  the  royalties  began  to 
take  a  hand  at  telegraphing.  The  Kaiser  sent  a 
message  to  his  devoted  friend  and  cousin  Nicholas, 
saying,  "  Remembering  the  hearty  friendship  which 
for  long  had  bound  us  two  securely  together,  I  am 
throwing  the  whole  of  my  influence  into  the  scale  to 
induce  Austria-Hungary  to  seek  for  an  open  and  sat- 
isfactory understanding  with  Russia.  I  confidently 
hope  for  your  assistance  in  my  endeavours  to  put 
aside  all  the  difficulties  that  may  arise." 

The  Czar  replied  on  the  29th, — "  To  obviate  such 
a  misfortune  as  a  European  war,  I  implore  you,  in 
the  name  of  our  old  friendship,  to  do  all  in  your 
power  to  restrain  your  ally  from  going  too  far." 
Though  the  Kaiser  and  Czar  could  not,  of  course, 
agree  with  each  other  as  to  the  respective  merits  of 
Austria  and  Russia  in  the  quarrel,  the  Kaiser  agreed 
to  act  as  mediator,  "  which  I  have  readily  assumed 
in  response  to  your  appeal  to  my  friendship  and 
help."  Then,  if  we  are  to  believe  ambassadors,  the 
German  Government  set  to  work  in  earnest  to  In- 
fluence Austria;  to  use  the  phrase  of  Sir  Edward 
Grey,  Germany  began  to  "  press  the  button  "  In  the 
interests  of  peace.  Few  In  Britain  believe  that,  since 
the  Jingo  press  have  told  us  all  the  diplomatists  for- 
got to  put  in  their  despatches.  The  fourth  and  fifth 
telegrams  of  the  German  and  Russian  monarchs  are 
of  sufficient  interest  to  give  in  full : 

"  July  30th,    I   A.M. 

"  My  ambassador  is  instructed  to  draw  the  attention  of 
your  Government  to  the  dangers  and  serious  consequences 
of  a  mobilization.     I  said  the  same  to  you  in  my  last  tele- 


ROYALTY  TAKES  A  HAND         257 

gram.  Austria-Hungary  has  only  mobilized  against  Servia, 
and  only  a  part  of  its  army.  If,  as  appears  from  your  com- 
munication and  that  of  your  Government,  Russia  is  mobil- 
izing against  Austria-Hungary,  the  role  of  mediator  which 
you  intrusted  to  me  in  friendly  wise,  and  which  I  accepted 
at  your  express  request,  is  jeopardized,  if  not  rendered  im- 
possible. The  whole  burden  of  decision  now  rests  upon 
your  shoulders,  the  responsibility  for  war  or  peace. 

"  William." 

He  might  not  have  meant  a  word  of  it;  it  might 
have  been  all  bluff,  and  the  Emperor  of  Russia  might 
have  known  the  true  character  of  the  Kaiser  almost 
as  well  as  editors  of  Jingo  papers;  nevertheless,  the 
telegram  contained  downright  good  sense.  The 
Czar's  reply  was  as  follows: 

"  Peterhof,  July  30th,  1914.  1.20  p.m. 
"  From  my  heart  I  thank  you  for  your  speedy  reply.  I 
am  this  evening  sending  Tatisheff  with  instructions.  The 
military  measures  now  coming  into  operation  were  decided 
upon  five  days  ago  for  reasons  of  defence  against  Austria's 
preparations.  Most  heartily  do  I  trust  that  these  measures 
will  in  no  way  influence  your  position  as  mediator,  which  I 
value  highly.  We  need  j'our  strong  pressure  on  Austria 
to  secure  an  understanding  with  us. 

"  Nicholas." 

"  All  would  depend  on  Russia,"  Count  Mensdorff 
said  to  Sir  Edward  Grey,  on  July  23rd.  So  the 
Kaiser  must  have  thought  after  he  received  the  tele- 
gram from  his  devoted  friend  and  cousin,  Nicholas. 
"  Go  on  mediating,  and  use  your  strong  pressure  on 
Austria,  while  we  make  all  our  preparations  to  bring 
a  stronger  kind  of  pressure  to  bear  on  her  later." 
The  Petersburg  correspondent  of  the  Times,  as  early 
as  the  26th,  said  that  the  army  manoeuvres  had  been 


2s8     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

countermanded  in  view  of  the  impending  mobiliza- 
tion, and  "  military  opinion,  although  ardently  de- 
siring war,  is  constrained  to  admit  that  Austria- 
Hungary  is  unaccountably  dilatory  if  she  really  in- 
tends war,  inasmuch  as  it  is  obviously  her  interest 
to  rush  Servia  in  order  to  be  ready  for  an  attack  from 
the  north."  At  that  time  the  war  party  in  Russia 
were  having  things  their  own  way.  But  the  tele- 
grams cannot  be  thoroughly  appreciated  without  the 
following  from  the  Petersburg  correspondent  of  the 
Times. 

"  St.  Petersburg,  July  27th. 
"  The  Czar  left  to-night  on  his  trip  to  the  Finnish 
Skerries.  Now  that  matters  appear  to  have  become  calmer 
it  may  not  be  amiss  to  quote  a  sentence  used  by  the  Czar  at 
the  close  of  the  Grand  Council  on  Saturday  (25th)  :  '  We 
have  stood  this  sort  of  thing,'  he  said,  '  for  seven  and  a  half 
years.  This  is  enough.'  Thereupon  his  Majesty  authorized 
the  issue  of  orders  for  a  partial  mobilization  confined  to  the 
14  Army  Corps  on  the  Austrian  frontier.  At  the  same  time 
an  intimation  was  given  to  Germany  that  orders  for  the 
mobilization  of  the  remainder  of  the  Russian  Army  would 
follow  immediately  upon  mobilization  by  Germany." 

On  July  29th,  Reuter's  Petersburg  correspondent 
telegraphed,  "  Confident  of  England's  support,  about 
which  doubts  have  mostly  disappeared,  the  Russian 
public  is  prepared  to  accept  war."  Up  to  one  o'clock 
of  the  morning  of  July  30th,  the  court  world  and 
diplomatic  world  (save  Austria)  seemed  to  be  shout- 
ing to  the  Kaiser  to  "  press  the  button  "  in  the  inter- 
ests of  peace,  while  all  the  fleets  and  armies  of  his 
opponents  were  busily  preparing  for  war. 

But  what  about  the  freest  assembly  in  the  world, 


THE  HOODWINKED  HOUSE        259 

the  British  House  of  Commons?  What  did  it  know 
about  the  business?  Did  It  know  as  much  as  the 
Russian  pubHc?  The  Prime  Minister  was  ques- 
tioned and  said,  "  As  the  House  Is  aware,  a  formal 
Declaration  of  War  was  issued  yesterday  by  Austria 
against  Servla.  The  situation  at  this  moment  is  one 
of  extreme  gravity.  I  can  only  say,  usefully  say, 
that  His  Majesty's  Government  are  not  relaxing 
their  efforts  to  do  everything  in  their  power  to  cir- 
cumscribe the  area  of  possible  conflict."  Then  the 
House  got  to  work  on  an  Aliens  Bill  and  Scottish 
Agriculture,  and  at  intervals  sought  the  ticker  for 
stray  scraps  of  information  from  the  chancelleries. 
Any  clerk  In  a  foreign  office  might  know  what  the 
consequences  meant  to  Europe;  any  pressman  "in 
the  know "  might  get  first  hand  Information  In 
Russia,  or  Austria,  or  Germany;  but  private  members 
of  the  Freest  Assembly  in  the  World  were  told  — 
what  they  had  already  seen  in  the  public  prints.  But 
why  should  any  private  member  on  the  Government 
side  of  the  House  worry  for  a  single  moment?  They 
all  knew  Britain  was  not  under  any  obligation  to  go 
to  war  to  support  any  Power.  British  interests  in 
Servla  were  nil.  Our  hands  were  quite  free.  We 
had  no  entangling  alliances:  Both  the  Prime  Min- 
ister and  the  Foreign  Secretary  had  time  and  again 
told  the  House  so  much.  Indeed  one  might  have 
wondered  why  the  Prime  Minister  should  refer  to 
the  situation  being  one  of  extreme  gravity.  Such 
In  the  universal  sense  it  might  very  well  be;  but,  In 
a  national  sense,  we  were  out  of  the  area  of  hostili- 
ties. 

That  was  the  position  on  July  29th,  and  the  House 


26o     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

rose  at  twelve  minutes  after  three  on  Thursday  morn- 
ing after  discussing  the  Inebriates  Bill,  with  the 
prospect  of  a  debate  on  the  Milk  and  Dairies  Bill 
after  questions  that  afternoon. 


CHAPTER  XII 

A    GAME    OF    CHESS 

"  In  England  men  will  learn  with  amazement  and  in- 
credulity that  war  is  possible  over  the  question  of  a  Servian 
port,  or  even  over  the  larger  issues  which  are  said  to  lie 
behind  it.  Yet  that  is  whither  the  nations  are  blindly  drift- 
ing. Who,  then,  makes  war?  The  answer  is  to  be  found 
in  the  Chancelleries  of  Europe,  among  the  men  who  have 
too  long  played  with  human  lives  as  pawns  in  a  game  of 
chess,  who  have  become  so  enmeshed  in  formulas  and  the 
jargon  of  diplomacy  that  they  have  ceased  to  be  conscious 
of  the  poignant  realities  with  which  they  trifle.  And  thus 
will  war  continue  to  be  made,  until  the  great  masses  who 
are  the  sport  of  professional  schemers  and  dreamers  say  the 
word  which  will  bring,  not  eternal  peace,  for  that  is  im- 
possible, but  a  determination  that  wars  shall  be  fought  only 
in  a  just  and  righteous  and  vital  cause." 

—  The  Times,  November  26th,   1912. 

When  the  House  of  Commons  met  on  Thursday, 
July  30th,  Mr.  Bonar  Law  asked  the  Foreign  Sec- 
retary for  information.  "  There  is  very  little  that 
I  can  say,"  Sir  Edward  Grey  replied.  "  I  regret  I 
cannot  say  that  the  situation  is  less  grave  than  it  was 
yesterday.  The  outstanding  facts  are  the  same. 
Austria  has  begun  war  against  Servia,  and  Russia  has 
ordered  a  partial  mobilization,  which  has  not  hith- 
erto led  to  any  corresponding  steps  by  other  Powers, 
so   far  as  our  information  goes.     We  continue  to 

pursue  the  one  great  object,  to  preserve  European 

261 


262     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

peace,  and  for  this  purpose  are  keeping  in  close  touch 
with  other  Powers.  In  thus  keeping  in  touch,  we 
have,  I  am  glad  to  say,  had  no  difficulties  so  far, 
though  it  has  not  been  possible  for  the  Powers  to 
unite  in  joint  diplomatic  action  as  was  proposed  on 
Monday."  British  interests  in  Servia  were  nil,  but 
the  Admiralty  had  armed  forty  merchantmen  all  the 
same;  the  arsenals,  factories,  and  depots  were  work- 
ing at  high  pressure;  and  yet  the  Foreign  Secretary 
could  not  understand  why  Germany  on  the  29th, 
was  dilatory  in  joining  the  four  Powers  to  use  mediat- 
ing influence.  That  was  what  he  telegraphed  to  the 
British  ambassador  at  Berlin  on  July  29th,  notwith- 
standing the  fact  that  he  had  the  day  before  given  up 
the  notion  of  a  conference,  and  adopted  the  idea  of 
direct  conversations  between  Austria  and  Russia,  ac- 
cording to  his  despatch  to  the  same  embassy.  Early 
on  the  29th,  he  heard  from  the  British  ambassador 
at  Berlin  that  Germany  was  giving  advice  to  Austria. 
Then  the  Austrian  Government  declined  definitely 
direct  conversation  with  Petersburg.  Why?  Rus- 
sia would  not  stop  making  all  military  preparations; 
she  had  been  at  work  since  the  25th,  and  had  left  no 
stone  unturned  to  perfect  her  mobilization,  which 
was  five  days  ahead  of  the  issue  of  the  ukase. 

Now  when  the  Foreign  Secretary  told  the  House 
on  July  30th,  that  there  was  very  little  he  could  say, 
he  was  in  possession  of  the  information  contained 
in  despatch  No.  85;  the  document  which  records  the 
"  infamous  proposal,"  so  described  by  Mr.  Asquith 
in  the  House  eight  days  after  it  was  received  at  the 
Foreign  Office.  It  would  be  better  to  glance  at  the 
whole  of  it  than  to  tear  sentences  from  their  con- 
text: 


THE  "  INFAMOUS  PROPOSAL  "      263 

No.  85. 
Sir  E.  Goschen  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. 

(Received  July  29th.) 
"Berlin^  July  29th,  1914. 

"  I  was  asked  to  call  upon  the  Chancellor  to-night.  His 
Excellency  had  just  returned  from  Potsdam. 

"  He  said  that  should  Austria  be  attacked  by  Russia  a 
European  conflagration  might,  he  feared,  become  inevitable, 
owing  to  Germany's  obligations  as  Austria's  ally,  in  spite  of 
his  continued  efforts  to  maintain  peace.  He  then  proceeded 
to  make  the  following  strong  bid  for  British  neutrality.  He 
said  that  it  was  clear,  so  far  as  he  was  able  to  judge  the 
main  principle  which  governed  British  policy,  that  Great 
Britain  would  never  stand  by  and  allow  France  to  be 
crushed  in  any  conflict  there  might  be.  That,  however,  was 
not  the  object  at  which  Germany  aimed.  Provided  that 
neutrality  of  Great  Britain  were  certain,  every  assurance 
would  be  given  to  the  British  Government  that  the  Imperial 
Government  aimed  at  no  territorial  acquisitions  at  the  ex- 
pense of  France  should  they  prove  victorious  in  any  war 
that  might  ensue. 

"  I  questioned  his  Excellency  about  the  French  colonies, 
and  he  said  that  he  was  unable  to  give  a  similar  undertaking 
in  that  respect.  As  regards  Holland,  however,  his  Excel- 
lency said  that,  so  long  as  Germany's  adversaries  respected 
the  integrity  and  neutrality  of  the  Netherlands,  Germany 
was  ready  to  give  His  Majesty's  Government  an  assurance 
that  she  would  do  likewise.  It  depended  upon  the  action 
of  France  what  operations  Germany  might  be  forced  to  enter 
upon  in  Belgium,  but  when  the  war  was  over,  Belgian  in- 
tegrity would  be  respected  if  she  had  not  sided  against 
Germany. 

"  His  Excellency  ended  by  saying  that  ever  since  he  had 
been  Chancellor  the  object  of  his  policy  had  been,  as  you 
were  aware,  to  bring  about  an  understanding  with  England  ; 
he  trusted  that  these  assurances  might  form  a  basis  of  that 
understanding  which  he  so  much  desired.     He  had  in  mind 


264     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

a  general  neutrality  agreement  between  England  and  Ger- 
many, though  it  was  of  course  at  the  present  moment  too 
early  to  discuss  details,  and  an  assurance  of  British  neutrality 
in  the  conflict  which  present  crisis  might  possibly  produce, 
would  enable  him  to  look  forward  to  realization  of  his 
desire. 

"  In  reply  to  his  Excellency's  enquiry  how  I  thought  his 
request  would  appeal  to  you,  I  said  that  I  did  not  think  it 
probable  that  at  this  stage  of  events  you  would  care  to  bind 
yourself  to  any  course  of  action  and  that  I  was  of  opinion 
that  you  would  desire  to  retain  full  liberty. 

"  Our  conversation  upon  this  subject  having  come  to  an 
end,  I  communicated  the  contents  of  your  telegram  of  to-day 
to  his  Excellency,  who  expressed  his  best  thanks  to  you." 

And  this  we  are  told  to  accept  as  coming  from  a 
man  whose  Government  had  planned  the  whole  of 
the  terrible  business  which  startled  the  world  at  the 
beginning  of  August.  Why,  panic  Is  large  In  every 
paragraph  of  It;  and  that  Is  not  surprising.  The 
German  Chancellor  had  just  returned  from  Potsdam 
where  no  doubt  he  learned  that  M.  Sazonof  was  say- 
ing one  thing  about  Russian  mobilization  to  the  Ger- 
man ambassador,  while  the  army  was  acting  In  quite 
a  contrary  manner.  We  in  Britain  were  busy 
enough  on  the  29th,  and  we  had  a  deal  less  reason, 
on  the  surface,  to  prepare  for  "all  emergencies" 
than  Russia.  The  telegram  from  the  Kaiser  to  the 
Czar  which  was  sent  at  midnight  on  the  29th,  Is 
Indicative  of  the  alarming  reports  received  at  Berlin. 
The  Kaiser  said,  "  If,  as  appears  from  your  com- 
munication and  that  of  your  Government,  Russia  Is 
mobilizing  against  Austria-Hungary,  the  role  of 
mediator  which  you  entrusted  to  me  ...  is  jeop- 
ardized. .  .  .  The  whole  burden  of  decision  now 
rests  upon  your  shoulders." 


GROTESQUE  PEACE  EFFORTS      265 

News  had  reached  Berlin  that  Belgium  had  issued 
as  early  as  July  24th,  a  mobilization  circular,  and  an 
undated  instruction  to  Belgian  ambassadors  which 
contained  the  information  they  were  to  give  to  the 
chancelleries  as  to  her  "  strengthened  peace  footing." 
Small  wonder  the  British  ambassador  at  Brussels 
*'  seemed  somewhat  surprised  at  the  speed  with  which 
we  (Belgium)  had  decided  to  mobilize  our  army," 
according  to  the  despatch  of  the  Belgian  Min- 
ister for  Foreign  Affairs.  Potsdam  must  have 
realized  on  the  29th  that  all  the  Powers  of  the 
Entente  were  well  ahead  of  the  game,  while  Ger- 
many was  "  pressing  the  button  "  at  Vienna.  The 
Russian  ambassador  telegraphed  to  Petersburg  that 
"  the  German  ambassador  has  asked  Grey  why 
Great  Britain  was  taking  military  measures  on 
land  and  sea.  Grey  replied  that  these  measures 
had  no  aggressive  character,  but  that  the  situation 
was  such  that  each  Power  must  be  ready."  The 
jargon  of  diplomacy!  No  Power  had  the  slightest 
wish  to  be  aggressive.  Not  at  all.  Millions  of  men 
were  being  set  in  motion  and  millions  of  money  spent, 
because  British  interests  in  Servia  were  nil;  because 
every  Power  was  earnestly  seeking  peace.  Will  a 
credulous  public  go  on  forever  believing  that  Belgium 
was  acting  quite  alone,  entirely  on  her  own  behalf, 
when  her  Foreign  Minister  sent  out  his  circular  on 
July  24th,  to  the  five  Powers  signatory  of  the  Treaty 
of  1839,  "  in  the  event  of  a  war  breaking  out  on  her 
frontiers "  ?  Do  people  realize  that  the  Belgian 
despatch  was  sent  out  on  the  same  day  Austria 
handed  to  Servia  the  famous  note,  which  began  all 
the  trouble?  Will  our  European  diplomatists, 
"  men  who  have  too  long  played  with  human  lives  as 


266     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

pawns  In  a  game  of  chess,"  to  use  the  phrase  of  the 
Times,  tell  us  that  the  first  despatch  in  the  Belgian 
official  report,  from  M.  Davignon,  was  the  work  of 
an  exceedingly  gifted  prophet?  This  is  what  the 
Belgian  despatch  says: 

"  In  these  circumstances  I  have  proposed  to  the  King  and 
to  my  colleagues  in  the  Cabinet,  who  have  concurred,  to 
give  you  now  exact  instructions  as  to  the  steps  to  be  taken 
by  you  if  the  prospect  of  a  Franco-German  War  became 
more  threatening." 

This  from  the  Belgian  Foreign  Minister  the  day 
before  Servia  replied  to  the  Austrian  note;  and  two 
days  before  Sir  Edward  Grey  proposed  the  Confer- 
ence of  the  four  Powers.  It  seems  incredible.  The 
Belgian  Government  on  July  24th  anticipated  a 
Franco-German  war;  and  began  to  make  prepara- 
tions for  it  on  the  very  day  Russia  started  to  mobi- 
lize, and  two  days  before  the  first  public  order  to  the 
British  Fleet  was  issued. 

If  we  are  to  believe  all  that  has  been  said  of  the 
highly  efficient  spy  system  of  the  German  Govern- 
ment, it  needs  no  stretch  of  the  imagination  to 
suspect  that  by  July  29th  the  German  Chancel- 
lor knew  pretty  well  how  things  were  with  all 
the  Governments  of  the  Entente  Powers.  There- 
fore, to  understand  the  inwardness  of  the  "  infa- 
mous proposal"  in  despatch  No.  85,  it  is  abso- 
lutely necessary  to  be  in  possession  of  at  least 
the  facts  set  down  above.  Besides,  the  Russian  offi- 
cial report  tells  us  that  the  Russian  ambassador  at 
London  had  heard  from  Sir  Edward  Grey  on  July 
27th;  that  he  had  told  the  German  ambassador  that 


PLAIN  SENSE  267 

"  if  Austria  were  to  begin  hostilities  in  spite  of  the 
Servian  reply  she  would  prove  her  intention  of  crush- 
ing Servia.  Looked  at  in  this  light,  the  question 
might  give  rise  to  a  situation  which  might  lead  to  a 
war  in  which  all  the  Powers  would  be  involved." 
The  wording  of  despatch  No.  85  leads  one  to  im- 
agine that  the  question  of  Belgian  neutrality  was 
mentioned  for  the  first  time  by  the  German  Chancel- 
lor. There  is  no  evidence  that  the  British  ambassa- 
dor was  instructed  by  the  Foreign  Secretary  to  ques- 
tion the  German  Chancellor  about  his  intentions  to- 
wards Belgium.  It  must  have  been  known  at  our 
Foreign  Office  that  Germany  in  April,  19 14,  had  de- 
clared she  would  respect  the  Treaty  of  1839.  It 
was,  however,  France,  not  Belgium,  that  was  trou- 
bling the  German  Chancellor  after  his  return  from 
Potsdam  on  July  29th.  The  German  Secretary  of 
State  had  told  the  British  ambassador  earlier  in  the 
day  that  "  he  was  much  troubled  by  reports  of  mobi- 
lization in  Russia,  and  of  certain  military  measures, 
which  he  did  not  specify,  being  taken  in  France." 
The  German  Chancellor  must  have  known  what  Rus- 
sian mobilization  really  meant,  and  how  that  affected 
France  and  Belgium.  Anyway,  the  terms  of  the 
Franco-Russian  Alliance  were  not  hidden  from  him; 
and  as  early  as  the  20th,  he  must  have  guessed  what 
was  in  the  mind  of  Franco-Russian  circles  in  Peters- 
burg when  according  to  Reuter's  correspondent  at 
the  state  banquet  the  toasts  implied  the  support  of 
England.  The  German  Chancellor  might  be  as 
wicked  a  diplomatist  as  there  is  in  Europe  to-day; 
he  might  have  known  the  terms  of  the  Austrian  note; 
he  might  be  the  most  colossal  liar  to  be  found  at  any 


268     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

embassy;  but  he  was  not  quite  so  great  a  fool  as 
those  who  believe  that  the  whole  story  of  this  affair 
is  contained  in  the  British  White  Paper. 

Is  it  to  be  imagined  that  the  German  military  au- 
thorities did  not  know  as  much  as  Mr.  Amery  did 
when  he  spolce  in  the  debate  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons on  July  4th,  191 2?  Bhnking  whenever  a  fact 
against  our  diplomacy  has  to  be  faced,  will  not  help 
the  people  of  Britain  or  Europe  to  root  out  the  awful 
cancer  which  lies  at  the  base  of  all  the  evil  system 
of  diplomacy.  By  shutting  one's  eyes  to  facts  some 
men  may  do  loyal  service  to  a  party,  or  a  Govern- 
ment; but  the  time  is  come  when  a  higher  standard 
of  political  life  is  called  for.  Therefore,  in  getting 
at  the  inwardness  of  the  "  infamous  proposal,"  we 
must  regard  it  as  the  desire  of  a  desperate  diploma- 
tist, hemmed  in, —  hoist,  if  you  like,  by  his  own  pe- 
tard—  to  know  the  worst  his  Government  had  to 
cope  with.  The  time  had  come  for  him  to  test  the 
British  diplomatic  position. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  was  in  possession  of  all  these 
facts  when  he  spoke  to  the  House  on  July  30th. 
The  next  day  the  Prime  Minister  made  a  statement 
after  business: 

"  We  have  just  heard  —  not  from  St.  Petersburg,  but 
from  Germany  —  that  Russia  has  proclaimed  a  general 
mobilization  of  her  Army  and  Fleet,  and  that  in  consequence 
of  this,  martial  law  was  to  be  proclaimed  for  Germany. 
We  understand  this  to  mean  that  mobilization  will  follow  in 
Germany  if  the  Russian  mobilization  is  general  and  is  pro- 
ceeded with.  In  the  circumstances,  I  should  prefer  not  to 
answer  any  questions  till  Monday  next." 

Up  went  the  signboard  "  Not  in  the  public  Inter- 
est"; and  the  representatives  of  the  free  and  en- 


WHAT  IT  ALL  MEANT  269 

lightened  electors  were  dismissed  for  three  days'  rec- 
reation. Representative  government!  Presumably 
the  war  party  in  the  House  would  have  carried  the 
day  had  the  Prime  Minister  given  the  Commons  the 
information  then  in  possession  of  the  Foreign  Office; 
but  what  the  country  on  July  30th  would  have  said  if 
that  day  the  whole  truth  had  been  told  of  the  agree- 
ment of  1906,  when  conversations  began  between 
French  and  British  military  and  naval  experts,  is 
another  matter.  The  weels.-end  made  all  the  dif- 
ference in  public  feeling,  and  indeed  in  the  feeling 
of  Ministers  themselves.  The  casus  belli  had  not 
been  determined  on  July  30th.  Suppose  the  Prime 
Minister  had  told  the  House  on  the  30th  that  the 
Foreign  Secretary  had  been  informed  by  M.  Cam- 
bon,  the  French  ambassador,  the  day  before,  that, 
"  He  anticipated  a  demand  from  Germany  that 
France  would  be  neutral  while  Germany  attacked 
Russia.  This  assurance,  France,  of  course,  could 
not  give:  she  was  bound  to  help  Russia  if  Russia 
was  attacked."  Of  course.  The  jargon  of  diplo- 
macy translated  into  plain  English  meant,  France 
through  her  agreement  with  Russia  must  fight  when 
trouble  arose  between  Germany  and  Russia,  there- 
fore Belgium  must  be  prepared,  for  her  territory 
would  become  the  battleground  of  the  operations  in 
the  west;  and  Britain,  because  of  her  secret  under- 
standing with  France  and  Belgium,  must  hasten  to 
their  assistance.  We  were,  for  good  or  for  evil,  en- 
gaged in  a  Continental  system.  Sir  Edward  Grey 
had  warned  the  German  ambassador  on  the  29th, 
that  he  did  not  wish  him  to  be  misled  by  the  friendly 
tone  of  our  conversation  into  thinking  that  we  should 
stand  aside.     Then  the  German  ambassador,  accord- 


270     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

ing  to  the  Foreign  Secretary's  despatch  to  Berlin, 
No.  90,  said  emphatically,  that  some  means  must  be 
found  of  preserving  the  peace  of  Europe.  Rapidly 
the  scene  was  changing  from  the  Danube  and  the 
Neva  to  the  Meuse  and  the  North  Sea.  Still  the 
actors  in  the  drama  talked  as  if  the  action  of  the  play 
lay  in  the  east.  They  were  obliged  to  do  so,  for  any 
indication  to  the  audience  that  the  unities  were  dis- 
regarded, would  have  led  to  the  danger  of  springing 
the  whole  plot  on  the  audience  too  soon. 

Germany  was  in  a  desperate  fix  at  midnight  on  the 
29th.  At  once  she  began  bringing  pressure  on  Aus- 
tria. She  has,  however,  received  no  thanks  for  her 
trouble.  Indeed,  it  has  been  said  that  she  never 
tried  to  influence  Austria.  Strange  it  is  how  war 
seems  to  close  the  gates  of  simple  justice  on  mankind. 
Why  even  the  British  ambassador  at  Vienna  in  his 
despatch,  No.  95,  said: 

"  The  French  ambassador  hears  from  Berlin  that  the 
German  ambassador  at  Vienna  is  instructed  to  speak  seriously 
to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  against  acting  in  a 
manner  calculated  to  provoke  a  European  war.  Unfortu- 
nately the  German  ambassador  is  himself  so  identified  with 
extreme  anti-Russian  and  anti-Servian  feeling  prevalent  in 
Vienna  that  he  is  unlikely  to  plead  the  cause  of  peace  with 
entire  sincerity." 

We  now  have  proof  of  this.  And  It  may  be 
pointed  out  how  a  people  may  easily  be  at  the  mercy 
of  the  antipathies  of  their  own  ambassador.  On 
July  29th,  the  German  ambassador  at  Petersburg 
telegraphed  to  Berlin  that  the  Vienna  Cabinet  had 
sent  a  negative  reply  to  the  wish  expressed  by  the 
Russian  Government  to  enter  into  direct  negotiations. 


SAZONOF  THE  UNHAPPY  271 

Thereupon  the  German  Chancellor  sent  the  follow- 
ing message  to  Vienna : 

"  Berlin,  July  30th,  1914. 
"  The  report  of  Count  Pourtales  does  not  harmonize  with 
the  account  which  your  Excellency  has  given  of  the  attitude 
of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government.  Apparently  there 
is  a  misunderstanding  which  I  beg  you  to  clear  up.  We 
cannot  expect  Austria-Hungary  to  negotiate  with  Servia, 
with  which  she  is  in  a  state  of  war.  The  refusal,  however, 
to  exchange  views  with  St.  Petersburg  would  be  a  grave 
mistake.  We  are  indeed  ready  to  fulfil  our  duty.  As  an 
ally  we  must,  however,  refuse  to  be  drawn  into  a  world 
conflagration  through  Austria-Hungary  not  respecting  our 
advice.  Your  Excellency  will  express  this  to  Count  Berch- 
told  with  all  emphasis,  and  great  seriousness. 

"  Bethmann-Hollweg." 

When  the  contents  of  this  despatch  were  made 
known  the  Austrian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
told  the  German  ambassador  there  had  indeed  been 
a  misunderstanding,  but  that  it  had  been  explained 
and  the  Austrian  ambassador  at  Petersburg  had  al- 
ready received  instructions  to  begin  negotiations  with 
M.  Sazonof.  But  notwithstanding  diplomatic  mis- 
understandings, M.  Sazonof  would  not  and  could  not 
stop  mobilizing.  He  was  ready  to  meet  Austria, 
make  and  re-make  formulas,  but  all  these  expedients 
carried  no  conviction  at  Vienna  or  Berlin  so  long  as 
Russian  mobilization  was  continued.  Poor  M. 
Sazonof!  he  was  not  in  the  position  of  our  Foreign 
Secretary,  who  was  regarded  by  Lord  Haldane  as 
the  "  Commander  of  the  Forces."  Ail  would  de- 
pend on  Russia  and  all  did  depend  on  Russia.  The 
German  Secretary  of  State  told  our  ambassador  at 
Berlin  to  impress  on  Sir  Edward  Grey  the  difficulty 


272     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

of  Germany's  position  in  view  of  Russian  mobiliza- 
tion and  the  military  measures  which  he  heard  were 
being  taken  in  France.  Only  officers  on  leave  had 
been  recalled ;  nothing  special  done  in  the  way  of  mili- 
tary preparations.  But,  "  something  would  have 
soon  to  be  done  for  it  might  be  too  late,  and  when 
they  mobilized  they  would  have  to  mobilize  on  three 
sides.  He  regretted  this,  as  he  knew  France  did  not 
desire  war,  but  it  would  be  a  military  necessity." 
Perhaps  the  Secretary  of  State  thought  it  was  time 
to  take  his  finger  off  the  button  and  place  it  on  the 
trigger.  At  the  same  time,  he  told  the  British  am- 
bassador that  the  warning  Sir  Edward  Grey  had 
given  the  German  ambassador  at  London,  as  to 
Britain's  neutrality,  had  not  reached  the  German 
Chancellor  until  after  the  "  infamous  proposal  "  was 
made. 

"  His  Excellency  added  that  telegram  received  from 
Prince  Lichnowsky  last  night  contains  matter  which  he  had 
heard  with  regret,  but  not  exactly  with  surprise,  and  at  all 
events  he  thoroughly  appreciated  the  frankness  and  loyalty 
with  which  you  had  spoken.  He  also  told  me  that  this 
telegram  had  only  reached  Berlin  very  late  last  night ;  had 
it  been  received  earlier  Chancellor  would,  of  course,  not 
have  spoken  to  me  in  the  way  he  had  done." 

Why  our  Foreign  Secretary  should  telegraph  on 
the  29th  to  our  ambassador  at  Paris  that  he  "  was 
about  to  warn  Prince  Lichnowsky  "  that  Germany 
must  not  count  on  Britain  standing  aside,  before  he 
telegraphed  the  same  grave  information  to  our  am- 
bassador at  Berlin,  is  a  mystery. 

It  Is  worth  while  looking  a  little  closer  at  this 
phase  of  diplomatic  negotiations  because  it  touches 


A  FRANK  ANALYSIS  273 

the  second  point  in  the  White  Paper  which  has  raised 
so  much  uneasiness  in  the  minds  of  some  of  the  most 
inteUigent  men  in  Britain.  Most  fair-minded  people 
now  admit  that  there  would  have  been  no  war  if  the 
British  Government  had  boldly  announced  on  receipt 
of  Sir  George  Buchanan's  despatch  on  July  24th  that 
the  Triple  Entente  would  proclaim  their  solidarity. 
Now  that  the  truth  is  leaking  out  and  intelligent  peo- 
ple have  had  time  to  reflect,  this  is  found  to  be  the 
first  point  in  the  White  Paper  that  is  the  cause  of 
widespread  regret.  The  "  warning  "  is  the  second 
point.  Analyzed  chronologically,  it  seems  to  be  a 
thoroughly  discreditable  affair. 

On  the  morning  of  Wednesday,  July  29th,  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  told  M.  Paul  Cambon  (see  despatch  No. 
87,  British  White  Paper,  to  Sir  Francis  Bertie)  that 
he  meant  to  tell  the  German  ambassador  that  day 
that  he  must  not  be  misled  from  the  friendly  tone  of 
their  conversation  that  Britain  would  stand  aside. 

In  the  next  despatch.  No.  88,  July  29th,  from  Sir 
Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen,  there  is  not  one 
word  about  warning  the  German  ambassador. 

In  despatch  No.  89,  Sir  Edward  Grey  told  Sir  E. 
Goschen  that  he  saw  the  German  ambassador  that 
afternoon,  July  29th,  and  told  him  not  to  be  misled 
by  the  friendly  tone  of  their  conversation  into  think- 
ing that  Britain  would  stand  aside. 

Despatch  No.  90  proves  Sir  Edward  Grey  saw  the 
German  ambassador  tzvice  on  July  29th. 

It  is  evident  that  Sir  Edward  Grey  did  not  warn 
the  German  ambassador  when  he  saw  him  that 
morning.  It  is  also  evident  that  Sir  Edward  Grey 
notified  M.  Paul  Cambon  and  the  British  ambassa- 
dor at  Paris  that  he  was  about  to  warn  the  German 


274     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

ambassador  that  Britain  would  not  stand  aside,  sev- 
eral hours  before  he  gave  the  warning  to  Prince 
Lichnowsky. 

There  is  no  reference  at  all  in  M.  Paul  Cambon's 
despatch  of  July  29th,  No.  98  in  the  French  Yellow 
Book,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey's  warning.  Strangely 
enough,  the  French  ambassador,  after  receiving  the 
news  from  Sir  Edward  Grey  of  the  warning  to  be 
given  to  the  German  ambassador,  told  the  French 
Government: 

"  My  German  colleague  having  asked  Sir  Edward  Grey 
what  the  intentions  of  the  British  Government  were,  the 
Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  replied  that  he  had 
nothing  to  state  for  the  present.  Sir  Edward  Grey  did  not 
disguise  the  fact  that  he  found  the  situation  very  grave 
and  that  he  had  little  hope  of  a  peaceful  solution." 

Why  there  should  be  no  reference  to  the  warning 
in  despatch  No.  98,  in  the  French  Yellow  Book, 
(the  only  despatch  sent  by  the  French  ambassa- 
dor at  London  to  his  Government  on  July  29)  is  as 
difficult  to  understand  as  the  statement  attributed  to 
Sir  Edward  Grey  which  is  quoted  above.  The  news 
of  the  warning  was,  however,  known  in  Berlin  on  the 
afternoon  of  July  29th.  In  despatch  No.  92  in  the 
French  Yellow  Book,  from  M.  Jules  Cambon,  the 
French  ambassador  at  Berlin,  we  learn: 

"The  attitude  of  the  Chancellor  (German)  is  very 
probably  the  result  of  the  last  interview  of  Sir  Edward  Grey 
with  Prince  Lichnowsky.  Up  to  quite  the  last  days  they 
flattered  themselves  here  (Berlin)  that  England  would  re- 
main out  of  the  question,  and  the  impression  produced  on 
the  German  Government  and  on  the  financiers  and  business 
men  by  her  attitude  is  profound." 


A  CURIOUS  PROCEEDING  275 

This  is  illuminating.  Indeed  it  explains  a  great 
deal  which  seemed  dark  and  difficult  in  the  early  days 
of  August.  It  was  then  thought  by  a  certain  school 
of  Jingo  journalists  that  the  threat  or  warning  of  Sir 
Edward  Grey,  on  July  29th,  was  the  influence  which 
forced  the  German  Chancellor  to  bring  pressure  to 
bear  on  Austria  to  obtain  direct  conversations  with 
Russia.  But  the  German  Chancellor  knew  nothing 
about  the  threat  or  warning  when  he  saw  Sir  Edward 
Goschen  on  the  afternoon  of  July  29th.  M.  Jules 
Cambon  was  evidently  misled  when  he  sent  his  des- 
patch, for  the  Berlin  Foreign  Office  knew  nothing 
then  about  "  the  result  of  the  last  interview  of  Sir 
Edward  Grey  with  Prince  Lichnowsky."  Still,  M. 
Cambon  might  have  been  in  possession  of  the  infor- 
mation which  was  to  be  given  to  Prince  Lichnowsky, 
for  it  had  been  given  to  his  brother  in  London  that 
morning. 

It  is  quite  clear  that  neither  Sir  Edward  Goschen 
nor  the  German  Chancellor  knew  anything  about  the 
warning  when  they  had  their  interview  on  the  after- 
noon of  July  29th.  There  is  no  evidence  at  all  that 
Sir  E.  Goschen  received  despatch  No.  89,  in  which 
Sir  Edward  Grey  told  him  that  he  had  warned  the 
German  ambassador.  It  was  not  telegraphed.  If 
he  had  received  it,  he  would  have  known  what  the 
German  Secretary  of  State  was  referring  to  on  July 
30th  when  he  was  told  that  the  telegram  received 
from  Prince  Lichnowsky  did  not  reach  Berlin  until 
very  late  on  the  night  of  July  29th.  Sir  Edward . 
Goschen  was  so  much  in  the  dark  about  this  matter 
that  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  to  telegraph  on  July  30th 
and  tell  him  that  he  (Sir  Edward  Grey)  had  warned 
Prince  Lichnowsky. 


276     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

The  whole  of  the  basis  Mr.  Asquith  took  for  his 
case  on  August  6th  was  despatch  No.  85,  British 
White  Paper,  from  Sir  Edward  Goschen  to  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey;  this  contained  the  "  infamous  proposal." 
No  notice  at  all  was  ever  taken  of  despatch  No.  98 
from  Sir  Edward  Goschen  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  It 
was  not  "  infamous  "  to  let  the  French  ambassador  at 
London  and  the  British  ambassador  at  Paris  know 
on  July  29th  that  Sir  Edward  Grey  was  about  to  warn 
Prince  Lichnowsky  that  Britain  would  not  stand 
aside;  it  was  not  "  infamous  "  to  let  the  British  am- 
bassador at  Berlin  meet  the  German  Chancellor  on 
the  afternoon  of  July  29th,  ignorant  that  Prince  Lich- 
nowsky was  about  to  be  warned, —  though  the  French 
ambassador  at  Berlin  seemed  at  that  time  to  be  pretty 
fully  acquainted  with  the  news  of  the  warning;  it  was 
not  "  infamous "  that  the  British  ambassador  at 
Berlin  should  not  know  what  the  German  Secretary 
of  State  was  referring  to  on  July  30th  when  he  told 
Sir  Edward  Goschen: 

"  That  telegram  received  from  Prince  Lichnowsky  .  .  . 
had  only  reached  Berlin  very  late  last  night;  had  it  been 
received  earlier  Chancellor  (German)  would,  of  course,  not 
have  spoken  to  me  in  way  he  had  done." 

So  the  infamous  proposal  would  not  have  been 
made  had  Sir  Edward  Grey  dealt  with  the  Berlin 
Foreign  Office  and  the  German  ambassador  at  Lon- 
don with  the  ordinary  courtesy  that  one  business  man 
extends  to  another.  Yet  it  will  be  seen  that  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  in  despatch  No.  loi  to  Sir  Edward 
Goschen,  July  30th,  does  not  refer  at  all  to  despatch 
No.  98,  though  after  he  had  sent  No.  loi  he  had  to 
telegraph  to  Sir  Edward  Goschen,  in  No.  102,  that 
he  had  warned  Prince  Lichnowsky. 


WHAT  MIGHT  HAVE  BEEN        277 

Is  it  any  wonder  that  Intelligent,  fair-minded  peo- 
ple now  smile  when  the  British  White  Paper  is  re- 
ferred to,  and  shake  their  heads  sorrowfully  when 
the  uninitiated  talk  about  the  "  infamous  proposal  "? 
Why  neither  Sir  Edward  Grey  nor  Mr.  Asquith  has 
ever  referred  to  despatch  No.  98  is  one  of  the 
first-class  mysteries  of  this  terrible  business.  But 
this  mystery  may  help  to  teach  Members  of  Par- 
liament a  lesson  in  diplomatic  methods.  In  future 
they  may  wish  to  see  papers  giving  a  full  statement 
of  the  case  in  good  and  ample  time  to  scrutinize 
closely  what  diplomatists  have  been  doing  and  say- 
ing. If,  on  Friday,  July  31st,  the  House  of  Com- 
mons had  been  in  possession  of  the  British  White 
Paper,  and  all  the  despatches  up  to  midnight,  July 
30th,  so  that  the  members  could  have  studied  it 
closely  over  the  week-end,  there  might  have  been  a 
very  different  set  of  circumstances  to  record  of  the 
first  week  of  August,  even  though  we  were  entangled 
with  France  and  Russia. 

But  Prince  Lichnowsky  was  not  the  only  person 
not  warned  in  time  in  that  dreadful  last  week  of 
July.  The  members  of  the  British  House  of  Com- 
mons were  not  warned.  During  that  week  our  al- 
lies seemed  to  have  no  doubt  that  the  peace  of  Eu- 
rope lay  in  the  hands  of  Great  Britain;  and  Russia 
and  France  constantly  warned  Sir  Edward  Grey 
of  the  fact.  The  Foreign  Secretary  knew  that  the 
President  of  France  had  told  our  ambassador  at 
Paris  on  July  30th,  that  he  was  convinced  that  peace 
between  the  Powers  was  in  the  hands  of  Great  Brit- 
ain.    He  said: 

"  If  His  Majesty's  Government  announced  that  England 
would  come  to  the  aid  of  France  in  the  event  of  a  conflict 


278     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

between  France  and  Germany  as  a  result  of  the  present 
dijfferences  between  Austria  and  Servia,  there  would  be  no 
war,  for  Germany  would  at  once  modify  her  attitude." 

The  Russian  ambassador  at  Paris  told  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  French  Council  on  the  night  of  July  30th 
that  war  was  imminent  and  that: 

"  She  (Russia)  counts  on  the  help  of  France  as  an  ally, 
and  that  she  considers  it  desirable  that  England  should  join 
Russia  and  France  without  loss  of  time.  France  is  resolved 
to  fulfil  all  the  obligations  of  her  alliance." 

From  the  beginning  neither  Russia  nor  France 
ceased  trying  to  get  the  British  Foreign  Secretary 
to  declare  openly  what  Britain  would  do.  Procrasti- 
nation was  the  offspring  of  secrecy,  and  the  "  Com- 
mander of  the  Forces  "  was  about  as  free  to  move 
as  Laocoon. 

A  leader  in  the  Times  on  July  30th,  said: 

"  The  Instinct  of  self-preservation,  which  is  the  strongest 
factor  in  national  life,  therefore  compels  us  —  if  the  efforts 
of  our  Government  to  keep  the  peace  should  fail  —  to  be 
ready  to  strike  with  all  our  force  for  our  own  safety  and  for 
that  of  our  friends." 

At  last  M.  Cambon  had  to  resort  to  some  com- 
pulsion, as  the  supplications  of  neither  Russia  nor 
France  were  of  complete  avail;  and  he  on  the  30th 
wrote  reminding  Sir  Edward  Grey  of  the  secret  en- 
gagement entered  into  in  January,  1906,  and  en- 
closed copies  of  the  letters  they  had  exchanged  in 
November,  191 2.  It  is  only  necessary  now  to  look 
at  the  letter  from  M.  Cambon : 


SECRET  HISTORY  EMERGING      279 

"  French  Embassy,  London. 

"November  23rd,  19 12. 

"Dear  Sir  Edward: 

"  You  reminded  me  in  your  letter  of  yesterday,  22nd 
November,  that  during  the  last  few  years  the  military  and 
naval  authorities  of  France  and  Great  Britain  had  consulted 
with  each  other  from  time  to  time;  that  it  had  always  been 
understood  that  these  consultations  should  not  restrict  the 
liberty  of  either  Government  to  decide  in  the  future  whether 
they  should  lend  each  other  the  support  of  their  armed 
forces;  that,  on  either  side,  these  consultations  between  ex- 
perts were  not  and  should  not  be  considered  as  engagements 
binding  our  Governments  to  take  action  in  certain  eventuali- 
ties; that,  however,  I  had  remarked  to  you  that,  if  one  or 
other  of  the  two  Governments  had  grave  reasons  to  fear 
an  unprovoked  attack  on  the  part  of  a  third  Power,  it  would 
become  essential  to  know  whether  it  could  count  on  the 
armed  support  of  the  other. 

"  Your  letter  answers  that  point,  and  I  am  authorized 
to  state  that,  in  the  event  of  one  of  our  two  Governments 
having  grave  reasons  to  fear  either  an  attack  from  a  third 
Power,  or  some  event  threatening  the^  general  peace,  that 
Government  would  immediately  examine  with  the  other  the 
question  whether  both  Governments  should  act  together  in 
order  to  prevent  aggression  or  preserve  peace.  If  so,  the 
two  Governments  would  deliberate  as  to  the  measures  which 
they  would  be  prepared  to  take  in  common ;  if  those  measures 
involved  action,  the  two  Governments  would  take  into  im- 
mediate consideration  the  plans  of  their  general  staffs  and 
would  then  decide  as  to  the  effect  to  be  given  to  those  plans. 

"  Yours,  etc., 
"  Paul  Cambon." 

With  the  letters  the  French  ambassador  enclosed 
a  communication  he  had  received  from  the  French 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  which  said  that  the 


28o     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

German  patrols  had  twice  penetrated  French  terri- 
tory, "yesterday  (Friday),"  which  was  not  correct, 
for  the  communication  was  dated  July  31st,  and  the 
31st  was  Friday.  According  to  despatch  No.  106 
in  the  French  Yellow  Book  German  patrols  pene- 
trated French  territory  on  Wednesday,  July  29th, 
but  not  until  August  2nd  did  M.  Viviani  think  it 
worth  while  notifying  Berlin  of  the  violation  of  the 
French  frontier  by  German  troops.  Then  he  in- 
formed the  French  ambassador  in  despatch  No,  139 
that  "  German  troops  having  to-day  violated  the 
eastern  frontier  at  several  points,  I  request  you  im- 
mediately to  protest  in  writing  to  the  German  Gov- 
ernment." To  the  request  of  M.  Cambon  the  For- 
eign Secretary  replied  that  the  Cabinet  would  meet 
in  the  morning  (Friday)  and  that  he  would  "see 
him  again  to-morrow  afternoon."  In  Sir  Edward 
Grey's  despatch  to  the  British  ambassador  at  Paris, 
he  states  that  M.  Cambon  had  reminded  him  of  the 
letters  of  November,  191 2,  and  that  the  French  am- 
bassador had  also  given  him  a  copy  of  the  communi- 
cation from  the  French  Minister  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs. But  as  the  communication  is  dated  "  Paris, 
July  31st,  1 9 14,"  and  the  British  despatch  to  Paris, 
No.  105,  is  dated  July  30th,  it  is  a  little  difficult  to 
understand  how  M.  Cambon  and  Sir  Edward  Grey 
could  have  been  in  possession  of  a  document  on  the 
30th,  which  did  not  leave  Paris  until  the  31st.  This 
communication  is  a  specimen  of  how  diplomatists 
make  war.  The  dates  are  all  wrong,  so  wrong  in- 
deed that  the  Foreign  Office  in  issuing  the  second  edi- 
tion of  the  White  Paper  cut  out  the  dates  and  day, 
Friday.  Compare  the  communication  (Enclosure  3 
in  No.  105,  British  White  Paper)  with  No.  106  in 


STRUGGLING  IN  THE  NET        281 

the  French  Yellow  Book  and  judge  to  what  extent 
the  collaboration  of  M.  Paul  Cambon  impressed  the 
British  Foreign  Office.  The  phrase  "  As  you  see, 
Germany  has  done  it,"  is  not  to  be  found  in  the  de- 
spatch from  M.  Viviani,  But  more  remarkable 
things  than  that  happen  in  diplomatic  circles;  so, 
like  many  other  curious  slips  in  the  despatching  busi- 
ness, we  may  leave  the  dates  for  future  Macaulays 
and  Guizots  to  set  straight. 

Friday,  July  31st,  was  perhaps  the  blackest  Friday 
the  world  has  ever  known.  Millionaires  came  from 
the  city  to  their  homes  in  the  west  end,  trembling 
with  anxiety,  wondering  what  their  financial  position 
would  be  within  a  week.  Prices  of  foodstuffs  went 
up  with  a  bound.  All  would  depend  on  Russia ! 
On  Friday  the  whisper  was  "  All  will  depend  on  Ger- 
many! "     From  Berlin  came  the  following  despatch: 

No.  108. 

Sir  E.  Goschen  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. 
(Telegraphic.)  (Received  July  31st.) 

"Berlin,  July  31st,  1914. 
"  Chancellor  informs  me  that  his  efforts  to  preach  peace 
and  moderation  at  Vienna  have  been  seriously  handicapped 
by  the  Russian  mobilization  against  Austria.  He  has  done 
everything  possible  to  attain  his  object  at  Vienna,  perhaps 
even  rather  more  than  was  altogether  palatable  at  the  Ball- 
platz.  He  could  not,  however,  leave  his  country  defence- 
less while  time  was  being  utilized  by  other  Powers;  and  if, 
as  he  learns  is  the  case,  military  measures  are  now  being 
taken  by  Russia  against  Germany  also,  it  would  be  im- 
possible for  him  to  remain  quiet.  He  wished  to  tell  me  that 
it  was  quite  possible  that  in  a  very  short  time,  to-day  per- 
haps, the  German  Government  would  take  some  very  serious 
step;  he  was,  in  fact,  just  on  the  point  of  going  to  have  an 
audience  with  the  Emperor.     His  Excellency  added  that  the 


282     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

news  of  the  active  preparations  on  the  Russo-German  fron- 
tier had  reached  him  just  when  the  Czar  had  appealed  to  the 
Emperor,  in  the  name  of  their  old  friendship,  to  mediate  at 
Vienna,  and  when  the  Emperor  was  actually  conforming  to 
that  request." 

To  the  British  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  Sir 
Edward  Grey  telegraphed  that  he  did  not  see  how 
Russia  could  be  urged  to  suspend  military  prepara- 
tions unless  some  limit  were  put  by  Austria  to  the 
advance  of  her  troops  into  Servia.  Then  to  Ber- 
lin he  sent  a  message  saying  Austria  has  declared 
her  willingness  to  respect  Servian  sovereignty  and  the 
integrity  of  Servian  territory;  and  that  while  Ger- 
many sounded  Vienna,  and  Britain  sounded  Peters- 
burg, all  Powers  would  suspend  further  military  op- 
erations or  preparations.  At  the  same  time  he 
warned  the  German  ambassador  that  if  France  be- 
came involved,  Britain  would  be  drawn  in.  Soon, 
however,  news  was  received  in  Berlin  that  the  whole 
Russian  army  and  fleet  were  being  mobilized,  and 
Germany  then  announced  that  she  must  certainly  pre- 
pare for  all  emergencies.  Kriegsgefahr  was  im- 
mediately proclaimed.  The  Foreign  Secretary  had 
failed  utterly  to  influence  Russia's  military  prepara- 
tions. 

Then  his  greater  struggle  with  his  Continental 
friends  began.  Both  Russia  and  France  pressed 
him  again  and  again  to  declare  that  Britain  would 
support  them.  In  vain  he  strove  to  put  France 
off  by  saying  British  treaties  and  obligations  were 
not  yet  involved.  The  French  ambassador  "  urged 
His  Majesty's  Government  to  reconsider  this  de- 
cision." From  Paris  came  a  message  saying  the 
German  Government  had  sent  an  ultimatum  to  the 


M.  CAMBON  AS  NEMESIS  283 

Russian  Government  to  demobilize  their  forces,  and 
that  a  reply  must  be  made  by  Russia  within  twelve 
hours;  failing  that,  the  German  Government  would 
consider  "  it  necessary  to  order  the  total  mobilization 
of  the  German  army  on  the  Russian  and  French 
frontiers."  The  French  Minister  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs asked  what  the  attitude  of  England  would  be, 
for  the  German  ambassador  at  Paris  was  to  call  at 
one  o'clock  the  next  day  (Saturday)  to  know  what 
the  French  Government  would  do  in  the  circum- 
stances. M.  Cambon  still  pursued  the  Foreign  Sec- 
retary; he  told  him  if  Britain  would  only  declare 
definitely  on  the  side  of  Russia  and  France  it  would 
decide  the  German  attitude  in  favour  of  peace.  The 
British  Cabinet  had,  however,  decided  "  not  to  give 
any  pledge  at  the  present  time."  Then  in  despatch 
No.  119  we  read: 

"  Though  we  should  have  to  put  our  policy  before  Parlia- 
ment, we  could  not  pledge  Parliament  in  advance.  Up  to 
the  present  moment,  we  did  not  feel,  and  public  opinion  did 
not  feel,  that  any  treaties  or  obligations  of  this  country  were 
involved.  Further  developments  might  alter  this  situation 
and  cause  the  Government  and  Parliament  to  take  the  view 
that  intervention  was  justified.  The  preservation  of  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium  might  be,  I  would  not  say  a  decisive, 
but  an  important  factor,  in  determining  our  attitude. 
Whether  we  proposed  to  Parliament  to  intervene  or  not  to 
intervene  in  a  war.  Parliament  would  wish  to  know  how 
we  stood  with  regard  to  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  and  it 
might  be  that  I  should  ask  both  France  and  Germany 
whether  each  was  prepared  to  undertake  an  engagement 
that  she  would  not  be  the  first  to  violate  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium. 

"  M.  Cambon  repeated  his  question  whether  we  would 
help  France  if  Germany  made  an  attack  on  her.     I  said  that 


2  84     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

I  could  only  adhere  to  the  answer  that,  as  far  as  things  had 
gone  at  present,  we  could  not  take  any  engagement.  M. 
Cambon  urged  that  Germany  had  from  the  beginning  re- 
jected proposals  that  might  have  made  for  peace.  It  could 
not  be  to  England's  interest  that  France  should  be  crushed 
by  GermanJ^  We  should  then  be  in  a  very  diminished  posi- 
tion with  regard  to  Germany.  In  1870  we  had  made  a 
great  mistake  in  allowing  an  enormous  increase  in  German 
strength,  and  we  should  now  be  repeating  this  mistake. 
He  asked  me  whether  I  could  not  submit  his  question  to  the 
Cabinet  again.  I  said  that  the  Cabinet  would  certainly  be 
summoned  as  soon  as  there  was  some  new  development,  but 
at  the  present  moment  the  only  answer  I  could  give  was  that 
we  could  not  undertake  any  definite  engagement." 

Neutrality  of  Belgium!  Mr.  Amery  had  told 
Parliament,  two  years  before  Sir  Edward  Grey  sent 
his  message  to  France  and  Germany,  asking  the 
Governments  if  they  would  respect  the  Treaty  of 
1839,  that: 

"  Germany  has  added  80,000  men  to  her  army  for  the 
express  purpose  of  strengthening  the  force  that  is  to  march 
through  Belgium  to  crush  the  French  left.  It  is  upon  our 
Expeditionary  Force  that  the  brunt  of  that  march  would 
fall.  .  .  .  Our  opponents  (the  Germans)  will  have  the 
choice  of  two  objectives.  They  can  attempt  either  to  inter- 
fere with  the  despatch  of  the  Expeditionary  Force  or  to 
cover  an  invasion,  a  counterstroke  intended  either  to  bring 
us  to  our  knees  or  at  any  rate  to  prevent  a  considerable  part 
of  the  Expeditionary  Force  from  going,  and  so  clear  the 
field  for  the  German  advance  through  Flanders." 

Neutrality  of  Belgium!  M.  Davignon  in  his  de- 
spatch of  July  24th,  showed  that  his  precautions 
were  at  least  a  week  ahead  of  those  of  Sir  Edward 
Grey.     M.  Cambon  must  have  been  amazed  at  the 


''  NEUTRALITY  OF  BELGIUM  "     285 

attitude  of  the  Foreign  Secretary  and  the  Cabinet. 
And  what  must  M.  Davignon  have  thought?  No 
wonder  those  brave  fellows  at  Liege  could  not  un- 
derstand why  they  were  not  supported  by  the  French 
and  English.  Many  men  in  France  and  Belgium 
must  have  wondered  what  had  happened  to  the  plans 
of  the  General  Staffs.  Friday,  July  31st,  was  a 
black  one  for  many  people  in  London,  but  to  none  so 
black  as  It  was  to  M.  Cambon. 

In  Russia  the  people  were  In  high  spirits  on  that 
day.  The  Times  correspondent  told  us  what  took 
place  In  Petersburg: 

"About  11.30  a  concourse  numbering  50,000  surrounded 
the  British  Embassy.  '  God  save  the  King '  alternated 
'  Bozhe  Tzara  Khranie,'  and  even  '  Rule  Britannia.'  The 
procession  also  visited  the  French  Embassy.  Truth  com- 
pels me  to  say  that  Russians,  high  and  low,  are  waiting 
with  the  intensest  anxiety  to  learn  Great  Britain's  decision. 
The  articles  in  the  Times  have  done  much  to  inspire  hope, 
but  if,  contrary  to  reasonable  expectation,  the  British  Parlia- 
ment insists  on  neutrality,  there  will  be  a  terrible  revulsion 
of  feeling  here." 

Germany's  reply  to  the  question  of  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium  was  not  satisfactory;  the  Secretary  of 
State  made  a  note  of  it,  but  was  doubtful  whether 
the  German  Government  would  return  any  answer 
at  all.  Hostile  acts  had  already  been  committed  by 
Belgium,  so  our  ambassador  was  Informed.  France, 
of  course,  sent  a  satisfactory  reply;  the  President  of 
the  Republic  had  spoken  of  It  to  the  King  of  the 
Belgians.  The  first  despatch  In  the  White  Paper 
addressed  to  the  British  ambassador  at  Brussels  is 
dated  July  31st,  but  M.  Davignon  In  the  Belgian 
official  report  states  that,   "  The   British   Minister 


286     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

asked  to  see  me  on  urgent  business,  and  made  the 
following  communication  which  he  had  hoped  for 
some  days  to  be  able  to  present  to  me," —  and  then 
follows  the  question  of  Belgian  neutrality.  So  the 
urgent  business  had  been  delayed  for  some  days, 
though  the  British  Minister  saw  the  Belgian  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  on  the  very  day  he  received  in- 
structions from  London  to  put  the  question  in  Brus- 
sels about  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  ! 

The  diplomatic  correspondence  in  the  Belgian 
White  Paper  is  unique ;  it  is  too  naive,  too  premoni- 
tory, for  acceptance  without  question.  According 
to  the  undated  enclosure  in  the  note  of  July  24th,  to 
ambassadors,  we  are  informed  that: 

"  All  necessary  steps  to  ensure  respect  of  Belgian  neu- 
trality have  nevertheless  been  taken  by  the  Government. 
The  Belgian  army  has  been  mobilized  and  is  taking  up  such 
strategic  positions  as  have  been  chosen  to  secure  the  defence 
of  the  country  and  the  respect  of  its  neutrality.  The  forts 
of  Antwerp  and  on  the  Meuse  have  been  put  in  a  state  of 
defence." 

This  was  done  in  prospect  of  a  Franco-German 
war.  Then  Belgium  must  have  been  convinced  that 
she  had  no  reason  at  all  to  guard  her  French  fron- 
tier; all  her  preparations  were  made  against  Ger- 
many. The  area  to  be  protected  was  that  through 
which  the  Meuse  ran:  Liege,  Namur,  and  Dinant. 
But  Belgium  less  than  four  months  before,  had  re- 
ceived specific  declarations  from  Germany  that  she 
would  respect  the  neutrality  and  independence  of  Bel- 
gium. Why  then  should  Belgium,  before  Servia  re- 
plied to  the  Austrian  note,  leave  the  French  frontier 
open,  and  concentrate  all  her  military  strength  on 


THE  BLOW  FALLS  287 

the  Meuse  and  at  Antwerp?  What  were  the  plans 
of  the  General  Staffs?  The  British  Secretary  of 
State  for  War  was  asked  in  the  House  of  Commons, 
in  1912,  for  an  "explicit  statement  of  the  relative 
forces  which  would  take  the  field  in  France  and  Bel- 
gium at  the  outbreak  of  the  conflict  "  with  Germany. 
On  July  31st,  the  Belgian  Minister  for  War  issued 
the  mobilization  order  to  carry  out  the  operations 
that  were  completed  before  the  24th. 

On  that  Friday  night  it  was  no  use  discussing  any- 
thing in  Berlin  but  the  demobilization  of  the  Rus- 
sian forces;  nothing  but  demobilization  would  satisfy 
the  German  Government.  It  was  demanded  "  in 
order  to  prevent  Russia  from  saying  all  her  mobiliza- 
tion was  only  directed  against  Austria."  The  Ger- 
man Secretary  of  State  told  the  British  ambassador 
"  that  both  the  Emperor  William,  at  the  request  of 
the  Emperor  of  Russia,  and  the  German  Foreign 
Office  had  even  up  till  last  night  been  urging  Austria 
to  show  willingness  to  continue  discussions  —  and 
telegraphic  and  telephonic  communications  from 
Vienna  had  been  of  a  promising  nature  —  but  Rus- 
sia's mobilization  had  spoilt  everything."  The 
Czar's  telegram  of  the  31st,  to  the  Kaiser,  murdered 
peace.     He  said: 

"  It  is  technically  impossible  to  discontinue  our  military 
operations  which  are  rendered  necessary  by  Austria's 
mobilization.  We  are  far  from  wishing  for  war,  and  so 
long  as  the  negotiations  with  Austria  regarding  Servia  con- 
tinue, my  troops  will  not  undertake  provocative  action.  I 
give  you  my  Word  upon  it." 

To  this  the  German  Emperor  replied: 

**  In  answer  to  your  appeal  to  my  friendship  and  your 


288     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

prayer  for  my  help  I  undertook  mediatory  action  between 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  and  yours.  While  this 
action  was  in  progress  your  troops  were  mobilized  against 
my  ally  Austria-Hungary,  in  consequence  of  which,  as  I 
have  already  informed  you,  my  mediation  was  rendered 
illusory.  Nevertheless,  I  have  continued  it.  Now,  how- 
ever, I  receive  trustworthy  news  of  your  serious  preparations 
for  war,  even  on  my  eastern  frontier.  The  responsibility 
for  the  safety  of  my  kingdom  compels  me  to  take  definite 
counter  measures.  The  efforts  to  maintain  the  peace  of 
the  world  have  now  reached  their  utmost  possible  limit.  It 
will  not  be  I  who  am  responsible  for  the  calamity  which 
threatens  the  whole  civilized  world.  Even  at  this  moment 
it  lies  in  your  power  to  avert  it.  Nobody  threatens  the 
honour  and  power  of  Russia,  which  could  well  have  waited 
for  the  result  of  my  mediation." 

On  the  very  day  these  telegrams  passed,  the  Rus- 
sian Government  issued  the  following  formula : 

"  If  Austria  will  agree  to  check  the  advance  of  her  troops 
on  Servian  territory ;  if,  recognizing  that  the  dispute  between 
Austria  and  Servia  has  assumed  a  character  of  European 
interest,  she  will  allow  the  great  Powers  to  look  into  the 
matter  and  determine  whether  Servia  could  satisfy  the  Aus- 
tro-Hungarian Government  without  impairing  her  rights  as 
a  sovereign  State  or  her  independence,  Russia  will  under- 
take to  maintain  her  waiting  attitude." 

Austria  conceded  everything  to  Russian  demands, 
but  it  was  technically  impossible  to  discontinue  Rus- 
sian military  preparations,  though  M.  Sazonof 
pledged  Russia  to  maintain  her  waiting  attitude. 
Waiting  to  spring!  The  position  of  the  Russian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  was  very  much  like 
that  of  Sir  Edward  Grey:  both  were  sincere  in  their 
efforts  to  stop  a  European  conflagration,  but  the  mili- 


A  PATHETIC  RECORD  289 

tary  and  naval  authorities  in  their  countries  were 
dead  against  them.  As  Mr.  Churchill  said,  "  the 
whole  generation  of  men  went  mad,"  and  out  of  the 
chaotic  jargon  of  diplomacy  nothing  but  war  could 
come.  Forty-four  years  of  secret  traffickings  had 
raised  a  Frankenstein's  monster  and  the  "  men  who 
had  too  long  played  with  human  lives  "  were  incom- 
petent to  deal  with  the  consequences  of  their  work. 
In  no  official  record  of  diplomatic  correspondence 
is  there  to  be  found  a  despatch  containing  so  much 
that  is  pathetic  as  that  in  the  British  White  Paper, 
No.  123.  It  reveals  a  man  in  desperation  at  the 
knees  of  a  symbol  powerless  to  grant  hope  or  mercy. 
Let  it  be  clearly  understood  that  Austria  had  on  the 
31st,  agreed  to  the  formula  submitted  by  Russia, 
and  that  Sir  Edward  Grey  knew  it.  He  also  knew 
that  Russia  never  once  gave  the  slightest  heed  to  the 
protests  made  by  the  German  Foreign  Office  or  by 
the  Kaiser  against  Russian  mobilization.  He  knew 
that  the  "  infamous  proposal  "  in  despatch  No.  85 
would  not  have  been  made  if  the  warning  which  he 
gave  Prince  Lichnowsky,  in  London,  had  been  known 
in  Berlin  on  the  29th,  as  early  as  it  was  known  in 
Paris.     Despatch  No.  123  is  as  follows: 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen 

"  Foreign  Ottice,  August  ist,  1914. 
"  Sir: 

"  I  told  the  German  ambassador  to-day  that  the  reply  of 
the  German  Government  with  regard  to  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium  was  a  matter  of  very  great  regret,  because  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium  affected  feeling  in  this  country.  If 
Germany  could  see  her  way  to  give  the  same  assurance  as 
that  which  had  been  given  by  France  it  would  materially 
contribute  to  relieve  anxiety  and  tension  here.     On  the  other 


290     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

hand,  if  there  were  a  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
by  one  combatant  while  the  other  respected  it,  it  would  be 
extremely  difficult  to  restrain  public  feeling  in  this  country. 
I  said  that  we  had  been  discussing  this  question  at  a  Cabinet 
meeting,  and  as  I  was  authorized  to  tell  him  this,  I  gave  him 
a  memorandum  of  it. 

"  He  asked  me  whether,  if  Germany  gave  a  promise  not 
to  violate  Belgian  neutrality  we  would  engage  to  remain 
neutral. 

"  I  replied  that  I  could  not  say  that;  our  hands  were  still 
free,  and  we  were  considering  what  our  attitude  should  be. 
All  I  could  say  was  that  our  attitude  would  be  determined 
largely  by  public  opinion  here,  and  that  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium  would  appeal  very  strongly  to  public  opinion  here. 
I  did  not  think  that  I  could  give  a  promise  of  neutrality  on 
that  condition  alone. 

"  The  ambassador  pressed  me  as  to  whether  I  could  not 
formulate  conditions  on  which  we  would  remain  neutral. 
He  even  suggested  that  the  integrity  of  France  and  her 
colonies  might  be  guaranteed. 

"  I  said  that  I  felt  obliged  to  refuse  definitely  any 
promise  to  remain  neutral  on  similar  terms,  and  I  could 
only  say  that  we  must  keep  our  hands  free. 

"  I  am,  etc, 

"  E.  Grey." 

Now,  was  the  Foreign  Secretary  In  a  position  to 
deal  with  the  German  ambassador?  Most  certainly 
not.  In  the  first  place  Sir  Edward  Grey's  hands 
were  not  free ;  he  was  bound  hand  and  foot  by  the 
plans  of  the  French  and  British  General  Staffs,  and 
the  conversations  entered  Into  In  January,  1906.  In 
the  second  place  public  opinion  was  not  In  any  way 
ripe  for  war;  every  Liberal,  Radical,  and  Socialist 
paper  In  the  kingdom  was  dead  against  our  participa- 
tion in  a  European  war.  There  was  no  Jingo  feel- 
ing worth  speaking  of  on  July  31st.     Besides,  the 


HELPLESSNESS  291 

Cabinet  was  not  anything  like  agreed :  it  was  then  in 
search  of  a  casus  belli.  Then,  in  the  third  place,  Sir 
Edward  Grey  and  the  Cabinet  could  not  have  done 
anything  else  but  remain  neutral,  if  Germany  had 
given  her  pledge  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  Bel- 
gium; presuming,  of  course,  the  neutrality  of  Bel- 
gium were  the  determining  question.  If  the  neu- 
trality of  Belgium  had  been  the  dominant  matter,  we 
should  have  been  obliged  to  abstain  altogether  if 
Germany  had  given  the  pledge,  and  take  no  action 
until  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  were  violated.  Sir 
Edward  Grey  was  as  powerless  to  remain  neutral 
as  Prometheus  to  chase  the  eagle  from  his  vitals. 

What  hope  was  there  for  peace  after  the  interview 
recorded  in  despatch  No.  123  ?  What  was  the  effect 
at  the  German  Foreign  OfBce  when  they  heard  from 
Prince  Lichnowsky  the  result  of  his  interview  with 
Sir  Edward  Grey?  Still,  our  Foreign  Secretary 
made  on  August  ist,  another  attempt  to  influence 
Russia.  He  sent  to  the  British  ambassador  at  Pet- 
ersburg instructions  that  he  "  should  inform  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  and  say  that  if,  in  the  considera- 
tion of  the  acceptance  of  mediation  by  Austria,  Rus- 
sia can  agree  to  stop  mobilization,  it  appears  still  to 
be  possible  to  preserve  peace.  Presumably  the  mat- 
ter should  be  discussed  with  German  Government, 
also  by  Russian  Government."  The  last  message 
from  the  British  ambassador  at  Petersburg  was  sent 
on  August  1st,  reached  London  August  2nd,  and  its 
contents  referred  to  the  affairs  of  July  31st.  The 
only  bit  of  news  worth  mentioning  in  that  long  rig- 
marole is,  "  The  Emperor  of  Russia  read  his  tele- 
gram to  the  German  Emperor,  to  the  German  am- 
bassador at  the  audience  given  to  His  Excellency  yes- 


292     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

terday.  No  progress  whatever  was  made."  Of 
course  not.  The  only  way  progress  towards  peace 
could  be  made  was  by  demobilizing,  and  that  Russia 
would  not  do.  No  answer  came  from  Petersburg 
to  Sir  Edward  Grey's  suggestion  of  August  ist. 
But  from  Berlin  came  v^ery  serious  news.  The  Brit- 
ish ambassador  telegraphed: 

"  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  said  that  Aus- 
tria's readiness  to  discuss  was  the  result  of  German  influence 
at  Vienna,  and,  had  not  Russia  mobilized  against  Germany, 
all  would  have  been  well.  But  Russia  by  abstaining  from 
answering  Germany's  demand  that  she  should  demobilize, 
had  caused  Germany  to  mobilize  also.  Russia  had  said  that 
her  mobilization  did  not  necessarily  imply  war,  and  that 
she  could  perfectly  well  remain  mobilized  for  months  with- 
out making  war.  This  was  not  the  case  with  Germany. 
She  had  the  speed  and  Russia  had  the  numbers,  and  the 
safety  of  the  German  Empire  forbade  that  Germany  should 
allow  Russia  time  to  bring  up  masses  of  troops  from  all  parts 
of  her  wide  dominions.  The  situation  now  was  that, 
though  the  Imperial  Government  had  allowed  her  several 
hours  beyond  the  specified  time,  Russia  had  sent  no  answer. 
Germany  had  therefore  ordered  mobilization,  and  the  Ger- 
man representative  at  St.  Petersburg  had  been  instructed 
within  a  certain  time  to  inform  the  Russian  Government 
that  the  Imperial  Government  must  regard  their  refusal  to 
answer  as  creating  a  state  of  war." 

The  ambassadors  at  Petersburg  and  Vienna  were 
perhaps  too  busy  doubting  one  another's  sincerity 
to  spend  much  time  in  working  for  peace.  In  those 
capitals  the  band-of-hope  spirit  seems  not  to  have 
pervaded  the  chancelleries.  In  London,  on  Satur- 
day, August  I  St,  the  situation  was  extremely  grave. 
Late  that  night  Lord  Lansdowne,  Sir  Edward  Car- 
son, and  Mr.  Bonar  Law  hastened  to  the  centre  of  the 


THE  DRUM-BEAT  293 

diplomatic  world.  Germany  had  issued  orders  for 
the  general  mobilization  of  her  army  and  navy;  the 
next  day,  the  Sabbath,  to  be  the  first  day.  Later  it 
was  reported  that  the  Russians  had  blown  up  a  rail- 
way bridge  between  Szezakowa  and  Granitza.  The 
despatching  business  was  fast  drawing  to  a  close, 
and  the  period  of  deeds  was  taking  the  place  of 
words,  words,  words.  And  the  war-weary  world 
rose  again,  like  the  phoenix,  from  the  ashes  of  a  mil- 
lion battlefields,  to  give  her  best  blood  and  bone  to 
the  insatiable  god  of  war.  Through  the  long  Sab- 
bath, all  over  the  kingdom,  thousands  of  feet 
tramped  Channel-wards;  regiment  after  regiment 
with  full  kit  wound  through  London  streets  as  the 
bells  from  tower  and  steeple  called  the  folk  to 
prayer.  Ministers  went  to  a  Cabinet  meeting,  there 
to  yield  up  to  the  French  ambassador  some  token  of 
Britain's  friendship. 

No.  148. 
(Telegraphic.) 

"  Foreign  Office^  August  2nd,  1914. 

"  After  the  Cabinet  this  morning  I  gave  M.  Cambon  the 
following  memorandum: 

"  '  I  am  authorized  to  give  an  assurance  that,  if  the  Ger- 
man fleet  comes  into  the  Channel  or  through  the  North  Sea 
to  undertake  hostile  operations  against  French  coast  or 
shipping,  the  British  fleet  will  give  all  the  protection  in  its 
power.' 

"  '  This  assurance  is  of  course  subject  to  the  policy  of  His 
Majesty's  Government  receiving  the  support  of  Parliament, 
and  must  not  be  taken  as  binding  His  Majesty's  Government 
to  take  any  action  until  the  above  contingency  of  action  by 
the  German  fleet  takes  place.'  " 

Having  been  treated  to  so  many  "  not  binding  " 


294     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

agreements  the  French  ambassador  must  have  won- 
dered how  they  all  stuck  together.  It  was,  however, 
a  fairly  safe  pledge  to  give;  for  the  Cabinet  knew 
pretty  nearly  where  the  German  fleet  then  was,  and 
just  about  how  much  chance  it  had  of  interfering 
with  the  passage  of  the  Expeditionary  Force  across 
the  Channel.     But  there  are  two  more  paragraphs : 

"  I  pointed  out  that  we  had  very  large  questions  and  most 
difficult  issues  to  consider,  and  that  Government  felt  that 
they  could  not  bind  themselves  to  declare  war  upon  Ger- 
many necessarily  if  war  broke  out  between  France  and  Ger- 
many to-morrow,  but  it  was  essential  to  the  French  Govern- 
ment, whose  fleet  had  long  been  concentrated  in  the 
Mediterannean,  to  know  how  to  make  their  dispositions 
with  their  north  coast  entirely  undefended.  We  therefore 
thought  it  necessary  to  give  them  this  assurance.  It  did  not 
bind  us  to  go  to  war  with  Germany  unless  the  German  fleet 
took  the  action  indicated,  but  it  did  give  a  security  to  France 
that  would  enable  her  to  settle  the  disposition  of  her  own 
Mediterranean  fleet. 

"  M.  Cambon  asked  me  about  the  violation  of  Luxem- 
bourg. I  told  him  the  doctrine  laid  down  by  Lord  Derby 
and  Lord  Clarendon  in  1867.  He  asked  me  what  we 
should  say  about  the  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium. 
I  said  that  was  a  much  more  important  matter;  we  were 
considering  what  statement  we  should  make  in  Parliament 
to-morrow  —  in  effect,  whether  we  should  declare  violation 
of  Belgian  neutrality  to  be  a  casus  belli.  I  told  him  what 
had  been  said  to  the  German  ambassador  on  this  point." 

It  is  evident  the  Cabinet  was  not  agreed  about 
Belgium  two  days  after  the  Foreign  Secretary  had 
asked  the  Belgian  Government  whether  they  would 
maintain  to  the  utmost  of  their  power  their  neutral- 
ity. Sir  Edward  Grey  must  have  found  himself  in  a 
very  difficult  position  with  the  Cabinet  on  August 


THE  COUNTRY  IN  IGNORANCE     295 

2nd.  What  Continental  Governments  thought  of 
the  situation  can  be  guessed;  and  our  impatient 
friends  in  Russia,  and  France,  and  Belgium,  were  no 
doubt  amazed  at  the  delay  of  the  British  Cabinet  in 
coming  to  the  support  of  the  military  and  naval  ex- 
perts. Some  members  of  the  Cabinet  learned  more 
that  Sunday  about  secret  diplomacy  and  its  conse- 
quences than  they  will  ever  wish  to  know  again  in 
their  political  lives.  Perhaps  the  replies  of  the 
Prime  Minister  and  the  Foreign  Secretary  to  ques- 
tions put  in  the  House  on  several  occasions  as  to  our 
military  obligations  came  like  ghosts  into  the  council 
room.     But  — 

"  Who  can  be  wise,  amazed,  temperate  and  furious, 
Loyal  and  neutral,  in  a  moment?     No  man." 

In  Whitehall  as  Ministers  passed  along  to  Down- 
ing Street  to  attend  the  second  Cabinet  meeting,  a 
crowd  of  people  parted  to  let  a  regiment  march 
through.  Save  for  a  short  cheer  from  a  few  young 
men,  the  troops  filed  along  an  avenue  of  silent,  re- 
spectful friends.  Two  Ministers  strode  round  the 
corner  into  Downing  Street  unnoticed  by  the  crowd; 
they  were  going  to  a  meeting  where  a  casus  belli  was 
to  be  found.  The  troops  tramped  on  past  the  War 
Office  and  the  Admiralty,  but  no  one  knew  their  desti- 
nation. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE   FOREIGN   SECRETARY'S   STATEMENT 

"  If  generous  honesty,  valour,  and  plain  dealing  be  the 
cognizance  of  thy  family,  or  characteristic  of  the  country, 
hold  fast  such  inclinations  sucked  in  with  thy  first  breath, 
and  which  lay  in  the  cradle  with  thee.  Fall  not  into 
transforming  degenerations,  which  under  the  old  name 
create  a  new  nation." 

—  Sir  Thomas  Browne. 

Going  to  the  House  of  Commons  on  Monday, 
August  3rd,  a  member  might  have  been  forgiven  for 
loitering  a  little  while  in  the  halls  of  Westminster 
and  St.  Stephen.  What  scenes  in  our  history  came 
thronging  to  the  mind!  What  an  enacting  and  an- 
nulling and  amending  of  statutes!  What  change 
and  decay  of  customs  and  of  men!  What  begin- 
nings and  endings  of  wars !  What  speeches  on  the 
benefits  the  wars  would  bring  to  the  people!  Mem- 
ories of  North  and  Burke  rising  to  mock  one,  and 
abruptly  turn  one's  thoughts  to  the  last  dispute  be- 
tween us  and  folk  of  our  own  stock.  Loitering  there 
the  mind  became  so  full  that  time  lost  its  significance; 
and  memory  so  crowded  the  halls  with  the  ghosts 
of  our  national  drama  that  never  ends,  that  Crom- 
well seemed  to  pass  under  the  arch  out  into  the 
Palace  Yard. 

The  House  was  full  long  before  Mr.  Speaker  ap- 
peared with  mace  and  chaplain.  Never  so  many 
came  to  prayers  before.     How  speedily  the  prelimi- 

296 


ANXIETY  297 

narles  were  dealt  with  after  the  service.  The  haste 
to  get  to  war  edipsed  anything  ever  done  to  make 
for  peace  and  happiness.  Earher  in  the  forenoon 
the  whisper,  "  Are  we  in  it?  "  passed  from  member 
to  member  in  the  lobby.  The  Foreign  Secretary  had 
not  been  speaking  for  more  than  five  minutes  when 
the  question  was  approached.  Those  who  had  re- 
lied on  the  answers  of  the  Prime  Minister  and  Sir 
Edward  Grey  to  the  many  questions  put  in  time  past 
regarding  secret  understandings  with  France,  did  not 
lose  hope  until  they  heard  the  following: 

"  I  come  first,  now,  to  the  question  of  British  obligations. 
I  have  assured  the  House  —  and  the  Prime  Minister  has 
assured  the  House  more  than  once  —  that  if  any  crisis  such 
as  this  arose,  we  should  come  before  the  House  of  Commons 
and  be  able  to  say  to  the  House  that  it  was  free  to  decide 
what  the  British  attitude  should  be,  that  we  would  have  no 
secret  engagement  which  we  should  spring  upon  the  House, 
and  tell  the  House  that,  because  we  had  entered  into  that 
engagement,  there  was  an  obligation  of  honour  upon  this 
country.  I  will  deal  with  that  point  to  clear  the  ground 
first." 

These  were  strange  words  to  come  from  a  Foreign 
Secretary  at  such  a  time.  Members  had  assembled 
to  hear  a  complete  statement  of  the  foreign  imbro- 
glio. Were  they  to  be  treated  to  an  explanation  and 
a  defence  of  what  Mr.  Asquith  and  Sir  Edward  Grey 
had  said  in  reply  to  questions?  Surely  the  answers 
when  they  were  given  were  quite  sufficient  to  dis- 
pose of  the  ugly  rumours.  Why  unearth  all  those 
answers  now?  Was  it  not  enough,  the  assurance 
that  no  compact  of  any  kind  committing  the  coun- 
try to  obligations  of  war  would  be  entered  into  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  House?     Even  the  Foreign 


298     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

Secretary,  himself,  In  November,    191 1,  had  said: 

"  I  saw  a  comment  made  the  other  day,  when  these  arti- 
cles (Moroccan  secret  agreements)  were  published,  that  if 
a  Government  would  keep  little  things  secret,  a  fortiori  they 
would  keep  big  things  secret.  That  is  absolutely  untrue. 
There  may  be  reasons  why  a  Government  should  make 
secret  arrangements  of  that  kind  if  they  are  not  things  of 
first-rate  importance  —  if  they  are  subsidiary  to  matters  of 
great  importance.  But  that  is  the  very  reason  the  British 
Government  should  not  make  secret  engagements  which 
commit  Parliament  to  obligations  of  war.  It  would  be 
foolish  to  do  it.  No  British  Government  could  embark 
upon  a  war  without  public  opinion  behind  it,  and  such  en- 
gagements as  there  are  which  really  commit  Parliament 
to  anything  of  that  kind  are  contained  in  Treaties  or  Agree- 
ments which  have  been  laid  before  the  House.  For  our- 
selves, we  have  not  made  a  single  secret  article  of  any  kind 
since  we  came  into  office." 

That  statement  was  made  just  one  year  before  he 
exchanged  letters  with  the  French  ambassador,  and 
about  six  years  after  he  authorized  the  conversations 
between  the  British  and  French  military  and  naval 
experts.  There  was  nothing  to  spring  on  the 
House!  On  August  3rd,  the  House  was  quite  free 
to  decide  what  the  British  attitude  would  be.  Quite  ! 
It  could  recall  the  fleet  if  it  thought  fit,  It  could  coun- 
termand the  orders  to  the  Expeditionary  Force,  and 
It  could  tear  up  the  plans  of  General  Staffs.  The 
mockery  of  It  all!  when  Reuter  told  us  what  was 
happening  In  Petersburg: 

"  St.  Petersburg,  August  3rd. 
"  Crowds  of    thousands  of   people   made   demonstrations 
to-day  before  the  British   Embassy  here.     Sir  George  Bu- 
chanan,   the    ambassador,    appeared    at    the    window    and 


A  RUBBER  STAMP  299 

addressed  the  crowd.  Amid  frantic  cheering  he  declared 
England's  perfect  sympathy  with  Russia.  The  Secretary 
of  the  Embassy,  standing  beside  the  ambassador,  then  raised 
cheers  for  Russia." 

Did  the  British  ambassador  at  Petersburg  be- 
lieve the  House  of  Commons  was  free  to  do  anything 
else  but  vote  supply?  And  what  would  it  have  mat- 
tered to  the  Government  if  one  hundred  members 
challenged  a  division  on  a  vote  of  credit?  There 
w^ere  five  hundred  to  vote  for  it.  Opinion  in  the 
House  was  ripe  enough,  if  it  were  not  nearly  ripe 
in  the  country.  The  week  end  had  made  all  the 
difference.  Why  the  statement  was  not  made  on  the 
Friday,  or  on  the  Thursday  when  Sir  Edward  Grey 
was  told  repeatedly  that  a  British  declaration  to  sup- 
port France  and. Russia  would  have  made  for  peace, 
must  be  obvious  to  any  one  who  has  gone  into  the 
w^hole  matter.  The  Cabinet  were  not  agreed  until 
Sunday  night.  There  were  other  weighty  reasons, 
but  that  was  the  chief  one.  Preparations  had  gone 
too  far  on  Sunday  for  the  Government  to  decline 
to  honour  the  negotiations  of  the  "  Commander  of 
the  Forces." 

Sir  Edward  Grey's  explanation  of  what  took  place 
in  January,  1906,  is  curious,  looked  at  in  the  light 
of  the  Delcasse  interview  and  the  Lausanne  reve- 
lations referred  to  elsewhere.     He  said: 

"  In  this  present  crisis  up  till  yesterday,  we  have  also 
given  no  promise  of  anything  more  than  diplomatic  sup- 
port —  up  till  yesterday  no  promise  of  more  than  diplomatic 
support.  Now  I  must  make  this  question  of  obligation 
clear  to  the  House.  I  must  go  back  to  the  first  Moroccan 
crisis  in  1906.  That  was  the  time  of  the  Algeciras  Con- 
ference, and  it  came  at  a  time  of  very  great  difficulty  to 


300     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

His  Majesty's  Government  when  a  general  election  was 
in  progress,  and  Ministers  were  scattered  over  the  country, 
and  I  —  spending  three  days  a  week  in  my  constituency  and 
three  days  at  the  Foreign  Office  —  was  asked  the  question 
whether  if  that  crisis  developed  into  war  between  France 
and  Germany  we  would  give  armed  support.  I  said  then 
that  I  could  promise  nothing  to  any  foreign  Power  unless 
it  was  subsequently  to  receive  the  whole-hearted  support  of 
public  opinion  here  if  the  occasion  arose.  I  said,  in  my 
opinion,  if  war  was  forced  upon  France  then  on  the  ques- 
tion of  Morocco  —  a  question  which  had  just  been  the 
subject  of  agreement  between  this  country  and  France,  an 
agreement  exceedingly  popular  on  both  sides  —  that  if  out 
of  that  agreement  w^ar  was  forced  on  France  at  that  time, 
in  my  view  public  opinion  in  this  country  would  have  ral- 
lied to  the  material  support  of  France.  I  gave  no  promise, 
but  I  expressed  that  opinion  during  the  crisis,  as  far  as  I 
can  remember,  almost  in  the  same  words,  to  the  French 
ambassador  and  the  German  ambassador  at  the  same  time. 
I  made  no  promise,  and  I  used  no  threats;  but  I  expressed 
that  opinion.  That  position  was  accepted  by  the  French 
Government,  but  they  said  to  me  at  the  time  —  and  I  think 
very  reasonably  — '  if  you  think  it  possible  that  the  public 
opinion  of  Great  Britain  might,  should  a  sudden  crisis 
arise,  justify  you  in  giving  to  France  the  armed  support 
which  you  cannot  promise  in  advance,  you  will  not  be  able 
to  give  that  support,  even  if  you  wish  to  give  it,  when  the 
time  comes,  unless  some  conversations  have  already  taken 
place  between  naval  and  military  experts.'  There  was 
force  in  that.  I  agreed  to  it,  and  authorized  those  conver- 
sations to  take  place,  but  on  the  distinct  understanding  that 
nothing  which  passed  between  military^  and  naval  experts 
should  bind  either  Government  or  restrict  in  any  way  their 
freedom  to  make  a  decision  as  to  whether  or  not  they  would 
give  that  support  when  the  time  arose." 

Nothing  binding!     But  what  did  the  French  Gov- 
ernment care  about  that;  all  they  wanted  was  his 


REVELATIONS  301 

consent  to  the  conversations.  That  was  all-sufficient. 
Once  conversations  had  gone  so  far  as  to  affect  the 
military  and  naval  positions  of  the  two  countries, 
the  experts  and  General  Staffs  would  see  to  it  that 
Britain  would  be  unable  to  leave  France  in  the  lurch 
when  the  "  sudden  crisis  "  arose.  No  one  can  blame 
the  French  ambassador  for  taking  every  advantage 
of  the  new  Foreign  Secretary;  in  the  game  of  diplo- 
macy M.  Cambon  won  all  along  the  line.  But  was 
it  not  bad  enough  to  leave  the  making  of  war  and 
peace  to  a  Cabinet;  bad  enough  to  let  the  fate  of  a 
nation  remain  in  the  hands  of  diplomatists?  To 
yield  up  the  most  vital  interests  of  our  people  to  the 
whims  and  caprices  of  militarists  was  the  most  colos- 
sal blunder  a  Liberal  statesman  could  be  guilty  of  in 
these  days  of  armament-rings  and  a  subsidized  Jingo 
press. 

We  now  understand  many  cryptic  utterances  of 
Conservative  statesmen  delivered  during  the  month 
of  December,  1905.  Sir  Henry  Campbell-Banner- 
man  had  spoken  at  the  Albert  Hall  on  armaments 
and  suggested  a  reduction  of  expenditure.  Five 
days  afterwards,  Mr,  Balfour  replied  to  the  new 
Prime  Minister's  speech.     Mr.  Balfour  said: 

*'  I  noticed  with  amazement  that  Sir  Henry  Campbell- 
Bannerman,  at  the  Albert  Hall,  in  the  speech  to  which  I 
have  just  referred,  announced  to  his  audience  that  he  meant 
to  cut  down  the  cost,  and,  as  I  understood  him,  with  the 
cost  the  number  and  magnitude  of  the  defensive  forces  of 
the  Crown  —  Army  and  Navy,  as  the  case  may  be.  I  won- 
der whether  he  consulted  the  present  Secretary  of  State  for 
War  before  giving  that  pledge.  I  doubt  whether  he  did. 
.  .  .  His  pledge  to  reduce  the  cost  of  our  armaments  and 
the  magnitude  of  our  armaments  is  a  pledge  not  given  with 


302     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

knowledge,  not  given  after  study,  not  given  in  consequence 
of  our  Imperial  responsibilities." 

Did  Mr.  Balfour  mean  that  the  new  Liberal  Gov- 
ernment had  not  only  taken  over  the  foreign  policy 
of  their  predecessors,  but  they  had  also  taken  over 
the  secret  understandings  with  France  to  give  armed 
support  when  the  "sudden  crisis"  would  arise? 
What  else  could  Mr.  Balfour  mean?  Lord  Percy, 
the  Under-Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs 
said,  just  before  his  Government  resigned,  that,  "  no 
one  doubted  for  a  moment  that  the  Liberal  party 
would  faithfully  fulfil  the  obligations  which  the  Gov- 
ernment had  already  entered  into  with  various  coun- 
tries. They  would,  of  course,  fulfil  in  the  spirit  and 
the  letter  the  understanding  which  we  had  happily 
made  with  France."  Why  should  Mr.  Balfour  won- 
der whether  Sir  Henry  Campbell-Bannerman  had 
consulted  Mr.  Haldane,  the  Secretary  for  War,  be- 
fore suggesting  reduction  of  "  cost  of  armaments 
and  the  magnitude  of  our  armaments,"  if  it  were  not 
a  matter  of  our  being  committed  to  obligations  of 
war  with  France?  Continuity  of  foreign  policy  en- 
tailed continui'ty  of  armed  support,  and  all  the  diplo- 
matic sins  of  political  forefathers  were  inherited  by 
the  Puritan  fathers,  who  were  pledged  to  the  coun- 
try to  walk  in  the  paths  of  freedom,  righteousness, 
and  peace. 

The  House  had  listened  to  the  Foreign  Secretary's 
explanation  with  the  receptiveness  of  children,  but 
without  their  insistent  inquisitiveness.  The  House 
was  not  in  an  analytical  mood,  for  the  combative 
instinct  does  not  carry  analysis  with  it.  The  ex- 
planation of  how  the  letters  came  to  be  exchanged 
with  M.  Cambon  was  accepted  without  amazement: 


FOREIGN  OFFICE'S  CASE  303 

"  The  Agadir  crisis  came  —  another  Moroccan  crisis  — 
and  throughout  that  I  took  precisely  the  same  line  that  had 
been  taken  in  1906.  But  subsequently,  in  1912,  after  dis- 
cussion and  consideration  in  the  Cabinet  it  was  decided  that 
we  ought  to  have  a  definite  understanding  in  writing,  which 
was  to  be  only  in  the  form  of  an  unofficial  letter,  and  these 
considerations  which  took  place  were  not  binding  upon  the 
freedom  of  either  Government;  and  on  the  22nd  of  Novem- 
ber, 19 1 2,  I  wrote  to  the  French  ambassador  the  letter 
which  I  will  now  read  to  the  House;  and  I  received  from 
him  a  letter  in  similar  terms  in  reply.  The  letter  which 
I  have  to  read  to  the  House  is  this,  and  it  will  be  known 
to  the  public  now  as  the  record  that,  whatever  took  place 
between  military  and  naval  experts,  they  were  not  binding 
engagements  upon  the  Government: 

"  '  My  dear  Ambassador :  From  time  to  time  in  recent 
years  the  French  and  British  military  and  naval  experts 
have  consulted  together.  It  has  always  been  understood 
that  such  consultation  does  not  restrict  the  freedom  of  either 
Government  to  decide  at  any  future  time  whether  or  not 
to  assist  the  other  by  armed  force.  We  have  agreed  that 
consultation  between  experts  is  not  and  ought  not  to  be 
regarded  as  an  engagement  that  commits  either  Government 
to  action  in  a  contingency  that  has  not  yet  arisen  and  may 
never  arise.  The  disposition,  for  instance,  of  the  French 
and  British  fleets  respectively  at  the  present  moment  is  not 
based  upon  an  engagement  to  co-operate  in  war, 

"  '  You  have,  however,  pointed  out  that,  if  either  Govern- 
ment have  grave  reason  to  expect  an  unprovoked  attack  by 
a  third  Power,  it  might  become  essential  to  know  whether 
it  could  in  that  event  depend  upon  the  armed  assistance  of 
the  other. 

"  '  I  agree  that,  if  either  Government  had  grave  reason 
to  expect  an  unprovoked  attack  by  a  third  Power,  or  some- 
thing that  threatened  the  general  peace,  it  should  immedi- 
ately discuss  with  the  other  whether  both  Governments 
should   act  together  to  prevent  aggression  and   to  preserve 


304     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

peace,  and,  if  so,  what  measures  they  would  be  prepared  to 
take  in  common.'  " 

The  most  important  sentence  in  the  letter  which  is 
given  in  full  in  the  White  Paper,  not  published  until 
August  6th,  was  not  read  to  the  House : 

"  If  these  measures  involved  action,  the  plans  of  the  Gen- 
eral Staffs  would  at  once  be  taken  into  consideration,  and 
the  Governments  would  then  decide  what  effect  should  be 
given  to  them." 

A  remarkable  letter!  If  there  had  been  a  para- 
graph in  it  on  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  it  would 
have  been  complete.  But  what  it  had  to  do  with  the 
Agadir  crisis  no  one  but  the  Foreign  Secretary  knows. 
It  bears  a  date  twelve  months  after  the  Agadir  affair 
was  closed.  It  is  an  amazing  document,  look  at  it 
how  you  will.  It  might  seem  to  some  people  that  it 
should  bear  a  date  somewhere  about  the  beginning 
of  July,  191 1 ;  others  might  think  a  date  not  later 
than  July  29th,  19 14,  would  be  nearer  the  mark. 
There  is,  however,  this  to  be  considered :  when  Lord 
Hugh  Cecil  heckled  the  Prime  Minister  in  February, 
19 13,  he  described  the  position  quite  fairly;  but,  on 
the  other  hand,  in  the  session  of  1913,  both  in  the 
Commons  and  the  Lords,  Ministers  stated  quite 
frankly  that  it  was  left  to  the  French  fleet  to  bear 
the  brunt  of  looking  after  British  interests  in  the 
Mediterranean. 

If  the  House  had  been  given  the  last  paragraph 
of  the  letter  it  would  have  been  in  a  better  position 
to  understand  the  Foreign  Secretary's  desperate 
pleading  for  sympathy  for  the  undefended  northern 
and  western  coasts  of  France.     He  went  on  to  say: 

"  The  French  fleet  is  now  in  the  Mediterranean,  and  the 


"  FRIENDSHIP  AND  CONFIDENCE  "     305 

northern  and  western  coasts  of  France  are  absolutely  un- 
defended. The  French  fleet  being  concentrated  in  the 
Mediterranean,  the  situation  is  very  different  from  what  it 
used  to  be,  because  the  friendship  which  has  grown  up 
between  the  two  countries  has  given  them  a  sense  of  secur- 
ity that  there  was  nothing  to  be  feared  from  us.  The 
French  coasts  are  absolutely  undefended.  The  French  fleet 
is  in  the  Mediterranean,  and  has  for  some  years  been  con- 
centrated there  because  of  the  feeling  of  confidence  and 
friendship  which  has  existed  between  the  two  countries. 
...  If  we  say  nothing  at  this  moment,  what  is  France  to 
do  with  her  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean?  If  she  leaves  it 
there,  with  no  statement  from  us  as  to  what  we  will  do, 
she  leaves  her  northern  and  western  coasts  absolutely  un- 
defended, at  the  mercy  of  a  German  fleet  coming  down  the 
Channel,  to  do  as  it  pleases  in  a  war  of  life  and  death 
between  them.  If  we  say  nothing,  it  may  be  that  the 
French  fleet  is  withdrawn  from  the  Mediterranean.  .  .  . 
We  have  not  kept  a  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean  which  is 
equal  to  dealing  alone  with  a  combination  of  other  fleets 
in  the  Mediterranean." 

So  it  was  friendship  and  confidence  that  kept  the 
French  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean  and  left  the 
northern  and  western  coasts  absolutely  undefended. 
The  conversations  between  the  British  and  French 
experts  had  nothing  to  do  with  It.  The  General 
Staffs,  trusting  wholly  to  the  friendship  which  had 
grown  up,  left  the  coasts  of  Brittany,  Normandy, 
Biscay,  and  the  Straits,  absolutely  undefended.  Ac- 
cording to  military  laws,  they  ought  to  have  been 
shot.  In  the  early  days  of  M.  Delcasse  there  must 
have  been  keener  men  on  the  staff,  for  In  July,  1905, 
the  Foreign  Secretary  of  France  said,  "  The  entente 
between  the  two  countries,  and  the  coalition  of  their 
navies,   constitutes   such  a   formidable   machine   of 


3o6     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

naval  war  that  neither  Germany,  nor  any  other 
Power,  would  dare  to  face  such  an  overwhelming 
force  at  sea."  Friendship  and  confidence  then  evi- 
dently did  not  supersede  military  resource  and  naval 
foresight. 

The  British  Foreign  Secretary  made  great  play 
with  the  story  of  the  French  fleet  being  concen- 
trated in  the  Mediterranean,  and  the  French  coasts 
being  absolutely  undefended.  In  the  French  des- 
patches in  the  Yellow  Book,  however,  there  is  noth- 
ing about  the  French  fleet  being  concentrated  in  the 
Mediterranean,  and  the  northern  and  western  coasts 
being  absolutely  undefended.  Indeed  all  reference 
to  the  disposition  of  the  French  fleet  and  the  de- 
fenceless position  of  her  northern  and  western  coasts 
are  suppressed  in  French  despatches.  Perhaps  the 
story  was  for  British  consumption  only.  Singularly 
enough  the  French  diplomatic  documents  throw 
quite  another  light  on  the  question  of  the  French 
fleet.  It  was  on  August  ist  that  the  question  was 
discussed  between  Sir  Edward  Grey  and  M.  Cam- 
bon.  The  French  ambassador  then  sent  word  to 
the  French  Prime  Minister  that  "  Sir  Edward  Grey 
will  propose  to  his  colleagues  that  they  should  de- 
clare that  the  fleet  will  oppose  the  passage  of  the 
German  squadrons  through  the  Straits;  or,  if  they 
passed  the  Straits,  to  any  demonstration  on  the 
French  coasts."  That  was  the  day  before  the  mat- 
ter was  discussed  by  the  Cabinet.  The  authoriza- 
tion to  this  proposal  was  given  by  the  Cabinet  the 
next  day;  but  in  the  French  ambassador's  despatch 
to  his  Government  he  did  not  refer  to  the  disposi- 
tion of  the  fleet;  he  did  not  say  why  the  British  Cabi- 
net had  given  the  pledge  to  assist  the  French  "  if  a 


VIVIANI  VS.  GREY  307 

German  fleet  were  to  undertake  acts  of  war  against 
the  French  coasts  or  the  French  mercantile  marine." 
On  August  2nd,  M.  Viviani,  the  French  Prime 
Minister,  telegraphed  to  the  French  ambassador  at 
London  as  follows : 

"  In  communicating  to  the  Chambers  the  same  declara- 
tion that  Sir  Edward  Grey  has  made  to  you,  of  which  your 
last  telegram  gives  me  the  text,  I  will  add  that  we  have 
herein  obtained  from  Great  Britain  a  first  support,  the  value 
of  which  is  precious  to  us. 

"  I  propose,  moreover,  to  indicate  that  the  assistance 
which  Great  Britain  has  the  intention  of  giving  to  France, 
with  the  view  of  protecting  the  French  coasts  or  the  French 
mercantile  marine,  would  be  so  exerted  as  to  afford  equal 
support  to  our  Navy  by  the  English  Fleet,  in  the  case  of  a 
Franco-German  conflict,  in  the  Atlantic  as  well  as  in  the 
North  Sea  and  in  the  English  Channel." 

This  does  not  coincide  with  the  statement  made  In 
the  House  by  Sir  Edward  Grey.  If  the  French 
fleet  were  concentrated  in  the  Mediterranean  and 
the  northern  and  western  coasts  were  absolutely  un- 
defended, how  could  the  French  fleet  fear  an  attack 
from  the  German  navy  In  the  Atlantic,  or  In  the 
North  Sea,  or  In  the  English  Channel?  Either  the 
French  Prime  Minister  did  not  know  where  his  fleet 
was  at  the  time,  or  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  been  mis- 
Informed  by  the  French  ambassador.  The  British 
Foreign  Secretary  was  certain  when  he  notified  our 
ambassador  at  Paris  on  August  2nd,  of  the  Cabinet 
decision  to  give  naval  support  to  France,  that  the 
French  fleet  was  concentrated  In  the  Mediterranean, 
and  that  the  north  coast  was  "  entirely  undefended." 
And  we  were  led  to  believe  such  was  the  disposition 
of  the  French  fleet  when  the  Foreign  Secretary  spoke 


3o8     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

to  the  House  on  August  3rd,  and  made  out  an  ex- 
tremely pathetic  case  which  served  its  purpose. 

The  first  half  of  the  speech  was  devoted  to  France 
and  the  second  half  to  Belgium.  He  referred  to  the 
German  reply  to  his  question  about  observing  the  neu- 
trality of  Belgium,  but  he  said  nothing  about  his  in- 
terview with  Prince  Lichnowsky.  All  the  House  got 
from  him  on  the  real  situation  was  just  so  much  as 
would  help  his  case  and  no  more.  After  dealing 
with  his  communication  to  the  Belgian  Government 
he  said: 

"It  now  appears  from  the  news  I  have  received  to-day 
—  which  has  come  quite  recently,  and  I  am  not  yet  quite 
sure  how  far  it  has  reached  me  in  an  accurate  form  —  that 
an  ultimatum  has  been  given  to  Belgium  by  Germany,  the 
object  of  which  was  to  offer  Belgium  friendly  relations  with 
Germany  on  condition  that  she  would  facilitate  the  passage 
of  German  troops  through  Belgium.  Well,  sir,  until  one 
has  these  things  absolutely  definitely,  up  to  the  last  moment, 
I  do  not  wish  to  say  all  that  one  would  say  if  one  were 
in  the  position  to  give  the  House  full,  complete,  and  abso- 
lute information  on  the  point.  We  were  sounded  in  the 
course  of  last  week  as  to  whether  if  a  guarantee  were  given 
that,  after  the  war,  Belgian  integrity  would  be  preserved 
that  would  content  us.  We  replied  that  we  could  not  bar- 
gain away  whatever  interests  or  obligations  we  had  in 
Belgian  neutrality." 

That  was  an  absolutely  misleading  account  of  what 
had  taken  place  between  Berlin  and  London.  "  I 
do  not  wish  to  say  all !  "  All !  no  indeed,  it  would 
not  have  done  to  say  all  on  August  3rd.  But,  then, 
it  was  only  the  House  of  Commons  he  was  address- 
ing; a  House  of  Commons  without  the  White  Paper, 
without  documents  of  any  kind  relating  to  the  mo- 


A  GREAT  FRENCH  COUP  309 

mentous  business  it  was  supposed  to  deal  with.  Sup- 
pose he  had  informed  the  House  that  up  to  Friday, 
July  31st,  he  had  been  told  over  and  over  again  by 
both  Russia  and  France  that  a  declaration  of  Brit- 
ish solidarity  with  those  countries  would  have  made 
for  peace.  Suppose  he  had  told  the  House  that  the 
German  Chancellor  would  not  have  made  the  sug- 
gestion about  Belgian  integrity  after  the  war,  if  the 
Foreign  Secretary  had  let  the  British  ambassador  at 
Berlin  know  about  the  warning  given  to  Prince  Lich- 
nowsky,  as  soon  as  he  let  the  British  ambassador  at 
Paris  know  of  it.  To  refer  to  despatch  No.  85  with- 
out giving  the  House  the  information  in  despatches 
Nos.  98  and  102,  and  the  explanation  of  the  three 
despatches,  was  not  quite  honourable  to  say  the  least. 

"  We  worked  for  peace  up  to  the  last  moment,  and  be- 
yond the  last  moment.  How  hard,  how  persistently,  and 
how  earnestly  we  strove  for  peace  last  week,  the  House  will 
see  from  the  papers  that  will  be  before  it." 

Strove  for  peace  I  Yes,  that  was  true.  And  what 
a  striving!  Bound  hand  and  foot  from  the  be- 
ginning to  support  France,  and  working  night  and 
day  for  peace.  It  was  one  of  the  greatest  triumphs 
of  French  diplomacy  since  the  days  of  Talleyrand. 
So  the  House  was  left  with  its  hands  quite  free  to 
decide  —  what?  That  the  will  of  the  experts  shall 
prevail.  Then,  having  performed  the  duties  of  a 
representative  body,  members  passed  from  the 
period  when  costly  armaments  were  sure  preventives 
of  war,  and  foreign  friendships  the  safest  guardians 
of  peace,  out  into  a  world  distraught  in  which  a 
"  whole  generation  of  men  went  mad  and  tore  them- 
selves to  pieces." 


310     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

While  the  Foreign  Secretary  was  busy  explaining 
himself  to  the  House  of  Commons,  the  French  Gov- 
ernment thought  it  was  high  time  to  do  something 
practical  in  the  interests  of  Belgium,  so  they  offered 
military  support.  The  British  ambassador  at  Brus- 
sels sent  the  following  message  to  Sir  Edward  Grey: 

"  French  Government  have  offered  through  their  military 
attache  the  support  of  five  French  Army  Corps  to  the  Bel- 
gian Government.  Following  reply  had  been  received 
to-day : 

"  *  We  are  sincerely  grateful  to  the  French  Government 
for  offering  eventual  support.  In  the  actual  circumstances, 
however,  we  do  not  propose  to  appeal  to  the  guarantee  of 
the  Powers.  Belgian  Government  will  decide  later  on  the 
action  which  they  may  think  it  necessary  to  take.'  " 

This  offer  of  five  army  corps  from  the  French  is 
suppressed  in  the  Belgian  White  Paper.  The  reason 
for  this  is  evident  in  the  communication  M.  Davig- 
non  made  on  August  3rd,  to  the  German  ambassador : 

"  The  German  Government  stated  in  their  note  of  Au- 
gust 2nd,  that  according  to  reliable  information  French 
forces  intended  to  march  on  the  Meuse  via  Givet  and 
Namur,  and  that  Belgium,  in  spit€  of  her  best  intentions, 
would  not  be  in  a  position  to  repulse,  without  assistance,  an 
advance  of  French  troops.  The  German  Government, 
therefore,  considered  themselves  compelled  to  anticipate  this 
attack  and  to  violate  Belgian  territory.  In  these  circum- 
stances, Germany  proposed  to  the  Belgian  Government  to 
adopt  a  friendly  attitude  towards  her,  and  undertook,  on 
the  conclusion  of  peace,  to  guarantee  the  integrity  of  the 
Kingdom  and  its  possessions  to  their  full  extent.  The  note 
added  that  if  Belgium  put  difficulties  in  the  way  of  the 
advance  of  German  troops,  Germany  would  be  compelled 
to  consider  her  as  an  enemy,  and  to  leave  the  ultimate  ad- 


"  COOPERATION  "—  WHERE  ?       311 

justment  of  the  relations  between   the  two   States  to  the 
decision  of  arms." 

Further,  the  Belgian  Minister  said  that  If  France 
violated  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  her  army  "  would 
offer  the  most  vigorous  resistance  to  the  invader." 

In  Sir  Edward  Grey's  message  to  the  British  am- 
bassador at  Berlin  he  refers  to  the  telegram  from 
the  King  of  the  Belgians  to  King  George,  and  men- 
tions the  proposal  of  the  German  Government  for 
a  free  passage  for  troops  through  Belgium;  but 
nothing  is  said  of  the  French  plan,  alleged  by  the 
Germans,  to  march  on  the  Meuse. 

The  Germans  entered  Belgian  territory  on  the 
morning  of  August  4th.  When  the  House  of  Com- 
mons met,  the  Prime  Minister  made  a  short  state- 
ment, and  sent  an  ultimatum  to  the  German  Govern- 
ment respecting  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  calling 
for  a  reply  before  midnight.  The  Army  Reserve 
was  ordered  out  on  permanent  service. 

That  same  evening  the  British  ambassador  at 
Berlin  received  his  passports,  and  after  eleven  o'clock 
that  night  a  state  of  war  existed  between  Germany 
and  Great  Britain. 

The  saddest  note  of  all  was,  perhaps,  that  from 
the  French  ambassador  at  Brussels  to  the  French 
Government: 

"  The  Chef  du  Cabinet  of  the  Belgian  Ministry  of  War 
has  asked  the  French  military  attache  to  prepare  at  once 
for  the  co-operation  and  contact  of  French  troops  with  the 
Belgian  Army,  pending  the  results  of  the  appeal  to  the 
guaranteeing  Powers  now  being  made.  Orders  have  there- 
fore been  given  to  Belgian  provincial  governors  not  to 
regard  movements  of  French  troops  as  a  violation  of  the 
frontier." 


312     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

Co-operation  1  The  cries  at  Liege  and  Namur 
were,  "Where  are  the  French?  Where  are  the 
English?"  And  General  Leman  who  thought  it 
possible  to  hold  Liege  for  three  days,  astonished  the 
whole  world  by  the  heroic  struggle  which  kept  the 
Germans  at  bay  for  ten  days  ! 

Neither  the  Prime  Minister  nor  the  Foreign  Sec- 
retary in  their  speeches  on  August  3rd,  and  6th,  men- 
tioned the  interview  recorded  in  despatch  No.  123. 
The  whole  case  Mr.  Asquith  made  against  Germany 
was  based  upon  the  "  infamous  proposal  "  despatch 
No.  85.  When  towards  the  end  of  August  the  For- 
eign Secretary  was  asked  "  whether  the  proposals 
of  Prince  Lichnowsky  were  submitted  to  and  consid- 
ered by  the  Cabinet,  and  if  not,  why  proposals  in- 
volving such  far-reaching  possibilities  were  thus  re- 
jected," Sir  Edward  Grey  replied,  "  These  were 
personal  suggestions  made  by  the  ambassador  on 
August  1st,  and  without  authority  to  alter  the  con- 
ditions of  neutrality  proposed  by  the  German  Chan- 
cellor." Then  followed  a  rambling  statement  about 
Cabinet  efforts  on  the  2nd,  to  find  conditions  on  which 
Britain  would  remain  neutral;  but  no  word  about 
Prince  Lichnowsky's  suggestions  being  submitted 
to  the  Cabinet.  The  Foreign  Secretary's  explana- 
tion of  the  reason  why  he  did  not  refer  to  No.  123 
is  as  follows: 

"  I  have  been  asked  why  I  did  not  refer  to  No.  123  In 
the  White  Paper  when  I  spoke  in  the  House  on  August 
3rd.  If  I  had  referred  to  suggestions  to  us  as  to  conditions 
of  neutrality  I  must  have  referred  to  No.  85,  the  proposals 
made  not  personally  by  the  ambassador  but  officially  by  the 


A  BELATED  CASUS  BELLI  313 

German  Chancellor,  which  were  so  condemned  by  the  Prime 
Minister  subsequently,  and  this  would  have  made  the  case 
against  the  German  Government  much  stronger  than  I  did 
make  it  in  my  speech.  I  deliberately  refrained  from  doing 
that  then." 

The  best  that  can  be  said  for  that  answer  is  that 
the  Foreign  Secretary  had  not  taken  the  precaution 
of  reading  again  his  speech  before  replying  to  Mr. 
Keir  Hardie.  Not  only  did  the  Foreign  Secretary 
refer  to  No.  85,  but  he  scored  one  of  his  biggest 
points  In  telling  the  House  what  his  reply  was  to  the 
suggested  "  bargain."  But  the  Important  point  Is 
not  whether  the  Interview  referred  to  In  No.  123 
was  discussed  by  the  Cabinet,  but  whether  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  told  the  Cabinet  that  the  "  bargain  " 
would  not  have  been  made  had  the  German  Chancel- 
lor known  early  on  the  29th,  that  the  Foreign  Sec- 
retary "  was  about  to  warn  Prince  LIchnowsky  not 
to  count  on  our  standing  aside."  The  "bargain" 
was  suggested  before  the  German  Chancellor  knew 
that  Britain  might  not  stand  aside,  and  before  the 
Foreign  Secretary  asked  the  Belgian  Government 
what  they  Intended  to  do  about  their  neutrality.  The 
"  bargain  "  was  suggested  on  the  night  of  July  29th, 
and  the  first  communication  from  the  Foreign  Office, 
recorded  in  the  White  Paper,  to  the  British  ambas- 
sador at  Brussels,  was  sent  on  August  ist.  If  the 
Cabinet  had  known  on  the  30th,  the  contents  of  des- 
patch No.  98,  there  might  have  been  no  necessity 
for  sending  No.  loi,  which  contained  the  reply  to 
No.  85.  So  little  did  the  Cabinet  think  of  the  ques- 
tion of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  that  they  had  not 
agreed  to  make  It  the  casus  belli  until  the  even- 


314     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

Ing  of  Sunday,  August  2nd, —  four  whole  days  after 
the  German  Chancellor  spoke  to  the  British  am- 
bassador at  Berlin  about  it. 

The  suggestions  made  by  the  German  ambassador 
on  August  1st,  were  personal  and  offered  without 
authority,  but  does  despatch  No.  123  indicate  in  the 
slightest  degree  that  the  Foreign  Secretary  was  un- 
der the  Impression  when  he  spoke  to  the  German  am- 
bassador that  he  was  dealing  with  a  man  who  had 
no  authority?  If  Sir  Edward  Grey  doubted  the 
authority  of  Prince  Lichnowsky,  why  did  he  neglect 
to  ask,  in  his  message  to  Sir  E.  Goschen,  if  the  am- 
bassador had  authority  from  the  Berlin  Foreign  Of- 
fice to  discuss  terms  of  British  neutrality?  For  the 
British  Foreign  Secretary  to  try  to  escape  from  a 
dilemma  by  casting  doubt  on  the  authority  of  the  ac- 
credited agent  of  the  German  Government  was  not 
clever;  because  the  Foreign  Secretary  had  at  least 
five  opportunities  of  finding  out  from  Sir  E.  Goschen 
whether  Prince  Lichnowsky  had  power  to  act  for  the 
German  Government. 

But,  whether  the  German  ambassador  had  au- 
thority or  not,  whether  the  suggestions  were  per- 
sonal or  official,  the  Foreign  Secretary  declined  the 
lot, —  lock,  stock,  and  barrel.  He  "  felt  obliged  to 
refuse  definitely  any  promise  to  remain  neutral  on 
similar  terms."  Britain  must  keep  her  hand  free,  so 
that  the  Government's  attitude  might  be  determined 
largely  by  public  opinion.  "  The  neutrality  of  Bel- 
gium would  appeal  very  strongly  to  public  opinion 
here,"  but  he  "  did  not  think  that  we  could  give  a 
promise  of  neutrality  on  that  condition  alone." 
Such  a  maze  of  contradiction  and  equivocation  was 
enough  to  make  the  wretched  German  ambassador 


JINGOES  AND  JINGOES  315 

wonder  whether  the  British  Foreign  Secretary  had 
authority  to  make  a  direct  statement  on  any  question 
but  free  hands  and  agreements  that  would  not  bind 
the  Government. 

Thus,  secret  diplomacy,  conversations  of  military 
and  naval  experts,  and  the  plans  of  General  Staffs, 
launched  this  nation  into  war.  And  Germany  sent 
her  troops  into  the  small,  weak.  State  of  Luxem- 
bourg, without  a  word  of  remonstrance  from  Britain, 
the  guardian  of  international  "  scraps  of  paper." 
The  Jingoes,  and  many  of  those  "  in  the  know,"  got 
what  they  had  sedulously  toiled  for  through  eight 
long  years  of  scares  in  which  every  brutish  instinct 
was  stirred.  The  only  regret  some  of  them  had 
was  that  the  War  Office  could  not  put  500,000  men 
into  Belgium  when  the  trouble  arose. 

Jingoes  there  are  in  every  country;  but  the  differ- 
ence between  the  Pnassian  and  the  British  cult  is 
that  Prussian  Jingoes  are  soldiers  as  a  rule  and 
British  Jingoes  are  not.  Whether  it  is  better  to  let 
military  Jingoes  run  an  empire  thrn  trust  its  fate  to 
commercial  Jingoes,  is  a  question  that  must  wait  solu- 
tion until  the  empire  that  has  always  spent  many  more 
millions  on  armaments  than  Germany,  destroys 
Prussian  militarism.  Is  it  then  too  much  to 
hope  that  when  the  empire  that  has  had  little  rest 
from  wars  and  expeditions,  teaches  the  empire  that 
has  known  very  little  war  since  1870,  how  to  suffer 
military  defeat  as  well  as  diplomatic  humiliation,  that 
a  Jingo  will  find  it  as  difficult  to  lodge  upon  British 
territory  as  Germans  to  find  their  place  in  the  sun? 

The  question  of  Who  began  it?  caused  little  con- 
troversy during  August,  because  it  was  considered 
most  unpatriotic  to  blame  any  one  but  the  Kaiser 


3i6     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

or  the  Crown  Prince  or  the  German  Chancellor  or 
the  German  ambassador  at  Petersburg  or  Vienna. 
Some  people  went  so  far  as  to  deny  any  credit  to  an 
Austrian.  Few  were  as  wise  about  it  as  the  man 
on  the  'bus  who  said,  "Well,  guv'ner,  we're  in  it; 
that's  all."  But  no  war  can  be  fought  without  a 
scapegoat;  it  is  almost  as  necessary  as  a  map  and 
pins  with  coloured  heads.  In  starting  out  to  fix 
responsibility  on  some  person  or  Power,  it  is  essen- 
tial that  the  date  from  which  investigation  starts 
should  be  selected  with  certainty  to  embrace  all  those 
issues  and  events  which  are  relevant  to  the  foreign 
policies  of  the  countries  involved  in  the  dispute.  To 
begin  with  the  murder  of  the  Archduke  is  sensational, 
but  much  too  recent;  it  is  convenient  for  the  theory 
that  the  Kaiser  dictated  the  Austrian  note  to  Servia; 
that,  however,  is  its  only  merit. 

Not  through  Servia  or  Austria  are  the  signposts 
to  be  found  which  will  enable  us  to  retrace  our  steps 
to  the  place  and  date  when  we  fell  "  into  transform- 
ing degenerations."  We  must  look  south,  towards 
Agadir,  then  to  Fez,  and  back  through  Tangier, 
Spain,  and  Paris,  to  London,  where  the  Anglo-French 
Agreement  was  signed  April  6th,  1904.  It  was  not 
a  person,  or  some  one  particular  Power,  that  was  re- 
sponsible for  this  war.  It  was  a  system  that  brought 
it  about;  and  that  system  was  secret  diplomacy. 

Who  then  is  to  blame  for  secret  diplomacy?  The 
people  of  the  nations  which  practise  it;  and  those 
nations  boasting  the  freest  institutions  should  bear 
the  greatest  responsibility. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

RECRIMINATION 

"  That  there  exists  between  France  and  Germany  a  senti- 
mental animosity;  and  that  between  Germany  and  England 
there  is  an  economic  rivalry,  we  do  not  deny;  but  what  we 
deny  is  that  there  exists  from  country  to  country,  between 
these  three  great  nations,  any  fundamental  and  irreconcila- 
ble antagonism.  It  is,  therefore,  our  claim  to  put  an  end 
to  all  enmity  between  them  and  do  away  with  all  animosity. 
War  would  no  longer  settle  anything.  The  times  are  gone 
when  the  conqueror  destroyed  the  vanquished  people  and 
reduced  it  to  slavery.  A  war  would  henceforward  be  a 
useless  disaster  and  vain  crime." 

—  i^.natole  France,  London,  December  nth,  191 3. 

Of  all  the  many  organizations  started  in  Ger- 
many and  Britain  to  promote  a  clearer  understand- 
ing and  a  better  feeling  between  the  two  peoples,  the 
Albert  Committee  under  the  presidency  of  Lord  Ave- 
bury,  was  the  best.  It  invited  the  co-operation  of 
every  one  interested  in  seeing  that  our  relations  with 
Germany  should  be  conducted  according  to  reason 
and  not  clouded  and  endangered  by  ignorance  and 
prejudice.  The  Anglo-German  Friendship  Com- 
mittee and  the  Associated  Councils  of  Churches  for 
fostering  friendly  relations  between  the  two  peoples, 
were  strong  bodies.  These  Councils  and  Commit- 
tees enrolled  most  of  Britain's  worthiest  men.  How 
powerless  they  were  to  avert  the  strife  when  the 

Z^7 


3i8     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

diplomatists  took  control  of  affairs  in  July,  1914,  is 
a  lesson  which  must  not  be  forgotten.  The  bench 
of  Bishops,  the  leading  nonconformist  divines,  the 
Catholic  prelates,  eminent  professors,  members  of 
the  Houses  of  Parliament,  distinguished  men  of  sci- 
ence, literature,  and  art,  were  as  little  children  in 
the  hands  of  the  men  of  the  chancelleries. 

Looking  over  the  pre-war  literature  published  by 
these  Councils  and  Committees  is  a  heart-breaking 
business.  The  article  published  by  Mr.  Basil  Wil- 
liams in  the  Edinburgh  Review,  October,  1909, 
reads  like  pages  from  a  Utopia  written  long  years 
before  Sir  Thomas  More  ordered  Wolsey  from 
the  precincts  of  the  Commons.  In  that  article  Mr. 
Williams  says  "  for  more  than  four  hundred  years 
Englishmen  and  Germans  have  fought  side  by  side  in 
almost  every  European  war."  And  he  quotes 
Stubbs : 

"  England  in  spite  of  the  Reformation  maintained  her 
alliance  with  Germany:  her  instincts  were  German  and  her 
antipathies  were  anti-French.  As  the  Hapsburgs  divided 
and  grew  weak,  England  sought  new  allies  among  the 
younger  Powers;  but  in  all  the  great  struggles  of  Europe 
she  has  had  Germany,  whether  Austrian  or  Prussian,  on 
her  side." 

Then  Mr.  Williams  goes  on  to  show  how  the 
grievous  work  of  ignorance  and  prejudice  brought 
about  misunderstanding  and  enmity.     He  says: 

"  Barely  four  years  ago  men  of  responsibility  in  Germany 
were  quite  convinced  that  England  designed  a  sudden  attack 
upon  their  country  without  any  previous  declaration  of  war 
or  other  warning.  Fears  have  been  expressed  that  Ham- 
burg, lying,  it  may  be  noted,  some  fifty  miles  up  a  river  well 


WHAT  DID  HE  KNOW?  319 

fortified  on  either  bank,  is  liable  to  bombardment  by  the 
British  fleet;  and  many  Germans  have  long  seriously  be- 
lieved that  we  intend  to  annihilate  the  German  navy  while 
it  is  still  comparatively  small  and  an  easy  morsel  for  ours. 
German  writers  and  even  German  statesmen  see  in  Eng- 
land's every  act  of  friendship  to  another  Power  a  fixed 
policy  of  isolating  Germany." 

Was  Mr,  Lloyd  George  conscious  of  such  a  fixed 
policy  on  January  ist,  19 14,  when  in  the  Daily 
Chronicle  he  gave  his  views  on  armaments?  He 
said: 

"  Both  countries  seem  to  have  realized  what  ought  to 
have  been  fairly  obvious  long  ago,  that  they  have  nothing 
to  gain  and  everything  to  lose  by  a  quarrel,  and  that  they 
have  everything  to  gain  and  nothing  to  lose  by  reverting 
to  the  old  policy  of  friendliness  which  had  been  maintained, 
until  within  recent  years,  for  centuries  between  Germany 
and  this  country.  .  .  .  The  German  army  is  vital,  not 
merely  to  the  existence  of  the  German  Empire,  but  to  the 
very  life  and  independence  of  the  nation  itself,  surrounded 
as  Germany  is  by  other  nations  each  of  which  possesses 
armies  almost  as  powerful  as  her  own.  We  forget  that, 
while  we  insist  upon  a  60  per  cent,  superiority  (so  far  as 
our  naval  strength  is  concerned)  over  Germany  being  es- 
sential to  guarantee  the  integrity  of  our  own  shores  —  Ger- 
many herself  has  nothing  like  that  superiority  over  France 
alone,  and  she  has,  of  course,  in  addition,  to  reckon  with 
Russia  on  her  eastern  frontier.  Germany  has  nothing 
which  approximates  to  a  two-Power  standard.  She  has, 
therefore,  become  alarmed  by  recent  events,  and  is  spending 
huge  sums  of  money  on  the  expansion  of  her  military 
resources." 

What  the  "  recent  events  "  which  occasioned  alarm 
in  Germany  were  we  now  know.  And  since  ministers 
have  started  their  campaigns  of  recrimination  on  the 


320     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

platform  and  In  the  Press  much  has  been  brought  to 
Hght  which  shows  how  difficult  it  is  to  get  at  the 
truth  of  foreign  affairs  and  armaments  under  the 
present  system.  Much  has  been  written  and  said 
recently  in  connection  with  the  Berlin  conversations. 
Since  the  war  began  the  political  and  diplomatic 
giants  of  Britain  and  Germany  have  been  busily  at 
work  informing  their  peoples  of  one  another's  perfidy 
and  chicanery.  A  pretty  spectacle  for  decent  simple 
folk!  Perhaps  it  would  have  been  better  to  leave 
the  mud  at  the  bottom  of  the  well  and  let  the  rank 
water  He  undisturbed.  It  is  not  nice  to  find  political 
leaders  of  any  country  hoodwinking  the  people,  say- 
ing things  which  are  not  true,  making  friendly 
speeches  to  cover  unfriendly  business.  Again  the 
year  191 2  has  been  brought  into  the  limelight,  this 
time  by  Mr.  Asquith,  who  in  a  speech  at  Cardiff, 
October  2,  19 14,  told  us  more  about  the  negotiations 
which  passed  between  Germany  and  Britain,  than  he 
condescended  to  tell  the  House  of  Commons  in  the 
debates  of  19 12.  Referring  no  doubt  to  the  con- 
versations between  Lord  Haldane  and  the  German 
Chancellor,  Mr.  Asquith  said: 

"  We  laid  down  —  and  I  wish  to  call  not  only  your  at- 
tention, but  the  attention  of  the  whole  world  to  this,  when 
so  many  false  legends  are  now  being  invented  and  circulated 
—  in  the  following;  year,  in  the  year  19 12,  we  laid  down, 
in  terms  carefully  approved  by  the  Cabinet  and  which  I 
will  textually  quote,  what  our  relations  with  Germany 
ought  in  our  view  to  be.  We  said,  and  we  communicated 
this  to  the  German  Government :  '  Britain  declares  that 
she  will  neither  make  nor  join  in  any  unprovoked  attack  on 
Germany.  Aggression  upon  Germany  is  not  the  subject, 
and  forms  no  part  of  any  treaty,  understanding,  or  combi- 


THE  SUCKING  DOVE  321 

nation  to  which  Britain  is  a  party;  nor  will  she  become  a 
party  to  any  thing  that  has  such  an  object.'  There  is  noth- 
ing ambiguous  or  equivocal  about  that.  But  that  was  not 
enough  for  German  statesmanship.  They  wanted  us  to  go 
further.  They  asked  us  to  pledge  ourselves  absolutely  to 
neutrality  in  the  event  of  Germany  being  engaged  in  war 
—  and  this,  mind  you,  at  a  time  when  Germany  was  enor- 
mously increasing  both  her  aggressive  and  defensive  re- 
sources, and  especially  upon  the  sea.  They  asked  us  for  a 
free  hand,  so  far  as  we  were  concerned,  if  and  when  they 
selected  the  opportunity  to  overbear,  to  dominate  the  Euro- 
pean world.  To  such  a  demand  but  one  answer  was  possi- 
ble, and  that  was  the  answer  we  gave." 

This  is  exceedingly  Interesting,  for  It  proves  the 
utter  Impossibility  of  the  House  ever  learning  from 
Ministers  just  how  International  affairs  stand.  On 
July  25th,  19 1 2,  Mr.  Asqulth  made  a  speech  In  the 
House  of  Commons  and  referred  to  the  Berlin  con- 
versations begun  by  Lord  Haldane  six  months  earlier 
In  that  year.  Question  after  question  had  been  put 
by  private  members  on  the  subject  during  the  spring 
without  drawing  much  definite  Information  from  the 
Treasury.  It  was  a  matter  for  congratulation  in 
July  to  learn  from  the  Prime  Minister  that: 

"  Our  relations  with  the  great  German  Empire  are,  I 
am  glad  to  say,  at  this  moment  —  and  I  feel  sure  are  likely 
to  remain  —  relations  of  amity  and  good  will.  My  noble 
friend  Lord  Haldane  paid  a  visit  to  Berlin  early  in  the 
year.  He  entered  upon  conversations  and  an  interchange 
of  views  there  which  have  been  continued  since  in  a  spirit 
of  perfect  frankness  and  friendship  both  on  one  side  or  the 
other  and  in  which  I  am  glad  to  say  we  now  have  the  ad- 
vantage of  the  participation  of  a  very  distinguished  diplo- 
matist in  the  person  of  the  German  Ambassador." 


322     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

There  is  nothing  ambiguous  or  equivocal  about 
that.  But  what  would  have  happened  if  the  state- 
ment made  by  Mr,  Asquith  at  Cardiff,  October, 
19 14,  had  been  made  in  July,  19 12,  to  the  Commons 
when  he  said  to  the  House: 

"  I  say,  and  I  say  this  deliberately,  we  have  no  cause,  and 
so  far  as  I  know  no  occasion,  for  quarrel  with  any  country 
in  any  part  of  the  world." 

Did  the  Prime  Minister  then  know  that  Germany 
had  asked  for  a  free  hand  and  that  Britain  should 
pledge  herself  absolutely  to  neutrality  in  the  event  of 
Germany  being  engaged  in  war?  These,  then,  were 
the  amicable  conversations  carried  on  between  Lord 
Haldane  and  the  German  Chancellor!  But  why  did 
Germany  test  us  in  that  way?  In  July,  19 12,  ac- 
cording to  rumour  she  had  just  about  reached  the 
end  of  her  financial  tether;  her  military  preparations 
had  been  then  stretched  nearly  to  the  utmost;  she 
had  reached  the  climax  of  expenditure  on  her  navy  — 
notwithstanding  Mr.  Asquith's  statement  at  Cardiff 
about  Germany  in  19 12  enormously  increasing  her 
aggressive  and  defensive  resources,  especially  on 
sea.  He  was  misinformed.  Though  her  gross 
naval  expenditure  rose,  Germany  reduced  her  ex- 
penditure on  new  construction  by  £500,000  in  1912; 
but  she  saw  both  France  and  Russia  vote  an  addi- 
tional £6,963,124  on  new  construction  for  19 12-13. 
Russia,  alone  for  that  year  spent  more  on  new  con- 
struction than  Germany  did.  Why  should  Germany 
ask  us  for  a  free  hand?  Did  she  glean  from  the 
amicable  conversations  that  we  were  fettered,  and 
wish  to  test  the  strength  of  our  engagements?  Any- 
way, her  request  that  we  should  remain  neutral  shows 


THE  FUNDAMENTAL  FACTS       323 

how  much  faith  she  placed  in  the  declaration  of  the 
Cabinet,  referred  to  by  Mr.  Asquith.  Germany 
then  no  doubt  knew  more  about  Britain's  obligations 
to  France  and  Russia  than  did  the  vast  majority  of 
the  members  of  the  House  of  Commons. 

The  result  of  all  the  frank  and  friendly  conversa- 
tions between  Germany  and  Britain  in  19 12  was  seen 
in  the  new  military  laws  of  France  and  Germany. 
Ever  since  Britain  departed  from  her  isolated  posi- 
tion in  diplomacy,  since  she  threw  in  her  lot  with 
France  and  aided  and  abetted  France  in  the  sordid 
schemes  of  exploiting  territory  in  Africa,  Germany 
has  worked  with  unremitting  energy  to  perfect  her 
military  system  and  build  up  a  modern  navy  which 
would  be  the  equal  of  that  of  France.  What  else 
was  to  be  expected?  When  Jingo  ministers  in  Brit- 
ain and  France  express  such  sentiments  against  Ger- 
many as  those  attributed  to  M.  Delcasse  and  Lord 
Roberts  no  other  result  could  be  looked  for  than 
German  military  and  naval  preparation  on  the  high- 
est scale.  Blame  Germany  for  her  ruthless  policy 
in  taking  French  territory,  blame  France  for  her 
policy  in  Africa,  curse  the  Kaiser  for  all  the  sins  of 
divine-right  monarchs,  and  when  the  full  course  of 
all-round  denunciation  is  complete,  there  is  left  the 
palpable  conspiracy  of  Entente  Powers  to  isolate 
Germany.  Diplomacy  destroyed  every  bridge 
raised  by  pacifists  in  the  principal  European  States, 
to  march  the  workers  into  an  international  corps 
which  would  overthrow  militarism  and  bureaucratic 
rule.  Diplomacy  in  dividing  Europe  into  two  hostile 
camps  stimulated  militarism  in  all  its  branches;  in 
each  State  it  fostered  the  vast  international  arma- 
ment interests;  it  raised  up  a  literature  of  enmity 


324     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

and  hatred;  and  threw  the  fate  of  democracies  into 
the  hands  of  military  and  naval  experts.  After  the 
British  Foreign  Office  became  entangled  in  the 
meshes  of  the  Continental  System,  war-lords  flour- 
ished to  greater  extent  than  at  any  time  since  1870. 
The  outcome  of  ten  years  of  diplomatic  labour  in  en- 
tente enterprises  amounted  to  suspicion  and  enmity, 
distrust  and  hate,  leading  up  to  the  only  possible  cli- 
max,—  a  Continental  War.  And  the  pity  and  pain  of 
it  is  that  the  British  Foreign  Secretary  had  no  desire 
to  engulf  his  country  in  war.  Labouring  for  peace 
under  such  a  system  was  a  task  Sisyphus  would  not 
envy.  What  effort  worth  while  could  be  made  by 
the  most  pacific  Foreign  Secretary  against  the  system 
which  could  bring  nothing  but  war?  No,  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  is  not  to  be  charged  with  belligerent  in- 
tentions. He  sinned  in  hiding  the  whole  discredit- 
able business  of  foreign  affairs  from  the  Commons 
and  the  people.  He  was  the  slave  of  secret  diplo- 
macy, and  not  the  servant  of  the  country.  If  he  had 
thought  as  much  of  the  British  people  as  he  thought 
of  French  diplomatists,  he  would  have  had  the  cour- 
age to  tell  the  country  the  whole  truth  about  foreign 
affairs  and  the  engagements  he  inherited  from  his 
predecessor.  Rather  than  the  onus  of  Morocco  and 
Persia,  resignation,  political  oblivion, —  anything,  so 
long  as  the  people  knew  the  whole  truth. 

We  shall  perhaps  never  know  all  that  passed  be- 
tween Germany  and  Britain  in  that  year  19 12,  and 
an  attempt  to  weave  a  story  of  the  inwardness  of  the 
diplomatic  negotiations  is  well-nigh  impossible;  so 
inconsistent,  so  contradictory,  are  minister's  speeches 
and  the  writings  of  publicists  of  the  time.  Now  that 
we  have  Mr.  Asquith's  Cardiff  speech  the  whole  affair 


MR.  BALFOUR  AS  JEREMIAH      325 

is  thrown  up  in  a  light  which  does  not  make  our  case 
look  any  better.  Lord  Haldane's  speech  in  March, 
19 1 2,  when  he  said,  "Strategy  must  respond  to 
policy,  the  policy  of  the  Foreign  Office,"  and  Mr. 
Churchill's  reference  in  February  of  that  year  to 
the  German  navy  as  "  more  in  the  nature  of  a  lux- 
ury "  do  not  harmonize  with  Mr.  Asquith's  descrip- 
tion In  the  following  July  of  our  cordial  relations 
with  Germany.  The  debates  on  Imperial  Defence 
and  the  Navy,  in  19 12,  might  be  read  now  with 
profit  by  many  people  who  wish  to  know  something 
of  the  origin  of  the  war;  but  nothing  in  these  de- 
bates gives  one  a  shred  of  evidence  as  to  any  useful 
purpose  being  served  by  the  conversations  between 
Lord  Haldane  and  the  German  Chancellor.  "  What 
is  the  good  of  diplomacy?  "  Disraeli  asked.  The  de- 
bates of  19 1 2  in  the  light  of  recent  statements,  proves 
how  utterly  absurd  it  was  for  any  one  to  hope  for 
pacific  relations  so  long  as  Europe  was  divided  Into 
two  vast  camps  arming  to  destroy  each  other.  Mr. 
Balfour  In  the  House,  July  22nd,  said: 

"  If  we  are  to  contemplate  the  horrible,  and,  as  I  hope, 
the  impossible  —  if  there  is  to  be  this  universal  Armaged- 
don, then,  looking  at  it  from  a  naval  point  of  view,  it  seems 
to  me  that  the  fleets  of  the  Triple  Entente  are  not  inade- 
quate now,  and  are  not  going  to  be  inadequate  to  any  strain 
that  is  going  to  be  placed  upon  them.  If  we  can  conceive, 
if  we  are  driven  to  conceive,  if  we  are  obliged  to  conceive 
this  condition  of  universal  warfare,  then  I  do  not  say  that 
the  fleets  with  which  our  interests  are  concerned  can  be 
regarded  as  inadequate,  in  any  theatre  of  operations,  to  the 
strain  which  will  be  thrown  upon  them.  I  decline  to  be- 
lieve it  possible  that  we  alone  should  be  concerned  with  all 
the  navies  of  the  world  except  those,  let  us  say,  of  France 


326     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

and  Russia,  who  remain  neutral  in  their  ports.  I  hope  and 
believe  we  should  not  be  unequal  even  to  that  strain,  but 
it  is  a  strain  which  is  surely  not  probable.  Surely,  if  we 
are  to  draw  these  dreadful  pictures  of  international  disaster, 
and  if  that  is  a  necessity  forced  upon  us,  we  need  hardly 
suppose  that  our  evil  fate,  or  even  the  most  imbecile  diplo- 
macy, would  force  us  into  conflict  with  these  nations  with 
whom  we  have  no  cause  of  quarrel,  with  whom  we  have 
been  —  at  all  events  as  regards  the  Mediterranean  Powers 

—  on  the  most  friendly  terms  within  the  memory  of  man, 
and  who,  I  can  hardly  believe,  will  be  driven  to  attack  us, 
and  attack  us  alone  in  anybody  else's  quarrel.  We  must 
prepare  even  for  that  danger,  but  I  think  it  most  improbable. 
In  any  case,  if  I  understand  the  policy  of  the  Government 
aright,  it  will  be  the  most  perilous  adventure  that  any  State 
could  in  future  engage  in,  to  drag  Europe  into  a  war." 

All  through  the  year  19 12,  In  debates  in  the  House 
and  speeches  in  the  country,  Germany  was  the  one 
Power  speakers  challenged  on  naval  supremacy. 
The  organization  of  the  North  Sea  Fleet  was  re- 
garded in  Germany  as  a  direct  threat  and  a  menace 

—  even  German  pacifists  lost  hope;  and  after  the 
Agadir  affair,  British  estimates  and  preparations  had 
all  the  appearances  of  a  Government  heading 
straight  for  war.  Though  the  Prime  Minister  and 
the  Foreign  Secretary  poured  oily  words  on  the  wa- 
ters troubled  by  our  foreign  policy,  the  tempest  of 
recrimination  abated  not  one  jot. 

It  is,  however,  quite  clear  why  Germany  tested  our 
neutrality.  In  asking  us  to  give  her  a  free  hand  she 
was  really  inquiring  if  we  were  in  a  position  to  give 
her  a  free  hand.  Certainly  the  time  had  come  when 
a  free  hand  was  necessary  for  her  Imperial  existence. 
She  could  not  imperially  afford  another  diplomatic 
humiliation.     Forces   had   been   unchained   by    the 


A  CABINET  CAT  SET  FREE        327 

events  of  the  Anglo-French  interests  in  Africa  which 
desired  other  methods  of  deaHng  with  international 
quarrels.  The  Crown  Prince  and  his  party  were  in 
the  ascendency,  and  they  were  no  courtiers  of  the 
pen  and  the  forum;  their  arena  was  the  place  for 
swords  and  shells.  The  more  evidence  they  gath- 
ered of  British  Jingo  feeling,  the  greater  naval 
preparations  we  made,  the  easier  became  their  task 
of  overbearing  the  moderate  party  in  Germany.  It 
would  be  no  difficult  task  to  collect  statements  from 
speeches  and  reviews  published  over  a  period  of  years 
in  Britain  which  would  serve  to  influence  the  German 
Jingo  with  notions  of  British  belligerence;  but  our 
actions  were  sufficient.  In  debate  after  debate  in 
the  House,  numbers  of  members  have  pointed  out 
where  ministers  and  ex-ministers  and  other  more  or 
less  responsible  men  have  said  things  calculated  to 
annoy  Germans.  Lord  Charles  Beresford  censured 
the  First  Lord  for  dragging  Germany  into  his 
speeches,  and  when  Lord  Roberts  at  Manchester  in 
19 1 2,  made  his  famous  reference  to  German  pre- 
paredness, the  Evening  Standard  said  of  it: 

"  At  a  time  when  all  prudent  people  on  both  sides  of  the 
North  Sea  are  endeavouring  to  establish  better  relations 
between  the  two  peoples,  it  is  mere  wanton  mischief-making 
for  a  man  with  Lord  Roberts's  unequalled  prestige  to  use 
words  which  must  drive  every  German  who  reads  them  to 
exasperation." 

Mr.  Churchill  went  to  the  Admiralty  In  the 
autumn  of  191 1,  shortly  before  the  Agadir  question 
was  explained  by  the  Foreign  Secretary  to  the  House. 
We  now  know  why  Mr.  Churchill  was  sent  at  that 
anxious  time  to  take  charge  of  the  navy.     Bit  by 


328     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

bit  the  truth  leaks  out.  A  Coalition  Government  has 
taken  the  place  of  the  Liberal  Government,  and  Mr. 
Balfour  has  replaced  Mr.  Churchill  at  the  Admiralty. 
Now  that  the  latter  is  free  of  direct  responsibility 
for  naval  policy  he  has  told  his  constituents  in  Dun- 
dee a  bit  of  history.  Indeed,  at  a  meeting  there  on 
June  5th,  19 15,  Mr.  Churchill,  intentionally  or  unin- 
tentionally, let  a  Cabinet  cat  out  of  the  bag  —  a  cat 
too  which  explains  a  lot  of  the  spilt  milk  and  broken 
crockery  of  the  year  1 9 1 2, 

Speaking  at  the  Kinnaird  Hall,  Dundee,  on  June 
5th,  19 1 5,  Mr.  Churchill  said: 

"  I  was  sent  to  the  Admiralty  In  191 1,  after  the  Agadir 
crisis  had  nearly  brought  us  into  war,  and  I  was  sent  with 
the  express  duty  laid  upon  me  by  the  Prime  Minister  to 
put  the  fleet  in  a  state  of  instant  and  constant  readiness  for 
war  in  case  we  were  attacked  by  Germany." 

Such  a  statement  made  three  years  too  late,  proves 
how  utterly  helpless  the  House  of  Commons  and  the 
electors  are  to  save  their  country  from  the  horrors 
of  war. 

In  the  debate  on  the  Naval  Estimates  19 14^  Mr. 
Philip  Snowden  referred  to  something  Lord  Welby 
said  earlier  in  that  year.  Lord  Welby  was  once  at 
the  head  of  the  Treasury;  he  had  held  the  highest 
position  in  the  Civil  Service  of  Britain  and  was  re- 
garded as  a  great  financial  authority.  Lord  Welby 
said: 

"We  are  in  the  hands  of  an  organization  of  crooks. 
They  are  politicians,  generals,  manufacturers  of  armaments, 
and  journalists.  All  of  them  are  anxious  for  unlimited  ex- 
penditure, and  go  on  inventing  scares  to  terrify  the  public 
and  to  terrify  Ministers  of  the  Crown." 


BELGIAN  NEUTRALITY  AGAIN     329 

Lord  Welby  knew  what  he  was  talking  about. 
"  Crooks  "  is  the  precise  word,  the  accurate,  the  in- 
spired word.  No  other  word  would  quite  meet  the 
occasion. 

In  support  of  what  has  been  written  on  the  Treaty 
of  1839  another  paragraph  or  two  must  be  added. 
Since  the  war  began  some  more  information  has  been 
gained. 

It  is  said  that  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  was  the 
one  sole  question  which  kept  the  Cabinet  together 
on  August  2nd;  when  that  treaty  was  made  the  casus 
belli.  Then  those  Ministers  who  had  handed  in 
their  resignations  withdrew  them, —  excepting,  of 
course.  Lord  Morley  and  Mr.  Burns.  This  view  of 
Cabinet  action  is  now  put  forward  by  many  writers, 
but  it  does  not  explain  the  strange  position  of  the 
men  in  the  Cabinet  who  protested  against  the  policy 
which  enmeshed  the  Government  in  the  Continental 
System.  The  critical  day  for  the  Cabinet  was  Au- 
gust 2nd,  the  day  after  Sir  Edward  Grey  informed 
the  French  Ambassador  at  London  that,  "  Germany 
had  explained  that  she  was  not  in  a  position  to  reply  " 
to  the  question  of  observing  Belgian  neutrality,  and 
that  he  would  "  propose  to  his  colleagues  that  he 
should  state  that  it  (the  British  Fleet)  will  oppose 
the  passage  of  the  Straits  of  Dover  by  the  German 
Fleet,  or,  if  the  German  Fleet  should  pass  through, 
will  oppose  any  demonstration  on  the  French  coasts." 
The  French  Ambassador  sent  that  information  to  M. 
Viviani,  the  President  of  the  French  Council,  on  Au- 
gust I  St,  the  day  before  the  British  Cabinet  gave  its 
sanction  to  the  proposal,  and  twenty-four  hours  be- 
fore Sir  Edward  Grey  notified  the  Cabinet  that  Ger- 


330     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

many  was  not  in  a  position  to  reply  to  the  question 
about  the  neutrahty  of  Belgium. 

This  method  of  conducting  the  affairs  of  Britain 
was  perhaps  quite  in  order,  and  a  Cabinet  which  was 
left  in  the  dark  about  so  many  diplomatic  negotia- 
tions perhaps  felt  grateful  for  any  second-hand  in- 
formation which  happened  to  come  its  way.  Never- 
theless we  are  told  the  crisis  was  bridged  by  the 
Treaty  of  1839,  and  uneasy  spirits  were  soothed  by 
the  mention  of  the  holy  relic  upon  which  presumably 
some  sanguine  statesmen  thought  no  Government 
would  lay  sacrilegious  hands.  What  the  revolters 
in  the  Cabinet  thought  of  the  Foreign  Minister  on 
August  2nd,  when  he  got  them  to  consent  to  the  pro- 
posal of  naval  aid  to  France  before  the  violation  of 
Belgian  neutrality  by  Germany  took  place,  and  what 
they  now  think  since  they  have  had  time  to  read  the 
diplomatic  correspondence,  would  be  of  deep  inter- 
est to  those  who  do  not  accept  the  view  that  making 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium  the  casus  belli  was  the  one 
sole  reason  for  the  withdrawal  of  all  but  two  resig- 
nations on  August  2nd.  How  can  any  Minister  say 
he  was  satisfied  to  remain  in  the  Cabinet  for  that 
reason  when  he  consented  to  naval  aid  to  France  be- 
fore Germany  invaded  Belgium? 

Consider  the  position  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George  who, 
in  an  interview  published  in  a  magazine,  explained 
the  attitude  he  and  several  of  his  colleagues  took  up 
before  the  war  broke  out.     He  said: 

"  This  I  know  is  true  —  after  the  guarantee  given  that 
the  German  fleet  would  not  attack  the  Coast  of  France  or 
annex  any  French  territory,  I  would  not  have  been  a  party 
to  a  declaration  of  war  had  Belgium  not  been  invaded ;  and 


A  FLIMSY  PRETEXT  331 

I  think  I  can  say  the  same  thing  for  most,  if  not  all,  of 
my  colleagues." 

Whether  the  guarantee  referred  to  by  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  carried  any  weight  with  Sir  Edward  Grey 
or  Mr.  Asquith  is  another  matter,  but  it  should  be 
borne  in  mind  that  Belgium  was  not  invaded  by  Ger- 
many on  August  2nd,  Anticipation  may  be  wise  as 
a  policy,  but  it  can  never  constitute  realization.  In- 
vasion of  Belgium  on  August  4th  could  not  justify 
Mr.  Lloyd  George's  anticipation  of  August  2nd. 

The  National  Review  said  several  members  of  the 
Cabinet  on  August  2nd  "  were  casting  about  for  a 
life-buoy  to  save  their  righteous  souls,  which  was 
ultimately  provided  by  Belgium."  Now  the  Times, 
that  mirror  of  Foreign  Office  reflections,  tells  us 
"  even  had  Germany  not  invaded  Belgium,  honour 
and  interest  would  have  united  us  with  France." 
The  "  Imperious  reason  of  self-interest "  was  our 
motive  in  all  connected  with  the  Treaty  of  1839. 
Would  it  not  have  been  the  better  policy  from  the 
first  to  tell  the  people  the  bald  truth?  Now  that  the 
Tory  press  Is  bent  on  mining  the  neutrality  trench 
In  which  Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  his  colleagues  took, 
cover,  their  position  becomes  every  day  more  unten- 
able and  stupid. 

No,  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  will  not  serve  for 
a  pretext,  since  those  who  do  not  take  every  minis- 
terial utterance  as  gospel  have  taken  the  trouble  to 
study  all  the  diplomatic  correspondence  and  the  his- 
tory of  treaties.  It  is  all  very  well  and  good  for  us 
t:o  be  told  day  after  day  that  Britain  must  fight  this 
war  to  a  successful  finish,  but  the  more  the  British 
people  are  told  they  must  shut  their  minds  to  all 


332     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

inquiries  as  to  the  real  causes  of  the  war,  the  more 
will  great  sections  of  them  feel  disposed  to  get  all 
the  information  on  the  question  they  can  gather. 
Already  the  effects  of  the  fatal  policy  of  secrecy  and 
shuffle  are  evident  all  over  the  country.  Newspapers 
cry  out  to  the  Government  to  be  frank  and  tell  the 
people  the  truth  about  the  conduct  of  the  war  and 
what  the  real  position  is  after  many  months  of  blood- 
shed; they  complain  that  the  seeming  apathy  of  the 
masses  is  caused  by  the  policy  of  withholding  news 
that  the  enemy  and  neutrals  possess.  But  no  one  is 
bold  enough  to  attribute  the  apathy  to  another  cause 
—  anterior  and  more  grave  —  to  the  amazing 
inconsistencies  and  suppressions  in  the  diplomatic  cor- 
respondence and  the  stupid  stories  faked  up  in  cer- 
tain newspapers  about  the  neutrality  of  Belgium. 
The  masses  read;  and  many  of  the  papers  issued  to 
Socialists  and  Labourites  are  singularly  well-in- 
formed and  deal  week  after  week  most  ably  with  the 
questions  which  forced  the  Government  into  a  Con- 
tinental war.  It  is  worse  than  folly  to  try  to  ignore 
these  facts,  for  if  our  masses  are  to  be  organized 
along  with  industries  to  bring  the  conflict  to  a  success- 
ful and  speedy  end,  the  Government  should  seek  now 
to  remove  the  suspicion  and  distrust  which  lie  down 
deep  in  the  minds  of  the  more  intelligent  workers. 
That  the  two  great  parties  should  tell  different 
stories  of  our  participation  in  the  struggle  is  not  the 
way  to  induce  the  workers  of  the  country  to  show 
any  real  enthusiasm  for  the  war.  Mr.  Bonar  Law 
on  August  2nd,  in  his  letter  to  Mr.  Asquith,  said 
nothing  about  the  neutrality  of  Belgium;  the  support 
of  the  Opposition  was  given  "  in  support  of  France 
and  Russia."     Lord  Lansdowne  said  "  we  had  to 


DEALINGS  WITH  BELGIUM        333 

consider  our  obligations  to  France,  by  which  we  were 
bound." 

Leaving  the  invasion  of  Belgium  out  of  the  ques- 
tion for  the  moment,  how  can  the  Government  con- 
tinue to  base  its  case  on  the  violation  of  the  Treaty 
of  1839?  We  know  now  how  the  treaty  came  into 
existence,  we  also  know  what  happened  in  1870 
to  preserve  the  integrity  of  Belgium.  The  full  story 
of  our  military  negotiations  with  Belgium  in  the 
spring  of  1906,  the  interview  of  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Bridges  with  General  Jungbluth  in  April,  19 12,  and 
the  report  of  Baron  Greindl  from  Berlin  (where  he 
was  Belgian  Ambassador)  to  the  Belgian  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  is  now  known.  It  is  an  ugly 
story  and  none  of  its  worst  features  are  removed  by 
denials  of  complicity  published  from  our  Foreign 
Office  nor  is  its  brutality  effaced  by  the  silly  ex- 
planations sent  out  by  the  Belgian  authorities  in 
March,  1915.  No  one  who  has  studied  Foreign 
Office  methods  will  at  this  time  of  day  rest  content 
with  the  phrase  "  not  binding."  That  military  at- 
taches may  act  as  did  Lieutenant-Colonels  Barnardis- 
ton  and  Bridges,  with  the  Foreign  Office  ready  to  re- 
pudiate responsibility  when  the  work  of  its  military 
attache  is  discovered, —  and  at  the  same  time  ready 
to  benefit  so  long  as  the  secret  is  kept, —  will  not 
deceive  those  who  desire  straightforward  methods 
in  Foreign  Affairs.  When  the  Belgian  General 
Jungbluth  was  told  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Bridges 
that  Britain  was  ready  to  land  a  force  of  160,000 
in  Belgium,  General  Jungbluth  objected  and  said  that 
the  consent  of  the  Belgian  Government  was  necessary. 
To  this  Lieut.-Colonel  Bridges  said  that  he  knew 
that,  "but  that  since  we   (Belgium)  were  not  able 


334     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

to  prevent  the  Germans  from  passing  through  our 
country  —  England  would  have  landed  her  troops  in 
Belgium  under  all  circumstances  {en  tout  etat  de 
cause) . 

Numbers  of  British  and  Belgian  soldiers  of  high 
rank  know  that  ever  since  Algeciras,  since  January, 
1906,  the  British  and  Belgian  armies  had  looked  to 
one  another  for  common  defence.  The  Belgians 
looked  for  160,000  British  soldiers  to  land  at  Ant- 
werp where  they  would  be  met  by  a  quarter  of  a  mil- 
lion Belgians.  The  General  Staffs  of  both  armies 
had  long  consulted  on  the  problem  and  the  plans. 
The  Government  not  only  failed  to  carry  out  its 
pledge  contained  in  No.  155  (British  White  Paper), 
it  failed  utterly  to  keep  the  military  understanding 
of  the  General  Staffs.  Belgium  was  thrown  away. 
And  when  the  day  of  reckoning  comes  it  will  be  found 
that  Britain  will  have  to  answer  for  broken  pledges 
as  terrible  to  Belgium  as  Germany's  violation  of  a 
treaty. 

While  we  are  engaged  in  our  usual  business  of 
lecturing  other  countries,  belligerents  and  neutrals, 
on  international  law  and  the  sanctity  of  treaties,  we 
have  no  time  to  examine  our  own  position.  Indeed 
it  would  be  difficult  to  find  it  now  under  the  slather 
of  whitewash  poured  on  by  the  unctuous  "  leaders 
of  thought "  since  the  war  began.  But  it  may  be 
said,  no  question  in  the  history  of  politics  was  started 
with  so  little  knowledge  as  this  one  of  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium.  We  have  not  shone  as  historians.  The 
best  said  and  written  in  our  favour  has  been  scrappy, 
vamped,  and  partial.  The  speeches  of  statesmen 
on  the  question  have  been  remarkable  for  what  was 
not  said ;  and  the  surge  of  sentimentality  which  arose 


WHAT  DISRAELI  THOUGHT       335 

from  the  story  of  atrocities  had  no  bearing  on  the 
Treaty  of  1839.  The  sudden  change  in  the  Lib- 
eral press  on  the  question,  which  amounted  to  a  com- 
plete volte-face  in  twenty-four  hours,  was  paralleled 
only  by  the  action  of  the  Cabinet  which  made  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium  a  casus  belli  on  the  day  naval 
aid  was  granted  to  France,  The  importance  given 
to  the  Belgian  treaty  in  the  first  week  of  August  was 
quite  modern,  indeed  suddenly  new.  It  was  not  al- 
ways held  so  precious.  And  now  that  the  walls  of 
our  towns  are  plastereci  with  copies  of  the  signatures 
of  the  Powers  who  signed  the  treaty,  one  wonders 
what  is  the  position  of  Palmerston  in  his  grave,  if 
any  Jingo  occurrence  can  disturb  him  now.  In 
1855,  when  Disraeli  proposed  the  neutrality  of  the 
Danubian  Principalities,  he  said: 

"  There  certainly  are  instances  in  Europe  of  such  propo- 
sitions, and  it  has  been  agreed  by  treaty  that  Belgium  and 
Switzerland  should  be  declared  neutral;  but  I  am  not  dis- 
posed to  attach  very  much  importance  to  such  engagements, 
for  the  history  of  the  world  shows  that  when  a  quarrel 
arises  and  a  nation  makes  war  and  thinks  it  advantageous 
to  traverse  with  its  army  such  neutral  territory,  the  declara- 
tions of  neutrality  are  not  apt  to  be  very  religiously  re- 
spected." 

Palmerston  when  he  spoke  no  doubt  knew  the  real 
value  of  the  treaty  to  which  he  had  put  his  name. 
He  was  not  disposed  to  attach  very  much  importance 
to  such  engagements.  What  action  would  he  have 
taken  early  last  August?  When  Germany  did  not 
very  "  religiously  "  respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
and  thought  it  advantageous  to  traverse  neutral  ter- 
ritory, would  Palmerston  have  wasted  time  lecturing 
Germany  on  the  sanctity  of  treaties?     Not  likely. 


2>2>(>     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

The  Times,  sick,  presumably,  of  the  slavering 
about  Belgian  neutrality,  reminded  us,  on  March 
8th,  1915,  that: 

"  There  are  still,  it  seems,  some  Englishmen  and  English- 
women who  greatly  err  as  to  the  reasons  that  have  forced 
England  to  draw  the  sword.  They  know  that  it  was  Ger- 
many's flagrant  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  which  filled 
the  cup  of  her  indignation  and  made  her  people  insist  upon 
war  {sic!).  They  do  not  reflect  that  our  honour  and  our 
interest  must  have  compelled  us  to  join  France  and  Russia 
even  if  Germany  had  scrupulously  respected  the  rights  of 
her  small  neighbours,  and  had  sought  to  hack  her  way  into 
France  through  the  Eastern  fortresses." 

It  is  all  very  painful  controversy,  for  it  casts  a  slur 
on  the  statements  of  the  Prime  Minister  and  the 
Foreign  Secretary  when  they  replied  to  questions 
in  the  House  before  the  war,  and  said  we  were  under 
no  obligation  to  go  to  war  in  the  interests  of  France 
and  Russia. 

In  the  'eighties  the  Treaty  of  1839  was  subjected 
to  examination,  at  home  and  abroad,  and  it  was  then 
widely  known  that  it  was  no  complete  guarantee. 
One  Belgian  War  Minister,  General  Brailmont,  de- 
cided that  Belgium  must  arm  and  look  to  her  own 
defences  for  securing  her  neutrality.  A  British 
Ministerial  organ,  the  Standard,  in  1880  had  told 
Belgium  not  to  rely  on  British  assistance  in  all  cases. 
Probably  the  termination  of  the  treaties  of  1870 
made  the  Belgian  authorities  think  seriously  of  their 
future  position.  That  the  efficacy  of  the  Treaty  of 
1839  was  generally  doubted  —  after  the  lapse  of 
the  treaties  made  for  the  period  of  the  Franco-Ger- 
man War  —  is  plain,  and  in  1887,  when  another  war 
cloud  loomed  up,  the  Standard  came  out  with  a  lead- 


THEN  AND  NOW  337 

ing  article  on  the  question.  It  was,  however,  a  let- 
ter signed  "  Diplomaticus,"  published  by  the  Stand- 
ard, February  4th,  1887,  which  raised  the  question 
then,  and  caused  the  discussion  which  followed  in 
several  of  the  chief  London  dailies  and  weeklies. 
The  Standard  was  then  regarded  to  be  the  official 
organ  of  the  Government  (Tory).  The  letter  is  as 
follows : 

"  To  the  Editor  of  the  Standard. 

"Sir:  Military  experts  are  of  the  opinion  that  France 
has  spent  so  much  money,  and  spent  it  so  well  during  the 
last  sixteen  years  in  providing  herself  with  a  fresh  military 
frontier,  that  a  direct  advance  by  the  German  armies  into 
France,  past  the  new  fortresses  and  forts  that  have  been 
erected  and  linked  together,  would  be,  even  if  a  possible, 
a  very  hazardous  undertaking. 

"  But  if  Germany  was,  or  considered  itself  to  be,  pro- 
voked into  a  struggle  of  life  and  death  with  France  would 
Prince  Bismarck,  with  the  mighty  forces  he  can  set  in  mo- 
tion, consent  to  be  baffled  by  the  artificial  obstacles  to  which 
I  have  alluded,  so  long  as  there  existed  a  natural  and  un- 
defended road  by  which  he  could  escape  from  his  embar- 
rassment? Such  a  road  or  way  out  does  exist.  It  lies  on 
Belgian  territory.  But  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  is  pro- 
tected by  European  guarantee  and  England  is  one  of  the 
guarantors.  In  1870  Earl  Granville,  then  at  the  head  of 
the  English  Foreign  Office,  alive  to  this  danger,  promptly 
and  wisely  bound  England  to  side  with  France  if  Prussia 
violated  Belgian  territory  and  with  Prussia  if  France  did  so, 

"  Would  Lord  Salisbury  act  prudently  to  take  upon  him- 
self a  similar  engagement  in  the  event  of  a  fresh  conflict 
between  these  two  countries?  It  is  for  Englishmen  to 
answer  the  question.  But  it  seems  to  me,  as  one  not  indif- 
ferent to  the  greatness  and  interests  of  England,  that  such 
a  course  at  the  present  moment  would  be  unwise  to  the  last 
degree.     However  much  England  might  regret  the  invasion 


338     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

of  Belgian  territory  by  either  party  to  the  struggle,  she 
could  not  take  part  with  France  against  Germany  (even  if 
Germany  were  to  seek  to  turn  the  French  flank  by  pouring 
its  armies  through  the  Belgian  Ardennes)  without  utterly 
vitiating  and  destroying  the  main,  purpose  of  English  policy 
all  over  the  world. 

"  But  it  will  be  asked,  must  not  England  honour  its  sig- 
nature and  be  faithful  to  its  public  pledges?  I  reply  that 
your  Foreign  Minister  ought  to  be  equal  to  the  task  of 
meeting  this  objection  without  committing  England  to  war. 
The  temporary  use  of  a  right  of  way  is  something  different 
from  a  permanent  and  wrongful  possession  of  territory;  and 
surely  England  would  be  easily  able  to  obtain  from  Prince 
Bismarck  ample  and  adequate  guarantees  that,  at  the  close 
of  the  conflict,  the  territory  of  Belgium  should  remain  intact 
as  before? 

"  You  will  see,  sir,  that  I  raise,  in  a  very  few  words,  an 
exceedingly  important  question.  It  is  for  the  English  peo- 
ple to  perpend  and  pronounce.  But  it  is  high  time  they 
reflected  on  it. 

"  I   am,  sir,  your  obedient  servant, 

"  DiPLOMATICUS." 

The  leading  article  refers  to  Its  correspondent  as 
one  "  who  speaks  with  high  authority,"  and  after 
setting  out  the  military  positions  of  France  and  Ger- 
many it  draws  the  following  conclusion: 

"  Would  the  violation  of  Belgian  territory,  whether  by 
Germany  or  France,  be  such  an  injury  to  our  honour  and 
such  a  blow  to  our  interests?  It  might  be  so  in  certain 
circumstances,  and  it  would  assuredly  be  so  if  it  involved 
a  permanent  violation  of  the  independence  of  Belgium. 
But,  as  '  Diplomaticus '  ingeniously  suggests,  there  is  all  the 
difference  in  the  world  between  the  momentary  use  of  a 
'  right  of  way,'  even  if  the  use  of  the  right  of  way  be  in  a 
sense  wrongful,  and  the  appropriation  of  the  ground  cov- 


WHOSE  OX  IS  GORED?  339 

ered  by  the  right  of  way.  We  trust  that  both  Germany  and 
France  would  refrain  even  from  this  minor  trespass.  But 
if  they  did  not?  If  one  or  other  were  to  say  to  England, 
'  All  the  military  approaches  to  France  and  Germany  have 
been  closed,  and  only  neutral  approaches  lie  open  to  us. 
This  state  of  things  is  not  only  detrimental  but  fatal  to  our 
military  success,  and  it  has  arisen  since  the  treaty  guaranteed 
the  sacredness  of  the  only  roads  of  which  we  can  now  avail 
ourselves.  We  will,  as  a  fact,  respect  the  independence  of 
Belgium,  and  we  will  give  you  the  most  solemn  and  binding 
guarantees  that  at  the  end  of  the  conflict  Belgium  shall  be 
as  free  and  independent  as  before,'  if  Germany  (and  of 
course  our  hypothesis  applies  also  to  France)  were  to  use 
this  language  —  though  we  trust  there  will  be  no  occasion 
for  it  —  we  cannot  doubt  what  would  be  the  wise  and 
proper  course  for  England  to  pursue,  and  what  would  be 
the  answer  of  the  English  Government.  England  does  not 
wish  to  shirk  its  true  responsibilities.  But  it  would  be 
madness  for  us  to  incur  or  to  assume  responsibilities  un- 
necessarily when  to  do  so  would  manifestly  involve  our  par- 
ticipation in  a  tremendous  war." 

That  was  the  ofHcIal  Conservative  opinion  in 
1887;  but  when,  in  19 14,  Germany  did  just  what  was 
suggested  by  "  Diplomaticus "  and  the  Standard, 
Liberal  statesmen  were  mortally  shocked,  and  ad- 
vised Belgium  to  decline  Germany's  proposal.  Must 
it  be  said  that  Belgium  strained  at  a  gnat  and  swal- 
lowed a  camel?  Of  course  her  diplomatic  honour 
is  intact,  though  little  else  seems  to  be  left  at  present. 
But  whose  opinion  will  guide  the  people  In  the  years 
to  come?  Whose  counsel  will  be  worth  heeding 
when  the  next  war  cloud  casts  its  gloom  ov-er  Eu- 
rope ?  Statesmen  and  "  leaders  of  thought  "  give  us 
no   hope.     Only  statesmen   and   diplomatists   could 


340     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

make  such  a  mess  of  affairs  as  we  see  now  in  Eu- 
rope. Certain  it  is,  if  the  people  had  had  control 
in  July  there  would  have  been  no  war. 

How  to  avert  another  such  cataclysm  is  the  ques- 
tion which  must  concern  us  now;  and,  so  that  we 
shall  know  what  steps  to  take  to  make  another  such 
war  improbable,  we  must  learn  the  whole  truth  of 
our  long  connection  with  international  militarism. 
We  cannot  crush  Germany,  we  cannot  destroy  Prus- 
sian militarism,  we  cannot  liberalize  Russia,  we  can- 
not make  the  Powers  disarm,  we  cannot  affect  the 
royal  and  republican  despotisms  of  the  Continent,  no 
matter  how  great  a  victory  we  achieve.  And  the 
greatest  victory  to  British  arms  will  serve  no  demo- 
cratic purpose  unless  the  British  people  now  firmly 
make  up  their  minds  to  set  their  own  house  in  order 
first.  That  is  a  matter  they  can  turn  their  attention 
to  without  waiting  for  the  war  to  end.  First  things 
first. 


\ 


CHAPTER  XV 

ON    BROTHERLY   TERMS 

I  THINK  I  could  turn  and  live  with  animals,  they  are  so  placid 

and  self-contain'd, 
I  stand  and  look  at  them  long  and  long. 
They  do  not  sweat  and  whine  about  their  condition, 
They  do  not  lie  awake  in  the  dark  and  weep  for  their  sins, 
They  do  not  make  me  sick  discussing  their  duty  to  God, 
Not  one  is  dissatisfied,  not  one  is  demented  with  the  mania 

of  owning  things, 
Not  one  kneels  to  another,  nor  to  his  kind  that  lived  thou- 
sands of  years  ago, 
Not  one  is  respectable  or  unhappy  over  the  whole  earth. 

—  Walt  Whitman. 

"  The  Devil  would  have  counselled  neutrality,  but 
Christ  has  put  His  sword  into  our  hand."  These 
words  were  spoken  by  Sir  W.  Robertson  NicoU  in 
calling  on  Mr.  Lloyd  George  to  address  a  large  gath- 
ering of  Nonconformists  in  London.  The  sentence 
has  a  familiar  ring  about  it.  Kaiser,  Czar,  and  Em- 
peror, have,  at  moments  during  this  war,  been  under 
the  same  delusion.  And  ever  since  the  first  war,  some 
warrior  or  medicine  man,  in  want  of  an  excuse,  has 
said  the  same  thing  of  his  deity  or  totem.  Yet, 
after  hundreds  and  hundreds  of  years  of  "  Christ 
putting  His  sword  into  our  hands,"  war  abates  not 
one  jot,  nor  do  the  nations  realize  that  "  all  they  that 
take  the  sword  shall  perish  with  the  sword." 

The  meeting  began  with  references  to  God  and 

341 


342     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

Christ,  but  before  Mr.  Lloyd  George  got  half  way 
through  his  speech  he  delivered  an  attack  on  the 
Beatitudes  as  if  they  were  tariff-reform  texts. 
*'  Now  there  are  men  who  maintain  that  war  is  not 
justifiable  under  any  conditions,"  he  said.  "  May  I 
just  say  one  or  two  words  about  that?  It  is  not  the 
creed,  as  your  chairman  reminded  us,  of  the  Puritan 
Fathers."  No  one  will  quarrel  with  that.  The 
speaker  was  quite  right;  it  was  not  the  creed  of  the 
Puritan  Fathers.  It  was  the  creed  of  Jesus.  But 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  went  further,  and  said,  "  I  main- 
tain it  is  not  the  principle  of  the  Christian  faith." 
Is  that  true  ?  Would  it  be  right  to  say  that  men  who 
maintain  that  war  is  not  justifiable  under  any  condi- 
tions are  not  Christians?  How  far  does  Mr.  Lloyd 
George's  reasoning  carry  us  in  that  direction?  How 
can  such  men  be  Christians?  Christians  not  only 
make  war,  whether  *'  justifiable  "  or  not,  but  this 
Christian  State  as  a  rule  spends  nearly  half  its  reve- 
nue on  the  weapons  of  war. 

When  Mr.  Lloyd  George  confessed  to  that  great 
gathering  of  Nonconformists  that  he,  "  never  read 
a  saying  of  the  Master's  which  would  condemn  a  man 
for  striking  a  blow  for  right,  justice,  or  the  protec- 
tion of  the  weak,"  he  revealed  a  peculiar  misconcep- 
tion of  the  Master's  teaching.  It  was  an  amazing 
confession  to  make,  but  he  is  a  man  of  great  courage, 
and  he  made  it.  Strange  as  it  may  appear,  the  Non- 
conformist audience  agreed,  for  the  newspaper  tells 
us  his  statement  was  greeted  with  "  Hear,  hear." 
The  revelations  may  explain  to  some  extent  why  there 
are  so  many  empty  pews  in  the  churches. 

What  particular  precept  the  Christian  faith  is 
based  upon  seems  to  depend  on  the  circumstances 


THE  TEACHINGS  OF  JESUS        343 

in  which  you  are  placed  when  it  is  convenient  to 
thinic  about  it.  Passive  resistance,  for  instance,  at  a 
time  like  this  would  be  party  folly.  When  it  is  a 
question  of  an  education  rate,  imposed  by  a  Con- 
servative Government,  then,  presumably,  the  creed 
of  the  Puritan  Fathers  must  not  be  applied.  The 
difficulties  of  the  argument  lie  in  attempting  to  apply 
a  precept  of  Jesus  to  a  political  party;  or,  what  for 
the  time  being  is  the  same  thing,  the  State.  It  al- 
ways has  been  difficult  to  make  the  precepts  of  Jesus 
meet  the  exigency  of  the  State.  His  precepts  were 
for  the  individual;  nations  and  states  concerned  him 
scarcely  at  all.  To  quote  from  a  chapter  in 
Matthew,  presumably  overlooked  by  Mr.  Lloyd 
George,  will  be  enough  to  prove  how  absurd  it  is 
to  attempt  to  apply  the  precepts  of  Jesus  to  the  State  : 

"  But  I  say  unto  you,  That  ye  resist  not  evil ;  but  whoso- 
ever shall  smite  thee  on  the  right  cheek,  turn  to  him  the 
other  also. 

"  Ye  have  heard  that  it  hath  been  said,  Thou  shalt  love 
thy  neighbour,  and  hate  thine  enemy. 

"  But  I  say  unto  you,  Love  your  enemies,  bless  them  that 
curse  you,  do  good  to  them  that  hate  you,  and  pray  for  them 
which  despitefuUy  use  you,  and  persecute  you: 

"  That  ye  may  be  the  children  of  your  Father  which  is 
in  heaven:  for  he  maketh  the  sun  to  rise  on  the  evil  and  on 
the  good,  and  sendeth  the  rain  on  the  just  and  on  the  unjust." 

Not  practicable?  Then  is  it  not  time  for  us  to 
leave  Jesus  out  of  our  party  speeches,  and  have  done 
with  cant?  What  prompted  Emerson  to  say,  "  God 
will  not  have  His  work  made  manifest  by  cowards  "  ? 
Perhaps  it  was  speeches  of  the  sort  delivered  at  the 
City  Temple.  For  if  the  precepts  of  Jesus  guided 
statesmen    and    the    Nonconformists,    the    meeting 


/^ 


44     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 


should  have  resolved  itself  into  prayer  for  all  who 
despitefully  used  them.  But  the  meeting  not  being 
convened  for  that  purpose,  such  a  suggestion  would 
have  been  most  inappropriate. 

"  O  ye  of  little  faith !  " 

Moreover,  is  there  in  these  days  any  faith  at  all 
in  the  precepts  of  Jesus?  Nationally,  none  what- 
ever. The  State  is  fast  absorbing  the  man;  and  that 
is  bad  for  Jesus.  It  is,  however,  a  pity  Mr.  Lloyd 
George,  when  he  was  discussing  with  the  Mohamme- 
dan gentleman  referred  to  in  his  speech,  did  not  bor- 
row a  copy  of  the  Koran  and  turn  to  the  17th  chap- 
ter, where  it  is  set  down,  "  Woe  be  unto  you,  for 
that  which  ye  impiously  utter  concerning  God!  since 
whoever  is  in  heaven  and  on  earth  is  subject  unto 
him."  But  the  Scriptures  have  troubled  many 
statesmen,  long  before  this  war  began.  Cromwell 
not  always  found  the  texts  fitting  In  with  his  actions; 
and,  no  doubt,  it  was  a  sore  point  with  him  that  Jesus 
was  so  persistently  literal.  Perhaps  the  same  diffi- 
culty presented  itself  to  Mr.  Lloyd  George.  He 
"  never  read  a  saying  of  the  Master's  which  would 
condemn  a  man  for  striking  a  blow  for  right,  justice, 
or  the  protection  of  the  weak."  That  may  be,  but 
it  is  not  the  point.  The  point  is,  he  never  read  a 
saying  of  the  Master's  that  counselled  him  to  strike 
a  blow  for  right,  justice,  or  the  protection  of  the 
weak.  Mr.  Lloyd  George  might  have  read,  "  Fear 
not  them  which  kill  the  body." 

So  long  as  men  give  an  Interpretation  of  Jesus 
which  fits  their  own  desires,  and  do  not  accept  his 
precepts  literally,  there  will  be  wars,  injustice,  wrong, 
and  weak  people.     The  way  to  end  all  the  misery, 


WHAT  BENEFIT  FROM  WAR?      345 

according  to  Jesus,  Is,  "  Seek  ye  first  the  Kingdom  of 
God,  and  His  Justice."  This  no  state  can  do.  It 
is  for  each  individual  to  seek  the  Kingdom;  and  he 
alone  can  seek  it,  no  one  can  seek  it  for  him.  Strik- 
ing blows  can  bring  no  relief;  blows  only  serve  to 
perpetuate  the  strife.  Surely  the  history  of  the 
world  proves  that.  What  did  all  the  blows  struck 
by  Israel  serve?  Why,  Jesus  scarcely  referred  to 
them.  Count  the  national  blows  struck  in  our  own 
land  since  we  came  from  Schleswig  to  Ebbsfleet,  or 
since  the  repulse  at  Abermenal,  and  what  have  all 
the  wars,  and  all  the  blows  struck  in  all  the  wars, 
done  for  mankind?  Think  of  the  wrong,  injustice, 
and  the  oppression,  practised  in  every  reign  since  Ag- 
ricola,  and  then  measure  how  much  nearer  we  are  to 
the  ideal.  Wars  breed  wars.  Blows  cause  anger, 
bitter  memories,  revanche.  After  two  thousand 
years  of  wars  in  every  clime  under  the  sun,  man  still 
suffers  all  the  afflictions  known  to  his  race  since 

"  Kaiumers 
Had  not  a  foe,  save  one,  a  hideous  demon." 

Some  one  has  said  history  does  not  repeat  itself; 
nevertheless,  the  histories  of  long  ago  present  op- 
pressions and  agitations,  injustices  and  wrongs,  wars 
and  settlements,  with  a  likeness  which  reminds  us 
strongly  of  those  we  see  now  in  Europe.  Any  one 
who  will  take  up  Thucydides  again,  and  read  through 
those  wonderful  pages,  will  lay  the  book  down  with 
the  sense  of  having  read  something  by  a  modern  au- 
thor recounting  twentieth  century  events ;  the  treaties, 
speeches,  and  wars  of  the  days  of  Alcibiades  seem 
not  to  have  been  so  long  ago.  Glance  at  an  old  map 
of  Greece,  and  the  Archipelego,  and  then  place  be- 


346     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

side  It  a  map  of  modern  Greece,  then  reflect  on  the 
causes  of  the  ancient  wars,  and  think  of  the  blows 
struck  for  right  and  justice!  "  Let  a  ruler  base  his 
government  upon  virtuous  principles,  and  he  will  be 
like  the  pole  star,  which  remains  steadfast  in  its  place, 
while  all  the  host  of  stars  turn  towards  it,"  was  said 
by  "  the  greatest  personage  of  the  largest  empire." 
Those  words  were  spoken  five  hundred  years  before 
the  birth  of  Jesus;  but  in  China  since  the  time  of 
Confucius  there  have  been  wars  enough  to  bring 
about  a  great  millennium,  if  all  the  blows  on  one 
side  were  really  struck  for  right  and  justice.  And 
what  have  all  the  wars  done  for  China?  Think  of 
the  tramping  feet  which  have  passed  across  this 
hemisphere  in  all  the  thousands  of  years,  and  count 
a  blow  for  every  soldier,  and  what  enduring  good  has 
been  done?  Count  a  tear  for  every  blow,  and  a 
drop  of  blood  for  every  soldier,  and  all  the  rivers 
of  blood  and  tears  have  not  washed  away  the  wrongs 
that  men  have  suffered  for. 

The  weapons  of  war  are  changed,  but  the  heart 
and  soul  of  men  and  women  remain  the  same  in  woe, 
and  pain,  and  longing  for  love  and  rest.  The  plaint 
of  long  ago  was  sung  in  the  same  sad  key  we  hear 
to-day.  The  soldier,  the  soldier's  wife,  and  the 
soldier's  child,  are  rewarded,  by  those  who  send  them 
all  their  misery,  not  much  better  than  they  were  in 
the  days  of  the  House  of  Chow.  The  ballads  of 
the  Shi-king  tell  us  that  much: 

"  Alone  the  russet  pear-tree  grows, 

With  fruit  upon  it  fair  to  see. 
Kings'  service  knows  not  speedy  close; 

Day  in,  day  out,  'tis  long  to  me. 
The  year  is  fast  receding,  O; 


"IS  THIS  CHRISTIANITY?"        347 

My  woman's  heart  is  bleeding,  O; 
My  soldier  rest  is  needing,  O." 

There  was,  however,  something  deeper,  something 
finer,  in  the  feeling  in  their  soldiers'  songs  than  we 
get  from  most  of  the  war  poets  of  these  days.  The 
yearning  for  a  higher  vocation  which  this  little  bal- 
lad throws  out  is  worthy  of  imitation : 

"What  plant  is  now  not  sallow? 

What  day  its  march  can  spare? 
What  mortal  but  must  toil  and  moil 

Here,  there,  and  everywhere? 

What  plant  is  now  not  sombre? 

What  mortal  undistraught? 
Poor  troopers,  we  alone  of  men 

Are  less  than  human  thought. 

Not  unicorns,  not  tigers, 

Why  haunt  we  the  wild  waste? 
Poor  troopers,  night  nor  morn  can  we 

The  sweets  of  leisure  taste. 

Leave  to  the  long-tailed  foxes 

To  haunt  the  sombre  grass. 
Along  the  king's  highway  should  we 

In  our  light  waggons  pass." 

It  was  weary  work  then  to  be  torn  from  the  high- 
way of  life,  and  toil  and  moil  In  the  service  of  dy- 
nasts who  were  "  served  by  the  field  "  but  digged  not 
In  It.  It  Is  weary  work  now,  and  dynasts  of  all  kinds 
seem  to  have  no  end.  Yes,  hope  of  wars  ending 
vanishes  when  one  reads  of  meetings  such  as  that 
held  at  the  City  Temple.  And  Nonconformity  will 
suffer  much,  for  men  will  say,  "  What  Is  there  then  in 


348     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

the  Idea  of  the  Fatherhood  of  God  and  the  Brother- 
hood of  Man?  "  Men  will  ask  themselves  whether 
a  religion  that  can  only  offer  war  such  as  that  now 
waged  on  the  Continent,  for  the  solution  of  wrongs 
and  oppressions,  is  a  religion  worth  maintaining  any 
longer. 

It  must  not  be  imagined  that  this  struggle  reflects 
the  true  mind  of  the  people.  It  should  be  remem- 
bered that  a  great  change  was  taking  place  in  the 
minds  of  workers  in  all  lands.  Great  bodies  of  men 
were  no  longer  content  to  let  politicians  do  all  their 
thinking  for  them;  they  were  reading  literature  un- 
known to  their  fathers.  Their  outlook  on  life  was 
changing,  and  some  fairer  vision  for  those  who  la- 
bour and  are  heavy  laden  was  touching  their  souls 
with  hope.  Now  the  lesson  of  this  awful  war,  with 
its  crushing  burden  of  taxation,  the  desolated  homes, 
will  eat  deeply  into  their  minds,  and  turn  them  — 
where?  Back  again  to  the  belief  in  the  Fatherhood 
of  God  and  the  Brotherhood  of  Man?  May  not 
many  turn  to  Swinburne  and  say  with  him: 

"  Though  before  Thee  the  throned  Cytharean 

Be  fallen,  and  hidden  her  head, 
Yet  thy  kingdom  shall  pass,  Galilean, 

Thy  dead  shall  go  down  to  the  dead." 

When  our  religious  and  political  leaders  bow  down 
before  the  god  of  battles,  and  approve  such  state- 
ments as  "  Christ  has  put  His  sword  into  our  hands," 
what  chance  is  there  for  the  Galilean?  None  what- 
ever. Why  hold  the  Kaiser  up  to  scorn  and  ridicule 
for  uttering  nonsense  about  the  vietix  Gott  boche,  as 
our  witty  French  reviewers  say?  The  chairman  of 
the    City   Temple   meeting  might   have   been    full- 


THE  SWORD  OF  THE  LORD        349 

blooded  about  it,  and  have  revived  the  spirit  of  1525. 
Thomas  Muntzer  put  it  this  way: 

"Arise!  Fight  the  battle  of  the  Lord!  On!  on!  on! 
Now  is  the  time;  the  wicked  tremble  when  they  hear  you. 
Be  pitiless!  Heed  not  the  groans  of  the  impious!  Rouse 
up  the  towns  and  villages.  Above  all  rouse  up  the  miners 
of  the  mountains.  On!  on!  on!  while  the  fire  is  burning! 
On,  while  the  hot  ground  is  yet  reeking  with  the  slaughter! 
Give  the  fire  no  time  to  go  out;  the  sword  no  time  to  cool. 
Kill  the  proud  ones;  while  one  of  them  lives  you  will  not 
be  free  from  the  fear  of  man!  While  they  reign  over  you 
it  is  no  use  to  talk  of  God." 

Thomas  Muntzer  called  himself  a  servant  of  God 
against  the  wicked.  Recite  the  proclamation  of 
Muntzer  to  a  Brotherhood  meeting  and  the  men 
would  scorn  to  accept  it  as  coming  from  a  man  who, 
at  any  time  since  Calvary,  called  himself  a  Christian. 
Yet  there  was  a  conflict  of  ideas  in  the  Middle  Ages, 
and  there  were  men  who  preferred  pestilence  to  war. 
Martin  Luther,   for  instance: 

"  War  is  one  of  the  greatest  plagues  that  can  afflict  hu- 
manity; it  destroys  religion,  it  destroys  states,  it  destroys 
families.  Any  scourge,  in  fact,  is  preferable  to  it.  Famine 
and  pestilence  become  as  nothing  in  comparison  with  it. 
Pestilence  is  the  least  evil  of  the  three,  and  'twas  therefore 
David  chose  it,  willing  rather  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  God 
than  into  those  of  pitiless  man." 

It  destroys  religion,  and  it  destroys  states.  W-^hat 
will  there  be  left  after  the  next  Treaty  of  Peace  is 
signed?  Perhaps  some  Winwood  Reade  will  come 
along,  and  tell  us  this  war  has  done  more  for  the 
progress  of  mankind  than  all  the  other  wars  lumped 
together.     Might   not   such   a   man   say,    this   war 


<> 


350     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

proves  beyond  all  else  that  Nietzsche  was  right  when 
he  said,  "  A  good  war  halloweth  every  cause,"  and 
that,  "The  only  Christian  died  on  the  cross?" 
What  if  another  Marx  should  rise  and  cry,  "  Work- 
ers of  Europe!  this  war  has  taught  you  what  can  be 
done  by  war.  Take  the  lesson  home  to  yourselves. 
Rise !  against  your  religious  and  political  dynasts. 
Only  the  devil  will  counsel  neutrality.  Christ  has  put 
His  sword  into  our  hands!"  A  syndicalist  more 
energetic  than  Sorel  might  appear  and  teach  the 
wealth-producers  the  efficacy  of  organized  force  to 
overthrow  organized  capital.  It  would  not  be  dif- 
ficult for  a  man  who  knows  something  of  the  history 
of  states,  to  present  evidence  which  would  impress 
men  and  women  who  have  toiled  and  moiled  to  get 
a  bit  of  a  home  together  from  the  savings  of  starva- 
tion wages,  that,  generation  after  generation  they 
in  the  main  provide  for  munitions  of  war,  and  give 
their  best  flesh  and  bone  to  the  Moloch  of  Nobel, 
Krupp,  Schneider,  and  Vickers,  to  win  justice  for 
states, —  without  any  State  ever  giving  a  passing 
thought  to  their  claim  to  individual  justice. 

What  contempt  could  be  poured  by  a  new  Lassalle 
on  the  catchwords  of  statesmen:  Prestige!  Balance 
of  Power!  Triple  Entente!  State  honour!  State  jus- 
tice! How  easily  he  would  convince  his  audience 
that  all  these  terms  are  the  gibberish  of  State  sor- 
cery: 

"  Adder's  fork,  and  blind-worm's  sting, 

Lizard's  leg,  and  owlet's  wing, 

For  a  charm  of  powerful  trouble; 

Like  a  hell-broth  boil  and  bubble." 

Suppose  it  were  shown  that,  since  the  revolution 
of  1689,  the  debt  of  this  country  incurred  by  wars, 


"LET  SATAN  HAVE  A  TRY"       351 

which  at  the  end  of  this  war  might  stand  at  not  far 
short  of  £2,500,000,000,  all  spent  in  upholding 
prestige,  honour,  and  justice,  had  not  brought  jus- 
tice to  a  single  individual;  would  not  the  workers  be- 
gin to  think  it  high  time  for  Government  to  shape  its 
policy  along  the  less  expensive  lines  of  peace,  and 
give  its  undivided  attention  to  removing  all  the  in- 
justice and  misery  which  afflict  the  people  In  times  of 
good  trade.  In  times  of  bad  trade,  in  times  of  war, 
and  In  times  of  peace?  This  war  we  are  told  will 
win  for  the  oppressed  of  Russia  the  freedom  they 
have  dreamed  of  ever  since  a  Romanoff  ruled  over 
the  Slav  race;  that  is  to  be  one  of  the  blessings  of 
the  war.  But  no  one  has  predicted  freedom  from 
economic  slavery  for  the  workers  of  Britain.  The 
menace  of  Prussian  militarism  is  to  be  driven  away 
from  France;  but  no  statesman  here  says  the  menace 
of  privilege  is  to  be  driven  away  from  the  homes  of 
our  people.  We  are  to  wipe  out  the  stain  of  Prus- 
sian cruelty  in  Belgium;  but  when  shall  we  wipe  out 
the  stain  of  British  landlordism?  Blood  in  gallons, 
and  money  in  millions,  must  be  spent  in  protecting 
the  rights  of  small  nations;  but  Government  makes 
no  suggestion  for  safeguarding  the  rights  of  English- 
men. Any  cause  but  that  of  man!  Any  duty  but 
the  nearest !  Might  not  some  new  Vogt  or  Biichner, 
in  regarding  the  ruins  of  the  Christian  era,  say, 
"  Well,  If  this  is  the  best  the  faith  of  the  Puritan  Fa- 
thers can  do  for  mankind,  let  Satan  have  a  try." 

The  Christianity  of  1866  and  1870  produced  the 
Biichners  and  the  Vogts.  And  what  did  they  desire 
for  their  fellows?  Freedom!  They  saw  what  they 
thought  to  be  the  failure  of  Christianity  to  bring  hap- 
piness and  abundance  to  those  who  produce.     May 


352     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

not  the  latter-day  Vogts  be  saying,  "  If  this  chaos  of 
bloodshed,  poverty,  and  grime,  Is  all  that  Christian 
civilization  after  two  thousand  years  of  endeavour 
can  do,  then  let  us  not  only  dismantle  Rheims,  but 
demolish  every  architectural  and  rubrical  device  that 
ever  symbolized  the  Cross!"  How  deep  the 
thought  of  German  humanists  sunk  into  the  minds 
of  British  workingmen,  during  that  period  when  our 
socialists  of  the  Marxian  school  were  introduced  to 
the  writings  of  Continental  atheists,  only  those  who 
have  closely  watched  these  tendencies  can  say.  It 
may,  however,  be  safely  imputed  that  speeches  such 
as  those  delivered  by  Sir  W.  Robertson  Nicoll  and 
Mr.  Lloyd  George,  have  done  more  to  turn  thou- 
sands of  workers  to  the  writings  of  men  like  Vogt, 
with  their  biting  sarcasm,  than  all  the  persuasive  elo- 
quence of  the  Ingersolls  and  Bradlaughs. 

"  Theism  or  belief  in  a  personal  God  leads,  as  all  history 
clearly  shows,  to  Monarchism  and  priestly  rule;  Pantheism 
or  belief  in  an  all-pervading  God  leads,  where  it  is  in  the 
ascendency,  to  contempt  of  the  senses,  denial  of  the  Ego,  to 
absorption  in  God,  and  to  a  state  of  stagnation.  Atheism 
or  Philosophical  Monism  alone  leads  to  freedom,  to  intelli- 
gence, to  progress,  to  due  recognition  of  man  —  in  a  word, 
to  Humanism." 

Biichner  has  his  thousands  of  adherents  In  our  land 
to-day.  And  what  has  the  creed  of  our  Puritan  Fa- 
thers done  to  offer  a  just  alternative  to  Humanism? 
Will  this  war  help  the  descendants  of  the  Puritan 
Fathers  to  stem  the  rising  tide  of  atheistical  culture 
and  the  desire  for  a  Marxian  revolution?  Has 
Christianity,  as  the  pound-a-week  man  sees  It,  pointed 
to  freedom,  to  Intelligence,  to  due  recognition  of 


AN  INSPIRING  VISION  353 

man?  Will  the  worship  of  the  god  of  battles  woo 
men  to  the  precepts  of  the  Galilean?  Not  likely. 
Never  has  war  drawn  a  single  soul  to  the  cause  of 
Jesus. 

"  'Tis  time  new  hopes  should  animate  the  world,  new  light 
Should  dawn  from  new  revealings  to  a  race 
Weighed  down  so  long,  forgotten  so  long." 

What  new  hope  of  justice  has  Christianity  given 
to  the  race  weighed  down  so  long?  A  new  hope 
was  born  at  Nazareth,  but  ever  since  that  time  Chris- 
tianity has  seemed  to  do  everything  in  Its  power  to 
prevent  that  hope  touching  the  soul  of  men.  It  was 
a  new  hope:  "  Your  heavenly  Father  l<:noweth  that 
ye  have  need  of  all  these  things."  No  one  ever 
gave  to  the  race  of  man  so  great  a  hope  as  that.  An 
All-Father  who  knoweth  the  needs  of  all  His  chil- 
dren, is  the  biggest  conception  of  God  ever  presented 
to  man.  From  It,  justice  to  all  His  creatures  flows 
spontaneously.  It  Is  without  limit  of  race,  colour, 
or  creed.  It  Is  fundamental,  universal,  and  eternal. 
What  has  been  done  by  Christianity  to  make  that 
conception  a  real  basis  for  existence?  No  Christian 
should  dare  scoff  at  atheistic  or  humanistic  aspiration 
until  he  can  translate  the  Galilean's  conception  of 
God  into  a  leading  to  freedom.  Intelligence,  progress, 
and  due  recognition  of  man.  The  tendency  to  God 
indicated  by  Browning  in  Paracelsus,  Is  what  man  is 
yearning  to  understand : 

"  But  in  completed  man  begins  anew 
A  tendency  to  God. 

I  never  fashioned  out  a  fancied  good 
Distinct  from  man's:  a  service  to  be  done, 


354     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

A  glory  to  be  ministered  unto 

With  powers  put  forth  at  man's  expense,  withdrawn 

From  labouring  in  his  behalf;  a  strength 

Denied  that  might  avail  him.     I  cared  not 

Lest  his  success  ran  counter  to  success 

Elsewhere;  for  God  is  glorified  in  man." 

We  have  time  day  after  day  to  recount  the  hor- 
rors of  war's  excesses,  the  atrocities  of  German  sol- 
diers, the  starvation  of  whole  provinces,  the  terrible 
plight  of  refugees;  the  world  is  appalled  at  the  ava- 
lanche of  woe.  No  one  remains  neutral;  waves  of 
universal  sympathy  reach  higher  and  higher;  from  all 
parts  of  the  globe  willing  hands  send  food,  raiment, 
and  money  to  procure  shelter  for  the  stricken.  But 
who  remains  neutral  in  the  fight  against  poverty, 
drink,  and  the  myriad  atrocities  of  our  economic 
system  which  are  perpetrated  year  in  and  year  out 
and  seldom  rouse  the  affluent  out  of  their  pernicious 
apathy?  What  devil  has  counselled  the  neutrality 
of  the  churches,  and  held  them  from  turning  the 
whole  of  their  attention  to  a  solution  of  economic 
problems?  When  will  Christ  put  His  sword  into 
the  hands  of  all  the  clergy  to  exterminate  poverty? 
Without  searching  the  police-court  news,  or  taking 
the  trouble  to  consult  the  police-courts,  any  one  who 
has  lived  in  any  street  of  any  British  town  could  write 
a  story  of  atrocities  that  would  satisfy  the  cravings 
for  horror  of  any  number  of  folk  who  now  revel  in 
the  exertions  of  Britain  to  chastise  the  Huns  in  Bel- 
gium. 

Last  night  in  the  street  below,  two  women  fought 
like  tigers,  while  a  large  crowd  swayed  and  twisted 
about  their  drunken  brawl.  They  were  young 
women  living  in  a  street  not  far  from  the  Abbey, 


"  CRUSH  PRUSSIANISM  "  355 

and  not  more  than  one  hundred  yards   from  the 
Houses    of    ParHament.     They    rolled    about    the 
muddy  street,  and  the  traffic  was  stopped  while  they 
clawed  and  smashed  each  other.     The   on-lookers 
were   in  many   respects   more   interesting   than   the 
combatants:  old  women,  half  stupified  with  drink; 
little  children,  in  rags;  blear-eyed  men,  just  tumbled 
out  of  the  pub  near  by;  and,  besides,  a  motley  lot  of 
decent-looking    people    from    the    flats    and    houses 
who   had   run   out  on   hearing  the   screams   of  the 
women  and  the  shouts  of  their  neighbours.     No  one 
seemed  to  care  to  interfere  save  one  or  two  inti- 
mates,   themselves    drunk    and    quarrelsome.     The 
language  of  the  denizens,  yelling  at  new-comers  the 
story  of  the  row,  was  vile;  the  comment  passed  on 
the  histories  of  the  brawlers  was  shockingly  Rabe- 
laisian.    When  the  women  tusselled  out  of  the  road, 
into  the  gutter,  and  then,  with  their  breast-coverings 
in  rags,  on  to  the  sidewalk,  one  bus-driver  cried  to 
another,    "What   about   the    Prussian   Hun,    eh?" 
Then  a  policeman  came  upon  the  scene,  and  after 
much  difficulty  dragged  the  women  off  to  Rochester 
Row.     A  clergyman  who  watched  the  small  crowd 
following  the  women  and  the  constable  pass  into  the 
gloom,  was  heard  to  say,  "  Terrible  neighbourhood 
this;   not  nearly  enough  policemen   on   the  beat!" 
And  yet  war  never  revealed  an  atrocity  like  Tufton 
Street;  but  the  marvel  of  it  is,  not  that  it  is  so  bad, 
rather  that  it  is  so  good.      It  is  a  mystery  how  in- 
dustrious, decent  men  and  women,  can  be  born  and 
bred  in  that  place,  but  they  are;  not  many,  still  a  few 
rise  out  of  it  with  a  desire  for  a  fuller,  sweeter  ex- 
istence. 

"  War  destroys  religion,"  Luther  said.     Yes,  but 


356     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

how  often  have  the  devotees  themselves  been  to 
blame  for  the  destruction  of  their  religion?  All 
the  religions  known  from  Katmandu  to  TIanahuaco 
that  have  lost  their  influence,  have  suffered  because 
the  simple  original  Idea  has  been  smothered  in  the 
embellishments  and  rituals  of  their  priests.  Would 
it  be  nearer  the  truth  to  say,  more  religions  have  been 
destroyed  by  priests  than  by  wars?  Who  can  say? 
Burnouf?  Anyway,  this  must  be  admitted:  priests 
have  never  been  satisfied  with  the  founder's  original 
idea.  It  has  been  pointed  out  that  wherever  a  re- 
ligion is  practised  to-day,  the  closer  it  has  remained 
to  the  original  idea,  the  larger  and  more  devout  the 
number  of  its  adherents.  This  cannot  be  wholly  a 
matter  of  geography  and  population,  for  "  Chris- 
tianity has  penetrated  to  the  uttermost  corners  of 
the  globe." 

"  I  do  not  find  your  Jesus  in  your  Christianity," 
said  a  Chinese  scholar  in  a  lecture  on  religion;  "  in- 
deed you  scarcely  ever  mention  his  name."  Was  the 
rebuke  merited?  What  are  we  afraid  of?  Here, 
in  a  paper  read  by  thousands  of  better-class  artizans, 
are  letters  to  the  editor.  One  correspondent  says, 
*'  There  is  nothing  unique  or  even  really  new  about 
this  so-called  Christian  doctrine.  Socrates  pro- 
pounded it  four  hundred  and  odd  years  B.C."  Thou- 
s^ands  of  well-meaning  people  have  the  same  notion; 
they  never  get  beyond  the  Idea  that  Jesus  was  a 
very  respectable  plagiarist.  How  often  In  speaking 
to  gatherings  of  men,  on  religious  and  economic  sub- 
jects, have  the  questions  taken  this  line:  "  Why  fol- 
low Jesus,  when  every  religion  has  had  Its  Jesus,  and 
religion  does  nothing  to  alter  the  lot  of  the  poor?  " 
or  this :  "  Wouldn't  you  advise  working  men  to  fol- 


EXTEMPORE  SOCIALISM  357 

low  Tolstoy  rather  than  Jesus  who  knew  nothing  of 
modern  conditions  of  industrialism?"  Then  think 
of  the  yearning  which  prompted  this:  "  Isn't  Kropot- 
kin  more  practical  for  a  pound-a-week  man  than 
Jesus?  "  These  are  only  some  of  the  most  reason- 
able questions  remembered  in  a  long  period  of  lec- 
turing. Millions  want  to  know  what  Jesus  means  to 
man.  The  thousands  who  tramp  day  after  day, 
year  after  year,  to  the  mills,  factories,  shops,  and 
offices,  of  our  great  towns,  want  to  know  if  there  is 
a  better  system,  one  that  will  put  an  end  to  the  awful 
war  of  toil  and  moil,  and  leave  man  to  wage  the  only 
battle  the  Creator  intended  his  creatures  to  wage, 
the  battle  against  nature.  Who  will  explain  the 
true  Jesus  to  these  men?  Who  will  show  them  the 
plan,  the  system,  the  order  of  existence  which  he  said 
the  All-Father  meant  for  His  children?  It  cannot 
be  done  during  a  war,  but  when  the  Treaty  of  Peace 
is  signed  will  the  churches,  editors  of  rehgious  papers, 
statesmen,  and  "  leaders  of  thought,"  lapse  again 
into  the  same  old  weary  business  of  hiding  Jesus 
behind  a  mask  of  superstition  and  cover  Him  with 
the  canonicals  of  an  archbishop?  Society  will  need 
a  new  basis  when  this  war  is  over.  Each  day  tend- 
encies are  shaping  into  efforts.  Already  the  Gov- 
ernment works  along  the  very  socialistic  lines  it 
poured  contempt  upon  a  few  years  ago.  Reversion 
is  the  dominant  note  of  the  period.  Swift  some 
teachers  have  been  to  point  the  moral  of  the  change 
to  many  artizans.  Statesmen  go  whither  the  cur- 
rents take  them.  Mr.  Blatchford  says,  "  If  the 
lives  of  all  the  citizens  belong  to  the  nation  the 
property  of  all  the  citizens  belongs  to  the  nation." 
Will  Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  Sir  W.  Robertson  Nicoll 


358     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

accept  that  doctrine?  Will  the  author  of  The  New 
Theology  accept  it?  In  a  hundred  ways  every  week 
the  Government  is  driven  along  the  very  path  it  once 
told  the  electors  to  avoid.  Amazing  revolution 
without  agitation !  What  is  the  great  force  behind 
the  Government  to-day,  rushing  it  into  channels  it 
abhorred  only  seven  years  ago?  The  exigencies 
of  an  Armageddon?  The  nation  fighting  for  its  ex- 
istence? Whatever  the  cause  of  it,  more  lessons  in 
the  workableness  of  the  proposals  of  British  social- 
ists have  been  given  by  this  Government,  since  the 
end  of  July,  than  can  be  found  in  all  the  literature 
of  Socialism  from  Saint-Simon  down  to  Belfort  Bax. 
The  circumstances  demand  it?  Yes,  but  it  may  be 
argued,  what  is  good  for  the  nation  in  war-time  is 
also  good  for  the  individuals  that  comprise  the  na- 
tion when  peace  is  proclaimed.  What  reply  is  to  be 
made  to  that?  Mr.  Blatchford  says,  *'  To  claim  the 
blood  of  our  young  male  citizens  and  to  exempt  the 
money  of  non-combatants  is  to  demand  that  one 
section  of  the  people  shall  sacrifice  themselves  to  pre- 
serve the  wealth  and  comfort  of  another  section." 
Why  Mr.  Blatchford  should  imagine  that  this  is  to 
be  particularly  applied  to  this  war  is  strange;  for 
what  else  was  the  upshot  of  any  war,  during  the  past 
century?  Were  not  all  recent  wars  fought  by  the 
many  to  protect  the  privileges  of  the  few?  No  mat- 
ter how  many  splendid  men  of  the  privileged  class 
are  giving  their  lives  away  in  Europe,  the  great  mass 
of  the  soldiers  of  Britain  are  too  poor  to  be  citizens. 
Mr.  Blatchford  says: 

"  I   hope  the  workers  will   refuse  to  be  duped   by   fine 
phrases  and  vague  promises.     I  hope  they  will  compel  right 


TWO  VIEWS  OF  JUSTICE  359 

honourable  gentlemen  to  grant  and  make  legal  the  full  scale 
of  separation  allowance  and  pension  before  they  enlist." 

If  all  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George  claims  this  war  will 
do  for  the  British  nation  is  not  utter  nonsense  and 
sham,  then  Mr.  Blatchford  asks  not  for  much.  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  said: 

"  Cannot  Britain,  fighting  one  of  the  most  chivalrous 
battles  the  world  has  ever  seen,  rely  on  her  children  to  rally 
to  the  flag?  That  is  the  appeal  I  make  to  the  young  men 
of  the  Nonconformist  churches.  .  .  .  Through  it  all  I  think 
I  can  see  the  hand  of  justice,  more  surely  and  gradual,  con- 
sciously but  certainly  gripping  the  victory." 

A  fine  vision !  But  if  after  all  the  wonderful  sac- 
rifice the  hand  of  labour  should  find  that  it  has  only 
gripped  again  the  sombre  standard  of  poverty,  what 
then?  Mr.  Blatchford  sees  something  else  away  on 
the  horizon  where  the  dawn  of  peace  must  come : 

"  This  is  a  great  opportunity  for  the  trade  unions  and 
for  the  workers.  There  are  plenty  of  men  for  the  army, 
and  there  is  plenty  of  money  to  deal  justly  with  the  men 
who  go  to  fight.  If  the  people  insist  upon  justice  this  war 
will  have  done  more  than  anything  else  in  our  time  to  help 
the  realization  of  a  free  and  sane  Socialism  in  this  country." 

So  both  Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  Mr.  Blatchford 
are  after  justice;  but  when  they  meet  after  the  war 
to  discuss  the  settlement  for  the  workers  of  Britain, 
it  will  be  found  that  their  definitions  of  justice  are 
poles  apart.  Then  the  big  struggle  may  begin! 
Right  honourable  gentlemen  may  quote  Mr.  Asquith: 

"  The  great  loss  of  counterbalancing  all  the  apparent 
gains  of  a  reconstruction  of  society  upon  what  are  called 
socialistic  lines  will  be  that  liberty  will  be  slowly  but  surely 


36o     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

starved  to  death,  and  that  with  a  superficial  equality  of 
fortunes  and  conditions,  even  if  that  could  be  attained,  we 
should  have  the  most  sterilizing  despotism  that  the  world 
has  ever  seen." 

That  statement  will  not  suit  Mr.  Blatchford;  not 
by  any  means.  "  If  the  people  will  only  insist  upon 
justice,"  the  one  says;  the  other  will  say,  "  What  is 
justice?"  Who  then  will  determine  that  question? 
No  statesman  has  laid  down  an  acceptable  definition 
of  justice.  The  Prime  Minister  was  conscious  seven 
years  ago  that  the  State  had  not  even  approached 
the  ideal  of  justice.  He  described  the  position  in 
these  words : 

"  Any  one  who  looks  around  with  unprejudiced  eyes  at 
the  structure  of  society  as  it  actually  is,  and  realizes,  not 
only  the  enormous  disparities  in  the  distribution  of  material 
comfort  and  happiness,  but  the  still  more  striking  discrep- 
ancies between  opportunity  on  the  one  side  and  talent  and 
character  on  the  other,  will  not  only  find  it  difficult  to 
reconcile  what  he  sees  with  even  the  rudest  standard  of 
ideal  justice,  but  will  be  tempted  to  be  amazed  at  the  pa- 
tience, even  the  inertness,  with  which  the  mass  of  mankind 
acquiesce  in  what  they  deem  to  be  their  lot.  No  wonder 
that  constant  contemplation  of  and  reflection  upon  such  a 
spectacle  has  driven  and  continues  to  drive  some  of  the  best 
and  finest  spirits  of  our  race  into  moral  and  intellectual 
revolt." 

The  moral  and  intellectual  revolt  of  the  past  will 
be  a  mere  gust  in  comparison  with  the  whirlwind  com- 
ing, if  something  practical  is  not  done  very  soon  after 
the  close  of  this  war.  It  is  not  fair,  not  honest  in- 
deed, to  ask  men  to  lay  down  their  lives  for  national 
justice  unless  you  are  determined  to  give  those  who 
live  individual  justice.     The  pound-a-week  justice  to 


WILL  LEGISLATORS  ACT?  361 

soldiers  and  sailors  and  their  wives  and  children  is 
not  justice;  it  is  only  the  merest  business-like  expedi- 
ent for  national  safety.  Justice  is  something  else. 
What  did  Mr.  Asquith  imagine  "  the  rudest  standard 
for  ideal  justice  "  to  be  when  he  spoke  at  Ladybank 
in  1907  ?  No  one  knows.  Mr.  Asquith  has  not  put 
on  record  his  definition  of  justice.  Before  we  are 
overtaken  by  "  the  most  sterilizing  despotism  that 
the  world  has  ever  seen,"  statesmen  must  find  a  defi- 
nition of  justice  which  will  be  compatible  with  the 
precepts  of  the  founder  of  what  is  called  the  Chris- 
tian faith;  or  else  both  state  and  religion  may  go 
down  mingling  with  the  debris  of  war. 

How  speedily  we  are  plunged  into  this  calamity. 
Who  in  June,  19 14,  believed  we  should  be  calling  for 
millions  of  men  to  enter  the  titanic  struggle?  A 
member  of  the  Government  on  Sunday,  August  2nd, 
said,  "  No  one  will  ever  make  me  believe  we  are 
going  to  war."  Up  to  the  last  moment  it  was  diffi- 
cult to  make  some  men  believe  we  were  In  it.  The 
time  was  short,  but  shorter  notice  may  be  given  some 
day  when  an  exasperated  people  decide  "  to  take 
what  Government  will  not  give."  When  that  cry 
so  long  struggling  in  the  throats  of  patient,  inert,  ac- 
quiescent labour  is  at  last  heard  in  the  land,  when 
the  shout  for  justice  goes  up  from  an  enlightened 
people,  will  the  political  parties  gather  with  the 
unanimity  which  amazed  the  world  when  war  was  de- 
clared on  Germany?  Will  legislators  unite  to  grant 
labour's  demand?  or  unite  to  deny  them  the  justice 
they  deserve?  Deserve!  the  justice  which  is  theirs 
by  right;  by  right,  or  Christendom  is  a  sham,  and  the 
Devil  has  counselled  cabinet  and  church  to  remain 
neutral  to  destroy  them.     The  time  Is  fast  coming 


362     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

when  they  must  choose.  What  must  they  choose? 
Sociahsm  or  Individuahsm?  The  former  we  know, 
the  latter  has  never  had  a  chance;  Christianity,  so- 
called,  killed  it.  Socialism  aims  at  equality.  Indi- 
vidualism at  equal  rights.  Herein  lies  the  colossal 
misconception  of  the  ages;  even  Nietzsche  in  Be- 
yond Good  and  Evil,  throwing  his  javelin  at  the  blun- 
ders of  philosophers  and  religionists,  is  guilty  of 
fundamental  error  in  mistaking  equality  for  equal 
rights. 

Mr.  Blatchford  writes  of  a  "  free  and  sane  Social- 
ism," but  the  brand  to  be  fought  for  may  be  the 
socialism  which  will  ask  that  the  "  property  of  all 
citizens  belongs  to  the  nation."  After  the  steps 
taken  by  the  Government  in  the  direction  of  Social- 
ism the  "  great  opportunity  "  will  not  be  frittered 
away  by  asking  for  homeopathic  doses.  How  far 
are  we  now  away  from  state  control  of  all  the  means 
of  production,  distribution,  and  exchange?  Flint 
says  Socialism,  "  denies  to  the  individual  any  rights 
independent  of  Society  and  assigns  to  Society  author- 
ity to  do  whatever  it  deems  for  its  own  good  with 
the  persons,  faculties,  and  possessions  of  individu- 
als." 

It  will  be  the  socialism  of  Mr.  Sidney  Webb,  if  it 
be  anything  at  all: 

"  The  first  step  must  be  to  rid  our  minds  of  the  idea  that 
there  are  any  such  things  in  social  matters  as  abstract 
rights." 

How  far  that  will  go  beyond  the  "  free  and  sane  " 
socialism  of  Mr.  Blatchford,  may  be  guessed  by  those 
who  have  watched  the  experiments  of  the  Govern- 
ment.    But  how  will  Mr,  Webb's  idea  fit  in  with  the 


THE  PURITAN  IDEAL  363 

creed  of  the  Puritan  Fathers?  Green  tells  us  that 
the  aim  of  the  Puritan  had  been  to  set  up  a  visible 
Kingdom  of  God  upon  earth,  and  that  they  regarded 
the  State  primarily  as  an  instrument  for  securing,  by 
moral  and  religious  influences,  the  social  and  political 
ends  of  the  Kingdom.  This  they  failed  to  bring 
about,  and  it  was  one  of  the  bitterest  disappoint- 
ments of  Cromwell's  declining  years  that  Puritanism 
had  missed  its  great  opportunity.  Think  of  a 
twentieth-century  Puritan  rising  in  the  House  of 
Commons  and  saying: 

"  I  well  remember  I  did  a  little  touch  upon  the  Eighty- 
fifth  Psalm  when  I  spake  unto  you  in  the  beginning  of  this 
Parliament.  Which  expresseth  well  what  we  may  say,  as 
truly  as  it  was  said  of  old  by  the  Penman  of  that  Psalm! 
The  first  verse  is  an  acknowledgment  to  God  that  '  He  had 
been  favourable  unto  His  land,'  and  '  brought  back  the  cap- 
tivity of  His  people  ' ;  and  then  how  that  '  He  had  pardoned 
all  their  iniquities  and  covered  all  their  sin,  and  taken 
away  all  His  wrath';  and  indeed  of  all  these  unspeakable 
mercies,  blessings,  and  deliverances  out  of  captivity,  pardon- 
ing of  national  sins  and  national  iniquities.  Pardoning,  as 
God  pardoneth  the  man  He  justifieth!  .  .  .  And  sometimes 
God  pardoneth  Nations  also!  .  .  .  He  hath  given  you 
strength  to  do  what  you  have  done!  And  if  God  should 
bless  you  in  this  work,  and  make  this  meeting  happy  on  this 
account,  you  shall  all  be  called  the  Blessed  of  the  Lord. 
The  generations  to  come  will  bless  us.  You  shall  be  the 
*  repairers  of  breaches,  and  the  restorers  of  paths  to  dwell 
in  ' !  And  if  there  be  any  higher  work  which  mortals  can 
attain  unto  in  the  world,  beyond  this,  I  acknowledge  my 
ignorance  of  it." 

The  Eighty-fifth  Psalm  and  the  fifty-eighth  chapter 
of  Isaiah.  What  a  strange  place  —  the  House  of 
Commons !  for  Hebrew  poetry. 


364     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

"  Mercy  and  truth  are  met  together ;  righteousness  and 
peace  have  kissed  each  other. 

"Truth  shall  spring  out  of  the  earth;  and  righteousness 
shall  look  down  from  heaven. 

"  Yea,  the  Lord  shall  give  that  w^hich  is  good ;  and  our 
land  shall  yield  her  increase." 

Strange  sentiments  these  for  St.  Stephen's.  May 
our  modern  Cromwells,  when  they  gather  at  the 
Meeting  to  Celebrate  the  Peace,  say,  "  legislators 
cannot  attain  to  any  higher  work  than  repairing  the 
breach  and  restoring  paths  to  dwell  in  "  ?  Will  they 
say,  to  quote  another  passage  from  the  same  chapter 
which  inspired  the  old  Puritan  Father : 

"  Is  not  this  the  fast  that  I  have  chosen?  To  loose  the 
bands  of  wickedness,  to  undo  the  heavy  burdens,  and  to  let 
the  oppressed  go  free,  and  that  ye  break  every  yoke?  " 

Will  our  legislators  succeed  where  Cromwell 
failed?  Cromwell,  if  things  had  gone  right  with 
him,  meant  justice.     Isaiah  meant  justice. 

"  Render  therefore  unto  Caesar  the  things  which  are 
Caesar's;  and  unto  God  the  things  that  are  God's." 

That  is  the  fundamental  of  Justice  which  Jesus 
gave  to  the  world.  Cromwell's  time  was  all  too 
short  to  make  a  vast  change.  How  short  will  the 
time  be  after  this  war,  when  the  next  great  oppor- 
tunity comes!  Will  it  be  gripped  this  time?  Or 
shall  some  Milton  years  hence  write : 

"  O  shame  to  men !  devil  with  devil  damned 
Firm  concord  holds,  men  only  disagree 
Of  creatures  rational,  though  under  hope 
Of  heavenly  grace;  and,  God  proclaiming  peace, 
Yet  live  in  hatred,  enmity,  and  strife 


DAVID,  ISAIAH,  JESUS  365 

Among  themselves,  and  levy  cruel  wars, 
Wasting  the  earth,  each  other  to  destroy; 
As  if  (which  might  induce  us  to  accord) 
Man  had  not  hellish  foes  enow  besides 
That  day  and  night  for  his  destruction  wait." 


CHAPTER  XVI 

AFTERMATH 

"These  are  the  things  that  ye  shall  do:  speak  ye  every 
man  the  truth  to  his  neighbour;  execute  the  judgment  of 
truth  and  peace  in  your  gates:" 

—  Zechariah. 

It  is  difficult  now  to  make  the  people  of  Britain 
and  America  understand  we  did  not  declare  war 
against  Germany  because  her  methods  of  warfare 
are  not  conducted  according  to  the  Hague  rules; 
neither  did  Britain  declare  war  on  Germany  because 
Louvain,  Malines,  and  Dinant  have  been  destroyed, 
and  the  Belgian  people  have  had  almost  every  kind 
of  atrocity  inflicted  upon  them.  It  is,  however, 
vitally  necessary  that  the  public  mind  should  be 
brought  back  now  to  an  appreciation  of  the  true 
position  of  European  affairs  as  they  were  before 
August  3rd,  19 14  —  If  the  people  are  to  take  any 
effective  part  In  peace  negotiations.  Statesmen  may 
find  it  convenient  to  fill  their  minds  with  all  that  is 
now  taking  place  on  the  battlefields,  to  the  exclusion 
of  what  really  happened  before  August,  19 14,  and 
what  the  position  of  essential  Interest  to  the  people 
will  be  when  the  war  is  over.  Governments  will 
look  after  their  own  Interests;  but  with  people  it  is 
different,  for  no  Government  will  do  anything  really 
worth  while  for  them  unless  they  keep  clearly  in  view 

all  those  factors  which  have  caused  so  much  suffer- 

366 


REAL  REASONS  AND  ISSUES       367 

ing  and  death,  and  firmly  decide  to  rid  themselves 
of  pernicious  systems  which  foment  wars. 

Let  there  be  no  mistake  this  time.  In  the  past 
certain  officials  and  writers  strove  during  wars  to 
make  people  forget  the  issues  which  made  wars;  the 
reasons  given  to  the  public  for  entering  on  war  were 
seldom  the  real  reasons;  usually  the  real  reasons 
never  reached  the  mind  of  the  general  public. 
Hence  the  ease  with  which  Governments  launch  na- 
tions into  wars.  It  is  all  very  proper  to  express  in- 
dignation at  ruthless  acts  inflicted  on  defenceless 
persons  and  towns;  but  it  would  be  most  unwise  to 
forget  the  issues  which  brought  about  the  strife. 
Real  sympathy  with  the  victims  in  all  countries  now 
suffering  from  the  ravages  of  war  must  extend  so  far 
as  to  make  a  recurrence  of  these  horrors  improbable. 
It  is  only  to  be  expected  that  men  and  women  of  re- 
finement should  be  deeply  incensed  at  the  destruction 
of  Rheims  Cathedral;  but  that  the  act  should  blot 
out  of  mind  the  events  which  brought  the  war  about 
is  a  poor  service  to  art  and  humanity. 

To  those  who  cannot  understand  why  certain  peo- 
ple should  be  horrified  at  the  burning  of  the  Louvain 
library,  the  ruination  of  beautiful  buildings,  and  not 
be  just  as  deeply  shocked  at  the  loss  or  mutilation  of 
a  soldier.  It  must  be  pointed  out  that  it  Is  the  custom 
of  the  world  to  regard  the  body  and  soul  of  a  man 
as  something  inferior  in  value  to  a  rare  volume  or  a 
grand  cathedral.  There  is  nothing  so  cheap  as 
human  life.  It  is  the  popular  notion  that  men  are 
easily  replaced;  and  so  long  as  men  permit  certain 
sections  of  their  fellows  to  think  they  are  cheap,  not 
worth  the  interest  bestowed  on  a  building  or  a  book, 
the  world  will  have  little  rest  from  war,  and  only 


368     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

very  few  men  will  ever  have  the  chance  of  learning 
how  to  appreciate  the  architecture  of  their  own  coun- 
try, or  why  the  art  of  Elzevir  should  be  revered. 

The  people  must  think  clearly  this  time.  They 
can  very  well  conduct  the  business  of  war  imposed  by 
the  Government,  and  at  the  same  time  keep  in  mind 
every  circumstance,  political,  social,  diplomatic,  mili- 
tary, and  naval,  which  forced  us  into  the  conflict. 
Whether  we  suffer  defeat  on  land  or  sea,  whether  we 
gain  great  victories,  we  all  must  decide  resolutely 
not  to  let  any  event  turn  us  aside  from  the  great 
work  of  protecting  future  generations  from  the  evil 
which  present  systems  have  wrought.  The  greatest 
triumph  will  be  won  in  vain  if  we  forget  our  duty  to 
the  children  of  the  future.  To  every  man  who  sac- 
rifices his  life  in  this  struggle,  the  people  owe,  not 
monuments  In  stone,  but  a  certain  escape  for  those 
who  live  after  him  from  all  the  secret  systems,  arma- 
ment rings,  and  economic  wrongs  which  compelled 
his  sacrifice. 

War  Is  so  awful,  so  terrible,  that  some  men  are 
driven  to  excuse  it  by  saying  It  Is  a  biological  neces- 
sity;  they  can  account  for  its  consequences  in  no  other 
way.  But  no  war  kills  so  many  men  as  there  are 
children  killed  year  after  year  by  involuntary  pov- 
erty. Poverty  thrusts  all  the  travail  of  war  Into 
millions  of  homes  at  all  times.  Poverty  Is  with  us 
so  much,  however,  that  we  have  become  used  to  it. 
War,  on  the  other  hand,  being  an  intermittent  effect, 
catches  our  attention.  It  takes  possession  of  our 
thought  and  sways  us  with  a  force  not  compatible 
with  reason.  It  assails  the  mind  and  will  not  let  It 
dwell  long  on  anything  else.  War  Is  arrogant.  Im- 
perious, and  vindictive :  It  will  push  all  thoughts  not 


PATRIOTISM  369 

of  It  aside,  It  will  rule  over  the  mind,  It  hits  back 
if  you  try  to  drive  it  out. 

During  a  war  It  Is  no  easy  task  to  prevent  your 
sympathy  clouding  your  reason.  The  whole  social 
system  seems  to  be  organized  against  any  individual 
attempt  to  concentrate  the  attention  dominantly  upon 
the  causes  of  the  war.  Governments,  churches, 
theatres,  the  press,  and  local  authorities,  direct  their 
efforts,  In  the  main,  warwards ;  the  whole  thought 
of  society  and  commerce  seems  to  be  occupied  with 
war;  and  all  desire  to  question  the  reasons  given 
by  statesmen  for  participating  in  the  war  must  be 
suppressed.  It  has  been  ruled  already  by  certain 
"  leaders  of  thought  "  that  it  Is  unwise,  unpatriotic, 
and  un-English,  to  suspect  the  motives  of  Govern- 
ments, or  waver  for  a  moment  In  swearing  whole- 
hearted allegiance  to  the  authorities:  you  must  think 
only  of  the  war.  If  you  dare  ask  for  the  truth, 
you  are  helping  the  enemy;  If  you  suggest  an  early 
peace,  you  are  hindering  the  militarists  who  desire 
no  peace  until  their  enemy  is  utterly  crushed.  In- 
sidious, bewildering,  and  plausible,  are  the  reasons 
given  by  statesmen  and  journalists  for  inflicting  a 
humiliating  defeat;  without  it,  they  tell  us  we  must 
not  hope  for  disarmament.  No  patriot  Is  supposed 
to  ask  If  disarmament  Is  at  all  probable.  No  one 
must  ask  If  a  single  statesman  really  believes  such  a 
blessing  will  follow  If  the  enemy  be  annihilated.  But 
Is  It  believable?  What  does  disarmament  mean? 
Does  it  mean  that  all  arsenals  and  depots  will  be 
scrapped,  that  all  yards  and  ordnance  works  will  be 
closed,  that  all  ships  of  war  will  be  dismantled,  that 
all  naval  and  military  weapons,  plant  and  ammuni- 
tion will  be  destroyed,  and  that  all  soldiers  and  sail- 


370     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

ors  will  be  dismissed?  Impossible  !  of  course  I  One 
has  only  to  think,  of  all  the  commercial  and  economic 
consequences  of  disarmament,  to  realize  how  utterly 
wicked  it  is  for  any  one  to  lead  people  to  believe  they 
intend  to  bring  any  such  change  about.  Besides,  we 
have  our  Essens,  we  have  our  Krupps,  we  have  our 
war-party,  we  have  our  Jingo  press;  and  if  only  a 
reduction  of  expenditure  on  armaments  is  to  take 
place,  it  must  be  Britain  that  must  lead  the  way. 

An  American  writer  says,  "  nothing  less  than  total 
disarmament  will  satisfy  the  people."  Has  that 
writer  asked  himself  these  questions:  "  Will  Russia 
disarm?  Will  France  disarm?  Again,  what  power 
will  Britain,  after  she  disarms,  have  of  making  Ger- 
many, after  she  is  crushed,  not  follow  the  example 
of  France  in  the  'seventies?  How  long  after  1870 
was  France  content  to  remain  quiet?  There  is  this, 
too,  to  be  considered:  Are  the  men  who  conducted 
the  negotiations  before  the  war  to  be  the  makers  of 
peace  terms?  Will  the  old  heads  serve  for  radically 
new  ideas?  After  the  war  it  is  quite  probable  there 
will  be  greater  Governmental  reasons  for  building  up 
massive  armaments  than  ever  before.  One  has  only 
to  think  of  the  position  in  Central  Europe  if  Ger- 
many be  utterly  crushed.  Will  she  be  satisfied  to  let 
Russia  become  the  greatest  Power  in  Europe?  Will 
Britain,  within  ten  years,  be  satisfied  with  Russia  as 
the  dominant  Power?  What  military  and  naval 
strength  will  Britain  require  to  insist  on  nearly  80,- 
000,000  of  the  Teutonic  race  in  Europe  remaining 
quiet?  If  in  a  comparatively  few  years  France  could 
rise  again  out  of  the  dust  of  1870,  to  be  a  Power 
great  enough  to  seek  alliances  with  Britain  and  Rus- 
sia, surely  any  one  with  a  grain  of  sense  must  realize 


SOME  PRACTICAL  PROPOSALS      371 

what  Germany  will  do  in  a  far  shorter  space  of  time. 
It  is  not  meet  that  statesmen  should  be  expected  to 
perform  miracles  of  that  nature.  Let  us  then  have 
done  with  the  silly  notion  that  a  crushing  defeat  of 
Germany  will  mean  disarmament. 

It  will,  however,  be  possible  to  reduce  to  some 
extent  expenditure  on  our  army  and  navy  if  we  insist 
on  radical  changes  talcing  place  in  our  Foreign  Office 
system.  In  the  first  place,  the  people  must  make  the 
Government  amenable  in  every  particular  to  Parlia- 
ment. Legislation  must  be  enacted  that  all  terri- 
torial acquisition,  treaties,  alliances,  ententes,  un- 
derstandings, all  negotiations  with  foreign  Powers, 
shall  be  submitted  to  the  House  for  ratification. 
There  must  be  no  more  secrecy,  no  more  Foreign 
Office  strategy,  no  more  "  Commander  of  the 
Forces,"  and  no  more  Cabinet  rule.  Parliament, 
and  Parliament  only,  must  be  responsible,  primarily 
and  finally,  for  all  affairs  affecting  the  lives  of  the 
people. 

Then  in  connection  with  the  navy  and  army,  all 
orders  for  all  material  must  in  detail  be  submitted  by 
the  experts  to  a  Parliamentary  Committee  made  up 
from  all  sections  of  thought  in  the  House;  and  esti- 
mates must  be  tendered,  as  was  done  recently  in 
America,  so  that  there  will  be  competition  strong 
enough  to  break  all  rings.  It  Is  also  necessary  to 
make  the  Minister  for  War  and  the  First  Lord  of  the 
Admiralty  the  servants  of  Parliament,  and  deliver 
them  out  of  the  hands  of  the  experts.  Democratiza- 
tion of  all  the  services  must  follow  these  changes. 
Some  reduction  in  armaments  might  then  be  made; 
but  let  it  not  be  imagined  that  these  changes  will  be 
sufficient  to  preclude  the  probability  of  war.     They 


372     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

will  only  give  the  people  a  chance  to  know  what 
is  taking  place,  and,  perhaps,  let  them  have  more 
time  to  think  before  they  engage  in  war.  No  more 
can  truthfully  be  said  in  their  favour. 

Another  important  change  might  be  made  with  ad- 
vantage to  the  people.  There  should  be  a  fixed 
period  for  a  Parliament,  so  that  all  members  may 
vote  fearlessly  at  all  times.  It  is  a  debasing  system 
which  influences  a  member  to  vote  for  legislation  or 
supply  which  he  dislikes,  solely  to  keep  a  Government 
in  office  to  carry  measures  he  does  like.  There  is 
not  proper  freedom  for  members  who,  in  the  main, 
support  the  Government;  and  if  the  people  are  to  be 
truly  represented,  if  the  opinion  of  the  House  is  to 
be  accurately  expressed,  members  must  be  free  to 
vote  as  they  conscientiously  desire,  without  fear  of 
losing  some  measure  on  which  they  have  set  their 
hearts. 

But  the  problems  of  armaments  and  war  are  not  to 
be  solved  by  merely  making  changes  such  as  are 
suggested  above.  These  problems  lie  deep,  away 
down  at  the  base  of  the  social  system;  and  they  must 
be  considered  in  relation  to  the  composition  of 
armies  and  navies  in  times  of  peace.  Big  battalions 
and  great  crews  mean  that  soldiers  and  sailors  have 
no  better  way  of  facing  the  struggle  for  existence. 
Grant  all  the  exceptions,  admit  all  the  attractions, 
concede  all  that  military  and  naval  writers  say  about 
courage  and  patriotism;  still,  the  economic  character 
of  the  problem  cannot  be  explained  away.  And  it 
does  not  matter  whether  the  name  of  the  system 
be  voluntary  or  compulsory,  compulsion  is  the  driv- 
ing force  which  gives  Governments  armies  and 
navies;  without  it  in  times  of  peace  comparatively 


GOOD  TIMES  AND  BAD  373 

few  men  would  enlist.  It  is  compulsion  of  a  vital 
kind  that  lies  at  the  back  of  the  problem;  with  the 
rank  and  file  indeed,  choice  scarcely  ever  enters  in. 
Choice  denotes  freedom  to  decide,  liberty  of  action, 
an  alternative.  As  was  said  by  a  soldier  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  only  a  little  while  ago,  "  Re- 
cruiting is  good  when  trade  is  bad."  Yes,  it  is 
hunger,  lack  of  a  home,  of  decent  clothes,  of  means 
of  keeping  clean,  which  are  the  chief  reasons  for  men 
joining  the  ranks.  Who  has  watched  recruiting  sta- 
tions at  different  seasons,  in  times  of  prosperity,  and 
in  times  of  depression,  and  not  seen  how  powerful  are 
the  needs  of  men  in  affecting  the  work  of  recruiting 
sergeants?  When  trade  is  booming,  only  a  weedy, 
wizened  lot  of  wretched  youths  are,  as  a  rule,  to  be 
seen  reading  the  posters,  or  chatting  with  the  men 
with  the  "  ribbons  and  the  cane."  But  when  depres- 
sion sets  In,  quite  another  type  of  man  Is  seen  about 
the  stations;  fellows  out  of  work,  hungry,  homeless 
labourers,  sometimes  artlzans  seeking  the  army  or 
navy  as  a  refuge,  not  with  zeal,  but  with  reluctance. 
To  those  who  Imagine  there  are  numbers  of  ad- 
venturous spirits  who  prefer  life  in  armies  and  navies 
to  the  monotony  of  a  factory  or  a  farm,  it  should  be 
pointed  out  that  generations  of  workers  under  un- 
favourable conditions  must  have  had  a  great  effect 
on  many  youths  who  see  no  better  prospect  in  life 
than  their  forebears  had ;  and  it  is  not  to  be  wondered 
they  seek  relief  in  other  directions.  But  if  it  were 
possible  to  make  young  men  understand  that  the  land 
of  their  birth  was  in  fact  their  heritage,  that  the 
gifts  of  God  were  theirs  to  enjoy  equally  with  their 
fellows,  they  would  prefer  a  life  of  production  and 
usefulness  rather  than  the  discipline  of  the  barracks 


374     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

and  the  tyranny  of  the  drum.  Uncertainty  of  work, 
low  real  wage,  high  prices  and  rent,  all  tend  to  cloud 
the  prospect  for  young  men.  Even  in  seaports,  wise 
old  men  tell  the  economic  tale  of  how  the  navy  is 
easily  recruited.  There  is  no  alternative,  they  say; 
sharp  young  chaps  look  for  something  more  exciting 
than  a  shop  or  a  mill  or  a  farm,  with  little  or  no 
chance  to  rise. 

It  is  opportunity  that  is  required  for  the  mass  of 
men  —  equal  opportunity  for  all,  indeed  —  if  the 
problems  of  armaments  and  war  are  to  be  solved. 
There  is  no  other  way  !  Arbitration  will  not  prevent 
the  nations  arming,  and  Mr.  Bryan's  notable  expedi- 
ent, of  a  year's  consideration  will  in  no  way  alter  the 
economic  system,  nor  limit  the  growth  of  armies  and 
navies.  It  is  justice  that  is  wanted,  if  men  are  to  live 
in  peace. 

Citizens  who  desire  peace  can  indulge  in  no 
greater  folly  than  that  which  is  summed  up  in  the 
phrase,  "  the  best  way  to  preserve  peace  is  to  pre- 
pare for  war."  That  rotten  expedient  has  been 
shattered  completely.  The  position  of  the  nations 
warring  in  Europe  proves  conclusively  that  no 
amount  of  "  preparedness  "  can  stem  the  rush  of 
militarists  once  they  get  out  of  hand.  Nothing 
could  stop  Russia  and  France,  who  over  a  period  of 
years  spent  over  £100,000,000  more  on  their  armies 
than  the  central  Empires.  The  "  armed  peace  "  of 
Europe,  during  the  thirty-seven  years  before  the  war 
began,  cost  her  peoples  £22,200,000,000;  £22,200,- 
000,000  for  "insurance";  that  is,  £600,000,000  a 
year.  The  two  countries  whose  estimates  in  the  year 
1 9 14  were  largest  for  military  and  naval  "  prepared- 
ness "  were  the  very  countries  to  be  invaded  and 


"VICISTI,  GALILiEEI"  375 

great  areas  of  their  territory  laid  waste.  These 
countries,  France  and  Russia,  estimated,  in  round  fig- 
ures, for  an  expenditure  of  at  least  £165,000,000  on 
army  and  navy,  while  Germany  and  Austria  estimated 
for  £122,000,000  for  both  services.  Add  Britain's 
estimates  to  those  of  France  and  Russia  and  let  those 
who  still  believe  in  "  preparedness  "  understand  that, 
round  figures,  the  Triple  Entente  estimated  in  19 14 
to  spend  the  enormous  sum  of  £123,000,000  more  on 
"  preparedness  "  than  Germany  and  Austria.  (Italy 
was  not  counted  in  the  Triple  Alliance  by  Bernhardi, 
when  he  wrote  his  book,  Germany  and  the  Next 
War.) 

The  pacifist  has  triumphed:  armaments  create 
wars,  and  militarism  is  at  all  times  inimical  to  the 
real  interests  of  the  people.  This  war  seems  to  be 
a  great  subconscious  protest  against  territorial  ag- 
grandizement, bureaucratic  tyranny,  governmental 
privilege,  imperial  dogmatism,  and  gross  com- 
mercialism. It  is,  in  a  vague  strange  way,  a 
challenge  against  a  discredited  Christianity.  While 
society  can  build  up  armaments,  pauperize  the 
poor,  "  bind  heavy  burdens  and  grievous  to  be  borne 
and  lay  them  on  men's  shoulders,"  "  shut  up  the 
kingdom  of  heaven  against  men,"  "  devour  widows' 
houses,"  and  "  strain  at  a  gnat  and  swallow  a  camel," 
Christianity  has  not  done  Its  work.  The  record  is  ex- 
tant: territorial  aggrandisement  violates  the  first  law 
of  the  Creator,  by  Caesar  taking  what  belongs  to 
God;  bureaucratic  tyranny  forces  the  people  to  sup- 
port Governments  in  maintaining  that  system;  gov- 
ernmental privilege  Is  the  power  which  keeps  people 
in  subjection  through  iniquitous  taxation  and  other 
restrictive    laws;    imperial    dogmatism    asserts    the 


376     HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  WAR 

colossal  lie,  that  the  State  is  the  people;  and  com- 
mercialism keeps  on  as  an  industrial  system,  thriving 
on  cruel  land  laws  which  force  labour  to  compete 
for  jobs  and  thus  lower  wages  to  subsistence-level; 
making  life  for  the  toilers  a  ceaseless  grind  in  murk 
and  stench,  stunting  the  life  of  the  young,  filling  the 
aged  with  sorrow,  and  driving  our  sisters  into  the 
sweat-shops  and  the  brothels  of  our  towns. 

This  war,  begun  by  diplomatists  and  militarists, 
has  made  the  peoples  of  Europe  conscious  of  all 
these  dreadful  evils;  in  no  other  way  can  the  seem- 
ing unanimity  of  all  the  forces  fighting  in  all  the 
stricken  countries  be  explained.  Each  people,  now 
the  war  is  in  progress,  is  actuated  subconsciously  by 
the  notion  that  the  end  of  the  war  will  bring  the 
freedom  that  will  raise  them  up  out  of  the  sloughs 
of  the  past.  The  vision  of  the  men  in  the  trenches 
is  one  of  peace  and  disarmament;  but  whether  the 
close  of  the  strife  will  open  an  era  of  an  unarmed 
enduring  peace  is  a  question  which  will  depend  en- 
tirely on  the  people  themselves.  Governments  have 
made  the  war;  only  the  peoples  can  make  an  un- 
armed peace. 


THE   END 


APPENDIX 

An  article  appeared  in  The  Labour  Leader  in 
February,  19 15,  which  contained  the  following 
article  and  notes  taken  from  the  Pall  Mall  Gazette 
of  February  4th  and  5th,  1887.  ^^  that  time  Mr. 
W.  T.  Stead  was  the  editor  of  the  paper. 

England  and  Belgium. 

Are  we  bound  to  intervene  ? 
There  is  no  guarantee. 

The  Standard  this  morning  gives  special  promi- 
nence to  a  letter  signed  "  Diplomaticus  "  on  the  neu- 
trality of  Belgium.  It  also  devotes  its  first  leading 
article  to  the  subject.  The  gist  of  these  utterances 
may  be  summed  up  in  two  propositions:  ( i)  Eng- 
land is  under  a  treaty  of  obligation  to  defend  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium;  (2)  But  circumstances  have 
altered  since  the  contraction  of  the  said  obligation, 
and  as  against  Germany,  at  any  rate,  England  must 
pocket  its  pledges,  and  allow  France  to  be  invaded 
through  Belgium  without  protesting  or  interfering. 

Considerable  importance  is  likely  to  be  attributed 
to  these  conclusions  abroad  owing  to  its  being  under- 
stood that  The  Standard  is  at  present  the  Govern- 
mental Salisburian  organ.  Each  of  the  propositions 
laid  down  by  our  contemporary  is,  it  will  be  seen, 
likely  to  be  taken  hold  of.     Germany  might  read  the 

277 


378  Appendix 

second  as  an  invitation  to  invade  France  through 
Belgium;  France  might  read  the  first  as  an  admission 
of  our  obligation  to  prevent,  or  rather  to  punish, 
such  an  infringement  of  neutral  territory,  if  we 
dared. 

It  becomes  important,  therefore,  to  point  out  that 
The  Standard's  argument  rests  on  a  false  assumption. 
We  do  not  for  the  present  argue  whether  in  the  con- 
tingencies contemplated  it  would  be  England's  inter- 
est to  intervene  by  declaring  war  against  whichever 
belligerent  might  violate  the  neutrality  of  Belgium; 
we  confine  ourselves  to  the  preliminary  statement  es- 
sential for  clearing  up  the  case  —  that  it  is  not  Eng- 
land's obligation  to  do  so. 

The  origin  of  the  mistaken  views  prevailing  on  the 
question  is  undoubtedly  a  confusion  between  the  Spe- 
cial Treaty  of  1831  and  1839  which  it  temporarily 
superseded.  By  the  treaty  of  1870  the  obligation  of 
England  was,  of  course,  clear  and  specific.  Here  is 
the  pledge  which  was  given  in  the  identical  treaties 
concluded  mutatis  mutandis  with  both  France  and 
Prussia  : 

"  Her  Majesty  the  Queen  of  the  United  Kingdom  of 
Great  Britain  and  Ireland  declares  that  if  during  the  said 
hostilities  the  armies  of  France  (or  Prussia)  should  violate 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  she  will  be  prepared  to  co-operate 
with  his  Prussian  Majesty  (or  the  Emperor  of  the  French) 
for  the  defence  of  the  same  in  such  a  manner  as  may  be 
mutually  agreed  upon,  employing  for  that  purpose  her  naval 
and  military  forces  to  ensure  its  observance." 

There  could  be  no  doubt  about  that  pledge;  but 
then  it  expired  twelve  months  after  the  conclusion  of 
peace.  At  the  expiration  of  that  period,  so  the 
treaty  continued: 


Appendix  379 

"  The  independence  and  neutrality  of  Belgium  will,  so 
far  as  the  High  Contracting  Parties  are  respectively  con- 
cerned, continue  to  rest  as  heretofore  on  the  first  article  of 
the  Quintuple  Treaty  of  the  19th  of  April,  1839." 

Now,  what  some  people  do  is  to  read  this  treaty  of 
1839  by  the  light  of  the  more  specific  treaty  of  1870, 
and  to  deduce  from  the  former  the  same  obligation 
on  the  part  of  England  to  intervene  against  any  in- 
fringement of  Belgium's  neutrality  as  was  contained 
in  the  1870  treaty. 

This,  however,  is  a  completely  untenable  proceed- 
ing. The  treaty  of  1839  must  stand  on  its  own  legs, 
and  these,  it  will  be  seen,  are  by  no  means  very 
strong.  The  following  are  the  terms  of  its  second 
article : 

"  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Austria,  King  of  Hungary 
and  Bohemia,  His  Majesty  the  King  of  the  French,  Her 
Majesty  the  Queen  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain 
and  Ireland,  His  Majesty  the  King  of  Prussia,  and  His 
Majesty  the  Emperor  of  all  the  Russias,  declare  that  the 
articles  hereby  annexed  to  the  treaty  concluded  this  day  be- 
tween His  Majesty  the  King  of  the  Belgians  and  His  Maj- 
esty the  King  of  the  Netherlands,  Grand  Duke  of  Luxem- 
bourg, are  considered  as  having  the  same  force  and  value  as 
if  they  were  textually  inserted  in  the  present  act,  and  that 
they  are  thus  placed  under  the  guarantee  of  their  Majesties." 

Here,  then,  we  are  sent  off  from  the  treaty  between 
the  Great  Powers  to  the  treaty  between  Belgium  and 
the  Netherlands.  The  seventh  article  of  this  treaty 
(which  is  identical  with  the  same  article  of  the  1831 
treaty)  runs: 

"  Belgium  will  form,  within  the  limits  indicated  in  i,  2 
and  4,  an  independent  and  perpetually  neutral  State.  She 
will  be  bound  to  observe  this  same  neutrality  toward  all 
other  States." 


380  Appendix 

In  this  treaty  it  will  be  seen  there  is  nothing  about 
any  guarantee;  all  that  can  be  elicited  from  it,  and 
from  the  one  cited  as  referring  to  it,  is  this,  that  this 
clause  is  placed  under  the  guarantee  of  "  their  said 
Majesties,"  that  is,  England,  Austria,  France,  Ger- 
many and  Russia. 

But  that  is  not  all.  This  constructive  guarantee 
must  be  considered  in  relation  to  the  party  to  whom 
it  was  given  —  namely  to  the  Netherlands.  For  the 
treaty  of  1839  was  one  between  the  five  Powers  on 
the  one  hand  and  the  Netherlands  on  the  other;  and 
what  the  five  Powers  did  was  to  guarantee  to  the 
Netherlands  the  treaty  contracted  between  it  and 
Belgium,  one  clause  of  which  treaty  said  that  Bel- 
gium should  form,  "  an  independent  and  perpetually 
neutral  State  "  and  should  "  be  bound  to  observe  such 
neutrality  toward  all  other  States," 

In  the  treaty  of  1 83 1 ,  it  is  true,  there  was  a  further 
article  guaranteeing  the  execution  of  all  preceding 
articles  (Including,  therefore,  the  one  just  cited  in 
similar  terms  from  the  1839  treaty)  to  the  King  of 
the  Belgians,  but  in  the  1839  treaty,  on  which  the 
Independence  of  Belgium  Is  now  said  to  rest,  Lord 
Palmerston  omitted  any  such  guarantee. 

There  Is,  therefore,  no  English  guarantee  to  Bel- 
gium. It  is  possible,  perhaps,  to  "  construct  "  such 
a  guarantee;  but  the  case  may  be  summed  up  as  fol- 
lows: (i)  England  Is  under  no  guarantee  what- 
ever except  such  as  Is  common  to  Austria,  France, 
Russia,  and  Germany;  (2)  that  guarantee  Is  not 
specifically  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  at  all;  and 
(3)   Is  given  not  to  Belgium  but  to  the  Netherlands. 


Appendix  381 


OCCASIONAL    NOTES 

The  attempt  of  the  Morning  Post  to  prove  that 
this  country  is  under  a  guarantee  to  Belgium  to  de- 
fend its  neutrahty  is  highly  unsuccessful.  "  The 
treaty  of  the  15th  of  November,  1831,"  it  says,  "  was 
cancelled  by  treaties  of  the  19th  of  April,  1839,  but 
the  provisions  regarding  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
remained  intact."  This,  as  we  pointed  out  yester- 
day, is  not  the  case.  The  treaty  of  1831  was  with 
Belgium,  and  the  execution  of  its  articles  (including 
one  which  provided  for  the  neutrality  of  Belgium) 
was  guaranteed  to  the  King  of  the  Belgians.  But  in 
the  treaty  of  1839,  though  the  article  asserting  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium  remains,  the  guarantee  disap- 
pears. It  is  the  more  surprising  that  the  Morning 
Post  should  be  at  such  pains  to  prove  that  there  is 
still  a  guarantee,  since  the  only  action  it  would  in  any 
case  recommend  being  taken  on  it  is  a  platonic  pro- 
test. To  construe  a  non-existent  guarantee  in  order 
to  have  the  privilege  of  uttering  an  unavailing  pro- 
test is  surely  the  very  superfluity  of  futility. 

But  the  line  taken  by  the  Morning  Post  is  perhaps 
not  quite  so  absurd  as  that  which  The  Standard  yes- 
terday suggested,  and  a  correspondent  repeats  this 
morning.  We  are  to  construct  the  guarantee  and  are 
then  to  declare  our  obligation  to  defend  the  neutral- 
ity of  Belgium  against  all  comers.  But  when  any 
particular  comer  infringes  that  neutrality  we  are  to 
grant  him  a  special  dispensation.  The  Standard 
and  Its  correspondent  speak  only  of  giving  this  dis- 
pensation to  Germany;  what  Is  to  be  allowed  to  Ger- 
many could  not  be  denied  to  France.  Our  defence 
of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  would  thus  be  never 
to-day  but  always  every  other  day;  It  would  be  as- 


382  Appendix 

serted  against  any  one  in  general,  but  withdrawn 
against  any  one  in  particular.  With  such  absurdi- 
ties staring  them  in  the  face,  it  is  surprising  that  our 
contemporaries  do  not  take  the  trouble  to  ascertain 
that  the  guarantee  which  they  are  so  ingeniously  but 
unheroically  whittling  down  does  not  in  fact  exist 
at  all. 


The  Spectator,  February  5,  1887.  ..  .  The 
general  idea  is  that  England  will  be  kept  out  of  this 
war.  .  .  .  That  she  will  try  to  do  so  we  do  not 
doubt,  but  there  is  the  Belgian  difficulty  ahead.  Our 
guarantee  for  her  is  not  a  solitary  one,  and  would 
not  bind  us  to  fight  alone :  but  there  are  general  Inter- 
ests to  be  considered.  The  probability  is  that  we 
shall  Insist  on  her  not  becoming  a  theatre  of  war  but 
shall  not  bar  —  as  Indeed  we  cannot  bar  —  the  trav- 
ersing of  her  soil. 


HOW  DIPLOMATS  MAKE  .WAR 

BY    FRANCIS    NEILSON 
COMMENTS       ON       THE      FIRST      EDITION 

NEW  YORK  times: 

"  The  volume  is  written  with  much  facility  of  expression  and  a 
large  fund  of  materials.  In  diplomatic  matters  it  attacks  the  faults 
of  the  ruling  class  in  Great  Britain  in  much  the  same  way  as  '  I 
Accuse!  '  attacked  those  of  the  corresponding  class  in  Germany." 

THE   BOSTON   HERALD: 

"  The  real  emphasis  of  the  book  is  on  the  direful  effects  of  war  on 
the  common  people  —  on  the  men  who  go  forth  from  their  Drum- 
drudge  villages  to  slay  and  be  slain  at  command,  and  on  the  kind  of 
society  that  survives  after  every  war  to  see  its  civilization  thrust 
back  for  a  century  and  the  solution  of  its  urgent  economic  problems 
thrust  far  forward  into  the  future." 

THE  DIAL   (Chicago)  : 

"  A  book  which  many  of  its  readers  will  feel  has  appeared  at  the 
moment  when  it  was  most  required.  Amidst  the  high  pressure  of 
emotionalism  in  which  sane  judgments  are  at  a  premium,  and  strong 
opinions  on  one  side  or  another  are  regarded  as  inevitable,  it  is  well 
to  be  reminded  that  quarrels  between  nations,  as  between  individuals, 
are  usually  due  to  'faults  on  both  sides.'" 

THE  nation: 

"  He  writes  with  a  bitter  pen  but  has  a  large  historical  sweep  and 
much  knowledge.  ...  As  to  one  of  the  chief  positions  of  the  volume, 
no  American  will  have  any  quarrel  with  the  writer  of  this  book.  It 
is  that  no  treaties,  forms  of  international  alliance,  or  agreements 
with  other  nations  ought  to  be  entered  into  until  they  have  been  sub- 
mitted to  the   representatives  of  the  people   in  Parliament." 

REVIEW   OF    REVIEWS: 

"  It  is  a  terrific  indictment  of  the  diplomatic  game  as  played  by 
all  the  great  European  governments.  It  shows  how  dangerous  is  the 
survival  of  a  diplomacy  that  is  not  only  removed  from  contact  with 
public  opinion,  but  is  even  beyond  the  knowledge  and  reach  of  the 
people's  representatives  in  Parliament." 

the  public  (Chicago) : 

"  It  is  a  stirring  story  of  the  rotten  result  of  a  sinister,  lying, 
bluffing  diplomacy  that  despoiled  the  Continent.  And  the  final  chap- 
ter, that  makes  a  tremendous  appeal  for  frankness  and  true  democ- 
racy, is  a  notable  one." 

PUBLISHED  BY  B.  W.  HUEBSCH,  NEW  YORK 


s  n 

n     : 


THE  LIBRARY 
UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 

Santa  Barbara 


THIS  BOOK  IS  DUE  ON  THE  LAST  DATE 
STAMPED  BELOW. 


Series  9482 


I 


UC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 


AA      000  336  277    9 


